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Abstract 
This research looks at how Abkhazia’s political elites and foreign policy decision-
makers in Russia, the EU, and the US, which engage with Abkhazia, interpret 
non-recognition and how this interpretation influences the formulation and 
implementation of their respective foreign policy objectives and strategies. 
Although there is an emerging literature on engagement this has tended to 
analyse it as a one-way interaction, while this research represents the first multi-
sided account of foreign policy interaction of a de facto state. It focuses on a 
single case study of Abkhazia between October 1999 and November 2014. 
Non-recognition has largely been taken a priori as a negative constraining factor. 
The great majority of scholarship on de facto states takes non-recognition for 
granted and views it in substantive rather than in relational terms. Focusing on 
meaning and interpretation of non-recognition by elites in de facto states as well 
as decision-makers in the patron state and other significant engagers, allows for 
a better understanding of the interactions between de facto states and other 
actors in the international community.  
The research proceeds from a constructivist theoretical framework, claiming that 
non-recognition is ultimately what states (including de facto states) make of it. To 
capture both domestic and external dimensions, the concepts of ontological 
security and geopolitical role, respectively, are introduced. Methodologically, the 
data was gathered through process tracing and semi-structured elite interviews 
with policy elites and decision makers in Sukhum/i,1 Tbilisi, Brussels, Moscow, 
and Washington D.C. The main finding of this research is that the internal 
situation in the de facto state and wider geopolitical considerations influence 
interpretations of non-recognition (by both recognised actors as well as the de 
facto state itself), which in turn shape interaction between de facto states and 
other actors.  
                                            
1 Bearing in mind that place names are subject to a political dispute between Abkhazians (who 
use Sukhum, Gal and Ochamchira/e) and Georgians (who use Sukhumi, Gali and Ochamchire), 
I opted for the most neutral version: Sukhum/i, Gal/i, and Ochamchire/a. 
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Introduction 
“[…] each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, 
which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognise 
themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”                                                         
– Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1977, 49–67) 
 
According to Jorge Luis Borges (1984, 29), “it only takes two facing mirrors to 
build a labyrinth”. He was wrong. It only takes one broken 17th century mirror. The 
world map is like the latter – composed of hundreds of shards of different sizes 
and shapes. These are like recognised states. Most shards have remained part 
of the mirror, but some have fallen on the floor. Where they used to be, now gapes 
a series of small black holes. These are like de facto states.2 Shards of the mirror, 
but now on the floor and not recognised as part of the mirror. All shards are 
mirrors, the recognised states acting as mirrors to one another.3 The edges of the 
shards provide friction to each other, so that they stay part of the same mirror. 
They are co-dependent; if one shard breaks loose, the adjacent ones might fall 
too. In the same way recognition binds the states to each other and maintains the 
system itself. De facto states look like black holes in the mirror, but that is not 
what they are. They are shards, like all other shards but that for some reason4 
they have found themselves on the floor. Often unseen unless the sun shines on 
them at an angle to produce a glare, they are more often noticed only when 
stepped on painfully by accident. They are small, but sharp. If we are willing to 
inspect them closely, we will find in them a reflection of the mirror, high up on the 
                                            
2 I use Caspersen's (2011, 337) definition of de facto states as “territories that have achieved de 
facto independence, often through warfare, and now control most of the area upon which they lay 
claim. They have demonstrated an aspiration for full de jure independence, but either have not 
gained international recognition or have, at most, been recognised by a few states.” These polities 
exhibit many trappings of statehood, but to this day remain largely unrecognised. Abkhazia has 
been de facto independent since the end of the 1992-3 war with Georgia. For much of its existence 
it has been unrecognised, but after the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, Russia formally 
recognised its independence with Nicaragua (2008), Venezuela (2009), Nauru (2009), and Syria 
(2018) following suit. Tuvalu and Vanuatu recognised Abkhazia on 2011 but later withdrew their 
recognition. It is not a member of the United Nations or any major international organisation. 
3 I owe the metaphor to Broers (2013), who considered de facto states to be ‘mirrors to the world’. 
4 The reason is the restrictive interpretation of self-determination, which is prevalent in the 
international community and heavily biased against secession and towards territorial integrity. 
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wall. They reflect the fragmented state of the mirror and the arbitrariness by which 
some shards have remained part of the mirror and others have fallen on the floor. 
De facto states are little mirrors that reflect the broken antique mirror that is the 
Westphalian system of sovereign states. This Borgesian labyrinth has remained 
standing despite all predictions of the demise of the state at the heyday of 
globalisation. In fact, as with Borges things are often the reverse of what they 
seem, this labyrinth, too, is an anti-labyrinth: it is much more difficult to find its 
entrance than to find its exit. The riddle of the labyrinth is not inside, but on its 
walls. The walls of recognition have proven to be as firm in supporting the 
structure internally as in denying entrance to the uninvited looking for an 
entrance. They are the same walls but seen differently, depending on where one 
is looking from. From the inside, they represent stability, predictability, order, and 
protection from the chaos of nature. From the outside, they are insurmountable 
barriers erected by unsympathetic residents to exclude those trapped outside and 
expose them to the elements. 
However small or insignificant they may seem to be, de facto states continue to 
matter as anomalies and exceptions to the international system predominantly 
composed of sovereign nation-states. They are the exceptions that prove the rule 
and if we want to understand the rules of the international system, we need to 
understand the exceptions to them. The relevance of studying de facto states has 
further increased with such events as the recognition of Kosovo by over half of 
UN member states since 2008, the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia following the August War in the same year, the proclamation of 
independence of Crimea (since annexed by Russia), the Donetsk People’s 
Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic in 2014 as part of the ongoing 
conflict in Ukraine, the Four Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Catalan 
crisis5 in 2017-2018. By focusing on Abkhazia’s interaction with Russia, the EU 
and the US, I hope to shed light on – and increase the understanding of – foreign 
policy interactions of de facto states in general and de facto states in the post-
                                            
5 Catalonia is not a de facto state (it has not achieved de facto independence and does not control 
the territory it lays claims on). Part of the population, however, has strong aspirations for a full de 
jure independence, which led to a constitutional crisis in 2017 when Spain denounced the 
referendum on the independence of Catalonia.  
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Soviet space in particular. The aim of this research is three-fold. Firstly, it aims to 
contribute to de facto states studies, both by unpacking recognition and 
presenting a multi-sided account of foreign policy interactions of a de facto state, 
and by bringing new empirical data to support it. Second, it aims to promote better 
understanding of these entities to inform policy discussions on how to deal with 
these entities in the belief that conflict resolution must be based on understanding 
not only the behaviours, but also the views, perceptions, and experiences of all 
parties to the conflict and the major actors involved in its resolution. Finally, the 
research aims to make a theoretical contribution by applying the perspective of 
ontological security to an area studied largely from implicit Realist assumptions. 
The approach is novel in adopting a constructivist view of states as persons, 
building bridges between Realism and Constructivism (through the introduction 
of such concepts as geopolitical identity), looking at honour in foreign policy, 
outlining the limits of ontological security, and proposing research into 
epistemological security as a complementary perspective of the constructivist 
view of international relations (IR).  
Most research on de facto states has not problematised or unpacked recognition 
and non-recognition.6 Yet, recognition is a curious thing. Fundamentally 
intersubjective, it is a social relationship based on mutuality and one could make 
an argument that the principle of reciprocity and with it a large part of diplomatic 
practice originates from it. There is a tendency in the IR literature, and particularly 
in Realist theory of IR, for long-established social institutions, such as recognition, 
to become reified, losing its intersubjective character and appear objective. They 
become walls that divide and chains that bind. Indeed, mutuality makes 
recognition like a chain: being recognised gives states the right to recognise other 
states. Accept a weak link into the chain, and it might break, accept a few and it 
might disintegrate. This is especially the view of the constitutive theory of state 
recognition, while the declaratory theory implies recognition ipso facto (by virtue 
of existence), and by equating fact with law it is equally objectifying (see Kelsen 
1941 and Briggs 1949 as early participants in what was called the 'sterile debate' 
by the latter). So, where does one start unpacking the concept of recognition, not 
                                            
6 Notable exceptions include Richards & Smith (2015), Fabry (2017), Caspersen (2018), and 
Coppieters (2018). 
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as a ticket to enter the club of internationally recognised states, not as a legal 
status, not as a set of criteria that describe which entities merit recognition? How 
does one examine recognition as an intersubjective bond between states, a 
relation of acceptance or rejection – in short – a relation of power, and the 
intersubjective nature of recognition – the perception and experience of it, its 
relation to identity, and how it shapes behaviour? 
First,7 to examine recognition as intra- and inter-subjective means to reject the 
notion of its objectivity. Recognition is not a fact, but a relationship with others 
(inter-) and oneself (intra-). Second, recognition is subjective, it does not exist 
outside an actor’s experience. States experience recognition and non-recognition 
differently. Third, as subjective, recognition can only be studied as a system of 
relations between actors and within an actor. The ‘truth’ of an experience of non-
recognition is to be sought in the de facto state’s relations with other states 
significant to it in which the perspectives of all actors must be considered. Fourth, 
perceptions of recognition shape identity, expectations, interests, goals, and 
finally behaviour. Non-recognition and recognition can enable or constrain states 
in how they act. We may expect non-recognition to constrain and recognition 
enable, but this cannot be taken for granted as it depends on the individual 
experience of a de facto state coping with non-recognition, including its informal 
relations, the strength of its fear of re-incorporation into the parent state, and its 
ontological anxieties. As we know, both Taiwan and Abkhazia lack international 
recognition of much of the international community, but their experiences are 
radically different. Fifth recognition and non-recognition are not only legal but also 
symbolic, social, and political relations. Recognition and non-recognition can be 
used as reward and punishment, as acceptance and rejection, as distinction and 
stigma. As such, they can not only influence identity but become part of it, and in 
the extreme become self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Hegel, who introduced the notion of recognition into Western philosophy (Burns 
& Thompson 2013, 3), understood it in the context of the conflict of two self-
consciousnesses, each a subjectivity trying to force its view and interpretation of 
                                            
7 These five points are developed in the following chapters: in Chapter 1 theoretically, Chapter 2 
historically, Chapter 3 methodologically, and in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, empirically. 
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the world on the other, engaged in a mortal combat in which each is trying to 
objectify the other while avoiding losing its subjectivity. This is the opposite of 
legal recognition in which the first state’s recognition is usually reciprocated by 
the second state’s recognition, with both now established as equal and disjunctive 
(each having exclusive sovereignty on its territory). Hegel’s process of 
recognition is much more violent and offers no such reconciliation. Equality is 
possible only as a moment of “recognizing themselves as mutually recognizing 
one another” (Hegel 1977, 49–67), becoming conscious that they are, in fact, 
enemies. Recognition is the recognition of the Other, through which I recognise 
the Self. At the same time, it is the recognition of the conflict in which I find myself 
with the Other. The result is inequality, the hierarchy represented by the extreme 
positions of Master and Slave. While one is recognised as the Master, the other 
is misrecognised as a Slave; objectified by the Master who imposes its 
subjectivity on the situation. This relationship is dialectical and as such unstable, 
making it more complex than understanding to draw an analogy with de facto 
states demands. It is interesting that Hegel never discusses non-recognition. The 
Slave is not unrecognised, but misrecognised; he is not ignored, excluded, and 
isolated, but engaged, included, and exploited. De facto states face a 
combination of non-recognition and mis-recognition. While ignored by most of the 
international community, they are often actively stigmatised, vilified and 
objectified by their parent states. Just as recognition and non-recognition affect 
interaction, so does misrecognition. Russia, which has recognised Abkhazia, 
closely engages with it to the extent that the latter fears of becoming 
overdependent. Georgia, from which Abkhazia seceded, engages (and often mis-
engages) with a mixture of threats and incentives aiming at future re-
incorporation. The EU and the US exhibit non-engagement, engagement, and 
mis-engagement8 in their attempt to resolve the conflict, implicitly or explicitly in 
favour of maintaining Georgia’s territorial integrity. 
                                            
8 In conceptualizing engagement, I lean on Berg and Pegg (2016), who have borrowed the 
definition from the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. There, engagement 
is defined as “the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders”. 
The concept of ‘engagement’ is very close to the concept of ‘interaction’. Both engagement and 
interaction describe a communicative act and an activity of establishing or maintaining a 
relationship. They can both be positive, negative, friendly or hostile, or neutral. Engagement 
however, is more closely tied to the sphere of international relations than interaction, which is a 
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This research examines how Abkhazia’s political elites and foreign policy 
decision-makers in Russia, the EU and the US, who engage with Abkhazia, 
interpret non-recognition and how their interpretations influence the formulation 
and implementation of their respective foreign policy objectives and strategies. 
The aim of this research is to present the first multi-sided account of foreign policy 
interaction of a de facto state. It focuses on a single case study of Abkhazia 
between October 1999 and November 2014. Rather than ask what a de facto 
state is, this research looks at how a de facto state is. Instead of making 
assumptions about its foreign policy from its unrecognised status, it starts by 
looking at its foreign policy to identify how and by what it is enabled and 
constrained. Rather than focusing on either the de facto state’s foreign policy or 
international engagement with it, it focuses on both. The research proceeds from 
a constructivist theoretical framework, claiming that non-recognition is ultimately 
what states (including de facto states) make of it. To capture both domestic and 
external geopolitical dimensions, the concepts of ontological security and 
geopolitical role, respectively, are introduced. Methodologically, the data was 
gathered through process tracing and semi-structured elite interviews with policy 
elites and decision makers in Sukhum/i, Tbilisi, Brussels, Moscow, and 
Washington D.C. 
The thesis is composed of seven chapters, the first three establishing the 
theoretical, analytical, methodological, and historical foundations for the analysis 
of data presented in the last three chapters, which are empirical in nature. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research question and proceeds to construct a 
theoretical framework for this research project. Chapter 2 introduces the historical 
background and provides information about the case study of Abkhazia, including 
the criteria of case selection, the scope and time-frame of the research. Chapter 
3 discusses research design and research strategy, operationalization of my 
theoretical concepts, data collection and analysis, validity and limitations of the 
research project. Chapter 4 focuses on Abkhazia, its identity and interactions, 
                                            
more general sociological concept. Another point of distinction and a reason why I prefer the term 
‘engagement’, is that engagement implies a more one-way relationship than interaction, which 
implies mutuality. Applied to my case, the US and the EU engage with Abkhazia, while Russia 
and Abkhazia interact with each other.  
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examining how decision-makers in Abkhazia interpret non-recognition and how it 
affects their foreign policy behaviour. Chapter 5 turns the focus to Abkhazia’s 
patron – Russia: how its identity, domestic politics, and wider geopolitical 
considerations have shaped attitudes towards (non-)recognition of Abkhazia and 
shaped their relationship. Chapter 6 explores EU and US engagement of 
Abkhazia, including the interests, actors, and strategies involved. Chapter 7 is a 
synthesis bringing together theoretical and methodological discussions with 
empirical data to interpret the results and construct a more complete and 
coherent picture of Abkhazia’s foreign interactions. Key insights are summarised, 
research questions answered, contributions, relevance, shortcomings, and 
avenues of further inquiry discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical framework 
“States are people too.”                                                                                                  
– Alexander Wendt (2004, 291) 
“States are people too, and people are  
       states too - but neither are essentially so.”                          
– Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2004, 287) 
 
Introduction 
The first chapter of the thesis clarifies and elaborates the research puzzle 
announced in the introduction, developing the theoretical framework of the thesis 
that forms the basis of this research project. The chapter is structured by the 
research question: how do interpretations of non-recognition influence the foreign 
policy interactions9 between Abkhazia10 and recognised actors in the 
international community: Russia, the EU and the US? This is done in four steps. 
First, I take stock of the research on the foreign policy interaction of de facto 
states, identify the gaps in the literature and explain how they will be addressed. 
Second, I proceed to define and justify the use of the three core elements of my 
theoretical framework: identity in interaction, ontological security and geopolitical 
role. Third, I explore the intersections and interactions between these elements 
and integrate them into a coherent theoretical framework for the study of foreign 
policy interaction of de facto states, in particular the analysis of elite 
interpretations of non-recognition in interactions between de facto states and 
recognised actors in the international community. I do so with the view of 
reconciling the Realist and Constructivist elements of my approach and building 
bridges between the two theories. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a 
                                            
9 Interaction is crucial in maintaining an identity and “contemporary states […] can only survive 
as members of the state system; as such their survival motive is intrinsically relational and can 
only be expressed as a positioning of the self vis-a-vis other states” (Mitzen 2006, 357). 
10 In this thesis, I have predominantly used the term ‘the Abkhaz’ to refer to the ethnic group (the 
Abkhaz language, for example). Exceptions include direct quotations that used ‘Abkhazians’ and 
my own use of the term when I wanted to emphasize that it refers not only to the ethnic group, 
but to all the citizens of Abkhazia, regardless of ethnicity. Similarly, I have used the term 
‘Abkhazian’ in relation to the state of Abkhazia (Abkhazian foreign policy, for example). 
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discussion on how my theoretical framework can be applied to the study of the 
foreign policy interaction of de facto states (further developed in Chapter 2, 3, 
and 7) and what forms of explanation I expect this approach to yield. 
The main theoretical contributions of the thesis put forward in this chapter and 
further discussed in Chapter 7, are the following. First, a problematisation of non-
recognition not as a given, but as perceived, experienced, and socially 
constructed. Second, examining the nexus of identity and foreign policy of de 
facto states through an honour-centred perspective in order to produce a thick 
description of a single case study, with several within-case comparisons. Third, 
the application of ontological security perspective to de facto states to gain a 
better understanding of their existentialist situation and how they make sense of 
their being-in-the-world. Fourth, the identification of the limits of ontological 
security and the development of a complementary epistemological security 
perspective as a new original avenue of inquiry. Finally, an original typology of 
the geopolitical roles played by the de facto states. 
IR theory and the study of de facto states 
Although there is a growing body of literature dedicated to de facto states,11 their 
interactions with other actors in the international community are still a much 
under-studied subject (Ker-Lindsay 2015). Although some early attempts at 
analysing the status of de facto states and how they relate to other actors in the 
international system were made (Lynch 2004), the studies of interactions of de 
facto states outside of the triangle de facto state–parent state–patron state12 only 
emerged around the year 2010 with the literature on ‘engagement without 
recognition’ (Caspersen & Herrberg 2010; Cooley and Mitchell 2010; Popescu 
                                            
11 Legal scholars have long focused on the conflicting principles of territorial integrity and right to 
self-determination, status and recognition, occasionally touching on the issue of de facto states 
(Dickinson 1923; Kelsen 1941; Levitan 1946; Briggs 1949, and more recently Fabry 1999, 2012, 
2013, 2015), political geographers on disentangling the state, territoriality and sovereignty (Agnew 
2005, McConnell 2009), while more recently scholarship emerged on political systems and 
domestic politics (Ó Beacháin, Comai & Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016), political economy (Prelz 
Oltramonti 2015), state-building and democratisation (Caspersen 2011, 2013; Berg & ria 2012), 
legitimacy (Broers 2013; Berg & Mölder 2012) and public opinion (Toal, Kolossov, O’Loughlin 
2013) in de facto states, to name just the main sub-fields. 
12 For a characterization of patron states see Graham and Horne (2012, 10-11). 
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2010; Ker-Lindsay 2015; Berg and Pegg 2016), while the foreign policy of de 
facto states came into focus only quite recently (Frear 2014; Smith 2018; Comai 
2018). 
In addition to the interaction between de facto states and other actors being 
under-studied, the scholarship on de facto states has hitherto not explored the 
issues of state identity and the meaning of (non-)recognition – the crucial 
elements of my research question – at any greater depth.13 Despite the fact that 
International Relations (IR) theory has had little to say about de facto states,14 I 
argue that drawing on – in particular Realism and Constructivism – can provide 
us with useful elements that can be combined into a coherent approach to explain 
how interpretations of non-recognition influence the foreign policy interactions 
between de facto states and recognised actors in the international community.  
Making use of IR theory 
Turning to IR theory, I briefly consider what Realism15 and Constructivism16 have 
brought to the study of de facto states before critically discussing their potential 
                                            
13 In Chapter 7, I make a more explicit link between legal ‘thin’ recognition of states and social 
‘thick’ recognition of actors in international relations 
14 IR scholars have not paid much attention to de facto states, seeing them as a marginal and 
transient feature of international relations. In the words of Geldenhuys (2009, 1–2): “Do these 
entities really matter in the larger scheme of global politics? One must concede that their number 
pales into insignificance when compared with the total of 192 internationally recognised states 
seated in the United Nations General Assembly and representing 6.7 billion people. There are 
presently only ten self-declared independent entities, comprising about 33 million people, which 
have been functioning like states for several years.” 
15 I understand Realist theory in a broad sense, from the pioneers, such as Morgenthau, and 
classics, such as Waltz, to Neo-Realism and its derivatives, such as Mearsheimer’s offensive 
neorealism. My intention here is not to build a straw man and then tear it apart with a critique, as 
many IR scholars did: “Realists are often at pains to recognise themselves in the portrayal of their 
detractors. Showing the ‘richness of the tradition’ can justifiably undermine some of the criticism” 
(Guzzini 2013, 111). However, despite recognizing that there is a large diversity within the Realist 
tradition, we cannot deny that there is much in common ground – for better and for worse. 
16 After outlining the relevance of Constructivism for the study of de facto states, Voller (2012) 
chooses the post-modern, linguistic (also called ‘European’) version of Constructivism over the 
modern, positivist (also called ‘North American’) version. The North American version focuses on 
the importance of social norms and identities in the construction of international politics and is 
committed to a positivist agenda of “uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and causal 
relationships between actors, norms, interests and identity” (Checkel 2008, 72). The European 
version emphasizes language, linguistic constructions and social discourses in the constructing 
of international relations, focusing on interpreting identity creation and change rather than 
explaining relationships between states (Checkel 1998, 73). Rather than understanding how Iraqi 
Kurdistan interacts with the outside world, Voller attempts to trace the “international and 
transnational sources of the transformation of the Kurdish National Liberation Movement in Iraq 
into the Kurdistan Regional Government”. This in itself is not a shortcoming, but since my work 
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and limitations. Early research on de facto states (in 1990s and early 2000s), 
drawing on IR, although partial in scope17 as well as normatively,18 had two 
important advantages over other approaches. First, it widened the perspective of 
Conflict Studies, focused primarily on intra-state dynamics, by emphasising the 
role of big powers and regional hegemons in the emergence and sustenance of 
de facto states. Second, it introduced a comparative dimension, which focussed 
on de facto states themselves rather than the conflicts that involved them and 
from which they have emerged.19 Both of these points are relevant to my 
research. The widening of the perspective to include other actors than parent and 
patron state is especially important as I do not examine the conflict between a de 
facto state and its parent state specifically, but how a de facto state interacts with 
other states and international organisations. Furthermore, I consider not just the 
identity a de facto state, but the role it can play in the context of geopolitical 
competition in the region, and how playing a role can help sustain an identity 
through the preservation of ontological security. Although I do not compare 
different de facto states, the comparative dimension is there in comparing the 
interactions of a single de facto state with different recognised actors.  
State-centrism,20 is also central to my project as I focus largely on states (with 
the exception of the EU); their identities, elite interpretations of non-recognition 
and their foreign policy interaction. Realist theory of IR has not delved very deep 
into the question of state identity, even though identity politics have come to the 
                                            
concerns foreign policy interaction between de facto states and recognised actors in the 
international community, his linguistic turn and the choice of European Constructivism – and in 
particular the theory of Communicative action as the “pivotal concept for understanding processes 
of change” (Voller 2012, 16) – is not a good fit and I therefore follow the ‘North American’ version 
of Constructivism more closely. 
17 De facto states were studied mostly as an epiphenomenon of ethno-political conflicts 
18 De facto states were seen as illegitimate ‘geopolitical black holes’ and warlord-run zones (Lynch 
2007, 489). For a review of Western academic discourse on the post-Soviet de facto states see 
Yemelianova (2015). 
19 Lynch (2004, 18), who is a good example of these scholars, has argued that as far as actors of 
international relations go, “there are states and there is little else” – a claim that can be argued 
for or against, but that is strongly present in de facto states themselves. 
20 Caspersen (2012, 68): “However much we talk about globalisation, erosion of the state, and 
the increasing irrelevance of territory, statehood remains the top prize.” Isachenko (2012, 19) 
acknowledges that mainstream international relations theories are not particularly useful in 
studying de facto states, but does, however concede that realism is a tempting starting point due 
to its state-centric approach. It is important to note, however (and Isachenko does not mention 
this), that there is a false incompatibility between Realism and (part of) Constructivism as 
Constructivism can be either rule-centric (Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1989) or state-centric (Wendt 
1999). 
 
21 
 
forefront of international relations already in the late 1980s.21 After the Cold War 
was over,22 the interactions between states changed and “strange and especially 
brutal conflicts erupted in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and elsewhere”23 
(Gantzel 1997). The focus of the study of IR widened from external interactions 
to include the role of internal dynamics and processes in states. These changes 
in the international system also brought about changes in the identity of states: – 
a category not considered to hold decisive explanatory weight by Realist IR 
scholars, who typically saw states as black boxes without delving into their 
internal structure and relations between different sub-state systems and social 
groups. This perspective proved to be very constraining for the study of de facto 
states, where the border between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the state is less 
apparent and where policies directed towards others often have domestic 
reasons or vice versa (explored in depth on the case of Abkhazia in Chapter 4). 
Constructivism, which focuses on the interplay between identity and interaction 
as the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the state respectively, can be more helpful in 
furthering my project and help to answer the question how interpretations of non-
recognition affect foreign policy interaction of de facto states. This, however, does 
not necessarily mean that Realist contributions, such as its emphasis on material 
factors and conflict, have to be abandoned. On the contrary, Constructivist 
examination of identity must add a layer of understanding rather than subtract 
from the already accumulated knowledge. Although the importance of physical 
security – emphasized by Realism (Steele 2008, 1) – for de facto states cannot 
be over-emphasized, several other forms of security are also important to these 
relatively young entities undertaking nation and state-building projects in the 
context of lacking recognition. As I demonstrate later, Constructivism broadens 
the concept of security to include other forms, including ontological security 
(Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008; Rumelili 2014), which is particularly relevant for 
examining the linkage between identity and interaction of de facto states. 
                                            
21 As Hall (1999, 3) states: “Nationalist and ethnic conflict, not cold war tensions or ‘superpower 
balancing in the periphery’ now largely consume the agendas of United Nations and NATO as 
well as the foreign policy concerns of powers, great and small.” 
22 “After the end of the Cold War, realism has been again on the defensive” (Guzzini 2013, 109). 
23 The linkage of “nation” and “state,” long unquestioned as the irreducible unit of global politics, 
suddenly seemed very questionable indeed. In some places, the future existence of a state, at 
least as we thought we knew it, was in doubt.” (Ferguson 2003, 1). 
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IR scholarship has, as mentioned before, taken little interest in de facto states 
and has not developed specific approaches to study how different actors interpret 
recognition or how this affects the way de facto states engage and are engaged 
by others.24 Because there are no ‘ready-to-use’ approaches available, a 
theoretical framework has to be developed by selecting compatible elements 
possessing explanatory power and combining them into a coherent whole, which 
can then be operationalized and applied for the use in fieldwork. 
State identity, ontological security and 
geopolitical role 
This thesis examines how interpretations of non-recognition influence 
interactions between a de facto state and recognised actors in the international 
community. In order to conceptualize this, I introduce three elements that make 
up my theoretical framework: 
1. State identity25 shaped through interaction: how political elites in de facto 
states interpret the world around them and the actions of other actors 
depends on their identity. Everything they perceive is mediated through 
their culture and these interpretations shape their (inter)actions. 
2. Ontological security: identity does not exist in isolation. It is shaped 
through interaction and at the same time identity provides the basis for 
interaction. Foreign policy of de facto states is based on preservation of 
their de facto independence, which includes both physical security as the 
security of identity (ontological security). 
3. Geopolitical role in the context of geopolitical competition: interactions 
between de facto states and recognised actors happen in a specific 
context. In the case post-Soviet de facto states, the context of geopolitical 
competition between Russia and the West is very important. 
                                            
24 Isachenko’s (2012) work draws heavily on IR but remains critical of the discipline’s contributions 
in studying de facto states. Isachenko (2012, 3) correctly states that “a solid conceptual framework 
for the analysis of these politically ambiguous spaces is still lacking.” 
25 State identity is further unpacked in this chapter. At this point it is important to understand it as 
a self-identity (the way the state sees itself). For the external identity that is based on how others 
see it, I am using the term ‘social identity’, further elaborated in Chapter 3. 
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I first introduce each of the concepts and then explore the relations between them 
with a view of fleshing out a coherent theoretical framework applicable to my 
research project. 
State identity of de facto states 
To define de facto state identity, a de facto state26 must first be defined. Although 
this has already been done in the introduction, it is useful to distinguish between 
different forms of (non-)recognition, including partial or limited recognition. This 
is especially important in my case, since Abkhazia is a partially recognised de 
facto state – and as we will see in Chapter 4 and 7, this has implications for 
everything from its ontological security to its foreign policy confidence.27  
As stated, there has been little discussion regarding the identity of de facto states 
and when identity was brought up, it was taken as something static and given – 
as a constant rather than as dynamic and reflexive.28 Early studies in 1990s often 
saw de facto states as a threat to the international system of sovereign states,29 
as exceptions and temporary anomalies resulting from the dissolution of Soviet 
Union30 or worse – as criminalized badlands and black spots (Stanislawski 2008). 
As Caspersen and Herrberg (2010, 8) have put it: “without 
sovereignty, anarchy is assumed.” An ontological statement par excellence, it 
squares well with the view of ontological security scholars that “behind the 
routines of daily life, chaos lurks” (Mitzen 2006, 346). With conflicts becoming 
stable (Rumelili 2015) – rather than frozen31 – and with the publication of 
                                            
26 For analogous terms see Geldenhuys (2009). Although the term ‘unrecognised state’ may be 
more widespread and popular (especially outside academia, in journalistic use), the majority of 
scholars studying these entities uses the term ‘de facto states’ (O’Loughlin et al. 2015, 2), which 
emphasizes their identity as states over the circumstance of non-recognition. 
27 Limited recognition is not only significant in terms of legal status, but also in terms of political 
expectations of de facto states and their confidence in foreign policy. After Russia’s recognition 
of Abkhazia in 2008, the latter expected that many more countries would follow, but only 5 (out of 
which two later cancelled their recognition) did until now. However, this did boost the confidence 
of Abkhazian elites to pursue multi-vector foreign policy. 
28 The best Realists can come up with is a “type identity [which] has no associated behavioural 
requirement, which means nothing about a state’s identity is at stake in interaction. Interaction is 
driven by physical security needs and is not linked to identity” (Mitzen 2006, 355). 
29 Hale (2000) used the term ‘parade of sovereignties’ suggesting the possible domino effect. 
30 See Pegg (1998) and Lynch (2004), for example. 
31 See Rutland (2007) and Broers (2015) for criticism of the concept of frozen conflict. 
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comparative studies32 (focusing mostly on the de facto states in the Caucasus)33 
these views were balanced, and de facto states became somewhat ‘normalized’ 
in the academic discourse (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2012). In some cases, state-
building successes and democratic achievements were acknowledged 
(Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland). De facto states themselves 
often drew on Freedom House Ratings, which were sometimes (in the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh) better than those of their parent states or equal to it (in the 
case of Abkhazia) (Broers 2014, 152; Gerrits and Bader 2016, 307). Despite 
these changes in the perception of de facto state identity, there was little 
discussion about identity itself and its relation to non-recognition, which also 
remains to be taken as a given (constraining factor) and one that largely shapes 
the identity and behaviour of de facto states, including their foreign policy.34 Since 
I am examining the relationship between collective cognitive processes 
(interpretation of non-recognition) and political practices (foreign policy 
formulation and implementation), it is important to examine how the identities of 
de facto states are shaped and what are the key factors in this process. I argue 
that examining state identity can help us explain their foreign policy. At the same 
time, looking at how they interact with other actors can tell us more about what 
de facto states are.35  
Differing from Realism, Constructivism makes identity the core concept, defining 
it as a “property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural 
dispositions” (Wendt 1994, 385) and sees identity as rooted in state “self-
understandings.” Wendt (1999, 277) distinguishes between four kinds of state 
identity: personal or corporate, type identity, collective identity, and – the most 
                                            
32 Pegg (1998, 4–11) was one of the first who tired to theorize engagement with de facto states 
on a more general level. 
33 De Wall (2003), Cornell (1999), and Svensson (2009) have done a great job in comparing 
ethnic-political conflicts and unrecognised entities in the Caucasus, while still focusing primarily 
on Nagorno-Karabakh. Khintba (2010), Grono (2010) and Popescu (2007) have focused more on 
Georgia’s breakaway republics, but also maintained the regional focus. Latawski et al. (2003) 
focused on Kosovo but is also rich on the context of regional disintegration. 
34 I discuss non-recognition’s effects on identity beyond the legal and the political, extending into 
inter- and intra-subjective: in relation to honor, stigma, shame, and guilt (Chapter 4), dependence, 
isolation, and proactiveness (Chapters 5 and 6) and sour grapes, fatalism, and self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Chapter 7). 
35 The approach is pragmatic – look what they do, not what they are – but the findings testify to 
both and as evidenced in Chapter 7 and the Conclusion, the contributions of the thesis are of 
theoretical, empirical and policy nature. 
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relevant for this case – the role identity.36 The national role identity exists only in 
relation to others and “is achieved by occupying positions in a ‘social structure’ 
and observing ‘behavioural norms’ towards others” (Wendt 1999, 277). Several 
authors37 have pointed out that state-building, establishment of good governance, 
respect for human rights and democratisation – although internal political 
processes – are also aimed at foreign audiences. Broers (2013, 146) argued that 
de facto states “present an enduring paradox: they simultaneously transgress 
and mimic the basic structure of the international state system.” Although the 
issue of legitimacy and legitimization has been touched upon by these and other 
authors,38 little has been done in terms of explaining how norms39 are internalized 
by de facto states and how this internalisation affects their interaction with other 
actors.40 This is where Constructivist literature on state socialisation,41 as a 
process central to international normative diffusion (Alderson 2001, 416) and 
Isachenko’s (2012) focus on dynamic and relational aspects of identity 
construction can help fill the gaps and allow us to understand identity as a 
changing and unfinished open-ended process influenced by external interaction. 
                                            
36 Holsti (1970, 234) introduces a similar concept of ‘national roles’ “as possible causal variables 
in the operation of international systems, or in explaining the foreign policies of individual nations.” 
37 Caspersen (2011, 338–344) acknowledged that there has been an evolution in the 
argumentation of the claims for independence: as in the past these were primarily based on 
identity and grievances, today they are more and more based on alleged progress in 
democratization. Voller (2015, 4) pointed to that in 2003 United Nations conditioned Kosovo’s 
recognition with implementation of eight principles of good governance, which included, among 
others: ‘free elections, protection of the rights and property of minorities, protection of private 
property, and equality for women’, which has not gone unnoticed by other de facto states. The 
UN policy of ‘standards before status’ in the case of Kosovo has prompted other de-facto states 
to try to earn sovereignty through democratization (Caspersen 2008, 2009), or at least through 
rhetorically promoting democracy and human rights in expectance of de jure recognition 
(Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011, 182). 
38 See Kolstø (2006); Caspersen (2009); Berg (2012), Bakke, O'Loughlin, Toal and Ward (2013); 
Protsyk (2013).  
39 Constructivists believe that focusing on social norms offers an alternative to accounts based 
on interest and power (Alderson 2001). However, we must not simply replace power with identity 
as Hall (1999, 6) does: “Against the ‘will-to-power’ of the state, in realist analysis, as the ultima 
ratio of international political interaction, I will posit the will-to-manifest-identity’ of social collectives 
as agents that spawn the social construction of domestic and social global orders.” 
40 I discuss modelling and mimicking that Abkhazia employs in order to present an image of 
normalcy to the world (Chapter 4) and how it is at the same time a state and acts as a state 
(Chapter 7). 
41 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 901–4) define state socialisation as an internalizing mechanism 
by which states adopt norms present elsewhere in the international system in an unequal 
relationship and under the pressure of ‘peer states’. It should be mentioned here, that for de facto 
states ‘peer states’ are mostly patrons and potential patrons – states that are seen as possible 
sources of support and – ultimately – recognition.  
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Focusing on relationality allows identity to be explored not as something fixed, 
but as dynamic and changing over time. Identity and action are in a dialectical 
relationship and identity is manifested through action, while action affirms 
identity.42 Isachenko (2012, 25) emphasizes that “motives and intents of actors 
are important, but the dynamic which develops in this process cannot be 
explained strictly in terms of these motives and intents.” She claims that de facto 
states (using the term ‘informal states’ to refer to them) are “a messy solution to 
a messy problem” (Isachenko 2012, 15). Perhaps one of the most important 
lessons to be drawn from her work is that by adopting an inter-subjective, 
relational approach, power also needs to be reconceptualised in this way. This in 
turn pushes us to problematize the conceptual framework that scholars of de 
facto states have used for analysing subjectivity: parent, patron, and puppet.43 
De facto states are neither strong nor weak, viable or non-viable outside these 
relations with other states.44 Isachenko’s (2012) historical approach emphasizes 
that these relations are dynamic and liable to change. The margin of 
independence (not formal but actual) therefore depends on the context and the 
types of interaction. My own research builds on these insights, proceeding to 
discuss the historical context of the case study at some length in Chapter 2 and 
adds a cultural dimension to it by focusing on Abkhazia’s cultural norms, including 
the importance of honour in its foreign policy (Chapter 4).  
Isachenko (2012, 7–9) introduces another useful conceptual distinction between 
stateness – the understanding of the state as a fixed territorial entity and 
statecraft – the ways statehood is constructed and maintained. She advocates a 
shift from questioning what the state is to how state and sovereignty are 
produced. This is useful as I explore not what de facto states are (status or 
identity), but how they are (engagement or interaction), and fits well with a more 
existentialist view (based on Hegel’s view of recognition and Laing’s view of 
                                            
42 As put by Mitzen (2006, 365) “Assuming that important aspects of state identity are constituted 
relationally provides new theoretical leverage on interaction dynamics and can lead to practical 
implications for important problems in world politics.” 
43 A parallel with socialisation is that relations between de facto states are not limited to their 
parent and patron, just like socialisation does not only take place in the family. 
44 Another parallel with socialisation is that when it comes to norm internationalisation, states find 
themselves in an unequal position vis-à-vis their peers who have adopted them, just like an 
individual to be socialized finds itself in an unequal position vis-à-vis someone who has already 
undergone the process of socialisation. 
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ontological security) of the de facto states hinted at in the Introduction and further 
discussed in Chapter 7 and the Conclusion. This conceptual shift represents the 
move from Realist ontology of state as a given, objective, territorially fixed and 
largely unchangeable entity to a Constructivist ontology of state as socially 
constructed, subjective, territorially fluid and constantly changing entity. 
Isachenko (2012, 21) further distinguishes between ‘seeing the state’ and ‘doing 
the state’, where doing the state is essentially an interactive process of internal 
and external state building. She puts more emphasis on the former, making the 
assumption that “by looking at the state-building practices of informal states, we 
can gain a better understanding of how world politics operate” (Isachenko 2012, 
3).45 Although I agree that examining domestic processes (as I do in Chapter 5 
and 6 when I explore Russian, EU and US engagement with Abkhazia) can help 
us better understand de facto states, I believe that the nexus of internal processes 
(culture, identity, self-perception, norms and values) and external reality – the 
institutional context of non-recognition and de facto states foreign policy 
interaction – is even less well understood and can valuably contribute to the 
understanding of not only de facto states but world politics more broadly. 
Non-recognition is variously seen as part of state identity of de facto states46 and 
as an institution (or the institutional context in which they operate).47 International 
law48 has distinguished between recognition as a legal and political act. Kelsen 
                                            
45 Another shortcoming of Isachenko’s study (and a common problem with post-structuralist and 
constructivist theory) is that it is not sufficiently grounded in territoriality, instead relying on 
ideational elements, such as identity and the bricolage and spontaneity of informal practices. 
46 In what seems to be a good metaphor for (non-)recognition of de facto states Mitzen (2006, 
347) states: “Think of the aspiring actor who waits tables. He may see himself as an actor, and 
take classes, audition and talk constantly about theatre. But until he gets the breakthrough role, 
in an important sense he cannot ‘be’ an actor. There is simply no way for us to know him as such; 
to society he is a waiter.” 
47 Non-recognition has largely been perceived as a negative and constraining circumstance: “If a 
strategy can be planned regardless of circumstances, a tactic is characterized by dependency on 
the circumstances” (Isachenko 2012, 3). Non-recognition in this context is the overriding 
circumstance, which condemns a de facto state to tactical level, which is the “space of the other”. 
This distinction fits very well into my conceptual framework of geopolitical roles de facto states 
play. See King (2001) for an analysis of benefits non-recognition can have for political elites in de 
facto states. 
48 International law had defined the criteria for recognition in the Montevideo Declaration of 1933 
(territory, population, effective government and ability to enter into relations with other countries). 
It has therefore prescribed what a state should be, but not how it should come to be (Briggs 1949, 
115). However even with the criteria about what the state should be remain vague and the 
decision to recognise is ultimately a political one and depends on the interests of states, which 
are under no legal duty to recognise an entity that has fulfilled these criteria (Briggs 1949, 114). 
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(1941, 607) argued that the question what the state is, has “to be answered from 
the observation of the practice of states” rather than through what Briggs (1949, 
120) called a ‘sterile debate’ – between declarative and constitutive theories of 
recognition that ask the question “whether the act of recognition ‘confirmed’ 
previously existing rights or ‘created’ new rights.” It is therefore useful to define 
recognition not in terms of identity,49 but as an institution and to emphasize its 
relationality – it defines the position of a state in the international community vis-
à-vis other actors and can be understood as the sum of external political relations 
of a particular state. Knowing that there is little they can do to challenge the 
institution of recognition itself,50 de facto states adopt different strategies, tactics 
and defence mechanisms to cope with their existential situation. They may try to 
socialize into recognised states through internalizing internationally accepted 
norms, to construct counter-narratives to battle stigma, balance their interactions 
to avoid overdependence on any one actor, conduct social moves (further 
elaborated in Chapters 4 and 7) to strengthen external legitimacy or resort to 
defence mechanisms to maintain ontological security when their behaviours 
could threaten their self-perceptions and conceptions of honour. All this is done 
through processes, which are internal but at the same time directed outwards at 
international audiences.   
The great majority of scholarship on de facto states takes non-recognition for 
granted also in considering it as a constraining factor a priori, often viewing it in 
substantive terms, as if non-recognition was a property or a negative 
characteristic rather than a relation without a fixed value and always dependent 
on what it relates to.51 Acknowledging that non-recognition is (inter-)subjective 
and focusing on the interpretation of non-recognition by both political elites in de 
                                            
49 “While recognition does not make a state, it does serve to legitim ize the state as a member of 
the wider inter-national community” (Ker-Lindsay 2015, 269). 
50 The institution of recognition serves to protect the norms of sovereignty territorial integrity and 
the power to recognise is only afforded to recognised sovereign states and international 
organisations formed by states. 
51 The symptom of this rigid approach is the concept of ‘frozen conflict’, which although heavily 
criticized by most of de facto state scholars (Rutland 2007, Broers 2015) continues to persist in 
journalistic and - to an extent - policy discourse. The concept does not correspond to reality and 
it does not allow to perceive these conflicts as dynamic, evolving, peaceful only within the limits 
of fragile and temporary ceasefires (and not peace agreements) that may and are broken when 
renewed violence erupts, as we have seen in Georgia (2008) and more recently in Nagorno-
Karabakh. 
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facto states as well as in recognised actors, can help explain interactions between 
them. Although non-recognition represents a significant (physical and 
ontological) security problem for de facto states and constrains their foreign policy 
options, it does not directly determine how non-recognition affects the 
interactions between de facto states and recognised actors. I expect that this 
depends on how non-recognition is experienced and interpreted by political elites 
in de facto state, parent state, patron state and the international community. I 
make two initial hypotheses here and then assess them in the light of empirical 
evidence in the concluding chapter: 
1. Interpretation of non-recognition (by both de facto states as well as 
recognised actors) depends on both the internal situation in the de facto 
state and the wider geopolitical context in which it exists.52 
2. Interpretation of non-recognition (by both de facto states as well as 
recognised actors) shapes interaction: foreign policy of de facto state, 
counter-recognition strategies of parent state,53 support of patron and 
engagement by the international community. 
Having discussed state identity and how it is shaped through internal processes 
(state-building), state socialisation (norm internalization) and non-recognition (as 
mediated through the interpretation of policy elites), I have hypothesised that the 
internal situation in the de facto state and the wider geopolitical considerations 
influence interpretations of non-recognition, which in turn shape interaction 
between de facto state and other actors. Since I am interested in how this 
happens, I need to look at how the internal situation in the de facto state and the 
wider geopolitical considerations are considered when foreign policy is made. I 
                                            
52 While Georgia interprets the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as ‘occupied territories’ and 
the interaction with them as ‘creeping recognition’, its ally the US does not follow this 
interpretation. In an analysis of US diplomatic cables leaked by Bradley Manning and made public 
by WikiLeaks, Berg and Pegg (2016, 17) have shown that US “is cognizant of parent-state 
preferences and takes them into account but that those preferences are not determinative of its 
willingness to engage de facto states. Strategic considerations arguably play a greater role in 
influencing US interactions with de facto states.” Berg and Pegg (2016) have also shown that 
interaction is largely event-driven, meaning it considers changes in the geopolitical situation in 
the region as well as internal developments in de facto states. For instance: “In order to 
counterbalance the increasing Russian influence in the South Caucasus, the US government 
brought Abkhazia more into focus in 2009” (Berg and Pegg 2016, 8). 
53 See Ker-Lindsay (2012) and Beacháin, Comai & Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili (2016). 
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do this through the perspective of ontological security and geopolitical role, 
respectively. 
The perspective of ontological security 
It would be a mistake to underplay the importance of physical security for de facto 
states, especially given the fact that most of them emerged out of violent conflicts. 
Nevertheless, ontological security is just as important – and in some cases – 
more important “because its fulfilment affirms a state’s self-identity (i.e. it affirms 
not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily 
how it wants to be seen by others)” (Steele 2008, 3). Indeed, of what importance 
is one’s physical survival if one is unsure about one’s own identity?54 If the crisis 
of ontological insecurity lasts long enough, it can go so far as to undermine 
physical security itself.55 As demonstrated empirically in Chapters 4 and 5, and 
discussed in reference to literature and theory in Chapter 7,  de facto states face 
the same ontological dilemma regarding their relations with parent and patron 
states: what do they gain if they wrest the territory from the parent state but lose 
their de facto independence to their patron,56 if they gain security, but lose their 
identity in the process? 
Ontological security can be defined as a “sense of continuity and order in events” 
(Giddens 1991, 243) and conversely, ontological insecurity “refers to the deep, 
                                            
54 I do not see identity as a final destination that can be reached, and ontological security achieved 
once and for all - it is an ongoing and contested process consisting of temporary identifications. 
However, retrospectively and through nation and state-building, most de facto states manage to 
construct relatively stable relational social identities and national role conceptions and as such 
enjoy a degree of ontological security sustained through nationally accepted political narratives. 
55 In the Bible we are asked "For what does it profit a man to gain the whole world, and forfeit his 
soul?” (Mark 8:36) and there are several historical examples (from Huns to Mongols) when a 
nation has conquered another people but was in turn conquered by and wholly assimilated into 
the culture of the conquered. They achieved military conquest but lost the ontological war and 
ceased to exist as a separate people. 
56 In the case of post-Soviet de facto states similarities between the post-Soviet and post-colonial 
context become apparent (see Moore 2001 for the discussion whether the post- in post-colonial 
is the post- in post-Soviet). This similarity is a fortiori true for de facto states, whose need for the 
political (and in most cases economic) support of the patron puts them in a position similar to 
decolonised states’ (mostly economic) dependence on their former colonizers. In post-colonial 
context political independence and attainment of sovereignty have often meant substituting formal 
political imperialism with informal economic imperialism and relationships of domination and 
control by the same colonial ‘core’. Kuzio (2002), for example, merges the two contexts into a 
term ‘post-Soviet colonial space’ and Beissinger and Young (2002) dedicate a whole book to the 
comparison of post-colonial Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia. 
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incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore, 
i.e. how to get by in the world” (Mitzen 2006, 345): “The actor’s identity [is] 
insecure. Individuals are therefore motivated to create cognitive and behavioural 
certainty, which they do by establishing routines” (Mitzen 2006, 324). This 
insecurity is only exacerbated by non-recognition and the difficulties de facto 
states face in establishing interaction routines (official and diplomatic channels of 
communication and cooperation),57 making interactions largely ad hoc, 
unpredictable and uncertain. Ontologically insecure states are “consumed 
meeting immediate needs” and “cannot relate ends systematically to means in 
the present, much less plan ahead” (Mitzen 2006, 345).58 But why do states have 
ontological security, and how is it possible to justify the use of this concept? 
Steele (2008, 20) convincingly argues that “The reason states have an ontological 
security is because they have a historical account of themselves that has been 
‘built up’ through the narrative of agents of the past, present, and the future.”  
The ontological security perspective does not exclude physical security and does 
not marginalize its importance; physical security is a necessary, although not 
sufficient condition for ontological security. Similarly, it implies no determination, 
but simply states that preservation of self-identity matters to states and that failure 
to realise the socially constructed ontological aspirations of a polity (a failure that 
can itself be the result of physical security challenges) can have security 
consequences that cannot be explained by traditional accounts of security. This 
perspective sheds light on how states aim to fulfil their self-identity needs and 
aspires to unpack the ‘motives’ of state behaviour. While Steele looks at moral, 
humanitarian, and honour-driven motives (Steele 2008, 2) but only the latter is of 
immediate interest for this case as I explain in the next chapter. It is worth 
mentioning that honour-driven motives may seem “irrational – yet such behavior 
must have made sense to the state agents who decided upon that course of 
action at the time” (Steele 2008, 3). In other words: ontological security 
                                            
57 For example, in the case of Abkhazia, much of routinized interaction with countries, which have 
not recognised it, only occurs within the format of Geneva International Discussions between 
Abkhazia, Georgia and the co-chairs: EU, OSCE and UN.   
58 This is similar to Isachenko’s (2012, 3) above mentioned view of de facto states only being able 
to operate on the tactical, but not on the strategic level: “If a strategy can be planned regardless 
of circumstances, a tactic is characterized by dependency on the circumstances.” 
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perspective enables us to see rationality behind state actions, which Realists, 
focusing on physical security, would deem irrational.  
There are two versions of the ontological security perspective. The first is Mitzen’s 
(2006) and focuses on collective aspects, emphasizing identity constitution 
through interaction. The second version is Steele’s (2008) and focuses on 
individual aspects, looking at how identity arises through the construction of 
narratives.59 Steele’s version is based on the claim that “actors already 
constructed some sense of self and some understanding of others prior to 
contact” (Inayatullah & Blaney 1996, 73). An old philosophical dilemma whether 
essence precedes existence – which threatens to open up here – is relatively 
easily resolved when it comes to most de facto states (and all post-Soviet de 
facto states). Several of them only came into existence as de facto independent 
in 1990s. While it is in this time that they entered into contact and interaction with 
the outside world, their national identity together with narratives about it has 
already been established (although it continues to change) as a result of a long 
historical process.60 Although providing a convincing account of the internal 
dynamics of the state, Steele eventually takes a linguistic turn, goes down the 
postmodernist constructivist path and becomes increasingly focused on the Self 
and the state narratives that sustain it. Since de facto states like Abkhazia cannot 
be studied in isolation from the conflicts and the context of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union (Tekushev, Markedonov and Shevchenko 2013), I am interested 
primarily in the relations between interaction and the ontological security of de 
facto states. Therefore, I more closely follow Mitzen’s version, which is a better 
fit, but also incorporate Steele’s use of ‘routine’ and ‘critical situation’ (concepts 
taken over from Giddens) – which I proceed to define – into the conceptual 
framework. 
                                            
59 According to Lebow (2012) there is no identity in the strict sense; we only have a 
phenomenological identity of the moment. Therefore, it is therefore better to speak of 
identifications rather than of identities. 
60 One could argue that this is not the case of Transnistria. At the time of its emergence as a de 
facto state it had little in a way of a positive identity, but its negative identity was strong – people 
did not know what they wanted their state to be, but they knew they did not want to be part of 
Moldova, which was drawing ever closer to Romania. 
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According to Giddens (1984, 171) “agents encounter social structures through 
the sustained activity of self-identity fulfilment through foreign policy. States 
consciously reproduce actions that then in turn form a structure through what can 
be called agency because ‘human societies, or social systems, would plainly not 
exist without human agency.’” Based on this, Steele sees foreign policy as the 
realisation of self-identity through routines. Policy elites construct a notion of state 
identity out of temporary identifications through discourse and action: the product 
of the first are narratives, the product of the second are routines. The “forging of 
selves, then, is a path-dependent process, since it has to cram in a number of 
previously negotiated identities in order to be credible” (Neumann 1999, 218–
219). If the routines, on which it is based, and which sustain it are disrupted, the 
ontological security of the state is threatened.61 
“De facto states act to fulfil their self-identity needs and preserve their ontological 
security, sometimes going as far as compromising their physical security and 
even their existence” (Jakša 2017, 31). Fabry notes not only that ontological 
security is not dependent on recognition, but that recognition can even show 
cracks in it: “While foreign recognition of statehood may fulfil a deep psychological 
need, it is its denial that makes a people’s collective sense of who they are more 
robust. Obtaining recognition as a state may, in fact, reveal the fragility of national 
identity within that state” (Fabry 2017, 23). As mentioned, non-recognition, does 
not affect the ontological security of de facto states (along with their behaviour) 
directly. Rather, this happens indirectly as non-recognition is interpreted by the 
political elites, and it is these elite interpretations of non-recognition and non-
engagement that influence the ontological security de facto states. All post-Soviet 
de facto states have gone through at least three ‘critical situations’: 1) collapse of 
the USSR; 2) military conflict with their parent state for the control over the 
territory claimed by the de facto state; and 3) international recognition of territorial 
integrity of their parent state, ruling out their own recognition of independence. A 
gradual shift in perception (it sometimes happens at the same time as the third 
                                            
61 Giddens (1984, 61) calls these disruptions ‘critical situations’ and defines them as “radical 
disjunctions of an unpredictable kind affecting substantial numbers of individuals.” Critical 
situations need to be interpreted as such by policy makers, they cannot be predicted and normally 
catch states unprepared (Steele 2008, 12). Ontologically secure states show more resilience 
when faced with critical situations, which disrupt routines that sustain a state’s self-identity. 
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critical situation) occurs when the state is not preoccupied anymore with its own 
existential questions and tending to its needs and has the ability and confidence 
to enter into relations with other states with realistic expectations. Looking at de 
facto states, this usually occurs when de facto state stops prioritizing the long-
term quest for recognition (accepts its unrecognised status) and focuses instead 
on short and medium-term goals, such as state-building, attracting aid and 
investment, and forging cultural links. 
In relation to the ontological security perspective I briefly examine the ‘level of 
analysis problem’ (sometimes referred to as the problem of ‘personification’ or 
‘reification’ of the state), which - although not unique to ontological security 
perspective – is often the target of Waltz-inspired62 Realist attacks. As Steele 
(2005, 529) notes: “most models of International Relations base the needs of 
states on some type of individual and human need” and then scale it to the 
collective entity. Realism derives relations between states from Hobbesian 
relations between individuals and Liberalism from rational self-interested 
homines oeconomici. But this ‘everyone else does it’ argument is not enough to 
convince the sceptics of the ‘scaling-up’ and in addition to Mitzen’s three 
defences, Steele (2008, 18) offers his own defence, which is perhaps the most 
convincing: “because they represent their state, state agents ‘are the state’ 
because they have the moral burden of making policy choices and the capacity 
to implement those decisions.”63 My own argument to back these is that since 
individuals in the society and the state share the same culture (the argument is 
stronger when there is a distinct culture with well-defined norms, like the apswara 
in Abkhazia, examined in Chapter 4), the same patterns of perceiving, 
experiencing, interpreting, assessing, and responding are present at both levels. 
These defences notwithstanding, Realists may argue that the concept of 
ontological security is too loose or too vague. This accusation can be countered 
by pointing out that it is actually the Realist understanding of identity that is loose 
                                            
62 In his 1959 book, Man, the State, and War, Waltz introduces three ‘images’ or levels of analysis: 
individual (personalities of leaders), national (domestic politics) and international (inter-state 
politics). 
63 This ‘representing the state’ versus ‘being the state’ is similar to Isachenko’s (2012, 7) above 
mentioned distinction between ‘statecraft’- the ways statehood is constructed and maintained as 
opposed to ‘stateness’ – the understanding of the state as a fixed territorial entity. 
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because it treats identity as a vaguely defined ‘type’ while its behaviourist view of 
states as ‘black boxes’ or ‘billiard balls’ prevents it from exploring intra-state 
dynamics and providing and account of how identity is shaped by and shapes the 
(inter)actions of states. This is precisely what the emphasis on ontological 
security allows. It enables one to structure their understanding of disparate and 
ever-changing state interests into a more coherent whole: “state interests change 
all the time, and if this is the case, then identity changes are possible within similar 
institutional forms. Ontological security helps connect interests to these sudden 
engagements with identity” (Steele 2008, 20). When interests are not material 
(such as ontological and identity-related), a synthesis of Realist and 
Constructivist perspectives is the only way not to abandon either for the sake of 
the other.  
The perspective has certain limitations beyond the ones mentioned in the 
literature and referred to above and that have become clearer to me throughout 
the research process. I argue that the most important of these limitations is that 
ontological security tends to cover – and fails to distinguish between – both 
ontological security and what I call epistemological security. If ontological security 
is the security of identity (the internal self), then epistemological security can be 
conceptualised as the security of the knowledge about the environment and 
different actors (elaborated further in Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the perspective 
of ontological security, especially its emphasis on narratives (discourse) and 
routines (action) does, enable a closer look at the internal situation in de facto 
states, enabling concrete elements of de facto states’ behaviour to be examined. 
Having stated that I follow the North American version of Constructivism more 
closely, I am primarily concerned with routines (actions) and not narratives 
(discourse),64 which has influenced my choice of methodology (Chapter 3). 
                                            
64 The routines (action) and narratives (discourse) are interdependent and do not develop 
independently one without the other. Therefore, the distinction I make is not of a theoretical, but 
of practical character – it is a necessary methodological distinction to either focus on conducting 
the process tracing of foreign policy behaviour through interviews or to focus on conducting 
discourse analysis of documentary data. Doing both at the same time would not only complicate 
the methodology but prolong the research beyond the scope of this thesis.   
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Geopolitical role 
I now turn to and the wider geopolitical considerations and their influence on de 
facto states’ foreign policy. I do this through introducing and developing the 
concept of geopolitical role, which brings together ideational (state identity) and 
material (territoriality) aspects of de facto states’ identity. Realists largely view 
“state motivations as fixed across time and state agents, and myopically 
connected to the survival drive of states” (Steele 2008, 8). Studies of de facto 
states have tended to focus on de facto state’s relationship to its patron state, 
parent state, or have simply denied any agency to de facto states (Frear 2014, 
83).65 Isachenko (2012, 3) has argued that de facto states employ different 
tactics, but non-recognition prevents them from having a strategy of their own 
(except when it comes to domestic policies). Instead they figure as objects in 
strategies of others and are much more reactive than proactive in their behaviour. 
This essentially Realist view puts severe constraints on agency and begs the 
question whether the constraints have anything to do with non-recognition and 
everything to do with the power capacities of the (non-recognised) state. 
Instead, I propose to adopt a Constructivist view of how de facto states cope with 
non-recognition. “To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, international social order is 
what states make of it, and thus what roles they play. The resulting international 
order thus shapes the social parameters within which individual states (and non-
state actors) pursue their individual ambitions and resolve their collective 
problems” (Harnisch et al. 2011, 2). Focusing on the role “offers a promising 
avenue for resolving on of IR theory’s most intractable problems, the relationship 
between actors and the system in international relations. Roles, as the notions of 
actors about who they are, what they would like to be with regard to others, and 
how they therefore should interact in (international) social relationships, are at the 
intersection between those two levels of analysis, and they also serve as hinges 
between the two” (Harnisch et al. 2011, 2). In my theoretical framework, 
introducing the concept of role serves three purposes: 
                                            
65 When de facto states secured support of a patron, they began to be seen as pawns in the game 
of big powers. For instance, claims that Russia is creating a cordon sanitaire made of dependent 
de facto states were made early on (Rywkin 1995). 
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1. It bridges the gap between the actor and the system (structure) and allows 
us to scale-up discussions about ontological security to the state-level. 
2. It operationalizes the concept of identity so that it is possible to show how 
states, drawing on their identity traits (traditions, social norms, notions of 
honour), put these into practices as temporary identifications, which 
constitute a role. 
3. It serves as the foundation for the concept of geopolitical role, which 
considers both ideational and material aspects drawing on the tradition of 
Critical Geopolitics. 
The main drawback of the Constructivist approach to IR (and in particular its 
European version) is that by putting the emphasis on the non-material entities, 
such as identity, interest and interpretation, relations between states (understood 
as socially constructed) become detached from their material environment: the 
territorial reality in which state exist. Although Wendt’s constructivism does not 
reject material explanations for state behaviour, it argues they are insufficient, 
and that ideational analysis is also required, which is what then the focus of his 
analysis becomes. If realism overplays the role of territory, its size, natural 
resources, size of population etc., constructivism underplays it. Therefore, 
Wendt’s approach has to be corrected. This is done through drawing on two 
traditions later on in the thesis: empirical constructivists66 (who have criticized 
Wendt) and Critical Geopolitics67 (which has reaffirmed the importance of territory 
vis-à-vis post-modernists while criticized the modernist view of territory as given 
and objective).  
Although the term ‘geopolitical role’68 is used by policy practitioners and the 
media69, there is no single definition of the term in academia. As written before, 
                                            
66 For an overview of constructivist empirical research see Finnemore (2001). 
67 The main works in this relatively recently emerged, but quickly developing field are: Toal (1996); 
Dalby and Toal (1998); Agnew (2003); Dodds, Kuus and Sharp (2013); Ingram and Dodds (2016). 
68 The concept of geopolitical role is ‘softer’ than the concept of geopolitical position in terms of 
suggesting influence rather than determinism and allowing for a degree of flexibility; de facto 
states take up different roles, change and combine them. In the following chapter, de facto states 
are examined more closely from the point of view of their engagement with other actors in the 
international community; as actors (conducting their own foreign policy) and as contested 
territories (being the object of recognised states’ foreign policies). 
69 Nicos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus recently gave a speech on the 
Geopolitical Role of Cyprus. 
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the concept designates a role that de facto states, influenced by ideational (state 
identity) and material (territoriality) factors, can play in foreign policy.70 One can 
read about specific roles de facto states play: contested territories, zones of 
influence, pawns, small states, linchpins, power brokers, etc. – yet their 
geopolitical roles have never been defined and elaborated.  
The distinction between identity and role does not mean that identity is static, and 
role is dynamic: “there are many ways to be agentic, including choosing rationally, 
matching appropriately, or varying a performative act.” (Mitzen 2006, 344). A 
state can therefore simply and automatically react to other actions, but it can also 
perform a role. The degree to which its actions are merely reactions to the actions 
of others or there is more planning and statecraft (Isachenko 2012) involved, is 
influenced by the state’s physical and ontological security, which in turn affects 
its margin of freedom of action. Just as the relation between identity and 
interaction is dialectical, so is the relationship between identity and role: “for a 
role to constitute an actor and motivate behaviour over time, it must be expressed 
in behaviour and that behaviour must be recognised by others as fulfilling the 
role.” (Mitzen 2006, 358) The role the state is playing must be credible – be 
recognised as such by others. Mitzen recognises the necessity of role to explain 
identity and interaction, but her conceptual development remains limited. When 
she states that “ideally, internally held role identities and externally recognised 
roles correspond, but as security dilemmas persist, by definition they will not,” 
(Mitzen 2006, 359) her terminology is confusing. It’s not exactly clear what she 
means by “internally held role identities” as role is something that is always 
external – the role only exists for the other (Turner 1956, 316). She claims that 
“states do not have the final say in whether they are security-seekers; other states 
play a crucial role” (Mitzen 2006, 357). I challenge that: states do have a final say 
in which role they play, but their success in playing it is determined by the 
environment and other actors. To sum up: roles that states play should be 
understood as external, directed at other states, decided by the state in question, 
                                            
70 The concept of geopolitical role allows us to conceive of different foreign policy approaches that 
de facto states adopt, in the context of territorial as well as more subjective (representation) and 
reflexive (self-representation) factors. It also allows to group together common characteristics and 
acts as a tool for comparing foreign policies of de facto states. 
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but their success is ultimately determined by other states. Mitzen (2006, 357) also 
claims that roles “locate and define the individual with respect to a social context; 
they are clusters of practices that constitute actors as objects of social experience 
(the ‘Me’).” Instead, I argue that roles do not locate and define the individual with 
respect only to social, but also the physical context. An actor in the theatre 
interacts with other actors, but also with the stage and the scenery. In playing out 
their geopolitical roles, the states locate and define themselves with respect to 
their geopolitical position and other states. However, before examining the 
concept of geopolitical role in more detail, I look at how role theory has been used 
in IR and how I can draw on that in my research: 
“There is an antecedent literature on roles in foreign policy analysis (FPA), 
international relations theory and social science theory proper. The 
concept of ‘role,’ originally developed by sociologists, deals with the 
assumptions and values individuals bring to their interactions with others. 
Depending on who those others are, in what relationship they stand with 
the individual under consideration, and in what specific social context the 
interactions take place, those roles differ; individuals thus are regularly 
considered to play multiple roles” (Turner 2001, 1). 
I define geopolitical role as a set of behaviours exhibited by a certain political 
entity in international politics, which reflects its position, importance and ability to 
project power and exert influence. This is in turn influenced by material-territorial 
factors, such as physical location, size, climate, topography, demography, natural 
resources, and technological factors that determine its strategic value for other 
(national, regional or global) players in international politics. The geopolitical role 
thus depends on geographical factors as well as on subjective perception and 
interpretation of these factors (strategic importance ascribed to them) by 
themselves and other political entities.71 
Using the concept of geopolitical role also allows us to account for change in the 
structure/agency equilibrium and enables us to study de facto states as changing 
                                            
71 To give an example of Kosovo, a peripheral region with little strategic importance is in Serbian 
media consistently referred to as the 'heart of Serbia' due to perceived historical and cultural 
importance for Serbian identity. 
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entities (as geopolitical role can be played, and one is not condemned to it – or 
blessed with it – which is the case of the concept of geopolitical position) and to 
emphasize the process over a snapshot of a point-in-time. This is important when 
comparing de facto states as it enables us to identify trends and predict future 
developments, therefore increasing the relevance of the research. 
Although it is important to reaffirm the importance of the spatial dimension of 
politics, one must conceive of the relationship between space and politics as a 
two-way (Critical Geopolitics) rather than a one-way (Classical Geopolitics) 
relationship (Agnew 2009, 2). I understand geopolitics not just in the sense of the 
impact of geography on politics, but also vice versa – the impact of politics on 
geography, or as Toal (1996) put it, “the politics of writing space”. Although 
geopolitical role is largely influenced by geographical variables, these are always 
mediated through cultural categories, which in turn construct geography through 
identity politics – from naming places to drawing maps and building memorials. It 
is important to point out that in Toal’s work (as well as in the works of other 
scholars working in the tradition of Critical Geopolitics) the political nature of 
geography is perceived through a linguistic turn and defined in terms of discourse, 
narratives, meanings, which is analogous to how identity is seen by the European 
version of Constructivism. Instead, I want to define it in terms in which North 
American Constructivism would, i.e. in terms of the importance of social norms 
and identities in the construction of geography with a research agenda of 
explaining relationships between de facto state and other actors through 
examining the interplay of identity and territoriality. It is through this 
understanding, offered by critical geopolitics and adjusted to fit my specific focus 
that I can establish the link between the territorial and the ethno-political (identity) 
nature of conflicts in de facto states.72  
To paraphrase Karl Marx (2008), states “make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, 
but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” 
These ‘inherited’ circumstances include everything from physical environment in 
                                            
72 The complex relationship between (territorial) security and (national) identity in the context of 
EU integration was explored by Kuus (2007). 
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which a state is situated (territory), to its social environment (predominant norms, 
values, and routines of interactions transmitted from the past) and the interplay 
of the two.73 A de facto state is composed of population and territory. Its state 
identity consists of national identity74 and geopolitical identity and geopolitical role 
draws on both. In defining national identity, I draw on Morin & Paquin (2018, 261) 
who define it as “a socially constructed image that a political community uses to 
portray itself. It is made up of a set of elements, including constitutive norms, 
comparative categories, collective aspirations and cognitive references” I 
examine each of these four categories in Chapter 4. 
A geopolitical role develops when policy makers look at and interpret material-
territorial factors through the prism of their perceptions. These perceptions differ 
from individual to individual, but they are collectively shaped (I develop this further 
in Chapter 4) by national identity, understood by Morin & Paquin (2018, 261) as 
consisting of four elements: constitutive norms, comparative categories, 
collective aspirations and cognitive references. In the case of Abkhazia these 
elements consist of norms, values, traditions and a sense of honour incorporated 
in the informal code of conduct ‘apswara’. Furthermore, every identity is relational 
and the perceptions of Abkhazian policy-makers are relational too, shaped by the 
comparative categories of kin, diaspora, friend, foe as well as considerations 
about the precarious demographic situation of the Abkhaz domestically. 
Furthermore, the prism is shaped by anxieties and the experiences of stigma, 
shame, and isolation. 
Geopolitical roles are not as much developed as they develop. The reason for 
this is that many of the abovementioned elements that constitute the prism 
                                            
73 This interplay between the geographical (territory) and social (interaction) environment can be 
explored through the concept of boundedness. “The bounded character of states makes them 
‘containers,’ enabling a government to concentrate its allocative and authoritative resources, thus 
increasing its administrative power (Giddens 1985: 13) – even if those resources have recently 
been undercut by Globalization.” (Ferguson 2003, 9). Furthermore, “it is the boundedness of a 
state that makes government such a ‘weighty actor,’ and social geography within those bounds 
structures how that weight is thrown around” (Ferguson 2003, 10). The boundedness of a state 
is in its essence territorial boundedness – a state’s geostrategic position, its resources etc., which 
influence which geopolitical roles it can play. 
74 National identities are partly a result of the roles states play(ed): France’s identity still reflects 
the role of a great power it once played, while Switzerland’s neutrality identity still reflects its 
smallness and precarious geopolitical position. 
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through which decision-makers interpret material-territorial factors, are 
subconscious. For example, policy-makers may be affected by the siege 
mentality stemming from Abkhazia’s isolation by the international community and 
overdependence on Russia. During my interviews, ‘siege mentality’ was never 
mentioned by my interviewees as a factor in their decision-making. Yet their often 
emotional responses to the questions related to the international status of 
Abkhazia and the firm belief in the righteousness of their cause (which was 
sometimes emotional, such as when they claimed that “recognition does not 
really matter”, is “not that important”, and that “it is enough to have recognised 
ourselves, and that we were recognised by Russia”), point to ‘siege mentality’ 
being a factor in how they interpret the empirical reality they inhabit. 
As I have argued before, leaning on Isachenko’s research (2012), post-Soviet de 
facto states do not act strategically due to limitations of size, resources and 
status. However, despite not being able to fundamentally change the 
environment in which they operate, they are capable of tactical adaptation, which 
is what playing a geopolitical role comes down to. Playing geopolitical roles is 
partly a result of policy makers’ subconscious interpretations of material-territorial 
factors through the prism of their perceptions and partly conscious tactical 
adaptations and reactions to threats and opportunities in their environment. The 
prerequisites for role play are therefore: the presence of objective conditions that 
enable the role75 (such as occupying territory that is a natural strategically 
important location – 'chokepoint', or through which leads the best transit route for 
natural resources, or possessing such resources themselves); a specific 
subconscious interpretation of material-territorial factors based on national 
identity; and  policy-makers’ conscious tactical adaptations to threats and 
opportunities in the environment. 
My taxonomy of geopolitical roles helps make sense of the plethora of foreign 
policy behaviours of de facto states by grouping them into six categories and 
classifying them according to common characteristics. As such, it is more a 
                                            
75 Extending the dramaturgical metaphor further, these objective conditions are to the de facto 
state what the stage set is to an actor. An actor without the stage, set design, costume, lighting, 
and an audience can no more play a role than a de facto state can play a geopolitical role without 
having some predispositions to do so. 
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heuristic device that helps us understand foreign policy of de facto states than an 
explanatory tool for foreign policy outcomes. Nevertheless, as the 
abovementioned examples of the different roles played by Abkhazia at different 
times suggest, Abkhazia – an internationally unrecognized state with a population 
of mere 200.000 and few natural resources - was occasionally able to ‘punch 
above its weight’ by tactically making use of opportunities that presented itself to 
it. From compelling Georgia to keep its military expenses high, preventing from 
joining the EU and NATO, to influencing Russian political elites, complying with 
Russian sanctions against Turkey in anticipation of future benefits, and finally, 
creating ‘facts on the ground’ that favour the status quo. However, Abkhazia did 
not achieve all this alone and benefitted from strong and overt Russian support 
since the early 2000s. It also did not always manage to achieve the desired policy 
outcome by playing a geopolitical role. For instance, it overestimated the 
importance of its geographical position for the Olympic games in Sochi and the 
high hopes of large Russian investments never materialized. To give another 
notable example, it failed to convince the international community that it has 
‘earned’ recognition. This shows that roles do not have a predetermined outcome 
but depend on how realistic the goals they aim for are, how well the roles are 
played, and how the role-playing is accepted by the audience. To sum up, 
geopolitical roles are both internally driven and based on external perceptions. 
Their success depends on the alignment of the two. 
Since post-Soviet de facto states lack ‘social capital’, they draw on the resources 
from physical environment. They attract patrons with offers to extract their 
resources and use their territory for transit. They rent-out strategically important 
locations for their patrons to establish military bases and offer them sea and 
airspace access for military purposes. In other words, they try to maximize 
physical and economic security, while maintaining ontological security through 
playing different geopolitical roles: 
1. Divider: they can be used by other states in enforcing the divide et impera 
policy. They can be a source of conflict and instability, preventing the 
countries involved in the conflict from fully developing by requiring them to 
 
44 
 
keep military expenditures high. Nagorno-Karabakh claimed by Armenian 
and Karabakh is a case in point.  
2. Middle man: play an important role in extraction and transit of natural 
resources, in the case of post-Soviet unrecognised states especially oil 
and gas pipelines. In some cases, they also possess their own natural 
resources (copper and gold in Nagorno Karabakh, timber and coal in 
Abkhazia) or important infrastructure (steel and weapons production in 
Transnistria). 
3. Tollman: due to topographical features, such as mountain ranges or dense 
forests76 act as strategically important locations – 'chokepoints', for 
instance military corridors, mountain passes, river crossings or coastal 
straights. Examples include Lachin corridor connecting Armenia with 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Roki Tunnel connecting North and South Ossetia. 
4. Extorter: secure benefits (aid, investment) in turn for their compliance. A 
case in point are past and would-be unrecognised states, which have 
declared independence, but were forced or convinced to renounce it. 
Gagauzia made a lucrative deal with Moldova, whereas Chechnya was 
reincorporated into Russia, who then invested heavily in the republic. 
5. Keeper of the status quo: delaying regional integration. Transnistria is a 
major concern in Moldova’s aspirations to join the EU, as are Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia for Georgia. 
6. Emulator: they attempt to emulate recognised states and adopt 
international democracy and human rights standards, differentiating 
themselves from their parent states in order to gain recognition.  
 
Each unrecognised state can play different roles at different times or even 
combine elements of several roles. As will be shown in Chapter 7, Abkhazia has 
played the role of the middle man, keeper of the status quo and emulator at 
different times. 
                                            
76 A predominant part of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as a substantial 
part of Kosovo are mountainous and densely forested, making the terrain ideal for asymmetric 
warfare. 
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The concept of geopolitical role highlights the fact that state is both an actor as 
well as a structure, which does not exist separate from sub-state actors and elites 
that rule it: “what is very real about ‘the state’ is the myth of its independent 
existence. Belief in the state is acceptance of being ruled. The idea of the state 
legitimates the compulsory control of a population by a political elite” (Ferguson 
2003, 9). People are ruled by the elites in the name of the state and not the other 
way around. To understand how the state works and how it acts, one must 
understand how the elites perceive the situations in which a state finds itself in 
and how they take decisions based on these perceptions and interpretations. The 
concept of geopolitical role can thus be put to use by looking at how policy elites 
interpret and relate to the wider geopolitical context and how this affects the 
interaction of de facto states through foreign policy.  
Before proceeding to develop an integrated theoretical framework, it is important 
to clarify the relationship between a state’s identity and its role(s). This is far from 
straight-forward as they are “closely intertwined in the work of most researchers, 
but hardly ever clearly defined and related to each other” (Harnisch et al. 2011, 
9). This confusion is compounded by the fact that scholarship on the matter 
differentiates between several kinds of identities and roles: national self-image 
(Hirshberg 1993), national role conception (Holsti 1970), and state (corporate, 
type, collective, and national) identity (Wendt 1994). Harnisch et al. (2011, 8) 
distinguish between role conceptions, defined by the decision makers, role 
enactment, which is how these conceptions manifest in foreign policy behavior, 
and role adaptation – referring to “changes of strategies and instruments in 
performing a role” (Harnisch et al. 2011, 10). Importantly, Breuning (2011, 26) 
conceptualises roles as having ideational as well as material elements (I claim 
the same and emphasize this through my concept of geopolitical role): 
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The relationship between identity and role is easier to disentangle through an 
example: “Think of the aspiring actor who waits tables. He may see himself as an 
actor, and take classes, audition and talk constantly about theater. But until he 
gets the breakthrough role, in an important sense he cannot ‘be’ an actor. There 
is simply no way for us to know him as such; to society he is a waiter. Moreover, 
if his acting attempts are poorly received, over time he may become attached to 
the waiter identity, because that is the identity his daily routines actually sustain” 
(Mitzen 2006, 347–348). As the metaphor illustrates, identity is therefore a 
singularity, something internally held, and exists independently from the multiple 
roles the subject can play, but at the same time is related to the role and 
influenced by whether role-playing is accepted or not. There can thus be a tension 
between role conception and role enactment in a way that “changes in roles or 
role sets are important determinants for both role enactment and identity 
formation” (Harnisch et al. 2011, 9). Krotz and Sperling (2011, 9) have concluded 
that the smaller the number of roles an actor performs, the more likely it is that 
these roles shape the identity of that actor. To further clarify the relationship 
between identity and role in international relations, it is useful to look at McCourt’s 
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research in which he asked whether Britain reinvaded the Falklands because of 
its identity or was this required by the role it played in international politics. 
According to him, “Britain’s decision to reinvade the Falkland Islands is 
incomplete without taking into consideration the roles that served to give meaning 
to Britain’s actions. Britain’s principled sense of Self was brought into doubt by 
the invasion, its ontological security threatened, but the way in which it could 
affirm its identity was crucially dependent on the international social context of its 
response” (McCourt 2011, 1619–1620). A role is more than a way of signalling 
and performing the identity that the actor identifies with or aspires to. Role is not 
simply a way identity manifests externally, in a given social context, but also a 
way of affirming identity and providing it with meaning (McCourt 2011, 1599). 
Developing an integrated approach 
As existing approaches to de facto states each by themselves do not offer a good 
theoretical basis to answer my research question and IR theory does not have a 
coherent approach I could use, I needed to introduce new concepts to examine 
how interpretations of non-recognition influence the foreign policy interactions 
between de facto states and recognised actors: state identity, ontological security 
and geopolitical role. Although I have, in some places, identified the links between 
them, I now bring these concepts into a coherent theoretical framework that 
bridges the Realist-Constructivist divide and provides an explanatory basis for 
my research. 
One of the most notable attempts to bridge the opposition between Realism and 
Constructivism is Barkin’s (2003) effort to reconcile constructivist normative 
transformation with realist conception of power. To do so, he proposes a realist 
infusion into Constructivism dominated by liberalism and idealism. Barkin’s work 
is particularly relevant to my research, because how de facto states interpret non-
recognition (Constructivist focus on interpretation) affects their interaction with 
other actors, but the interpreting process itself depends on considerations that 
consider physical and ontological security as well as wider geopolitical 
considerations (Realist focus on power derived from material capabilities). This 
calls for detachment from idealism and a greater consideration of material factors 
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(although ‘socialised’ through the concept of geopolitical role, which is performed 
by policy elites interpreting the wider geopolitical context). It also calls for 
“dissociating constructivism from the liberal tradition” (Jackson 2004, 337), which 
means shifting the focus from norms that facilitate cooperation towards routines 
that sustain the security (which is again both material and ideational – physical 
and ontological) of de facto states.77 
The infusion of Realism need not go too far, of course as it would bring us back 
to the starting point. The subjective nature of non-recognition (which lends itself 
to interpretation and affects interaction), the constructed, changing and 
interaction-dependent nature of identity, the conceptualisation of security as both 
physical and ontological, and of geopolitical role as (although rooted in 
territoriality) socially constructed all have to be maintained. However, this does 
not mean that the Realist notions of power and conflict are incompatible and have 
to be rejected. They can be maintained but have to be reconceptualised from 
substantive to relational categories. Power does not simply manifest itself in the 
ability to preserve physical security and project influence, but also in the ability to 
preserve ontological security and successfully perform geopolitical roles with the 
aim of increasing de facto independence in the context of non-recognition. 
Conflict is not an inherent property of the international system, but a relation, 
which emerges in a specific context, such as the conflicts between parent and de 
facto states in the post-Soviet context. 
As Ejdus (2017, 1), warns, ontological security should not be considered the 
opposite of physical security in the sense of being immaterial, while the latter is 
material: “Extant scholarship on ontological security in international relations has 
focused on the significance of social environments for state identity. In this article, 
I argue that material environments also provide an important source of ontological 
security for states.” Instead, ontological security is tied to sustaining the identity 
through interaction and routines (which can be and are material), while physical 
security is tied to defending its territory and population (which are as socially 
                                            
77 The departure from Liberalism is even more necessary when it comes to post-Soviet de facto 
states, which are embroiled in bitter political conflicts with their parent states. While Liberalism 
can explain well the cases of state cooperation, Realism offers the best explanatory framework 
for understanding conflict. 
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constructed as they are material). Critical Geopolitics has long stressed that the 
territory is not some dead natural thing that exists independently, but that it is 
‘written’ – it depends on the subjects that inhabit it, contest it, fight over it, and 
talk about it. I define geopolitical role of de facto states more narrowly as a set of 
foreign policy behaviours aimed at external actors (parent and patron state as 
well as the international community) with the aim of preserving both ontological 
and physical security of the state, maximizing its margin of political independence 
and economic prosperity. I argue that certain geopolitical factors can compensate 
for unrecognised states’ lack of recognition and allow them to 'punch above their 
weight' (Edis 1991; Björkdahl 2007: Jakobsen 2009), much like some small states 
(in particular the Scandinavian ones) do, partly through playing geopolitical roles. 
I expect these elements (material and ideational) and the core concepts (state 
identity, ontological security and geopolitical role) of my approach to interact in 
various ways. First, I expect the policy elites to be very conscious of the 
geopolitical context and internal developments in the de facto state and to make 
connections between the two.78 Second, I expect policy elites to have a strong 
interest in preserving the state identity (supported by nation-building and state 
building practices), to consider ontological security as important and see foreign 
policy as one of the ways to preserve it.79 Third, I expect policy elites to 
understand the geopolitical interests other actors have in their territory and 
resources and to know which roles they can play in order to preserve (or even 
increase) their de facto independence.80  
                                            
78 For example, the NGOs in post-Soviet de facto states, especially the ones of which the patron 
state is Russia (which exerts significant political and cultural influence over them), are often 
branded as ‘foreign agents’, reflecting the belief that their efforts to bring about social and political 
change (internal developments) are supported by Western powers (primarily the EU and the US) 
and motivated by their geopolitical ambitions. 
79 For example, policy elites in post-Soviet de facto states are very proud of their state identity, 
which they have preserved through armed struggle and weary of over-dependence on their 
patron. In Abkhazia the fight for independence was largely seen as a struggle to preserve their 
national identity and see the growing Russian influence as a threat to it (for instance by the use 
of Russian language as a lingua franca, strong presence of Russian in culture and media). 
Foreign policy is one of the tools used to prevent re-incorporation into the parent state (and risk 
assimilation) both through seeking recognition and engagement, and to curb (legislation that 
prevents non-Abkhazians from buying land) and balance (multi-vector foreign policy) the influence 
of the patron state. 
80 For example, although Abkhazia depends on Russia for security, there is a growing sense 
among the policy elites sense that Russia should pay more for being allowed to keep military 
bases on its territory (role of extorter). 
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My theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy of de facto states fills the 
gaps in two bodies of literature: it draws on IR theory that has had very little to 
say about de facto states (gap in IR theory) and on existing literature on de facto 
states, which has not explored issues of state identity and the meaning of non-
recognition (gap in de facto states literature). It builds on both, but constructs a 
framework based on concepts of state identity, ontological security and 
geopolitical role to better understand the linkage of material and ideational, 
physical and ontological, territorial and role factors, in the interaction between de 
facto states and recognised actors.  
Conclusion 
This chapter clarified and elaborated the research puzzle and developed the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. Departing from the research question on how 
interpretations of non-recognition influence the foreign policy interactions 
between Abkhazia and Russia, the EU and the US, I have taken stock of state-
of-the art in literature, identified its major contributions and gaps relevant to my 
project, and proposed ways of addressing them. I then defined my key concepts: 
identity, ontological security and geopolitical role, followed by an examination of 
the intersections and interactions between the concepts to connect them into a 
single theoretical framework that builds bridges between the Realist and 
Constructivist theories of IR. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion on 
how my theoretical framework can be applied to the study of the foreign policy 
interaction of de facto states (further discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 7) and what 
forms of explanation I expect this approach to yield. 
My theoretical framework lends itself well to qualitative empirical research. 
Therefore, I expect to be able to demonstrate the interaction of the three 
aforementioned elements of my approach, test my hypotheses and answer my 
research question through process tracing and elite interviewing. Process tracing 
is an appropriate method to examine the evolution of de facto states’ and 
recognised actors’ foreign policy. Examining policy documents can uncover 
narratives that sustain state identity and institutional routines that preserve 
ontological security in de facto states and the influence of interpretation of status 
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on engagement of actors who engage with them. Interviews with policy elites are 
an appropriate method to tease out the important factors that shape policy elites’ 
(in both de facto states and recognised actors) interpretations of non-recognition. 
I discuss the application of the theoretical framework to the case study of 
Abkhazia and the methodology in more detail in Chapter 3. 
I expect my thesis to yield two main types81 of explanation.82 The explanation of 
foreign policy interaction between de facto states will likely be ideational: 
dependent on the interpretation of non-recognition and ‘man made’ – “the 
consequences of ‘resolved contingencies’, meaning that it must have been 
possible at some point for a different set of ideas or institutions to be in place” 
(Daigneault & Béland 2015, 387). I expect the explanation of the interpretation 
(which factors influence it and how) of non-recognition to be institutional: “based 
on rationality under constraints” - the logic of position (Daigneault & Béland 2015, 
387) and particular. That said, I believe the strongest explanation in the sense of 
causal relationship to emerge between the ideational (elements of state identity) 
and material factors (wider geopolitical considerations) and the interpretation of 
non-recognition. The explanation of how the interpretation of non-recognition 
affects foreign policy will likely be more interpretative than causational. To 
summarize, I expect my thesis to contribute to explaining how non-recognition is 
interpreted and explaining how the interpretations of non-recognition influence 
foreign policy interactions between de facto state and recognised actors.  
                                            
81 Parsons (2007) discusses four types of explanation in political science: institutional, ideational, 
structural and psychological. He maps these along two dimensions – general/particular and 
position/interpretation. Institutional explanations are made from position and are particular, 
ideational are made from Interpretation and are particular, structural are made from position and 
are general and psychological are made from interpretation and are general. For a detailed 
analysis see Parsons (2007) and Daigneault and Béland (2015). 
82 “To ‘explain’ involves making a statement about why something has occurred, by contrast with 
how it occurred or what it is” (Brady and Collier 2004, 288). 
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Chapter 2: Introduction  
to the case study 
“Here's a map of the Byzantine Empire, here is Absilly - they are marked not as 
a territory of the Roman Empire in 211 AD. That is, they were considered by the 
Romans in the 3rd century, as a separate state. Absilly, Abkhazian tribes. So, 
the beginning of the Abkhaz statehood, begins precisely in this period”  
– Interview with Alik Gabelia 
 
Introduction 
As has been established in the preceding chapter, one of the under-researched 
aspects of de facto states has been the meaning that they attach to non-
recognition and how this affects their behaviour. In furthering this understanding, 
this chapter serves two purposes. First, it introduces the historical context, which 
is then referred back to in the empirical chapters. As this is an in-depth single-
case study, understanding the history is crucial. Because my research puts 
emphasis on identity and culture, honour and apswara (explored further in 
Chapter 4), it is unavoidable to understand the context of their emergence and 
their relevance in different historical periods. The history of Abkhazia is 
contentious, and historiography has been a battlefield for Georgian and Abkhaz 
history scholars for decades before the escalation of ethnic tensions that led to 
the 1992–1993 war. As confirmed in the empirical chapters and explored further 
in Chapter 7, history matters, and ontological security concerns have a long 
history that predates the current conflict, stemming from the fears of annexation, 
overdependence, and marginalization as well as the corresponding concerns to 
preserve their physical and ontological security.83 
                                            
83 As these fears are an important part of Abkhazia’s history and identity, and continue to shape 
its foreign policy, it is worth explaining where they come from, why they exist and what their 
implication is for the foreign policy of Abkhazia. As the historical account in this chapter 
demonstrates, Abkhazians have been, throughout parts of modern history, subject to assaults on 
their territory and on their identity. Throughout its history, Abkhazia repeatedly saw its lands 
conquered and foreign rule established after periods of relative autonomy: it was incorporated 
into the Georgian Kingdom in 11th century, conquered by the Russian Empire in the late 19th 
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Second, the chapter provides information about the empirical scope of the 
research, including a discussion on case selection and its justification, time frame 
of my research and the expectations. I present my case selection of Abkhazia in 
terms of critical and extreme/deviant case among the population of de facto 
states. While a critical case allows for exploring if and why it stands out among 
de facto states in terms of foreign policy interaction, choosing it as an 
extreme/deviant case, helps to better understand post-Soviet de facto states as 
a group (what they share and how Abkhazia differs from them). I argue that 
despite not being a typical case, Abkhazia has enough in common with other de 
facto states that some external generalizability of conclusions can be expected 
(further discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7). Looking at the other side of the 
interaction, I have chosen Russia, the EU and the US as the actors with which 
Abkhazia has most significant and meaningful engagement. In terms of timeline, 
I will be looking at the period between October 12, 1999 and November 24, 2014. 
I present my reasons for both choices below. Finally, I briefly discuss my research 
expectations which already anticipate some fieldwork and methodological 
choices (Chapter 3) and possible findings (Chapter 7) and as such link the 
theoretical-historical part of my dissertation (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2) to the 
methodological part (Chapter 3). 
Historical context 
Abkhazia is a land with an ancient history with “Abkhazians tracing their lineage 
to the Hittites, a tribe that ruled over Anatolia in the second and third centuries 
                                            
century and incorporated into the Georgian SSR in 1931. In this context, a fear of being swallowed 
up territorially by Georgia or Russia, annexed or re-incorporated respectively, is understandable. 
Perhaps an even greater danger is that of being robbed of their identity, a fear that exists because 
of the historical experience of both Russification and Georgianisation, as shown in this chapter. 
This fear is nowadays most closely associated with a concern for the preservation of Abkhaz 
identity in the face of overdependence on Russia and the precarious internal demographic 
situation in which the Abkhaz make up barely half of the population of the titular republic. To sum 
up, Abkhazians have three main fears: the fear of being attacked and swallowed up by Georgia, 
the fear of being turned into a protectorate by Russia, and the fear of being marginalised in their 
own republic by the minorities that constitute half of the population (without counting the expelled 
Georgian refugees). The implication of these fears for the foreign policy of Abkhazia will become 
clearer in the empirical chapters and in the Interaction between the ‘isolation’ and ‘engulfment’ 
section of Chapter 7. Here, it suffices to state that as a result of these fears, Abkhazia’s foreign 
policy has vacillated between the strategies of multi-vector foreign policy and patron reliance, and 
the defence mechanism of self-isolation. 
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BC.” (George 2009, 99). It is not, however, the intention and is well beyond the 
scope of this thesis to present an all-encompassing account of Abkhaz history. 
Instead, the account focuses mainly on the Soviet and post-Soviet history of 
Abkhazia, especially on periods and events that are relevant to understanding 
Abkhazia’s de facto statehood between 1999 and 2014 (the time-frame of the 
thesis) and in particular with reference to my theoretical framework and the core 
concepts of identity, ontological security, and geopolitical role. 
The Pre-Soviet period: origins of statehood 
The kingdom of Colchis, which is subject to many legends, can be traced back to 
the 8th century BC. Scarce historical sources make it impossible to determine the 
exact location of the Colchian kingdom so Samegrelo (Mingrelia in Georgia), 
Krasnodar Krai (Russia) and Abkhazia vie for this ancient heritage (Sideri 2012, 
263). In the first century AD, the territory of today’s Abkhazia came under the rule 
of the Romans, who held it until the fourth century AD. In medieval times, the 
territory changed hands between the Arab caliphate, the Byzantine Empire, and 
the Khazar Empire before uniting with the province of Imereti to form the Kingdom 
of Abkhazia in 780. This independent kingdom is seen by the Abkhaz as a 
precursor of the contemporary Abkhazia and legitimizes their striving for 
independence. The Kingdom of Abkhazia lasted until 1008, when it was 
incorporated into the Kingdom of Georgia. This period from 780 to 1008 AD was 
referred to during my fieldwork in Abkhazia by several interviewers (interviews 
with Alik Gabelia84 and Gennady Gagulya85) and can thus be judged to play an 
important role in self-perception and ontological security of Abkhazia.  
The Shervashidze dynasty ruled the principality of Abkhazia until 1578, when it 
became a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire (Coene 2009, 148-9). Between the 
end of the sixteenth until the beginning of the nineteenth centuries Abkhazia was 
subjected to Islamisation and a part of the population converted to Islam 
                                            
84 Alik Gabelia was the Dean at the Faculty of History and International Relations, University of 
Sukhum/I at the time this interview was conducted. 
85 Gennady Gagulya was the Head of the Chamber of Commerce of Abkhazia at the time this 
interview was conducted. He died on September 8, 2018 as the serving Prime Minister of 
Abkhazia in a car accident while in the cortege of the official delegation of Abkhazia returning 
from Syria (which has recognised Abkhazia three months earlier. 
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(Souleimanov 2013, 117). While Abkhazia was being subordinated, the 
Shervashidzes asked the Russian Empire for assistance (Coene 2009, 149). The 
Russians slowly pushed the Ottomans south, so that by 1810 all the Georgian 
kingdoms, Abkhazia included, were under the Tsar. Despite becoming a Russian 
protectorate in 1810, Abkhazia’s self-administration lasted until 1864, when it was 
revoked by the Russians, leaving it within the boundaries of Georgia (George 
2009, 99). After land and taxation reforms, the Abkhaz revolted in 1866. During 
the crushing of the revolt and in the following years many Abkhaz, especially 
Muslims, emigrated en masse to the Ottoman Empire so that the ones left behind 
were mostly Christian. Coene (2009, 211) defines the people who were expelled 
– the mahajirs as those "who migrated (often forced) from the Northwest 
Caucasus (and Abkhazia) to Turkey and the Middle East. The term is derived 
from the Islamic word hijra, designating population movement triggered by the 
occupation by non-Muslims of Muslim territories and the unwillingness of Muslim 
communities to live under non-Muslim rule." The scale of the expulsion of the 
Abkhaz and Circassians is described by King (2008, 97): "A decade prior to the 
expulsions, there were perhaps 145,000 people living in the Abkhaz lands and 
another 315,000 Circassians belonging to various tribes, plus tens of thousands 
of other coastal and highland peoples. Yet at the time of the first general imperial 
census in 1897, there were only about 60,000 people living on the coasts of 
Circassia, and of those only 15,000 had been born there." Looking at the past it 
seems ironic that Russians are today seen in Abkhazia as protectors, while in 
1860s most of the Abkhaz nation was either killed or expelled from the Russian 
Empire.86 The mahajirs were the founders of Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey today 
(explored in Chapter 4). This episode also illustrates well the historical complexity 
of the Russian-Abkhaz relations, that were not always peaceful and friendly and 
that I explore further in Chapter 5.  
                                            
86 The term mahajirs primarily refers to Muslims who fled the Russian Empire’s conquest of 
Caucasus to Turkey and the Middle East. While the conquest was completed by 1864 and most 
of the population expulsions happened in 1860s, they also occurred afterwards, for instance of 
those the Russians considered as collaborators in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78) (Bgazhba 
and Lakoba, 2007, 236–240). 
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The Soviet period 
During the Soviet period, often seen as monolithic today, Abkhazia’s status 
changed several times, while its identity was both subject to persecution and to 
institutional entrenchment. The current conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia 
has its roots in this period and its conflicting tendencies. Five distinct periods can 
be distinguished: 1917–1921 (Abkhaz SSR), 1921–1931 (incorporation into 
Georgian SSR), 1931–1945 (Georgianisation), 1945–1980 (institutional 
entrenchment), and 1980-1991 (ethnic tensions). 
Following the October revolution in 1917, Abkhazia adopted its own constitution 
and in May 1918 became part of the emerging North Caucasian Mountainous 
Republic. This was a turbulent period marked by "strife between various political 
splinter groups – pro-Russian Bolsheviks, pro-Turkish aristocrats, and pro-
Georgian Socialists (Mensheviks) (Souleimanov 2013, 114). "Abkhazian 
leadership had friendly ties with the government in Moscow based on Bolshevik 
sympathies. When the Red Army led by Ordzhonikidze betrayed and occupied 
the independent Republic Georgia in February 1921, the Abkhaz leaders asked 
Lenin for an SSR status and received it. There was a problem however, because 
the SSR status was granted as a ‘treaty republic’ together with the SSR Georgia 
(Companjen 2010, 189). In Abkhazia fighting between Mensheviks and White 
forces raged during the civil war and offering it special status was a way of 
creating a buffer and managing the conflict at a contested border (King 2008, 
189). Accordance of special statuses in Soviet Union was therefore more a 
decision that was based on making the territories governable and not a 
recognition of a separate identity. This kind of geopolitical gerrymandering and 
pressures on the identities of small nations has shaped the historical experience 
of the nations in the Caucasus and influenced their behaviour, including 
Abkhazia’s choice of geopolitical roles through the playing of which it attempts to 
preserve its physical and ontological security.  
In early 1930s, Stalin stopped the Soviet policy of indigenization (korenizatsia) 
and enforced political and economic centralization in USSR (Sideri 2012, 269). 
As a result of Stalinist territorial-administrative rearrangements, the status of 
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Abkhazia was downgraded to that of an autonomous republic (ASSR) within the 
Georgian SSR in 1931 (Coene 2009, 149). Abkhazia thus existed as an SSR 
(albeit a special ‘treaty republic’ together with the SSR Georgia) between 1921 
and 1931, which is another historical period the Abkhaz point to when legitimizing 
their right to independent statehood. After Abkhazia was downgraded to an 
ASSR, “the Georgian language was declared the official language and ethnic 
Georgians were encouraged to live there. The many mixed marriages date from 
this period, as do the migration of Russians and Armenians to Abkhazia." 
(Companjen 2010, 189). It should be noted that during the rule of Stalin, the 
politics of USSR became intertwined with local politics in the Caucasus as several 
key people in the regime were from the region. Political allies and close 
associates Stalin (Georgian), Ordzhonikidze (Georgian) and Mikoyan (Armenian) 
were jokingly referred to as the "Caucasian Clique, while Lavrentiy Beria (a 
Georgian-Mingrelian, born in Merkheuli, Abkhazia) was a bitter rival of Nestor 
Lakoba (an Abkhaz) and had allegedly poisoned him. 
Georgian historiography in 1930s represented the Kingdom of Abkhazia "as ‘no 
more than a title for Georgian kings’, whilst the ancestors of the Abkhaz 
themselves were described as a Georgian tribe with a Georgian dialect." 
(Marshall 2010, 240) and in 1960s Georgian historians had this to say on Abkhaz 
ethnogenesis, firmly denying the existence of the Abkhaz nation, and classifying 
them instead as a Georgian tribe: "Those whom we call Abkhazians are not 
Abkhazians. The Abkhazians were a Georgian tribe. The present Abkhazian are 
the descendants of Kabardeys and Balkars who migrated into Georgia in the mid-
19th century" (Souleimanov 2013, 116). Although these views may persist today, 
they are limited to political fringes in Georgia. The Abkhaz were never able to 
mirror these claims and pronounce Georgians as an Abkhaz tribe, but they have 
developed a strong defence mechanism that involves presenting proofs of 
historical origins of the Abkhaz whenever Georgian-Abkhaz relations are 
discussed, as witnessed by the author in most interviews. This denial of existence 
continues to live on in the conflict as Georgia was reluctant to recognise the 
Abkhaz as a party to the conflict, claiming that the conflict is really between 
Georgia and Russia. The Abkhaz, on the other hand, aim to portray Georgia as 
little more than an instrument of American interests.  
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Abkhaz grievances during the Soviet period concerned the status of the region, 
but also the campaign of Georgisation which they viewed as a way of destroying 
their culture. "One of the reasons for this was that there had been a large influx 
of Georgians, Russians, Armenians and others. Whereas in 1886 (i.e. after many 
of them had left for Turkey) ethnic Abkhaz formed 42 per cent of the population, 
by 1959 this had been reduced to only 15 per cent” (Coene 2009, 149). The Gal/i 
region and major cities of Abkhazia were all predominantly Georgian. The two 
exceptions were the regions of Gudauta and of Tqvarchel(i) (Shesterinina 2014, 
97). As part of this policy teaching the Abkhaz language was stopped and the 
language was given a Georgian alphabet (Coene 2009, 149). However, due to 
the location of Abkhazia and its status as the Soviet Riviera, where the USSR 
political elite had their dachas and spent summer vacations, Abkhazians had 
good connection to authorities in Moscow: "Moscow was regarded as the power 
which guaranteed that Tbilisi would act cautiously when face-to-face with the 
political, administrative, and demographic preponderance of Georgians.” 
(Souleimanov 2013, 121). The Abkhaz authorities and intellectuals wrote 
frequent letters to Moscow complaining about the Georgianisation policy, but also 
the historiography that reduced the Abkhaz status as a titular nation (Shesterinina 
2014, 113). Although these letters were mostly dismissed as nationalist, the 
status of Abkhaz language and cultural rights gradually improved, especially in 
the Brezhnev era (Souleimanov 2013, 130), while the percentage of the Abkhaz 
in leadership position rose, as the Soviet authorities tried to manage the conflict 
by redistributing power. While the demographic percentage of the Abkhaz in 
Abkhaz SSR has fallen to 17.9 in 1989, there was a marked increase in the 
percentage of the Abkhaz occupying leadership positions in administrative 
districts, from 42.9 percent of first secretaries to 50 percent by 1975. In a few 
years’ time, the Abkhaz came to dominate 67 percent of the government minister 
positions and composed 71 percent of the Oblast committee department heads 
(George, 2009, 104). According to Souleimanov (2013, 130), this was an 
unprecedented situation in Soviet history considering the small demographic 
percentage of the Abkhaz in the autonomy. Georgians saw this as privileging the 
Abkhaz in Abkhazia and such a plan by Moscow’s to weaken and undermine the 
Georgian state (Souleimanov 2013, 130).  
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Perhaps in response to perceived bias in the distribution of power towards the 
Abkhaz, by 1970s the Georgian historical discourse has changed and the Abkhaz 
were depicted as guests "[t]he cultivation of the myth of Georgia as the 
“hospitable mother” has consigned South Ossetians and the Abkhaz to the roles 
of mere guests who – only relatively recently within the context of the long history 
of Georgian statehood – have settled on Georgian territory, and from whom 
respect for the territorial integrity of the “host” country can be rightfully demanded 
(Coppitiers & Huysseune 2002, 96). Seen from this lofty perspective of “historical 
justice,” the separatist aspirations of these subordinate peoples have, therefore, 
practically no legitimacy at all. This is the source of the slogans that were 
commonly heard in the vocabulary of many nationalistically oriented Georgians 
during the 1980s and 1990s: “If you don’t like things in Georgia, go back to Iran” 
is what Ossetians heard in reference to their Iranian origin, while it was suggested 
to the Abkhaz that they move back to the North Caucasus, to Russia and their 
Adyghean fellow tribesmen" (Souleimanov 2013, 117-8). This has been mirrored 
by the Abkhaz by not only claiming that they are the original inhabitants of 
Abkhazia but that it is the Georgians who are the latecomers (Kvarchelia 1998). 
Dissolution of the USSR 
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost (openness), which inadvertently encouraged 
nationalists, made the situation even worse. The ‘Abkhazian Letter’ of June 1988 
and the petition of the ‘Abkhazian Forum’ of March 1989 addressed to the Soviet 
leadership forwarded claims to change the status of Abkhazia back to SSR, 
opening the door for secession from Georgia. This along with growing feeling of 
nationalism in Georgia and isolated inter-ethnic clashes led to the demonstrations 
in Tbilisi in April 1989. This was a watershed moment as the intervention of Soviet 
troops killed 19, leading to anger with the communist regime and even greater 
tensions (Coene 2009, 149). In Abkhazia, the political but also the economic 
situation were worsening quickly as tourist revenues and the lucrative export of 
local citruses and tea declined. This exacerbated ethnic fragmentation and forced 
people to take sides. Before, “Abkhazians had enjoyed the formal opportunity, 
when necessary, to approach the central authorities in Moscow – the ‘honest 
broker’ – to advance their complaints and push forward their age-old 
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emancipation agenda with respect to Tbilisi. By the beginning of the 1990s, 
however, that opportunity seemed to have melted away, both for Abkhazians and 
South Ossetians" (Souleimanov 2013, 95). With tensions rising and no way of 
defusing them in sight, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia proclaimed Abkhazia a 
full union republic in August 1990. This move was condemned by the Georgian 
SSR, which in April 1991 itself declared independence from the Soviet Union and 
in February 1992 restored the constitution of the 1921 Democratic Republic of 
Georgia with Abkhazia within its borders (McCorquodale & Hausler 2010, 36). In 
June 1992, the Abkhaz president Ardzinba proposed a solution of confederation 
with Georgia, which was refused by the Georgian government. One month later 
Abkhazia discontinued the 1978 constitution (George 2009, 116), restored its 
1925 constitution and thus proclaimed its independence again (Coene 2009, 149-
150) and triggered the armed conflict (McCorquodale & Hausler 2010, 36). 
The 1992–1993 war 
Local clashes began between the Abkhaz and Georgians. Gamsakhurdia, who 
stirred tensions now tried to manage the crisis, but was ousted in a coup. In early 
1992 the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR Shevardnadze assumed 
power in Georgia but was unable to put a lid on growing calls for a military solution 
to the problems in Abkhazia (King 2008, 215-6). In August 1992, the Georgian 
National Guard and police intervened to restore order in Abkhazia (Coene 2009, 
150), but the troops commanded by Kitovani did not stop at the border and 
invaded Abkhazia without Shevardnadze’s permission, and occupied Sukhum/i 
in a few days. It is important to note that the context in which these events were 
taking place was one of uncertainty and instability, where Georgia in early 1990s 
came close to being a failed state losing nearly 18% of its territory due to the 
secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even worse was that Georgia faced 
disobedience in Mingrelia, Gamsakhurdia’s home region and in Adjara, ruled by 
Abashidze as a personal fiefdom. At its lowest point, the Georgian government 
administered barely two thirds of its internationally recognised territory (George, 
2009, 108). What followed was a “vicious, ethnically based pillage, looting, 
assault and murder” by Georgian troops. Abkhaz cultural monuments, including 
the archives of the Abkhazian national museum and the properties of Sukhum/i 
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University, were destroyed. Secessionists fled Sukhum/i for their stronghold of 
Gudauta (Coene 2009, 150). There, Abkhazian troops were joined by hundreds 
of volunteers from the North Caucasus, including North Caucasian and Don 
Cossacks, some allegedly armed and equipped by the Russian army 
(Souleimanov 2013, 160-1). Together they were able to push back the ill-
prepared Georgians, retake Sukhum/i in September, with Ochamchire/a and Gal/i 
falling to the secessionists soon afterwards. Atrocities were committed against 
the Georgian population, with about 200.000 Georgians fleeing the region. The 
latest ceasefire was concluded in December 1993 and has - despite major 
incidents in 199887 - been largely respected (Coene 2009, 150). The agreement 
brokered by Russia in May 1994 allowed for the deployment of CIS peacekeepers 
- in practice wholly Russian - to monitor the security zone along the border (King 
2008, 215-6). 
Interbellum 1993–1999 
Russian position in the war was contradictory as it lent military and political 
support to both sides. After the war, Russia joined the CIS-enforced economic 
blockade against Abkhazia (George 2009, 199–120). Abkhazia’s economic 
survival depended on smuggling through the ports of Gagra, Gudauta, 
Ochamchire/a, and Sukhum/i. It is estimated that 60–70 percent of Abkhazian 
trade took place at seaports and the rest by car transport, mostly along the 
Russian border but also through the Gal/i district, along the porous border with 
Georgia. The CIS blockade envisioned to push Abkhazia toward Georgia out of 
desperation failed as the blockade was not particularly effective. CIS countries, 
in particular Russia, did not fully implement the blockade and contraband still 
found its way into the region, fostering criminal groups on both sides of the 
Abkhazian-Georgian border (George, 2009, 133). In late 1990s and early 2000s 
Russians slowly became more consistent in their support for Abkhazia, allowing 
it to recover somewhat: "/…/although the economic infrastructure in the conflict 
zones suffered extensive damage during the war, their relative bargaining 
                                            
87 On 11th April 1998, after months of low-level insurgency, Georgian guerrillas launched an attack 
against Abkhazia, injuring eight Russian servicemen, part of the CIS peacekeeping force (Fuller 
1998). 
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position increased due to a growing consistency in Russian support. In the early 
and even late 1990s, Abkhazia specifically had complained about Russian pro-
Georgian tactics, but by the early 2000s, the Russians had chosen a side" 
(George, 2009, 132). This new vector in Russian foreign policy endowed 
Abkhazians with optimism and on October 3rd, 1999 they organized a referendum 
in which the population had voted for an independent state after which they 
declared independence again (in 1992, when Abkhazia first declared 
independence, no referendum took place) (Companjen 2010, 189). 
Factors, such as Putin’s arrival in power in Russia in 1999, Saakashvili’s Rose 
revolution in Georgia in 2003, were instrumental in this. Understanding the post-
Soviet aftermath and the later shifts in regional realignments involving Abkhazia, 
Russia, the West, Georgia, and the North Caucasus (Chechnya), is key for 
understanding Abkhazia's foreign relations later. Especially important is the 
understanding that between 1991 and 1999, Russia's relationship with Abkhazia 
was mostly a function of its relationship with the above-mentioned actors. The 
next four sections therefore serve the purpose of providing the historical context 
for the reader as well as an orientation for situating the analysis in the empirical 
chapters (Chapter 4, 5, and 6). 
Abkhazia in Russia’s Caucasus conundrum 
Relations between Russia and Georgia in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
USSR were marked by Russia's disinterest in engaging with former Soviet 
republics. When Russia showed interest, Georgia refused to join the CIS and 
restored its pre-Soviet constitution, an act mirroring the Baltic states, giving the 
signal that Georgia was an “occupied territory” during the Soviet period. These 
kind of “restorationist” moves only worsened the problems with the legitimacy of 
the border since the borders of pre-Soviet states were different from those of the 
Soviet Republic (Toal 2017, 65). Meanwhile the Georgian-Abkhaz War was going 
on and accounts on Russia's role in it vary, with some (George 2009) arguing that 
Russia actively intervened on the Abkhaz side, while others (Hopf 2005) claim 
that Russia has either passively allowed fighters from the North Caucasus to 
come to Abkhazia or insist that Russia was not a unified political actor and its 
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military, sometimes even individual commanders, were not acting on orders 
based political decisions (ibid., 226). Interestingly, Abkhazians too, saw Russia 
as biased against them (Wright et al. 1996, 143), since it supported Georgia's 
territorial integrity and sold arms to it. Nevertheless, Shevarnadze accused 
Russia of assisting Abkhazia (ibid. 52) but the defeat of the Georgian troops in 
Abkhazia and a rebellion in western Georgia forced Shevardnadze to ask 
Moscow for military assistance. He promised Yeltsin that Georgia will join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). Georgia also gave Russia control over four Soviet-era 
military bases and access to its Black Sea ports. In return, Russia supplied 
Georgia's army with weapons, Georgian population with fuel, and provided 
protection for Georgian railway and port infrastructure. With Russian help, 
Shevardnadze was finally able to quell the rebellion of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and 
stay in power (Toal 2017, 101). 
The last factor influencing Russian-Abkhazian relations in 1990s was the 
situation in Chechnya, which affected Russia’s view of the situation in its 'Near 
Abroad' (and in particular in the Caucasus). Abkhazia, although geographically 
part of the South Caucasus, has culturally more in common with the North 
Caucasus (Hewitt 1999, 241). Since the beginning of the 19th century, the 
peoples of North Caucasus were fighting a common enemy – the Russian 
Empire, which was expanding southward and conquering their ancestral lands 
(Coene 2009, 126). In the vacuum that existed between the collapse of the 
Russian Empire and the consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks, from 1917 to 
1920, existed the North Caucasian ‘Mountain Republic’. In the aftermath of the 
collapse of the USSR, the Confederation of Mountain Peoples sought to restore 
this independent polity, proclaiming Sukhum/i to be its capital (Cornell 2002, 178). 
A voluntary formation of the peoples of the North Caucasus (Wright et al. 1996, 
142) intervened on the side of Abkhazia to recapture Sukhum/i (Hopf 2005, 231-
2). To the Russians, the Confederation of Mountain Peoples was “an illustration 
in microcosm of the dangers of replaying the regional dynamics of 1917–20” 
(Marshall 2010, 304). It fuelled fears that the Abkhaz might assist the Chechens 
in a potential military conflict with Russia. In the context of the 'parade of 
sovereignties' there were fears that separatism would then spread into other parts 
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of the Russian Federation. Even after Russia imposed sanctions on Abkhazia in 
late 1993, the neighbouring Russian republic of Krasnodar failed to respect it, 
while in August 1994 the governments of Russian republics of Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan concluded Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with the de 
facto government of Abkhazia. Such actions encouraged Abkhazia to believe 
“that Russia’s official nonrecognition was only de jure, not de facto” (Hopf 2005, 
231–2). This also encouraged separatists in the North Caucasus, especially the 
Chechens who have already declared independence in 1991. Russia intervened 
in late 1994 but the Abkhaz did not return the favour and did not send help to 
Chechnya, making the Chechens deeply resentful and prompting them to 
improve relations with Tbilisi (Walker 1998, 3). 
Russian-Abkhazian relations 1991–1999  
It is perhaps the 1991–1999 period of Russian-Abkhaz relations that is the most 
poorly understood of any, with even some specialists in the field omitting 
wholesale the many fluctuations in Russian-Abkhaz relations, including a period 
in which no relations existed at all.  
Gerrits and Bader (2016, 298), for example, write that “Russia has been the 
biggest supporter of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the emergence of 
separatist conflicts in the two regions in the late 1980s” (Gerrits and Bader 2016, 
298). While some support did come from a wide array of sources and actors, 
including Communist chauvinists in Russian security structures, especially 
officers with real estate in Abkhazia, Soviet hardliners, Russian nationalists, local 
Sochi mafia, and pan-Islamists from the North Caucasus (Derluguian 1998, 285), 
it is hard to attribute much support in this period to the Russian state. In addition, 
the Russian-led CIS embargo was enforced for several years between 1993 and 
1997 (Walker 1998, 3), and officially in place until March 2008 (Toal and 
O’Loughlin 2016, 110). Consequently, it is hard to agree in the absolute with 
Gerrits and Bader (2016) that Russia has been the biggest supporter of Abkhazia 
since the outset of the conflict. While the Russian embargo of Abkhazia does not 
contradict some support coming from Russia, it warrants at least a distinction 
between the official actions of the Russian state and the unofficial and 
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independent actions of other actors in Russia.88 A relative claim that Russia has 
been the biggest supporter of Abkhazia is, however, more feasible, and its 
disproval would require pointing to a state that supported Abkhazia more since 
the start of the conflict. No state provided such support to Abkhazia although the 
Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey did act as a lifeline for Abkhazia during the 
embargo. While Turkey, much like Russia, did not officially and actively support 
Abkhazia, it did little to stop black market trading. In 1990s first a bus, then a 
maritime connection was established between Trabzon and Sukhumi. Since 
1994, the ferry named ‘Ritza’ made two journeys per week between the two cities, 
mostly fully booked. The line was shut down in 1996, when Turkey complied with 
the CIS embargo (Punsmann 2008, 78–79). Even after the embargo, 
communication and exchange of goods continued between Turkey and Abkhazia 
through diaspora intermediaries and Turkey continues to be Abkhazia’s second 
biggest trade partner after Russia (Eissler 2013, 125). To conclude, neither the 
Russian nor the Turkish state provided much official support to Abkhazia but both 
at least tolerated some communications and support between Abkhazia and its 
supporters in Russia and Turkey, and at most facilitated these activities. The 
virtual inexistence of external state support makes Abkhazia an outlier among the 
post-Soviet de facto states as it initially had no patron state, owing its existence 
more to the weakness of Georgia than to its own strength or foreign support.  
Although relations between Russia and Abkhazia improved from 1991 to 1999, 
this improvement was not linear and was more due to the change in Russia's 
other relationships and it is difficult to see any strategy in Russia's engagement 
of Abkhazia at the time. In the state in which Russia found itself throughout most 
of the 1990s, it would be perhaps too much to expect Russia to act strategically. 
We can, however observe that throughout the 1991-1999 period, Russia carefully 
balanced forces in the Caucasus and changed its support for different actors 
several times. In the spirit of 'divide and conquer', Russia opposed Georgia, the 
actor with the best relations with what it considered to be the biggest threat – 
Chechnya. Russia at least passively allowed North Caucasian fighters to save 
                                            
88 The extent of state control (and therefore the distinction between state and non-state actors) 
was not always clear in this period, making it even harder to make categorical statements 
regarding the extent of Russia’s support of Abkhazia. 
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the existence of Abkhazia until its relations with Chechen separatists became 
threateningly close. In October 1993 it threw its weight behind Georgia and 
declared an embargo on Abkhazia (Hopf 2005, 231-2). In the course of the First 
Chechen War and the ensuing de facto Chechen independence, relations 
between Chechnya and Abkhazia soured, while Georgian-Chechen relations 
improved, so Russia changed positions again. Whether Russia's foreign policy 
reached strategic level or stayed confined to tactical responses, is a matter of 
discussion that far exceeds this scope of this thesis.89 
What is clear, however, is that Russia was at this time a Janus-faced actor, 
optimistically trying to integrate with the West, while bemoaning the loss of an 
empire and with it its ontological security, which depended on horizontal 
relationships with great powers (a loss of an arch-enemy is a huge loss indeed!), 
vertical relationships with its periphery, a sense of status and honour based on 
imperial past and alternative Soviet civilisation. Post-Soviet ontological insecurity 
is clearly manifested through nostalgia in which Abkhazia figures prominently. 
The 1991-1999 period of Russian-Abkhaz relations is poorly understood in part 
because the fluctuations in the relationship are not acknowledged, and in part 
because the foundations for the improvement of Russian-Abkhaz relationship 
remain poorly understood. I claim that a part of these foundations consists of 
Abkhazia's position in the imaginary of Russian elites, who have vacationed in 
Abkhazia for generations and have forged strong and lasting bonds with local 
elites.90 To understand what Abkhazia means for Russia today, it is not enough 
to consider Russia's other relationships or Abkhazia's 'strategic value', but also 
its symbolic value. What does Abkhazia represent to Russia's political elites and 
why does it matter? 
One of the symptoms of the turbulent and traumatic period as experienced by the 
population of Russia, is the nostalgia for Soviet Union, which is today being used  
                                            
89 Perhaps the closest Russia has come to strategic decisions, was in its ‘base politics’. In 1995 
it secured the right to maintain four military bases in Georgia, which were nevertheless closed 
once Georgia recovered and changed its foreign policy course (Nichol 2008, 114). 
90 The best example perhaps is that of Moscow’s former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, the first Russian 
politician who recognised the independence of Abkhazia and who expanded his business into the 
de facto state many years before Russia’s lifting of the economic embargo. Luzhkov was so open 
in his support for Abkhazia that the Georgian government eventually blacklisted him (Brokes 
2018). 
 
67 
 
for political and foreign policy purposes with the Soviet past being celebrated 
increasingly openly, which is evident in how the Russian political elites use Soviet 
nostalgia, especially the struggle during the Second World War, to gain popular 
support (Hansen 2016, 367). Part of the Soviet nostalgia and the longing for the 
empire is also the longing for Abkhazia – a place of good memories for many 
Russians who vacationed there. The Abkhaz coast, although part of Georgia, was 
considered by Russians as “their Riviera”, with an important Russian military base 
and many dachas of high-ranking Russian generals (Companjen 2010, 182). 
Russian tourism in Abkhazia is not a Soviet but a much older phenomenon. In 
fact, famous cultural figures like Chekhov and statesmen like Stalin, chose to 
spend their summers in Abkhazia’s sub-tropical climate, enjoying its “pristine’ 
beauty” (Sideri 2012, 263). Nostalgia is often related to one's childhood, a sense 
of childhood security and innocence. It can have autobiographical elements 
(Dickinson & Erben 2006) or refer to an imagined place (Kalinina 2014; Velikonja 
2009), never experienced by the nostalgic person  or to an actual place idealised 
to become a 'paradise on earth' (Souleimanov 2013, 95). Soviet nomenklatura 
vacationed in Abkhazia with their children, many of whom would later become 
part of political elites in Russia and other post-Soviet republics. The relations 
between local Abkhaz political elites and vacationing political elites from Moscow 
was especially strong (Derluguian 1998, 262).91 According to Samokhvalov 
(2017, 176) “the Black Sea region retained a special status for Russian identity.” 
It was seen as “a sort of Promised Land”, the location of adventures for Putin, 
who associated the region with freedom, escapism, and exoticism (Samokhvalov 
2017, 176). Childhood memories of family vacations of the elites in 1970s and 
1980s are factors that contribute to Russians visiting Abkhazia today (Sideri 
2012, 272). According to Sideri (2012, 266), Abkhazia was one of the places that 
played a crucial role in “the development of the ‘tourist gaze’ for generations of 
                                            
91 This proximity between Moscow and Abkhaz elites is maintained through shared education. 
Gerrits and Bader (2016, 303) note that in Abkhazia “of the 19 highest-ranking persons holding 
positions in executive power (the Head of State and cabinet ministers), 12 have studied in either 
post-Soviet Russia or the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Nine of these 
12 functionaries have studied in Moscow. This includes President Ankvab, who graduated from 
the Academy of Social Sciences of the Communist Party in 1987, Vice President Logua, who 
graduated from the Moscow State Automobile and Road Technical University in 1995, and Prime 
Minister Lakerbaya, who is a graduate from the same Moscow institution.” 
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Russian and Soviet travelers.”92 It is not at all surprizing if many Russian 
politicians and policy makers who have spent parts of their childhood vacationing 
in Abkhazia, had fond, nostalgic memories of it. Tourism keeps this nostalgia of 
Abkhazia as the lost oasis in the Russian imperial imaginary, alive for an older 
generation of Russian tourists who still vacation there each year. Despite the fact 
that Abkhazia is no longer the place of choice for Russian decision-makers, 
leaders such as Putin and Medvedev, often vacation in Sochi, less than 100 miles 
from Abkhazia. Nevertheless, according to Nemtsova (2010), Russian special 
services continue to have an especially close relationship with the Abkhaz 
authorities. According to Tsyshba, the privatization guru of Gagra, after 1991 
several former and current FSB officers have come to rent and privatize luxury 
hotels, sanatoriums, and dachas on prime locations, making the city “the best 
FSB resort.” 
In the chaos of the post-Soviet collapse, to paraphrase Marx, all that was solid 
melted into air, all that was holy was profaned, and political elites were at last 
compelled to face with sober senses, their real conditions of life. With ideology 
and institutions gone, they tried to preserve what they had left of the old – their 
relationships and routines. While these relationships and routines alone did not 
decisively shape foreign policy (ideology of transition; of integration with the West 
and distancing itself from the post-Soviet space being equally if not more 
important), in the absence of a strategy to deal with an increasingly complex and 
challenging environment, in the long-term, they became a lodestar for Russian 
policy-makers in 1990s. 
Interbellum 1999–2008 
Further "enhancing the regional position of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia was 
the changing Russian policy with the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Unlike the 
ambivalence of the Yeltsin era, where Russians certainly supported the 
                                            
92 Here it is possible to draw parallels with Crimea. Crimea is historically more important for Russia 
than just a tourist destination and was brought fully into the fold, having been annexed and 
officially incorporated into the Russian federation. Abkhazia lacking such historical importance, 
nevertheless has symbolic importance, and was also brought into the fold, however not entirely 
and fully, maintaining its de facto independence but being heavily reliant on Russia. 
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secessionist efforts of the territories, but also offered sometimes support to the 
Georgians as well, under Putin the Russian policy became more consistently pro-
Abkhazian and pro-Ossetian. Not only did the CIS peacekeeping unit in Abkhazia 
(and, arguably, a fully equipped Russian base in northern Abkhazia) provide 
security to the Abkhazians, starting in 2002 the Russians granted Abkhazians 
and South Ossetians partial citizenship. This offer did not formally incorporate the 
regions into the Russian Federation but extended some social welfare benefits to 
the economically devastated populations" (George, 2009, 133). Although 
Moscow formally withdrew from CIS embargo of Abkhazia only in 2008, in 
practice trade sanctions were lifted much earlier. After its independence Georgia 
had to accept the stationing of four Russian bases on its territory with a total of 
around 9,200 troops. At the 1999 OSCE summit Russia agreed to withdraw 
troops from Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and Gudauta (in Abkhazia) until 2004, while the 
bases in Akhalkalaki (Javakheti) and Batumi (Adjara) were abandoned in 2007. 
(Coene 2009, 39).  
August War 2008 and Russia’s recognition 
The war started on the morning of August 8, just after the opening ceremony of 
the Beijing Olympiad on which the gaze of the international community was fixed. 
Russian troops poured through the Roki tunnel from North to South Ossetia, 
driving the Georgian army back almost to Tbilisi in five days (Marshall 2010, 306). 
While the August War focused on Ossetia, some fighting took place in Abkhazia 
as the Abkhazians expelled the Georgian troops from the Kodori valley (Coene 
2009, 151), leaving the Abkhaz for the first time in full control of the territory they 
laid claim on (Kabachnik 2012, 403). Georgian military moved out of Kodori on 
12 August, retreating with hundreds of Georgians who had been living there. On 
the same day, Russian soldiers based in Abkhazia entered Georgia proper and 
occupied Poti (Coene 2009, 155). Then, Russians military operations stopped, 
having acheived their objectives, and a ceasfire was signed. On 16th August, with 
the mediation of the French President Sarkozy (France was at the time chairing 
the European Council), a six-point peace plan was signed (Antonenko 2008, 27) 
by Russia and Georgia.  
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Although some scholars (Cornell 2009) have argued that Russia had a 
contingency plan to invade the two de facto states and attack Georgia, no senior 
US official holds this view, suggesting that "the Russian leadership was genuinely 
surprised by Georgia’s attack." (Toal 2017, 164). It would be wrong to understand 
August War in only one dimension, either as 'Georgian genocide' or as 
'premeditated Russian aggression'. The war was a result of  Saakashvili's efforts 
to recover the 'lost territories', which provoked a reaction within these territories 
and their Russian patron (Toal 2017, 128). While Saakashvili's rhetoric and 
actions towards the de facto states were revanchist (Toal 2017, 144), Russia was 
not seeking revenge against Georgia in the August War, but recognition from the 
West. Despite alleging that the West was partially responsible for the war, they 
consistently remained very cautious to keep a working relationship with the EU, 
and “one could see that Russia was seeking recognition rather than revenge in 
this war” (Samokhvalov 2017, 194). The war and the ensuing recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia clearly had the function of checking NATO's 
expansion to the Caucasus (Toal 2017, 281) and deterring the West from 
impinging on Russia's strategic interests (Rumer et al. 2017). However, Russia's 
reaction was not a mere strategic and geopolitical response. According to Toal 
(2017, 167), "Saakashvili’s armed intervention caused great anger and provoked 
disgust among Russian political elites, which was visible in the language they 
employed – "not the language of diplomacy or transactional geopolitics. Instead, 
this was the language of righteous anger." Putin felt betrayed, he felt that 
Saakashvili whom he had helped to get rid of Abashidze in Adjara, failed to 
honour his promises and abstain from using ilitary force. Russia resented 
Georgian attempts to change the format of the conflict resolution negotiations and 
to include the EU and UN in the peacekeeping, which would effectively undermine 
Russia’s role. They resented Saakashvili’s creation of alternative governments 
and administrations in exile, his unwillingness to talk to de facto authorities and 
his reliance on military force (Samokhvalov 2017, 193–194). If the war came as 
a shock to Georgia, another one would follow soon. On 26th August 2008, 
Abkhazia received its first recognition, when President Medvedev signed a 
decree recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia “as independent and sovereign 
states", calling on other states to follow suit (Coene 2009, 155). The decree stated 
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that “Russia continually displayed calm and patience. We repeatedly called for 
returning to the negotiating table and did not deviate from this position of ours 
even after the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo’s independence. However, our 
persistent proposals to the Georgian side to conclude agreements with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia on the non-use of force remained unanswered. Regrettably, 
they were ignored also by NATO and even at the United Nations.” (Jeifets & 
Dobronravin 2017, 221). 
Russia has justified its recognition on remedial grounds with President Medvedev 
claiming that Georgia had chosen genocide when it attacked South Ossetia and 
that Russia’s recognition of the two de facto states was to  provide the safety for 
their populations (Coppieters 2018, 1002). Rather than focusing on the right of 
peoples to self determination, Russia argued its recognition was legitimate on 
moral and practical grounds, because coexistence of Abkhaz and Ossetians 
within Georgia was untenable (Dubinsky 2018, 245–246). The Russian president 
claimed that Georgia's objective was "annexing South Ossetia through the 
annihilation of a whole people" and that "the same fate lay in store for Abkhazia” 
(Dubinsky 2018, 243–244). With the recognition, Russia showed disregard for the 
principle of territorial sovereignty, which it later repeated in Crimea in 2014. By 
acting in such a way, it contradicted its position on sovereignty in the cases of 
Iraq, Serbia, Syria, and others (Deyermond 2016, 957). However, inconsistencies 
were also present during Western recognition of Kosovo as countries granted 
their recognition regardless of Serbia’s claim to territorial integrity and despite the 
fact that Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council calling for the respect of 
Serbia's territorial integrity, was still valid. In other words, “Kosovo was 
recognised while at the same time there was a legally binding document in force 
demanding (implicitly) not to recognise" (Hille 2010, 196). Arguably as important 
as the recognitions but much less discussed, was the signing of treaties between 
Russia and the de facto states on September 17, 2008. In the 'Agreements on 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support', the sides pledged to help defend 
each other’s sovereignty, to grant each other the right to build and make use of 
military bases, and to work towards close economic integration (Gerrits & Bader 
2016, 302). These treaties, which represent the foundation for subsequent 
agreement, are identical in all but the names of the entities, which points to 
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Russia being able to impose its rules on the new actors with weak bargaining 
power (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 679).  
The August War was not without consequences for Russia. Its recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia following the August War drastically diminished the 
leverage it held over Tbilisi (Makarychev 2016, 2), however the relations soon 
began restoring and in January 2010 air traffic was reopened. In the August War, 
Russia effectively checked Western involvement in the 'Near Abroad', but it also 
signalled that it possessed military capabilities and could use them to secure its 
interests like a great power, stopping the decline in its status and stabilizing its 
horizontal relationships. Its ontological security was further enhanced by 
recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia and establishing a new set of vertical 
relationships with them, giving it the ability to play a great power role at least vis-
à-vis the actors in its Near Abroad. 
Empirical scope and case selection 
Drawing on my theoretical framework, I believe that focusing on meaning and 
interpretation of (non-)recognition and (non-)engagement by policy elites in de 
facto states as well as decision-makers in recognised actors would allow us to 
better understand the interaction between de facto states and other actors in the 
international community. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, changes in the 
meaning of non-recognition are changes that affect both sides of the relationship; 
the (non-)recognised and the (non-)recognizing. This calls for looking at both 
sides of the interaction; the de facto state and its interlocutors. Therefore, the 
object of my research is foreign policy interaction between a de facto state and 
recognised actors, its scope covering three sets of interactions: Abkhazia-EU, 
Abkhazia-Russia and Abkhazia-US. Below, I discuss the selection of my cases, 
the historical context in which they appear and the timeframe I employ. 
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Case selection: Abkhazia 
There are many de facto states (depending on the criteria chosen, of course) in 
the world today,93 which makes finding a good case for my research on the role 
of elite perceptions on foreign policy interactions between de facto states and 
recognised actors no less difficult than in a small set, but for different reasons. As 
Flick (2007, 27) notes, the selection of cases (sampling) "in qualitative research 
in most cases is not oriented on a formal (e.g. random) selection of a part of an 
existing or assumed population. Rather it is conceived as a way of setting up a 
collection of deliberately selected cases, materials or events for constructing a 
corpus of empirical examples for studying the phenomenon of interest in the most 
instructive way." In purposive sampling, such as mine, the bigger the choice, the 
bigger the possibility of making the wrong choice. Through the selection of case 
studies, the researcher does not only show familiarity with the population of 
cases, but also demonstrates his or her own reflexivity. Or as Stake (1994, 237) 
put it: “a case study is both the process of learning about the case and the product 
of our learning”. Therefore, I spent a lot of time considering different options 
before making my final choice. I outline the reasons and arguments as well as 
limitations below. 
Although mine is a single case study, it is worth taking Klotz's (2008) advice that 
every single case study is in a hermeneutical sense - in relation to the context it 
was extracted from - comparative: "Researchers need to remember that cases 
are cases of something Well-crafted case selection takes into account the 
universe of possible cases and the logic of comparison implied by the research 
question."94 Even more so because although it is a single case study, as 
mentioned before, I look at three sets of interactions and at two time periods 
(1999–2008 and 2008–2014), so opportunities and need for comparison 
abounds. However, I prefer to think of my research in terms of Gray's (2004, 132) 
classification of case studies. Per Gray's definition my case study can be 
                                            
93 While Caspersen (2012, 11-12) quotes seventeen cases and two borderline cases of 
unrecognised states after 1991, out of which nine still exist today, Florea (2017), using looser 
criteria, finds seventeen de facto states ‘alive’ today. 
94 Gerring (2004, 346) expresses a similar idea: "It seems justifiable for case studies to work on 
two levels simultaneously, the unit itself and some broader class of (perhaps difficult to specify) 
units." 
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considered as an embedded case study in which "there may be a number of 
different units of analysis." This means that the case and unit of analysis are not 
the same. My case - put more precisely - is not Abkhazia, but foreign relations of 
Abkhazia. Within that case there are different units of analysis (decision-makers 
in Abkhazia, EU, US, Russia). Baxter and Jack (2008, 550) discuss the merits of 
embedded case studies: "The ability to look at sub-units that are situated within 
a larger case is powerful when you consider that data can be analysed within the 
subunits separately (within case analysis), between the different subunits 
(between case analysis), or across all of the subunits (cross-case analysis). The 
ability to engage in such rich analysis only serves to better illuminate the case." 
Yin (2003) warns against the problem many novice researchers face - failure to 
return to the main problem after analysing the sub-units. In my case the danger 
is getting lost in interpretations and policy-planning at the level of policy-makers 
in Abkhazia, EU, Russia and US while missing the bigger picture. To avoid this, 
I frequently refer back to Chapter 1 and my main argument about the way 
interpretations of non-recognition influence the formulation and implementation 
of foreign policy objectives and strategies. 
Another useful distinction - between idiographic and nomothetic single case 
studies - is offered by Gerring (2006). While the first ones are entirely interpretivist 
and only aim to explain a single case, nomothetic case studies - although still 
focusing on a single case - aim to implicitly and indirectly compare the case with 
the larger population and are therefore more concerned with generalisation. Mine 
is therefore an embedded nomothetic single case study that seeks to provide a 
holistic account of Abkhazia's foreign relations but at the same time reflect upon 
the foreign relations of other de facto states and the de facto state foreign policy 
as such. This means some of my findings are generalisable beyond the case of 
Abkhazia (discussed further in Chapter 7). 
In my research, I focus on a specific territorial and temporal context. I look at 
Abkhazia as a case among other de facto states (in Chapter 7 I discuss that my 
findings are not limited only to post-Soviet cases). These cases are interesting 
for several reasons: emergence out of wars that followed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, common (especially administrative and political) Soviet legacy, the 
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process of economic and political transition, being perceived by scholars and 
practitioners for most of their existence as temporary exceptions to the nation-
state system and as illegitimate actors (black holes) on the political map of 
Europe. 
Four de facto states fit these criteria: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Although I draw occasional parallels between these, I 
examine the case of Abkhazia in more detail, looking at how its political elites and 
decision-makers in Brussels, Moscow and Washington - who interact with their 
Abkhazian counterparts - interpret non-recognition and how does this 
interpretation influence the formulation and implementation of their respective 
foreign policy objectives and strategies. Leaning on Flick (2007) and Patton's 
(2002) guidelines for selecting cases, I argue that Abkhazia is both a critical case 
in which we can examine foreign interactions between a de facto state and 
recognised actors with most clarity as well as an extreme/deviant case,95 which 
needs to be accounted before any generalization about post-Soviet de facto 
states as such are to be made. Just like one must better understand its 
extreme/deviant elements - the de facto states - if one wants to understand the 
nation-state system, we need to look at deviant cases among the de facto states 
to better understand the de facto statehood as such.   
                                            
95 Klotz (2008, 51–53) discusses easy and least likely cases. 
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Abkhazia as a critical case 
Flick (2007, 28) calls critical cases "those cases in which the experiences or 
processes to be studied become especially clear – for example in the opinion of 
experts in the field." These cases are in some way unfavourable - they are the 
most difficult ones to test a certain hypothesis on. However, if the hypothesis is 
successfully tested on these cases, we can reasonably expect that the same 
hypothesis would also be confirmed when tested on more conventional cases. 
Flyvbjerg (2006, 225-226) illustrates this with Gallileo's choice of lead and a 
feather to test his theory of gravity: "if Galileo’s thesis held for these materials, it 
could be expected to be valid for all or a large range of materials" (Flyvbjerg 2006, 
226). It is important to note that metallic object and a feather do not function as 
extreme cases here, although the line between critical and extreme case can - 
such as in this example - be hard to define and the two categories can overlap. 
Flyvbjerg (2006, 229) provides further clarification: "The extreme case can be 
well-suited for getting a point across in an especially dramatic way, which often 
occurs for well-known case studies such as Freud’s (2003) “Wolf-Man” and 
Foucault’s (2012) 'Panopticon.' In contrast, a critical case can be defined as 
having strategic importance in relation to the general problem." The critical and 
the extreme case are therefore distinct in relation to the general problem but can 
overlap in terms of the case itself. Flyvbjerg (2006) believes the best way of 
identifying critical cases is to look for either “most likely” or “least likely” cases, 
but this would mean selecting a case on the dependent variable, which is 
generally not advised. Therefore, in my selection the most important criterion was 
how much there is to research, in other words, the extent and meaningfulness of 
external relations.  
The development of the margin of internal and external independence greater 
than in other post-Soviet de facto states has happened against all odds (making 
it a critical case). First, as mentioned above, Abkhazia is a heterogenous, multi-
ethnic society in which the titular nation that achieved secession and declared 
independence was a minority. Second, a Soviet vacation spot, Abkhazia lacked 
economic resources to sustain itself. Whereas Transnistria had a strong industrial 
base and Nagorno-Karabakh was helped by the large and wealthy Armenian 
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diaspora, Abkhazia was much less industrialised and had a much less influential 
diaspora. Furthermore, it didn’t even have a patron and Russia (which would later 
become its patron) enforced a CIS economic embargo that crippled the economy. 
Its continued existence was possible more due to the weakness of Georgia than 
due to its own strengths. From the outset, Abkhazia could not rely on any one 
actor, which prevented it from proverbially 'putting all eggs in one basket'. 
Maintaining relations (often through diaspora ties) with local actors in Russia 
(especially the North Caucasian republics and in Krasnodarski Krai) and Turkey 
rather than having a state as a patron was instrumental in its survival and later 
worked as a guarantee against over-dependence.  
Abkhazia is arguably the most viable of the four post-Soviet de facto states; 
having access to sea, a port and the possibility to trade with other countries in 
addition to possessing significant hydropower generation facilities (Inguri), some 
industry (cement), natural resources (wood), availability of fertile land 
(tangerines) and large tourist potential (mainly Russian tourists). Since Abkhazia 
is more viable and less constrained by material factors, this provides more 
manoeuvring space for political elites, allowing it to compensate the relative 
isolation of non-recognition. I expect the political elites to disagree on how these 
(more significant than in other de facto states) resources should be managed and 
to express concerns regarding economic over-dependence on Russia. A greater 
degree of state-building in comparison to other de facto states also increases 
Abkhazia’s viability.  
In relation to its viability, Abkhazia has, throughout its existence as a de facto 
state, retained a greater margin of independence than other post-Soviet de facto 
states. Whereas regime changes in other three de facto states are rare 
occurrences, Abkhazia has since declaring independence had four different 
heads of state (Ardzinba, Baghaps, Ankvab, and Khajimba). These regime 
changes must – to a certain extent – be translated into changes in foreign policy. 
During the presidencies of Baghaps and Ankvab, Abkhazia has shown the most 
ability and willingness to develop an independent, multi-vector foreign policy in 
which it prefers to engage with Turkey and EU in addition to its patron Russia, 
while Khajimba has since his ascent to power in 2014 signed several agreements 
 
78 
 
with Russia, forging even closer ties between the countries. I expect that regime 
changes and changes in foreign policy affect how elites interpret non-recognition 
at different points in time. It would be reasonable to expect that members of elite, 
who do not see over-reliance on Russia as a problem (or not to the same extent 
as the others) see non-recognition as less constraining, perhaps even rejecting 
the notion itself and seeing Abkhazia as being recognised (by Russia and a 
handful of other states). 
Although few states and international organisations are interested in engaging 
with Abkhazia, there has been more interest in engaging Abkhazia than other 
post-Soviet de facto states as EU’s policy of engagement without recognition 
testifies. This may be because of the geopolitical position of Abkhazia (EU), 
economic benefits and diaspora (Turkey) or because of conflict resolution 
attempts (EU, OSCE). After 2008, when Abkhazia forged closer ties with Russia, 
some interest of the West may have been lost, but Abkhazia has become more 
relevant again with the Ukraine crisis and its implications for the Black Sea region. 
Since Abkhazia seems to figure more prominently in the minds of decision-
makers in Brussels, Washington and Moscow than the other three de facto states 
(with only Transnistria perhaps arousing a similar level of interest), it is more likely 
to come across more informed, elaborate and diverse opinions on engagement 
in general and on interpretation of non-recognition in particular. 
Abkhazia as an extreme/deviant case 
According to Patton (2002), the researcher should make a conscious effort to 
integrate extreme or deviant cases. In three important ways Abkhazia is such a 
case and any research that aspires to a level of generalisation must account for 
these. First, among all post-Soviet de facto states, it is the only case of a 
secession by a minority (Zürcher 2007, 54). Consequently, the ethnic war 
narrative - a popular explanatory framework applied to post-Soviet de facto states 
– does not completely apply.96 Second, among all the post-Soviet de facto states 
                                            
96 Abkhazia was and is a multi-ethnic state in which allegiances are often quite complicated and 
it would be an oversimplification to present the conflict as Abkhazian-Georgian in ethnic terms, 
like for instance the Ossetian-Georgian conflict. Many Armenians joined Abkhazians in fighting 
Georgians (despite many Armenians living in Georgia and even forming the majority of 
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and despite being largely dependent on Russia, Abkhazia has shown much more 
agency and appetite for true independence than other de facto states. 
Consequently, the narrative that presents it as a Russian puppet state or satellite 
does not hold water. Third, Abkhazia is the only one among post-Soviet de facto 
states to have access to the sea and the access to shipping lanes with potential 
for passenger, import and export transport.  Consequently, the discourse of de 
facto states as peripheral territories, prisoners of their own geography relegated 
to the role of buffers etc. does not correspond to Abkhazia's situation. 
As a multi-ethnic society with regular and competitive elections, Abkhazia has the 
most diverse political elite among the four de facto states (Nagorno-Karabakh 
and Ossetia are mono-ethnic, while oppositional elites are small and weak in 
Transnistria and South Ossetia). The political elite, although dominated by ethnic 
Abkhazians and members of Raul Khajimba’s pro-Russian political party Forum 
for the National Unity of Abkhazia, differ according to ethnicity (and sometimes 
local identity), government/opposition role and party membership and attitude 
towards closer ties with Russia. I expect different political elites to ascribe 
different meanings to non-recognition, with ethnicity being the most important 
factor in shaping elite perceptions of non-recognition.  
Abkhazia's status in Soviet administrative hierarchy was the highest among all 
future de facto states: Abkhazia was a Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR Abkhazia) 
with the status of a treaty republic in association with the Georgian SSR, after 
1931 incorporated into Georgia as the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Abkhaz ASSR). South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh were mere 
Autonomous Oblast (AO), lower in status than both the SSR and the ASSR. It is 
this 10-year period of being equal to other Socialist Soviet Republics like Russian 
SSR and Ukrainian SSR, that is at the heart of both Soviet-era grievances as well 
as the post-Soviet demands for secession and independence. 
The primary reasons for choosing Abkhazia as my case study have to do with it 
standing out in the group of post-Soviet de facto states. It is a critical case in 
                                            
Samtskhe–Javakheti region). Some Gali Georgians joined Georgian lines, while others refused 
to take sides. 
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which we can observe foreign policy interaction (and how much of it there actually 
is) as well as being an extreme/deviant case, which needs explaining in order to 
better understand post-Soviet de facto states as a group. However, the fact that 
Abkhazia stands out in mentioned ways should not obscure the similarities 
between it and the other three post-Soviet de facto states. Although in no way a 
typical case,97 Abkhazia shares some traits with other post-Soviet de facto states, 
enabling a certain level of generalizability of conclusions.  
Although not in itself a reason for selecting Abkhazia, the existence and 
availability of good research in languages the researcher understands, is an 
important practical consideration. On the other hand, having a wealth of data and 
literature can render research unnecessary or irrelevant. Abkhazia is more 
researched than Transnistria and especially South Ossetia due to better 
accessibility, but less researched than Nagorno-Karabakh (due to the more 
precarious security situation the international interest is greater). Although foreign 
policy of Abkhazia and engagement with other actors in the international system 
is still poorly researched (with only Frear’s 2014 paper dedicated specifically to 
this question), there is a sizable body of literature on Abkhaz history, ethnicity (a 
lot of anthropological and linguistic research), identity and the relations between 
these. There is a sizable body of useful literature in Russian (Kuznetsova 2013; 
Petrova 2011; Shkunov 2010; and some literature in French (Zarifian 2010; 
Barriere 2010; Dembinska 2009) and Spanish (Pevarello 2014; Janashvilli 2014; 
Ramirez 2013; Casallas 2013) – to consider only publications in languages I can 
read, which has not been considered by the majority of English-speaking 
scholars. This literature, although it is not specifically dedicated to discussing the 
meaning and perception of non-recognition and how it affects interaction, can be 
very helpful on providing context for understanding perceptions of elites and 
decision makers. 
  
                                            
97 A typical case is one that is closest to the average case among the population of cases. 
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Case selection: choosing the interactors 
As stated in the introduction, I look at both sides of the interaction; the de facto 
state and the recognised actors in the international community with which it 
interacts. Even though foreign policy interactions of de facto states are limited by 
internal and external constraints, namely their smallness (meaning they dispose 
of limited resources and capacities to conduct foreign policy) and lack of 
recognition (which narrows both the scope as well as intensity of interactions they 
can have), it is still too wide of a research field to cover within this thesis. 
Therefore, it makes sense to look at the actors Abkhazia has meaningful 
interaction with. The population of potential cases includes the following. 
First, recognised (UN member) states, which have recognised Abkhazia: Russia, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Syria. Russia is the obvious 
choice here. On 9 September 2008, it became the first country to recognise and 
establish diplomatic relations with Abkhazia. Throughout time these relations 
have expanded and deepened, culminating in the signing of controversial 
defence and economic cooperation treaties with Russia in November 2014. 
Russian-Abkhaz relations are comprehensive and include political, economic, 
military and cultural relations. Even though Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru 
have recognised and established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia, they do not 
share a border with the de facto republic and are indeed very far away, limiting 
prospects for interaction. None of them have established any sort of permanent 
diplomatic presence in Abkhazia. Despite the initial enthusiasm on the Abkhaz 
side and talk of potential for cooperation, the current level of interaction with 
Nicaragua and Venezuela is very low, while Vanuatu and Tuvalu have withdrawn 
their recognition. 
Second, unrecognised and partially recognised (non-UN member) states, which 
have recognised Abkhazia: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria. 
Since none of the other post-Soviet de facto states share a border with Abkhazia, 
the interaction has been limited. Moreover, the possibilities for interaction have 
been further limited by non-recognition and limited resources. 
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Third, recognised (UN member) states, which have not recognised Abkhazia but 
have had some degree of continuous (even if indirect) interaction with Abkhazian 
de facto authorities in the past: Georgia, the US, Turkey. Georgia, the parent 
state of Abkhazia, continues its policy of counter-recognition and has since the 
August War in 2008 claimed that Abkhazia is an occupied territory. Georgian 
authorities and Abkhaz de facto authorities continuously interact, but that 
interaction is limited to Geneva Peace Process. Since I'm not looking at the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and the conflict resolution process, Georgian-Abkhaz 
relations are not of my primary interest. The US has not recognised Abkhazia and 
follows Georgia in claiming that Abkhazia is an occupied territory. It is however a 
party in the Geneva International Discussions, has an interest in conflict 
resolution in the region, while its representatives continue to interact informally 
and in unofficial capacity with Abkhaz de facto representatives. Despite there 
being no official interaction in terms of track one diplomacy, there is meaningful 
and continuous interaction through intermediaries, such as USAID (a US 
governmental agency dealing with foreign aid), HALO Trust (a British-American 
non-profit organisation) and through academic and youth exchanges. Turkey, 
home to the biggest diaspora of ethnic Abkhaz is another country to consider. 
Turkey, which maintains good relations with Georgia, does not recognise 
Abkhazia, but is the de facto state's "second-largest trading partner (after 
Russia), with 18 percent of Abkhazia’s total trade turnover" (Rukhadze 2015). 
However, much of that trade happens through the Abkhaz diaspora networks on 
both sides without direct participation of the Turkish state. Turkey has in the past 
interacted directly with de facto authorities in Abkhazia. In 2009, Abkhaz officials 
in Sukhum/i received a visit by the Foreign Ministry Deputy Undersecretary Ünal 
Çeviköz (ibid.). In April 2011, Abkhazia's President Baghapsh visited Ankara and 
met with Turkish officials (Frear 2014, 10). On one hand, the history of interaction 
makes Turkey an appealing potential case. On the other hand, these interactions 
have mostly been limited to economic and cultural relations and in most cases, 
took place through the networks of Abkhaz diaspora. There is no permanent 
Turkish representation in Abkhazia. Furthermore, the Abkhaz-Turkish relations 
have been damaged during the Turkish-Russian crisis following Turkish shoot-
down of a Russian military aircraft, when Abkhazia followed Russia in declaring 
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economic sanctions against Turkey, even if it had little impact on trade relations. 
In words of Frear (2014, 11): "Despite official Abkhazian rhetoric it is unlikely the 
Abkhazian-Turkish relationship will develop further until direct (and un-harassed) 
transportation links by land, sea and air can be established. In the meantime, the 
Turkish vector will remain heavily dependent on transnational factors, primarily 
the activities of the diaspora and religious institutions." It is for all these reasons, 
that I am choosing to look at the interaction between US and Abkhazia rather 
than that between Turkey and Abkhazia. 
Fourth, International (intergovernmental) organisations that have not recognised 
Abkhazia but have had some degree of continuous (even if indirect) interaction 
with Abkhazian de facto authorities in the past: UN, OSCE, and the European 
Union. UN, OSCE, and the EU are the three co-chairs of the Geneva International 
Discussions, the conflict resolution format, which includes representatives of 
Georgia, Russia, the US, and participants from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.98 
The United Nations is an exclusive club of recognised member states. The official 
position of the UN is one of upholding Georgia's territorial integrity, reflecting a 
quasi-consensus in the international community. UN's role as a mediator and co-
chair in the Geneva Process both requires and enables a certain degree of 
interaction with the de facto authorities, but these do not go beyond UN's mediator 
mission, which is demonstrated "in the consistent failure of Abkhazian officials to 
gain a platform at the UN from which to express their opinion, a position that has 
caused deep resentment among the Abkhazian authorities who identify this as 
biggest obstacle as obtaining a US visa" (Frear 2014, 8). The UNDP - a UN 
agency concerned with development - does maintain an office in Sukhum/i, there 
are UN-funded programmes (mostly funded by UNCHR and UNICEF) 
implemented by UNDP, UNICEF and a plethora of non-governmental 
organisations, but there is little interaction between UN and Abkhazia above UN 
agency level and outside of mostly NGO-implemented projects. The closure of 
the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) on 16 June 2009 due 
to a Russian veto, has further diminished this interaction. Despite being one of 
                                            
98 Abkhazians and South Ossetians are not equal parties to the other three in the GID and do not 
have official representatives. They merely have ‘participants’ who take part in the GID in their 
personal capacity. 
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the three co-chairs of the Geneva International Discussions, OSCE keeps a 
relatively low profile when it comes to interaction with Abkhaz de facto authorities. 
The OSCE Mission to Georgia, which was tasked with assisting the Georgian 
Government with conflict settlement, democratization, human rights and the rule 
of law issues operated out of Tbilisi between November 1992 and 31 December 
2008, when its mandate expired (OSCE 2008) following the August War in 2008. 
Ever since the closure, OSCE's presence on the ground has been limited to 
regular staff visits to Georgia. For instance, on 16th April 2015, the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities Astrid Thors visited the administrative 
boundary line near Abkhazia and met people displaced from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. She expressed an intention of visiting Sukhum/i in the future (OSCE 
2015). "Many former OSCE Mission Members moved to the newly established 
EU Mission (European Union Monitoring Mission, EUMM), which patrols on the 
Georgian side of the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) and took over the 
monitoring of the conflict regions. In July 2010, some 26 former OSCE staff 
members were employed at EUMM headquarters in Tbilisi alone. Their great 
experience and, above all, their knowledge of how the conflict appears from the 
South Ossetian side of the conflict zone are of enormous value to the new 
mission" (Stöber 2010, 219). In addition to that, the only other form of OSCE 
interaction with Abkhazia is the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism 
(IPRM), which "was created in February 2009 as a result of the Geneva 
Discussions that followed the 2008 conflict in Georgia. The meetings are an 
opportunity to discuss, among other issues: the identification of potential risks, 
the follow-up of incidents and the exchange of information, as well as problems 
affecting the communities on a daily basis. The meetings are co-facilitated by the 
OSCE and the EUMM" (OSCE 2018). IPRM however is focused not on 
interactions with (de facto) authorities on both sides, but on interaction with 
communities and residents in the areas in and around Gal/i (in Abkhazia) and 
Ergneti (just outside South Ossetia). The European Union is neither a state nor 
an international organisation, which means that its interactions with Abkhazia are 
complex. They involve several institutions, such as EEAS, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, and mostly adhere to the EU's so called 
'engagement without recognition' policy. This policy uses engagement as a carrot 
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to incentivise Abkhazia to participate in the conflict resolution process under the 
format of the Geneva International Discussions, of which the EU is a co-chair. 
Alongside Russia and the US, the EU is the most important political actor in the 
South Caucasus and its Eastern Partnership initiative is an important element of 
regional integration that allows EU to promote its values as a regional normative 
hegemon (Frear 2014, 9), although the EU does not recognise Abkhazia and 
supports Georgia's territorial integrity. Due to internal differences among EU 
member states, forging of a common policy towards Abkhazia (and other post-
Soviet de facto states) has been difficult, which has been reflected in different 
stances EU institutions have taken in the past. For instance, the EEAS usually 
does not apply the term 'occupied territory' to Abkhazia, while the European 
Parliament was among the first to have adopted it. EU's role in conflict resolution 
of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was minor compared to UN and OSCE, but has 
grown significantly after 2008, when UNOMIG and OSCE Mission to Georgia 
closed, leaving the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) as 
the primary peacekeeping force, albeit one not permitted to enter Abkhazia (Frear 
2014, 9). EU's presence also includes the European Union Special 
Representatives (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, who 
travels to Abkhazia and interacts with the de facto authorities. EU-Abkhaz foreign 
policy interactions are similarly under the radar to the ones between the US and 
Abkhazia with EU preferring to be involved through projects implemented by 
international and local NGOs. 
Fifth, other actors in the international community: ICRC, UNPO, other NGOs 
(Soros Foundation, World Vision, Danish Refugee Council, Accion Contra el 
Hambre, Conciliation Resources, Berghoff Centre for Constructive Conflict 
Management, among others). Abkhazia's interaction with these other actors - 
mostly non-governmental organisations - is important in terms of mediation, 
support to conflict-resolution process, providing humanitarian and developmental 
assistance, and other services. However, none of these actors maintains 
comprehensive and continuous relations with the Abkhaz de facto authorities.  
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As follows from the above presentation of potential case studies, the object of my 
research are the foreign policy interactions between a de facto state and 
recognised actors: Abkhazia-Russia, Abkhazia-US and Abkhazia-EU relations. 
Time-frame 
Having outlined the most important periods and events that form the historical 
context of this research, I now narrow my chronological window. Every research 
project inevitably needs to be limited by choosing the research question and 
hence the topic of focus, the case(s), as well as choosing the appropriate time-
frame. Generally, there are two kind of research time-frames: cross-sectional and 
longitudinal. The first one is a “a ‘snapshot’ approach where the data are collected 
at one point in time”, while the second is used “to study change and development 
over time” (Gray 2004, 31–32). The latter is more relevant to my research project, 
as I’m interested how non-recognition affects elite perception, decision-making 
and state behaviour, including the foreign policy of de facto state Abkhazia. As 
perceptions, behaviours, decision-making processes and policies change 
gradually and over a longer period of time (usually several years or even 
decades), longitudinal time-frame is more relevant. This is particularly the case 
since I’m asking the ‘how’ question, i.e. I am interested not only in what was the 
state of affairs in two moments in the past, but how we got from one to the other. 
Having selected the longitudinal time-frame, I now proceed to define the start and 
cut-off dates and years of my research focus: 12th October 1999 when the Act of 
State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia was signed and entered into 
force and 24th November 2014 when the Russian-Abkhaz ‘Agreement on Alliance 
and Strategic Partnership’ was signed. Despite the fact that the Act of State 
Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia marked the second time Abkhazia has 
declared independence, this can be considered the only formal declaration of 
independence. The conclusion of ‘Agreement on Alliance and Strategic 
Partnership’ of November 24th, 2014 marked a long process of Abkhazia’s 
increasing dependence on and integration with Russia. I hypothesize that the 
period roughly between 12th October 1999 and after November 24th, 2014 is the 
period of real Abkhazian de facto statehood. Before 1999, Abkhazia was cut-off 
from the rest of the world by a crippling embargo, with a war-torn economy, 
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fledgling institutions and hence more of a secessionist breakaway province than 
a de facto state. After 2014, Abkhazia is more integrated with Russia with a 
significantly smaller margin of independence then before, hence becoming closer 
to a Russian protectorate. The period of fifteen years between these two 
watershed moments is long enough to observe changes in perceptions, 
behaviours, decision-making processes and policies, while being short enough 
to allow the research to be focused and manageable, i.e. not to get lost in a mass 
of data that is not strictly relevant to the case. Moreover, it includes the optimal 
spectrum of different political contexts needed to understand the changes in 
foreign policy interaction as it covers the Ardzinba, Bagapsh, Ankvab and 
Khajimba presidencies in Abkhazia, the Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev 
presidencies in Russia, and Shevarnadze, Saakashvili and Margvelashvili 
presidencies in Georgia. Furthermore, it includes the periods when Abkhazia was 
under embargo and nearly completely isolated, the period when it was 
unrecognised but able to trade, and finally the period after 2008 when it became 
partially recognised. It includes the hugely important August 2008 war as well as 
reset and again the worsening of relations between Russia and the West, the 
takeover of Crimea and part of the ongoing War in Ukraine – not the focus of our 
research but constituting the context that has to be considered. 
Expectations 
As discussed in Chapter 1, I expect the policy elites to be conscious of the 
geopolitical context and internal developments in the de facto state, to make 
connections between the two, to have a strong interest in preserving the state 
identity, to consider ontological security important and see foreign policy as one 
of the ways of preserving it. I also expect policy elites to understand the 
geopolitical interests of other actors to play their geopolitical roles in a way to 
preserve (or increase) their de facto independence.  
Building on top of these expectations, with the historical context presented in this 
chapter in mind, I expect Abkhaz officials to express their interest in engagement 
with other countries, but do not expect them to make direct references to the 
multi-vector foreign policy of the previous presidents, Baghaps and Ankvab. 
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Instead, I expect them to see Russia as the most important and reliable partner 
but still with a degree of mistrust based on historical experiences. It is reasonable 
to assume that the opinions of political elites differ according to their ethnicity; 
Abkhazians, Armenians and, of course, Russians are expected to be more pro-
Russian and Georgians in the Gal/i district to be more interested in a multi-vector 
foreign policy. The study conducted by O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal in 2011 
Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State points towards these 
expectations. I expect to find political elites (especially Abkhaz) in Abkhazia less 
committed to dialogue with Georgia than in the past and due to the worsening of 
the relations between Russia and the West, more sceptical of the latter, especially 
towards the EU. Most them likely see non-recognition as a constraining factor. 
There is a possibility that non-Abkhaz interviewees could see non-recognition as 
benefiting the Abkhaz. I expect the Abkhaz government to be interested in 
keeping the status-quo and in very tight relations with Russia, while I expect the 
opposition to be more critical and weary of over-dependence of Russia and in 
favour of diversifying economic cooperation by deepening economic relations 
with EU, Turkey and other countries. 
On the other side of the interaction, I have selected decision-makers form EU, 
United States and Russian Federation to be interviewed. EU and US are in the 
case of Abkhazia the most important gate-keepers, while EU also has strategic 
interest in Abkhazia because of its proximity and Abkhazia’s geopolitical position. 
Both EU and US have an interest in resolving the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict 
and in peace in the Caucasus and both have been engaged in. Russia is 
Abkhazia’s ally and the state Abkhazia most significantly engages with.  
While it may come as a surprise that only one interview with Georgian decision-
makers (Paata Zakareishvili99) was conducted, this can be explained by the fact 
that there is very little meaningful interaction between Georgia and Abkhazia 
beyond the format of the Geneva Process (the peace process intended to bring 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to an end through finding a peaceful solution) and that 
these as well as political discourse, foreign policy positions, strategies and 
                                            
99 Paata Zakareishvili was the Georgian Minister for Reintegration at the time when this interview 
was conducted. 
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arguments have been relatively well researched and literature on this readily 
available. 
Conclusion 
The chapter examined the historical context of the thesis that serves as a 
reference for the reader as well as for the researcher and that is referred back to 
in the empirical chapters. As this is an in-depth single-case study, understanding 
the history is crucial. Being aware of historical details is also important due to this 
being a contentious and highly politicised subject among Georgians and 
Abkhazians. Finally, as my research puts emphasis on identity and culture and 
such notions as honour and apswara (explored further in Chapter 4), it is 
unavoidable to know the context of their emergence and their relevance in 
different historical periods. 
As the analysis shows, the history of Abkhazia is full of twists and turns: it was 
Georgia, which opened the gates to Russian influence in the South Caucasus 
(Zürcher 2007, 16), Abkhazian Bolsheviks who sided with Russian Bolsheviks 
against the Georgian Mensheviks (Souleimanov 2013, 114), Russia which in 
1990s enforced an embargo on Abkhazia, Russia which recognised Abkhazia 
after the 2008 war with Georgia. Given this tumultuous history, two mistakes have 
to be avoided in further research. First, it is tempting to see these historical twists 
and turns as "a never-ending epic struggle between mountain dwellers and 
Cossacks, Christians, and Russians, taking place in the borderlands of empires, 
and being fuelled by a mountainous topography, as well as by deeply rooted 
cultural beliefs." (Zürcher 2007, 1) This would at best underplay the long periods 
of relatively stable and peaceful relations of coexistence between these peoples 
and at worst manifest itself in racist remarks about the backward and ever-warring 
tribes. The second temptation is just the opposite: to see history or even periods 
as monolithic and to simplify their complexity. As the analysis of the Soviet period 
showed, Abkhazian identity was both persecuted and entrenched, threatened 
and preserved.  
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In the second part of the chapter, the empirical scope of the research was 
introduced and justified. I chose Abkhazia as a critical and extreme/deviant case 
among the population of de facto states. While a critical case allows for exploring 
if and why it stands out among de facto states in terms of foreign policy 
interaction, choosing it as an extreme/deviant case, helps to better understand 
post-Soviet de facto states as a group (what they share and how Abkhazia differs 
from them). Although in no way a typical case, Abkhazia shares some traits with 
other de facto states, enabling a certain level of generalizability of conclusions 
(discussed further in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7). As my research examines both 
sides of the interaction, I have considered the population of actors that engage 
with Abkhazia, choosing Russia, the EU and the US as the most significant and 
meaningful. Next, I have defined my timeline cut-off dates to be 12th October 1999 
when the Act of State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia was signed and 
entered into force and 24th November 2014 when the Russian-Abkhaz 
‘Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ that was signed. Finally, I 
briefly discussed my research expectations which already anticipate some 
fieldwork and methodological choices (Chapter 3) and possible findings (Chapter 
7). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
“Доверяй, но проверяй” (“Trust, but verify”). 
– Russian proverb 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I look at how I go about answering my research question, set forth 
in Chapter 1. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss my research design and 
research strategy and provide arguments for its relevance and appropriateness. 
I then go on to adapt my approach and operationalize my theoretical concepts to 
best look at how Abkhazia’s political elites and decision-makers in Russia, the 
EU, and the US, interpret non-recognition and how this influences their foreign 
policy interaction. In this part I also decide how I go about engaging with empirical 
data. In the second part of the chapter, I shed more light on data collection, 
focusing on my two primary methods: interviews and process tracing. This is 
where I draw on my field work notes and observations, discuss the selection of 
interviewees and obstacles encountered. In the third part, I shift my focus to data 
analysis, describing in detail the process behind transcription, translation, 
analysis, and interpretation of data. Finally, I address the questions of validity and 
limitations to my research. I discuss the reliability of my methods, the objectivity 
of my research design. I go on to critically assess the explanatory weight of my 
research and to what extent its results can be generalized. I reflexively discuss 
the limits and biases of my research and the ethical considerations that have 
come up during it. 
Methodology 
Methodology represents the crucial link between my theoretical approach and the 
empirical reality that is the object of my research. It is therefore important to 
discuss where I came from and where I am going. As advised by Kallet (2004, 
1229), usually there are several methods to choose from in investigating a 
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research problem and “the methodology section /…/ should clearly articulate the 
reasons why you chose a particular procedure or technique.” Klotz & Lynch 
(2007, 107), observe that the choice of method must draw on select evidence 
and the limits of different interpretations. In other words, the choices made 
regarding the methodology of research, define not only what I research, but also 
what must be left out: which data is not gathered and analysed. This is perhaps, 
after forming the research question, the second most important watershed 
moment in a PhD project as missing a crucial part of the puzzle, can be very 
difficult to correct later. However, despite the importance of getting methodology 
right, the researcher does not have the luxury of rigidly sticking to a pre-
determined methodological design. It is often said that writing of a doctoral thesis 
is an iterative process. There are feedback loops between literature and 
theoretical concepts, between the researcher and the supervisor(s), but there is 
also “a give-and-take process between data collection and refinement of the 
research design” (Klotz & Lynch 2007, 107), so the researcher should remain 
open to new and surprizing evidence that can challenge the central arguments or 
hypotheses of the research. The key to successful research can thus be summed 
up as: have a plan but be ready to change it, if necessary.  
In the First Chapter, I developed a theoretical framework that aims to reconcile 
Realist and Constructivist elements and lends itself well to qualitative empirical 
research. According to Flick (2007, 21), “the theoretical perspective of our 
research program informs how we plan our concrete research.” My aim is to 
observe the interaction between interpretations of non-recognition and foreign 
policy behaviour through my tripartite conceptual framework of state identity, 
ontological security, and geopolitical role. My plan is to answer my research 
questions through analysing the data collected through elite interviewing and 
process tracing. Before choosing to work within a research paradigm, it is 
important to know its strengths, weaknesses, limitations, and above all the fit 
between the paradigm and the object of research. According to Harrison et al. 
(2017, 8), “qualitative paradigms are broad and can encompass exploratory, 
explanatory, interpretive, or descriptive aims.” Their strength is that they can give 
“complex textual descriptions” of peoples’ experience of a certain research issue. 
Therefore, they provide data about the “human” side of the research problem; 
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“the often-contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships 
of individuals.” Without getting into more detailed quantitative/qualitative 
discussions, this paradigm is well suited to my research that focuses on human 
behaviours and is interested in meaning and interpretation. Furthermore, 
“qualitative methods are also effective in identifying intangible factors, such as 
social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose 
role in the research issue may not be readily apparent” (Mack et al. 2005, 1–2). 
Since I examine state identity, ontological security and geopolitical role – all 
empirically grounded but to a large extent intangible factors, it makes sense to 
establish the foundation for my research firmly on qualitative ground.  
Those familiar with the recent developments in the de facto states studies, 
understand that my qualitative, single-case, constructivist methodology goes 
against the current of in the field, which is progressively moving from case studies 
to large(r)-n comparative research (Florea 2017, Comai 2018) with the aim of 
reaching more generalizable conclusions and constructing a theory of de facto 
states: “Case-based research aims to develop “the conceptual underpinnings of 
future social scientific inquiry” as concepts derived from case-based research 
rather than causal inferences coming from variable-oriented research have been 
the most enduring contributions of modern social science (Schrank 2006, 23). 
Although this is often the trajectory taken by (sub-)disciplines, I believe a simple 
linear progression of the research agenda in the case of de facto states is deeply 
problematic. As I have mentioned before, the cases are very diverse, often highly 
culturally specific, and by abstracting away the context (as large-n research 
inevitably does), much detail is lost and results, now more generalized, not as 
valid. “Large-n fundamentalists” believe  that small-n researchers should adopt 
or mimic their method by analysing larger numbers of cases. They advise small-
n researchers to “maximize leverage by increasing the number of cases at their 
disposal” (Schrank 2006, 22). Indeed, there is a tendency to forcibly include more 
and more cases, including not only borderline cases, but also cases that cannot 
in any way be considered de facto states even according to the definitions used 
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by authors themselves.100 Large-n research focuses on variables through 
exclusion of agents and mechanisms (Hedström & Swedberg 1998) and “while 
large-n researchers treat classificatory ambiguity as a threat, small-n researchers 
view it as an opportunity. “What is my case a case of?” they ask” (Schrank 2006, 
33). This is the approach I follow in my own research. 
Research design 
According to Ragin (1994, 191), research design is “a plan for collecting and 
analysing evidence that makes it possible for the investigator to answer whatever 
questions he or she has posed.” Research design is concerned with practically 
all aspects of qualitative research ranging from specific details of data collection 
to the selection of data analysis techniques (Ragin 1994, 191). It is therefore the 
master plan that specifies how the data are collected and analysed. Flick (2007, 
44) believes that the main element of good research design is the potential to 
limit the focus of the study. Good research design can break down complex 
research issues so that they are manageable with limited time and resources and 
can lead to results. In other words, the role of research design is preventing us to 
bite off more than we can chew. Even though good research is based on rules 
and procedures that ensure quality, validity and the possibility of verification, it 
also needs to incorporate a degree of flexibility. As Flick (2007, 79) stresses, 
flexible design is all about adapting the selection of interviewees and perhaps 
some of the questions to the development of the research process and to what 
researcher finds interesting and accessible in the field. That is why the 
methodology - even if limited to this chapter – in fact runs through the full length 
of the research project and the thesis: “Continuous design means to redesign – 
to adapt and improve the design – throughout the research process” (Flick, 2007, 
79).  
Having already drawn on my literature review in my Theoretical Framework 
without discussing the methodology of it, I feel the need to briefly address it now 
– in relation to the question of narrowing down the focus and limiting the scope 
                                            
100 For instance, Florea (2017, 339) considers Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina as a de 
facto state that continues to be ‘alive’ - and perhaps even more curiously - Gaza as a de facto 
state since 2007 with Palestine as its parent state. 
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of my research. This important early stage of research is often not explicitly 
discussed. Indeed, it is often dependent on an individual’s ‘googling skills’ (Comai 
2018) and as such more a question of search engine algorhythms, arbitrariness 
and serendipity than methodical and systematic combing of the field. This is made 
more difficult since “literature review searches are nonlinear. There is no specific 
path for finding sources related to your topic” (Roselle & Spray 2012, 24). In case 
of interdisciplinary research, such as my own, the process is made even more 
difficult as relevant literature is spread out across different fields and searchable 
under different labels: “for example, ethnic conflict could just as easily fall within 
the publishing guidelines of a journal covering international law as it could be 
found in a journal on international organizations” (Roselle & Spray 2012, 24). My 
approach to literature review was to focus on my research question. In the first 
phase I read widely to be able to identify gaps in de facto state literature. I knew 
I wanted to focus on de facto states in post-Soviet space, but I was not sure about 
what I want to focus on, which cases and how many I want to choose, and what 
angle (theoretical framework and methodology) should be taken. Hence, I read 
to develop my research question and narrow down my focus. With the research 
question in place, I focused on depth: I read literature than helped me discover 
how to best go about answering my question, how to conceptualise its parts and 
how to grasp the empirical reality I was interested in. As Roselle & Spray (2012, 
16) advise to remember always the purpose of the literature review, which is to 
ground the study “in the field of international relations” and to use it to get up to 
date with the understanding of other researchers in the field (Roselle & Spray 
2012, 16). In other words, first I studied the literature to get up to speed with the 
scholars in the field, then to develop my own contribution. One of the trickier parts 
of interdisciplinary research methodology in general and literature review, is the 
complex connections and the overlap between various fields. When researching 
foreign policy, this overlap – in the form of intersection of domestic and 
international – is particularly acute as “foreign policy occurs in the complex 
intersection of domestic and international environments” (Neack 2014, 4). 
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Adapting my approach  
In relation to researching intersecting areas, doing research on foreign policy also 
requires looking at different levels of analysis, since posing “questions at a single 
level, we acknowledge that our understanding will be limited to that level; an 
analysis conducted at just one level will not yield a complete picture” (Neack 
2014, 9). This is complicated by the fact that these are not physically separate 
areas, but “heuristic devices—that help us study our subject.” To clarify with an 
analogy, levels of analysis are like different lenses on a camera and give us 
different views of the research subject. “At each level of analysis, we gain a 
particular perspective on or understanding of our subject” (Neack 2014, 9). In my 
case, these different levels of analysis are the subnational level (domestic 
politics), national level (foreign policy) and international level (interaction and 
engagement). It must be noted that state behaviours do not always fit comfortably 
in the three levels of analysis. This is particularly true of small de facto states, 
where domestic politics and foreign policy are closely intertwined. Foreign policy 
itself bridges the national-international divide and engagement with de facto 
states often has more to do with the domestic environment as the EU and the US 
prefer to engage directly with the civil society and NGOs and not with de facto 
governmental structures. Even when researching phenomena on the same level, 
a researcher may discover more sub-levels as it is sometimes necessary to 
contact people on several levels of administrative hierarchy before being able to 
get in touch with research participants. People on each level may have 
reservations against the researcher, the research or the institution (Flick, 2007, 
58). If multi-level analysis depends on analysing (i.e. breaking the research 
subject down into smaller, more manageable units), it sometimes requires 
synthetizing assumptions, for instance the decisions of policy-makers can be 
seen as the decisions of the state. This conflation of elites with the state assumes 
that “all leaders will act in ways consistent with the long-term, persistent national 
interests of the country.” (Neack 2014, 17). However, if one is not careful to 
clearly demonstrate the presence of such “persistent national interests”, such 
assumptions can be put under question and the so called ‘level of analysis 
problem’ (discussed in Chapter 1) can arise. 
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A research design is a way of systematically organizing the research process, 
including adopting definitions and defining “clear measures for observations” 
(Roselle & Spray 2012, 32), but also importantly assesses the availability of 
resources and makes sure they are sufficient on relation to proposed research 
project (Flick, 2007, 51). In other words, a research design plays a vital role in 
adapting any general methodology (such as my qualitative, single-case, 
constructivist research) to the empirical reality under question (the role of 
perceptions of non-recognition on foreign policy interaction between Abkhazia 
and Russia, EU and US between 1999 and 2014). 
Operationalization of concepts  
According to Roselle & Spray (2012, 38), “operationalization is the process used 
in the social sciences to define variables in terms of observable properties. 
Without the clear definition of terms, readers and researchers may not have a 
common understanding of what is being studied.” This definition is, however, 
deceptively simple. It involves making a series of important decisions about which 
concepts to use and how they capture the empirical reality, and then defending 
those choices. Sometimes this may seem straightforward, but often a researcher 
would likely find different definitions of the same object or concept and “would 
use discretion in deciding which definition to adopt.” (Roselle & Spray 2012, 39). 
Operationalisation is a two-step process. The first step consists of achieving 
conceptual clarity and the second is making sure it is a good fit for the empirical 
reality studied (Ruane 2005, 51). In case of mismatch, we need to either change 
the concept (definition), the way we use it (application) or the empirical reality we 
apply it to (case). Indeed, if we find ourselves struggling with operationalization, 
we need to sometimes reconsider revisiting our theoretical framework. Often, 
difficulties arising in measurement come from not having achieved sufficient 
conceptual clarity, for instance if we have not specified all the dimensions of our 
concepts (Ruane 2005, 52). 
Operationalization can also be a transformation of “concepts into variables (the 
abstract into the concrete” (Ruane 2005, 57). In practice, operationalisation is 
achieved through adoption of operational definitions, which specify the steps of 
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the measurement process (Ruane 2005, 57). In my research I employ three key 
concepts that I now operationalize: state identity, geopolitical role, and ontological 
security. 
State identity and geopolitical role 
As discussed in Chapter 1, despite the changes in the perception of de facto 
states, their social identity (how other actors see them) is very much a negative 
identity – they are defined by others by what they are not, i.e. widely 
internationally recognised. It is better to define concepts by what they are than 
what they are not. If a state is composed of population and territory, then state 
identity consists of national identity and geopolitical identity (which I call 
‘geopolitical role’ and look at separately). In Chapter 4: Foreign Relations of 
Abkhazia, I further unpack the notion of national identity, using Morin & Paquin's 
definition of national identity as “a socially constructed image that a political 
community uses to portray itself. It is made up of a set of elements, including 
constitutive norms, comparative categories, collective aspirations and cognitive 
references” (Morin & Paquin 2018, 261). I discuss important cultural (and 
therefore slowly-changing) sources of Abkhazian national identity, such as 1) 
apswara; 2) comparative categories and relations with outside actors that 
importantly shape national identity; 3) the influence of collective aspirations and 
anxieties, such as stigma, shame and isolation on national identity; cognitive 
references or how self-identity is reproduced in media and cartography, through 
mimicking and modelling.  
As this goes well beyond operationalization, I want to focus here instead on a 
crucial methodological problem: how does one operationalize something as 
dynamic and reflexive as state identity? Identities are not unchangeable 
individual or collective characteristics; they are not assigned at birth but produced 
and reproduced by people. That is why constructivists examine the interlinked 
processes between actions and their contexts in the development of self-identity, 
the meanings behind it and the effects it produces (Klotz & Lynch 2007, 65). 
National identity with its slow-changing cultural norms may be considered the 
anchor of state identity, but there are important elements of state identity that are 
processual, and we cannot talk merely about being and not-being, but also about 
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becoming. This is best seen in the concept of state-building and – to a lesser 
extent – democratisation. These are, at least in the case of Abkhazia, empirically 
existing processes, but also important parts of state identity that authorities want 
to showcase. The state identity of Abkhazia is the self-identity, which includes 
state-building and democratisation as processual dimensions in opposition to the 
social identity of a largely unrecognised state. 
To summarize into an operational definition: The state identity of Abkhazia is 
composed of national identity and geopolitical role. National identity is self-
identity and as such positively based on slowly changing cultural norms, external 
relations, cognitive references and aspirations to statehood and recognition. 
These aspirations are empirically observable as promotion of cultural values, 
willingness to engage with other actors (preferably through the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, but also through trade, unofficial civil society engagement, 
and cultural links), and through state-building and democratisation. The state 
identity can best be captured through interviews with decision-makers and 
gleaned from official documents, such as statements of the President and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The state identity as a self-identity clashes with the 
social identity of Abkhazia, its identity as perceived by other actors in the 
international community. The social identity of Abkhazia is negative, based on the 
status of a widely unrecognised state (if not a puppet or an occupied territory). 
The social identity of Abkhazia is empirically observable through statements of 
states and international organisations voicing support for Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, rejecting the recognition of Abkhazia, but in some cases being willing to 
engage with it, mostly in unofficial and indirect ways in what is often called 
‘engagement without recognition’. Geopolitical role, as defined in the Theoretical 
Framework, is a set of behaviours that reflect the position, importance and ability 
to project power influenced by material-territorial factors, such as physical 
location, size, climate, topography, demography, natural resources, and 
technological factors. It depends on geographical factors as well as on subjective 
perception and interpretation of these factors (strategic importance ascribed to 
them) by themselves and other political entities – it thus brings together ideational 
and material aspects of de facto states’ identity. Geopolitical role is a classic 
example of the fact that “identities become institutionalized and thus part of the 
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context within which people act” (Klotz & Lynch 2007, 84). They can be 
empirically observed through looking at institutional practices and the behavioural 
patterns. To make this more systematic, I have developed a typology of 
geopolitical roles in Chapter 1. 
Ontological security 
In Chapter 1, I presented one of the main dilemmas of de facto states - what do 
they gain if they wrest the territory from the parent state but lose their de facto 
independence to their patron, if they gain security, but lose their identity in the 
process? – as a question of ontological security, which I defined – borrowing from 
Giddens (1991, 243) – as a “sense of continuity and order in events.” The concept 
of ontological security, however, presents challenges to operationalisation, one 
of them being its relative novelty and a limited (yet quickly growing) number of 
cases it has been applied to.  
As Klotz & Lynch (2007, 17) state that constructivists understand ‘security’ as “a 
relationship historically conditioned by culture rather than an objective 
characteristic determined by the distribution of military capabilities.” They 
consequently favour methodologies acknowledging “contingency and context.” 
Unfortunately, they do not proceed to give examples of such methodologies. 
Steele (2008, 11) is more concrete as he states that “even if this is an incomplete 
practice for measuring ‘‘ontological security,’’ until we develop a method to read 
the minds of decision-making groups, analysis of discursive consciousness is the 
best we can do, and it is a large improvement on existing assumptions made by 
social scientists about actor motivations.” I do not agree with Steele here; through 
discourse analysis it is only possible to see the ideal image (ontological security), 
while through interviews with decision-makers you get to understand both the 
idea as well as the practice and a more complete picture including incoherencies 
(ontological insecurity) can be assembled. Mitzen’s approach to ontological 
security consisting of “operationalizing the modes of routinization in security 
dilemmas” (Mitzen 2006, 364) and Pratt’s relational understanding of ontological 
security, which “implies that actors seek not to secure the coherence and stability 
of self in particular, but rather of their broader social context” are much more 
promising. Having decided that the North American version of Constructivism 
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focusing on routines (action) rather than narratives (discourse) is more relevant 
to my research project, this inevitably shapes how I proceed to operationalize the 
concept of ontological security. 
Keeping in mind the above, ontological security can be translated into this 
operational definition: ontological security allows to structure our understanding 
of disparate and ever-changing state interests into a more coherent whole and 
thus presents the missing link between identity and interests.101 Key elements of 
ontological security are status (recognition, partial recognition or non-
recognition), and interaction (from isolation to extensive and intensive 
engagement). Both status and interaction are liable to change and both shape 
identity. The more the status and the level of interaction are deemed sufficient 
and are stable across time, the more the state is ontologically secure. Ontological 
security can be operationalized by connecting these various components to 
empirical realities. Status can be observed empirically by counting the number of 
international recognitions of Abkhazia and comparing them across time, and by 
judging their quality and relevance (recognition by Russia and Nauru are not 
worth the same) of recognitions. The level of interaction can be gouged from 
press statements of Abkhazian MFA, its size and activity, the presence in 
Abkhazia of foreign NGOs, the presence of Abkhazian delegations abroad at 
trade fairs and other economic and cultural events (observable through 
participant observation and interviews with foreign policy actors in Abkhazia, but 
also their counterparts in Russia, the EU and the US). 
Data collection 
In this section I want to discuss what kind of data was collected and how I went 
about doing it. As Lamont & Swidler (2014, 14) put it: “different methods shine 
under different lights and that one should choose the most appropriate data 
                                            
101 When discussing identity and collective aspirations (Realists would talk of national interest), 
it is good to remember that “regardless of whether researchers concentrate on individual or 
collective agency, constructivists need to denaturalize the conflation of identities and interests” 
(Klotz & Lynch 2007, 85). It is therefore not permissible to equate identity with interest, but also 
wrong to completely detach one from another. It is, however, fair to say that identity and interest 
are inexorably linked and affect each other. According to Klotz & Lynch (2007, 41) this is through 
a ‘constructivist ontology of mutual constitution’, which is itself very difficult to operationalise. 
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collection technique based on the question being asked and the types of facts 
and theories one wants to operate with.” My research is a case study and this 
method necessitates using several different sources of data, which may include 
“structured, semi-structured or open interviews, field observations or document 
analysis” (Gray 2004, 129). Indeed, I rely on two types of data mentioned: semi-
structured (elite) interviews and, to a lesser extent, document analysis. Because 
of its multiple sources, a case study can generate a lot of data, which can 
overwhelm the researcher (Gray 2004, 130–131). It is therefore crucial to make 
data collection focused on answering the narrowly defined research question 
(Roselle & Spray 2012, 32–33) while not putting on the blinders that would 
prevent us from understanding the relevant context. This focusing is itself an 
iterative process, as described by Gillham (2000, 25): “As the data collection 
progresses (and accumulates) you will move from gathering data to making more 
focused, selective decisions about what you are going to concentrate on.” 
Interviews 
As mentioned, my case study research depends largely on interview data and it 
is in this section that I discuss in more detail how I planned and conducted my 
semi-structured, elite interviews. The interview is the most commonly used 
research tool in social and political science (Morris 2009, 209) and the semi-
structured interview is the cornerstone of case study research and can be the 
richest source of data. Its simplicity can, however, be deceptive (Gillham 2000, 
65). Elite interviews are conducted with people “in a position of authority, or 
especially expert or authoritative, people who are capable of giving answers with 
insight and a comprehensive grasp of what it is you are researching” (Gillham 
2000, 63–64). I have decided to conduct semi-structured elite interviews 
conducted with representatives of political elites in Abkhazia and corresponding 
decision makers dealing with Abkhazia in European institutions, Russian 
Federation and United States. I conducted 32 interviews in total, 13 of them in 
Sukhum/i, 2 in Tbilisi, 3 in Moscow, 6 in Brussels and 4 in Washington D.C., 2 in 
New York and 2 over Skype. I first conducted interviews in Abkhazia before going 
to Moscow, Brussels and Washington. Elite interviewing has been chosen as the 
main method, because it is the best way of getting the data on how non-
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recognition is interpreted by politicians and policy-makers and how this informs 
and affects the formulation of foreign policy objectives and strategies. Decision-
makers (who are part of the political elite) are the best placed to provide insight 
into policy making and semi-structured interview is the best way of extracting rich 
(Gillham 2000, 62), but focused information from them. 
Two of the most important questions regarding elite interview planning are 
sampling (selection of interviewees) and access. Flick (2007, 30) notes that 
sometimes it is hard to determine in advance who the best interviewees to answer 
your questions are. Although ‘sampling’ implies that selection of interviewees can 
be done in the beginning and once and for all, qualitative research practice shows 
that it is usually an iterative process. In other words, when sampling for elite 
interviews, it is not so much about ensuring a representative sample as in large-
n case studies, which rely on structured interviews, but more about having an 
idea what kind of information we want to acquire and what kind of individuals we 
must approach to acquire that information. In-depth knowledge of interviewees is 
the most important factor in succeeding at elite interviews (Mikecz 2012, 491). 
Getting to know potential interviewees by reading their interviews, publications, 
public statements, asking other people, plays an important role in sampling 
(deciding whether the person in question is relevant and would make a good 
interviewee) and in “gaining access, trust and establishing rapport” (Mikecz 2012, 
491).102 The main criteria for selection in my research is interviewee’s relevance 
to my topic (direct involvement in foreign policy development, implementation or 
assessment), degree of influence he/she has over the formation of foreign policy 
(influence), his/her experience (seniority), his/her ability to openly express views 
(e.g. by seeking people no longer in positions of power who might be more open 
and have more time for questions). The aim of selecting these criteria is to get 
honest, informed and informative answers from people well placed to provide 
insight into the aims and conduct of foreign policy. In line with my prior ethical 
                                            
102 Gray (2004, 222–223) defines rapport as “understanding, one established on a basis of respect 
and trust between the interviewer and respondent. To establish a rapport, it is particularly 
important to make the respondent relaxed and to get the interview off to a good start.” If there is 
little rapport, the interview can be cut short or the interviewee may refuse to answer questions 
(Gray 2004, 223). In creating rapport with elites, Mikecz (2012, 492) believes the researcher’s 
positionality is key and is positively influenced by preparation so that it evolves throughout the 
course of data collection. 
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commitments, criteria, such as gender, race, age, social condition or sexual 
preference played no role in the selection of the participants. Interviewees were 
not paid and have not received any reimbursements. I was constantly aware of 
the threat of bias in selecting participants. Seidman (2006, 40), has pointed out 
that more accessible people are not necessarily the most relevant or 
representative (Gillham 2000, 30–31) and especially beginner interviewers often 
seek “the easiest path to their potential participants. They often want to select 
people with whom they already have a relationship” (Seidman 2006, 40). That is 
why when gaining access in elite interviewing, I have followed Harvey’s (2010, 
203) advice that “in gaining access, researchers should try and pursue as many 
avenues as possible, including using their own social networks. Researchers 
should also think about how their positionality, such as their institutional affiliation, 
may affect their ability to gain access to elite members.” I have drawn on my 
social network of researchers and NGO representatives to identify gatekeepers 
and potential interviewees much like Kopeček, Hoch, Baar (2016, 92) have 
described their fieldwork in Abkhazia:  
“two gatekeepers (a leading representative of a non-profit organisation and 
a former adviser of a prominent Abkhazian politician, currently working as 
an independent journalist) were selected and contacted in advance on the 
basis of publicly available information. They provided contacts to further 
potential respondents. The interview with the gatekeepers, who were 
contacted beforehand, was always preceded by biographic preliminary 
research, which helped the authors suitably lay out the topic of the 
interviews.”  
Another inroad was provided by a British academic who introduced me to senior 
decision-makers in Abkhazia, including the then acting Minister of foreign affairs 
and several of his predecessors. Yet another gatekeeper was an employee of 
Abkhazian MFA, who I met at an international conference several years. I also 
conducted informative interviews useful to inform myself of the wider political, 
social, economic and cultural context and to identify other interviewees. I spoke 
with journalists, professors, environmentalists, and representatives of the civil 
society. I was very satisfied with the interviews in Abkhazia, both in terms of 
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access to policy-makers (including several high-level interviewees) keen on 
sharing their point of view, and the quality of the data. I was equally happy with 
the interviews in the US, which turned up useful information on representation of 
and lobbying on behalf of Abkhazia in the US (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). 
The interviews in Brussels were in line with my expectations but the interviewees 
were a bit more diplomatic and less outspoken. Both in the US and the EU, I was 
mainly able to speak to mid-level diplomats and more senior think tank employees 
(most of them with policy experience) and those who used to work on Abkhazia 
but no longer do, proved to be the most valuable sources. The interviews in 
Russia were very difficult to obtain, likely due to the political tensions between 
Russia and the West (with which I was inevitably associated), but also smaller 
network of contacts there and greater cultural and linguistic barriers. I did manage 
to conduct three interviews with Russian diplomats, but two of them on the 
condition of them being strictly off-record. 
In practical terms of conducting interviews, I’ve made use of Seidman’s (2006) 
advice on conducting interviews, namely to: 1) Listen More, Talk Less, 2) Follow 
Up on What the Participant Says, 3) Follow Up, but Don’t Interrupt, 4) Keep 
Participants Focused and Ask for Concrete Details, 5) Follow Your Hunches. To 
ensure validity (unity of approach and consistency of data gathered), I asked a 
few same questions in every interview (tailored to each interviewee) as “the issue 
of validity can be directly addressed by attempting to ensure that the question 
content directly concentrates on the research objectives” (Gray 2004, 219). To 
explore the context, a few questions in the interview that were specific to the 
interviewee. I tried to keep a balance between using the same method to increase 
the similarity of the research situations “so that differences in the data can more 
likely be drawn back to differences in the interviewees (their attitudes towards 
something, for example) rather than to the differences in the situation of data 
collection” (Flick, 2007, 42–43) and the fact that “very good interviews always 
profit from the flexibility of the researchers to adapt their questions to the 
individual participant and to the course of the concrete interview.” (Flick, 2007, 
64). Seeking prior consent from my interviewees, I have used my mobile phone 
to record most interviews. This had the benefits of accurately recording interview 
data while allowing me to focus on listening what my interviewees had to say 
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(Gray 2004, 227). Finally, I have tried as far as possible to be a participant-
observer in addition to being an interviewer. Often the location of the interview, 
dress code, body language and other perceptible elements provide clues that 
may prove valuable in the analysis of interview data. Especially as interviews with 
elites and even more with diplomats tend to be quite formal “becoming a 
temporary member of the setting /…/ you are more likely to get to the informal 
reality” (Gillham 2000, 28). I’ve tried to do this through taking mental notes to 
capture moments and events, “to draw as detailed a mental picture as possible 
for later recording” (Ruane 2005, 170). 
Policy documents and WikiLeaks 
I have already put textual analysis to use by applying it to secondary sources 
during my literature review (academic literature, expert reports, and media 
reports). In this phase of my research, I mainly focussed on textual analysis of 
primary (legal documents, official speeches, public statements, and leaked 
confidential correspondence). As Bowen (2009, 28) notes, document analysis is 
often combined with other qualitative methods with the data being triangulated 
(several methods applied to the same research problem). In my case, too, I used 
document analysis as a complementary approach to triangulate interview data 
and for process tracing of Abkhazia, Russian, EU, and US foreign policies across 
time. I discuss the sources and selection of textual and documentary data in this 
section and its analysis in the next.  
In the case of Abkhazia, I gathered the majority of my data through interviews. 
Because Abkhazia does not have diplomatic relations with many states, there are 
few official foreign policy documents and many of them not publicly available. 
When I was conducting interviews in Abkhazia in January 2015, I was told that 
the Foreign Policy Concept is in the making, but it has not been released since. 
Therefore, the main additional sources for triangulating interview data were the 
public statements published by ApsnyPress (the state press agency of Abkhazia) 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Abkhazia. 
When it comes to Russia, my expectation that there was significantly less 
interview data, turned out to be correct. This is so because the policy-makers in 
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Russia were less accessible. Fortunately, Russia and Abkhazia have official 
diplomatic relations, and these are well documented. For instance, Medvedev's 
Statement On Russia's Recognition Of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (August 26, 
2008), the Agreement on a joint Russian military base in Abkhazia (17 February 
2010), Agreement on the trade of goods (28 May 2012), the Agreement between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on Alliance and Strategic 
Partnership (23 December 2014) are all valuable documents for the study of 
Russian-Abkhaz relations. Furthermore, statements published on the websites of 
ITAR-TASS (the state press agency of the Russian Federation), the President 
(www.kremlin.ru), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian 
Federation, are also useful complementary sources. 
Much like with Abkhazia, with the EU, I also gathered most of my data through 
interviews. Since none of the EU member states recognises Abkhazia, there few 
official documents that touch upon these largely informal links. Public statements 
concerning Abkhazia are sometimes published on the homepage of the EEAS, 
but these usually just reiterate EU's support for Georgia’s sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity, condemning the recognition of Abkhazia by 
other states. In addition to the interviews, which explored the under-the-radar 
interactions between EU and Abkhazian officials, I turned to notable policy papers 
on ‘EU’s engagement without recognition’ by Cooley & Mitchell (2010), 
Caspersen & Herrberg (2010), Popescu (2011), Hoch (2011), Ker-Lindsay 
(2015), Kerselidze (2015), and Fischer (2016). 
Finally, in the case of the US, I expected to find least evidence on relations and 
interactions with Abkhazia from interviews. As I had less access to decision-
makers than in the EU, also due to the recent change in the US Presidency. 
Nevertheless, I did obtain solid data on the informal links between US and 
Abkhazian officials. Fortunately, some of this can then be triangulated with the 
help of leaked US diplomatic cables, the confidential correspondence available 
through WikiLeaks. Berg & Pegg (2016) have used WikiLeaks as a source of data 
for examining US interaction with de facto states. While their data is useful in 
triangulating my interview data, my interview data adds some detail to the 
interaction from the perspective of those who engaged in it on behalf of Abkhazia. 
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Data analysis 
The next step after data collection is to analyse the data. It should be noted, 
however that data collection and data analysis are often not subsequent but 
concurrent. Researchers often analyse and interpret data even during an 
interview to adapt to the flow of the discussion and after the interview to analyse 
and adjust for next interviews. Data analysis is itself an important part of data 
collection that helps us determine the point at which “data collection has to 
virtually stop and will have been winding down for some time before that. 
Somehow you have to reduce this mass of data” (Gillham 2000, 25). My semi-
structured interview data was non-standardized, which means that qualitative 
analysis is most appropriate (Gray 2004, 215). Qualitative analysis can be 
defined as a “rigorous and logical process through which data are given 
meaning.” This is done through “disaggregating the data into smaller parts, [to] 
see how these connect into new concepts, providing the basis for a fresh 
description” (Gray 2004, 319). 
Transcription and translation  
Before any analysis can take place, before data can be broken down and re-
arranged, data first must be put into a format amenable to the analysis. Interviews 
must be transcribed and – if not in the same language as the thesis (as in my 
case) – translated. As Gillham (2000, 71) points out, it is impossible to study 
interview data if it is not in written form. Furthermore, interviews must be 
annotated and some sort of quick reference system (in my case colour-coding) 
established. Further, verbatim transcriptions of interviews must be converted into 
a more relevant and manageable set of data by identifying “substantive 
statements that really say something” (Gillham 2000, 71). It is a good practice to 
carry out transcription as soon as possible after the interview as the details are 
still fresh in the memory (Gillham 2000, 71; Mack et al. 2005, 84). One of the 
problems with interview data is its quantity. As Gillham (2000, 65–66) notes, 
“even one interview generates a huge amount of work for the researcher.” 
Hancock & Algozzine (2006, 56) believe that to deal with this difficulty, it is 
necessary to “remind oneself of the fundamental research questions being 
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explored in the study. Each new piece of information should be examined in light 
of these fundamental questions.”  
I have used the services of a translator to transcribe my interviews and translate 
them from Russian to English. The main reason is that my spoken Russian (I 
have conducted interviews in it) is much better than my written Russian. I made 
every effort to still ensure anonymity and to protect the confidential information of 
my interviewees and have signed a non-disclosure agreement as an annex to the 
contract with the translator. The translator was carefully chosen: a Russian native 
speaker fluent in English, with a post-graduate degree in Political Science, high 
moral integrity, and with absolutely no relation to the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. 
In line with the advice by Mack et al. (2005, 84) that “when the transcriptionist is 
not the person who collected the recorded data, the interviewer or focus group 
moderator who did collect it should review completed transcripts for accuracy.” I 
have thus checked all transcripts and translations for accuracy and made 
corrections where necessary. The translator was only sent the recordings of 
questions and answers without any personal information of the interviewees and 
has not had access to the ‘key’. The non-disclosure agreement also stipulated 
that the translator had to destroy all recordings after the transcripts and 
translations are be made. I’ve taken additional measures to protect my 
interviewees’ anonymity. Electronically stored data (audio recordings of 
interviews and interview transcripts) was first stored on a voice recorder and then 
transferred to a personal password-protected laptop computer. During fieldwork 
(in situ), back-up copies of electronic data were stored on a USB stick, and kept 
in a locked room. After coming from the field, electronic data was transferred to 
a password-protected external drive. Paper-based data (interview transcripts and 
notes) were stored in a locked room during fieldwork and in a locked unit in a 
locked room after coming from the field. 5-years after the completion of the 
research project, the data will be destroyed. 
Analysis of policy documents, triangulation, and process tracing 
An important early step of data analysis is developing structures that 
systematically arrange data, for instance categories and typologies (Flick, 2007, 
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59). This systematisation of data later allows to identify patterns, variables, and 
possible causal relations between them. At this step data merging also happens: 
interview data is merged with data collected with other methods, such as 
document analysis. However, this merger is rarely smooth and unproblematic. 
The results may be compatible or discrepant. What people say and do might be 
at odds with what records show. If it does not add up, it does not mean that data 
is wrong, but that the relationship either does not exist or needs to be understood 
differently. This must be determined through triangulation (Gillham 2000, 29–30).  
The reason why document analysis is useful when combined with interview data 
is because “documents can provide data on the context within which research 
participants operate—a case of text providing context, if one might turn a phrase” 
(Bowen 2009, 29–30). They provide supplementary research data that may or 
may not be complementary. In case it is, it strengthens the interview data and 
allows for stronger conclusions. In case documentary analysis yields different 
data from those coming from the interviews, triangulation is necessary. This can 
either be done by clarifying interview data (second interview, follow-up 
questions), or it can inform questions for future interviews (Bowen 2009, 30). To 
put it in a nutshell, quality of research doesn't only depend on quality of collected 
data and the quality of the analysis, but also on how different bits of data are 
assembled together. As Henri Poincaré (1905) famously stated: "Science is built 
of facts the way a house is built of bricks: but an accumulation of facts is no more 
science than a pile of bricks is a house.” 
Documents are also useful in tracking change and development (Bowen 2009, 
30). Published at a specific point in the past and generally immutable, they are a 
good way to corroborate interview data, which mostly relies on memories, which 
can be inaccurate, temporally unspecific, and can change through time. 
Furthermore, when there are various drafts of a single document, one can 
compare them amongst themselves and identify even subtle changes that can 
reflect changes in a project’s development (Bowen 2009, 30). A good example is 
the draft Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Abkhazia on Alliance and Strategic Partnership, which was leaked to the public. 
A modified agreement was later signed, reflecting Abkhazia’s dissatisfaction with 
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some provisions of the first draft (Ambrosio & Lange 2015). It is important to 
consider the context in which the document has been produced: its creators, 
purpose, audience (Bowen 2009, 33). Sometimes the document can act as a 
primary source and the role of the interview is in finding out more about this 
context.  
Process-tracing (of foreign policy decisions) is a diachronic, processual, historical 
approach. Process tracing is a good compromise between a more descriptive, 
idiographic historical account and a more analytical, nomothetic approach. Since 
my approach is based on understanding and not explaining, process-tracing is 
not the most important part of my research strategy. However, it fits well with my 
research design and does offer a valuable possibility of identifying causal links 
and consequently of greater generalizability of research.103 Beach (2016, 8) 
likens process-tracing to “an electron microscope, it has only a few different uses, 
but what it does, it does powerfully.” It is a good tool, but best used in conjunction 
with other methods, as I do in my research. One of the main objections seems to 
be the fact that process-tracing is often (mis)applied to analyses that would 
benefit more from a different method (Trampusch & Palier 2016, 2). It is worth 
noting that process-tracing was originally “employed in cognitive and 
psychological studies on individual decision-making” (Trampusch & Palier 2016, 
1). As my research puts emphasis on perceptions and decisions of decision-
makers, this is quite a good fit. Process-tracing does not just allow the tracing of 
processes, but also enables us to determine the forms of causal processes, like: 
causality, convergence, interacting variables, and path-dependence (Bennet et 
al. 2005, 212). I expect that using process tracing can help determine the form 
and strength of causal processes and to determine the relationship between the 
degree of dependency on the parent in the context of sustained non-recognition, 
and the foreign policy strategies of a de facto state. Most scholars agree that the 
main strengths of process-tracing are unveiling causal connections and temporal 
mechanisms (Ruane 2005, 89; Bennet et al. 2005, 206; Beach 2016, 8; 
                                            
103 A constructivist framework does present difficulties in generalizing research but does not 
preclude it. Even when examining something as subjective as a de facto state’s experience of 
being unrecognised, we may be surprised how many elements of that experience are shared 
among de facto states, indicating that difficult choices between isolation and dependence are 
existentially true for several of them. I discuss this in detail in Chapter 7. 
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Trampusch & Palier 2016, 2), which opens the possibilities for “further 
development of theory building and testing in social sciences” (Trampusch & 
Palier 2016, 15). My research looks at Abkhazia’s foreign relations throughout 
time and across two periods. I am interested in if and how the changed status 
has changed decision-makers perceptions and in how changes in perception in 
turn affected Abkhazia’s foreign policy. Process-tracing may be a powerful way 
of discovering the connections between these parts of my research puzzle, but I 
must be careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees, to be conscious of the 
significant data required by the method and acknowledge “the epistemological 
assumptions inherent in its application” (Checkel 2008, 114). As process-tracing 
is good in identifying interaction and much weaker in defining structural context 
(Checkel 2008, 116), I only use it after defining the structural context by drawing 
on my interview and document data. 
Validity and limitations 
After discussing my research design, the collection and analysis of data, I now 
explain which measures I took to ensure my research is valid and discuss the 
limits of it. First, all efforts were made so far to make my research transparent by 
accurately describing the research process in detail and step-by step. 
Transparency also makes research externally verifiable. Second, in this section I 
want to make every effort to provide an objective assessment of the validity of 
the findings. It is an important ethical principle to be honest about any potential 
biases and any circumstances that have affected the research and to provide 
ideas and recommendations on how future research could better be conducted. 
A distinction is commonly made between internal and external validity (Bennett & 
Chechkel 2015). The question of internal validity is “if the overall research plan 
or research design is really capable of detecting causal relationships when they 
exist.” (Ruane 2005, 38). Sometimes this is also referred to as ‘measurement 
validity’ – making “sure that the variables used in research really do capture the 
true meaning of the concepts being measured” (Ruane 2005, 50). External 
validity is usually equated with generalizability of results (Bennett & Chechkel 
2015, 103–104). 
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Internal validity 
Credibility of research, as internal validity is sometimes called, has been ensured 
through the following measures. First, an early step towards a good measure and 
consequently to internal validity is “good conceptualization /…/ the researcher 
must be sure to clarify the meaning of the concepts as the researcher sees it” 
(Ruane 2005, 51). I believe I have defined and sufficiently justified the use of my 
core concepts in the First Chapter and have further clarified and operationalized 
them in this chapter. I discuss them again in the next chapter, embedded in their 
historical and cultural context.  
Second, I focused my research on as few closely related researches questions 
as possible, therefore reducing the influx of extraneous variables into the study 
at a later stage (Engeli et al. 2014), making links between variables clearer and 
more easily observable. I limited my research to a single case (Abkhazia) and to 
the period between 1999 and 2014. My research is influenced by constructivist 
research methodology and is more interpretative than explanatory, which means 
seeking causal relations between variables is not its main purpose. I am, 
however, interested in relations between interpretations of status by political 
elites and foreign policy behaviour, but I expect to find these relations to be more 
in terms of shaping perceptions and influencing foreign policy behaviour than in 
terms of one causing the other. Nevertheless, maintaining a sensible focus on 
the research question – not to lose sight of it but also not to disregard important 
contextual elements and factors – is important for the internal validity of my 
research.  
Third, measurement validity was verified through triangulation of data from 
different sources. Interview data was compared to document data. An example 
of that is the triangulation of interview data acquired in an interview with a former 
US diplomat with leaked cables accessible through WikiLeaks.  
Explanatory weight and generalizability  
As Flick (2007, 41) notes, “qualitative research often is not very strongly linked to 
generalization issues.” However, he goes on to state that “even in a case study, 
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we assume that its findings will be relevant beyond the specific situation if they 
apply to “the life of the case beyond the research situation” (Flick 2007, 41). This 
is indeed my position too. The decision not to make external generalizability of 
results the ultimate goal of my research is not a case of sour grapes. It is a 
conscious choice since methodological choices are always choices between 
depth and width, between in-depth interpretation on one and general explanation 
on the other. Earlier in this chapter I have expressed my reservations towards the 
current development of the field of de facto states – one of progressively moving 
from case studies to large(r)-n comparative research with the aim of reaching 
more generalizable conclusions and constructing a theory of de facto states. This 
involves including “an increasingly diverse range of subjects” while noting that 
“entities such as Taiwan and Nagorno- Karabakh may not really be comparable” 
(Comai 2018, 192). Therefore, I fully agree with Mack et al. (2005, 2) that even 
though results from qualitative data can mostly be extended “to people with 
characteristics similar to those in the study population, gaining a rich and complex 
understanding of a specific social context or phenomenon typically takes 
precedence over eliciting data that can be generalized to other geographical 
areas or populations.”  
I am aware of the limits to generalizability and conscious that my research is 
primarily interpretative in character, but my conclusions do have some 
explanatory weight and are generalizable (discussed in Chapter 7). Maxwell 
(2005, 115) distinguishes between internal and external generalizability. By 
internal generalizability he the generalizability of a result or a conclusion “within 
setting or group studied.” By  external generalizability he means generalizability 
“beyond that setting or group.” I expect my research to have a high degree of 
internal generalizability due to triangulated data from various sources (elite 
interviews in Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia, the EU institutions, and the US and 
document analysis) that capture the empirical reality from various sides and 
angles. Furthermore, a degree of standardisation of the research situations (Flick, 
2007, 42) provides additional validity: my semi-structured elite interviews 
included a portion of questions that were posed to all interviewees and the 
execution of interviews (format, length, style) also tried to be as uniform as 
possible. 
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Limitations and biases  
There are limits and threats of interference to every research and mine is no 
exception. One limitation both in terms of internal and external validity (and hence 
also external generalizability) is a small number of cases – in fact it is a single 
case study. However, this is mitigated by the fact that it is still comparative in two 
ways: 1) as a within-case study, which looks at two periods 1999-2008 and 2008-
2014; and 2) as a comparison of relations Abkhazia has with Russia, the EU, and 
the US. This has important implications for external validity (discussed in Chapter 
7). 
In terms of bias, in qualitative social science research, investigator bias 
(sometimes called researcher effects or researcher bias) is a common 
interference that may distort or spoil results (Gerring 2012, 160). Roselle & Spray 
(2012, 10) advise designing research in the most neutral way possible and claim 
that research coming to unpredicted conclusions often has the potential to be the 
most valuable and interesting. Additionally, researchers designing a project with 
desired outcomes in mind, tend to fare worse at identifying relevant explanatory 
variables. In other words, it is important to keep an open mind throughout the 
research process, be ready to shed assumptions and not jump to conclusions. 
Another type of bias can be present on the other side – in interviewees and even 
implicit in documents analysed.104 On my part, every effort has been made to 
reduce researcher’s bias by being reflexive about my research, discussing my 
approach with my supervisor and other experts in the field, considering their 
doubts, suggestions and interpretations, relying on different and diverse sources 
of information and cross-checking them regularly.  
When it comes to interviewees, I have already addressed the threat of sampling 
bias (Hay 2016, 15) earlier in this chapter in the section ‘Interviews’. Harvey 
(2011, 439) warns of the danger that elites might try to control the interview, be 
willing to answer some questions and reject others. It is important to prepare for 
this by reading up in advance the people I was going to interview and on subjects 
                                            
104 A common bias is ‘attribution bias’: “a cognitive error in which one assumes that one’s own 
group is good by nature and only does bad things when forced to do so, while the opponent does 
bad things because it is inherently bad” (Neack 2014, 171). 
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that are likely to arise in the conversation. I also refused to let go of the thread of 
the discussion and would persistently but politely bring my interlocutors back to 
the question. I have already hinted at the importance of emotions (explored in 
more detail in relation to identity, honour, and anxiety in the next chapter). 
Emotions are both a potential source of bias as well as a potential source of data 
and insight. However, as Morin & Paquin (2018, 72) note, it is not easy to include 
emotions into foreign policy research, the main obstacle being methodological: 
“Presidents and prime ministers refuse to be scrutinized with magnetic resonance 
imaging apparatus, to lie down on a psychoanalyst’s couch or answer a 
questionnaire on their affective life.” (Morin & Paquin 2018, 72). Still, I believe it 
makes sense to note down any observations both to better contextualize the 
interview data and to be more reflexive about the practice of interviewing itself. 
In terms of limitations, I experienced mostly difficulties with data collection: 
practical difficulties of fieldwork and difficulties related to conducting interviews. 
Practical difficulties were luckily limited only to my stay in Abkhazia. The first was 
an almost catastrophic mistake of forgetting my backpack, which included my 
passport, money, and laptop computer in the marshrutka (shared minivan) 
immediately upon arrival to Sukhum/i. In my defence, the journey was long and 
tiring. I have taken a noisy overnight train from Tbilisi to Zugdidi and then two 
marshrutkas – one to the border at Inguri and the other from the border to the 
capital, waking up upon arrival in Sukhum/i after a sleepless night. After moments 
of horror and despair, the situation turned to be a blessing in disguise. I 
immediately went to the market to inquire where marshrutkas normally go after 
completing the drive and was directed to the train station. On my way I met a kind 
man who called me a taxi – I have just met the deputy mufti of Abkhazia. Taking 
a taxi to the train station at the edge of the town, I inquired with marshrutka 
drivers, describing the van and the driver, but they were unable to help me. 
Returning to the centre, I decided to have breakfast first and look for the bag later. 
I must have stood out with a mixture of tiredness and despair on my face and was 
approached by a kind young man, asking me if I needed something. It turned out 
he was working for the Administration of the President of Abkhazia. In no time at 
all he was on the phone calling anyone who he could think of, telling them that 
the Administration of the President is interested in a bag, which a foreigner forgot 
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in a marshrutka. Thanks to the kindness and help of this person, two hours later 
I got my bag. I’ve also met quite a few people that would later be helpful in 
navigating Abkhazia and arranging interviews. Another practical difficulty worth 
mentioning, were the frequent electricity blackouts in Abkhazia. As I was told, the 
low temperatures made the Inguri river freeze, causing the water level in the 
Inguri dam to drop, reducing electricity generation. I learned that although 
importing electricity from Russia was an option, it was deemed too expensive by 
the government. Taking cold showers in sub-zero mornings, eating cold food and 
preparing for interviews in the dark was unpleasant, but I took my cue from local 
residents, used to worse and more prolonged blackouts from the past (especially 
in 1990s), who didn’t seem at all bothered and saw it only as a minor nuisance.  
Difficulties with data collection were more numerous and diverse. In Abkhazia 
and Russia, some interviewees were reluctant to speak on record. Others were 
quite hostile.105 In one memorable instance, the interviewee arrived with a print-
out of an article I have written. Before answering my questions, he would protest 
my use of the term ‘de facto state’ in the article:  
“It doesn't exist in the international law. Read all the texts. There is no such 
notion. So why use it in a serious political analysis? What are de facto 
states? Well, states which are not a part of the UN system, fine. Would you 
call Switzerland a de facto state? It became part of UN only a few years 
ago. Was it not a functional state before that? There is no such thing as a 
de facto state in international law. A state exists or does not exist. It is not 
relative. I would not put too much emphasis on de-facto or de-jure, but on 
whether it is a functional system” (Interview with Vyacheslav Chirikba). 
Due to political reasons (bad relations between Russia and the EU), it was almost 
impossible to access foreign policy-makers in Russia and despite several 
attempts impossible to arrange an interview at the Ministry of Defence. This would 
be difficult for any researcher but coming from a British university and having 
                                            
105 In Abkhazia, policy-makers were mostly keen to speak with me but also often very opinionated. 
Sometimes I was taken as a representative of the West and they would express their grievances 
to me. In Russia, policy-makers were reluctant to talk to me and, when discussing relations 
between Russia and the West, came across as quite cynical.  
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worked for NATO in the past, made it even more so. The data I intended to collect 
through interviews in Russia thus had to be largely replaced by data from other 
sources, especially documents. Luckily, due to the existence of formal diplomatic 
relations between Abkhazia and Russia, these are quite plentiful. 
When accessing interviewees in European Institutions, the problems were 
different. Several times when contacted, potential interviewees would declare 
themselves not competent to speak about the topic (which to be honest is a hot 
potato) and suggest I contact their colleague. In one memorable instance, the 
referrals and redirections came full circle, so that the person I initially contacted 
then agreed to an interview. In Abkhazia and Russia, I observed that lower-
ranking officials would, out of respect for their superiors and the hierarchy, almost 
always refer me to their bosses (even if these were less knowledgeable of the 
topic). In the European Commission, the EEAS and the European Parliament the 
opposite trend of referring me to lower-ranking officials (typically desk officers) 
was at play. 
Interviews conducted in the US were done at an unfortunate time, just weeks 
after Trump has been elected. The State Department seemed to be in flux and 
policy-makers seemed preoccupied with their own worries, namely job security. 
It was difficult to gain access to people in official positions, but easier to approach 
past office holders. Since my research looks at the period between 1999 and 
2014, that was another blessing in disguise. Finally, a recurring challenge 
independent of the place of the interview, was that some interviewees were 
interested in who I talked so far and what they said. Remembering the warning 
by Mack et al. (2005, 11) that although it might be tempting to share seemingly 
innocent and unimportant information from one participant to the other (like a 
piece of news or a funny statement), this should be avoided at all costs. 
Consequently, I was conscious to avoid this pitfall and refused to answer 
questions regarding other interviewees to protect the privacy of all interviewees. 
Ethical considerations  
Mack et al. (2005, 8) differentiate between research ethics and professional 
ethics – both are relevant ethical considerations in the wider process conducting 
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research. While research ethics deal mostly with the interactions between the 
researcher and research participants, professional ethics mostly concern  
“collaborative relationships among researchers, mentoring relationships, 
intellectual property, fabrication of data, and plagiarism, among others.” (Mack et 
al. 2005, 8). 
One of the most important methodological and ethical principles is transparency 
so I want to lay out the ethical principles on which I have based my research (Flick 
2007, 69): 
1. Informed consent means that no one should be involved in research as a 
participant without knowing about this and without having the chance of 
refusing to take part. 
2. Deception of research participants (by covert observation or by giving 
them false information about the purpose of research) should be avoided. 
3. Participants’ privacy should be respected, and confidentiality should be 
guaranteed and maintained. 
4. Accuracy of the data and their interpretation should be the leading 
principle, which means that no omission or fraud with the collection or 
analysis of data should occur in the research practice. 
5. In relation to the participants, respect for the person is seen as essential. 
6. Beneficence, which means considering the well-being of the participants. 
7. Justice, which addresses the relation of benefits and burdens for the 
research Participants. 
 
Mack et al. (2005, 9) define informed consent as “a mechanism for ensuring that 
people understand what it means to participate in a particular research study, so 
they can decide in a conscious, deliberate way whether they want to participate.” 
(Mack et al. 2005, 9). In acquiring informed consent, I followed the best practice 
of preparing information sheets and interview agreements (Flick, 2007, 72), which 
described my research project, explained its purpose and the interview format. I 
expected that most interviewees in Abkhazia, Russia, and possibly in Georgia, 
have a poor knowledge of English, which proved to be true. Most interviews were 
conducted in Russian. This means that the information sheets and consent forms 
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were first be drafted in English and then translated into Russian before being 
given to the participants. The research has involved no deception of participants 
of any kind. Interviewees were given an opportunity to ask questions and finally 
asked to mark to whether they have read the information sheet, understand that 
participation in the interview was entirely voluntary and confidential. They were 
also asked to mark whether they consent to taking part in the study, to having the 
interview recorded (it was possible to reject recording and still take part in the 
study), I also asked them if and how they wish to be quoted in the thesis and 
whether it is possible to identify them with their full name or perhaps just with their 
position.  
Anonymity, if requested, was achieved by pseudonyms and broader categories. 
For instance, an interviewee may prefer to be identified only as a ‘former senior 
government official’ or ‘MFA employee’, or ‘interviewee A’. The choice of 
pseudonym could be agreed with the interviewee with the pseudonym protected 
by encrypted keys. In case anonymity was requested, I made sure that their 
identity is not apparent from the context, and that any identifying information is 
excluded. These include specificities of time, place, institutional position, 
affiliation, names of other people mentioned in the interviews, etc. In some cases, 
anonymity cannot be guaranteed, for instance in case of high-ranking 
interviewees, who possess unique inside-information, only available to them, 
which I am referencing. This is especially relevant in such a small and close-knit 
society as Abkhazia. In such cases, I pointed this out to the interviewees and 
make sure they understand the implications and that they are comfortable with 
them. The list of interviewees will be made available to the examiners but will be 
destroyed after the successful passing of the viva. Participants were informed 
that they are entitled to refuse to answer any questions and, to end the interview 
and leave at any time. Finally, they signed the agreement. I must note that one 
interviewee in Abkhazia and two interviewees in Russia refused to sign the 
consent sheet but were willing to speak to me informally. Consequently, to 
respect participants’ privacy and guarantee their confidentiality, I have not 
included data from those interviews, but they were nevertheless helpful for 
contextualising other interviews. The interviewees were not asked why they did 
not wish to sign the consent sheet, but one of them did state that they have had 
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a negative experience of being misquoted and his statements being taken out of 
context. It is not uncommon in post-Soviet countries for people to be hesitant to 
sign documents, because this usually implies a legal obligation on their behalf. 
Signing documents can also be negatively associated with bureaucratic 
procedures of Soviet Union closely related to corruption, abuse of power and 
denial of privacy in totalitarian system and a surveillance state. No major issues 
were expected at this stage and precautions were taken, such as using secure 
systems of transfer and encrypted systems of storage. Data was analysed only 
by me, even if the interview recordings were externally transcribed and translated 
from Russian to English by a trusted person with an academic background. 
Qualitative analysis started by ordering the recordings by date, venue and the 
person interviewed, followed by transcribing the audio recordings of interviews 
and digitalizing interview notes. The relevant parts were translated into English. 
The most important points were highlighted, and brief interpretative notes were 
made. Finally, the results of the research will be published as a doctoral thesis, 
possibly followed by as a book or a series of articles. Participants were asked if 
they want to be sent an electronic copy of the publication. If so, they were asked 
to provide an electronic address where this publication will be sent when 
completed.  
Accuracy of the data means “no omission or fraud with the collection or analysis 
of data should occur” (Flick 2007, 69). In relation to this, just interpretation 
extends the same principles to data interpretation, which should be fair and 
without bias. These were the fundamental ethical principles I had in mind when 
approaching data processing and analysis. Despite that, there were ethical 
challenges associated with sensitivity and impartiality, namely regarding the 
nature of questions I was asking. I was especially careful when posing questions 
as many topics are politically sensitive and I made sure to approach them with as 
much sensibility as possible to prevent causing offence, discomfort or distress to 
participants (interviewees). As some people I interviewed might be affected by 
the worsening relations between Russia and the West, I had to be careful to 
maintain my neutrality and objectivity by not expressing any of my own political 
views, praising or criticizing any side, person or institution, which might lead my 
research participants to believe my research is partial. An example of a 
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challenging question was a question posed to an Abkhaz foreign ministry official, 
whether they think tight cooperation between Russia and Abkhazia may constrain 
Abkhazia’s ability to conduct independent foreign policy. I needed to be especially 
careful how such a question was posed as wording, tact, and even intonation was 
very important. In general, I started my interviews with less difficult and sensitive 
questions to build trust and would only ask sensitive questions at the end of the 
interview when I felt that I have established rapport and that the interviewee would 
be comfortable answering it. 
Transparency is not only important when carrying out data collection and 
analysis, but also when writing up research, so that readers have “enough 
information to decide whether they would have done the same and arrived at the 
same conclusions as the researchers or not” (Flick, 2007, 66). Similarly, 
Moravcsik (2014, 666) writes about three components of research transparency: 
data transparency, analytic transparency, and production transparency, which 
rest upon the premise that researchers in social science should make available 
the full set of their research design choices that produced “the combination of 
data, theories, and methods they use for empirical analysis.” In writing up 
research, it is also important to maintain the anonymity of interviewees, to be 
careful when generalizing and conscious of the language used to avoid bias 
(Flick, 2007, 75).  
Risk 
Although the risk of doing fieldwork in a post-conflict society did not appear to be 
a limiting factor on my research, I nevertheless want to briefly discuss the risks 
involved in conducting my research and how I addressed them. I first talk about 
risks to research participants, then about risks to myself, the researcher. 
Do no harm is an important ethical principle that stipulates the researcher should 
cause no disadvantage to participants (Flick 2007, 73). The potential risks facing 
participants are connected to the answers they give in interviews. Since most of 
the people I interviewed in Abkhazia were elites, many of who are well-known 
public figures, their statements attract more attention (even if they only appear in 
the PhD thesis) and are liable to criticism, which can affect their reputation and 
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career. This, however is not very likely, as most people I interviewed are 
educated, familiar with interviews and know the limits within which they can 
speak. Talking about war, conflict, refugees, borders, minorities and other 
potentially controversial and emotional topics was inevitable and in a post-conflict 
society people can be expected to have very strong opinions about many of these 
issues. Some of my questions caused unintentional offence and discomfort, even 
if phrased very carefully.106 I tried to mitigate this risk by starting with easier 
questions, building trust through the interview, and with paying close attention to 
the verbal and non-verbal signs of any discomfort of the interviewee. In case of 
doubt, I asked if the person is comfortable to talk about a certain topic before 
posing the questions. There are not only risks, but also potential benefits to 
participants. People in de facto states often feel isolated, let down by the 
international community that seems uninterested in their views and problems. It 
is in the interest of elites, especially government officials to talk to foreign 
researchers and journalists to present their side of the story and thus gain visibility 
for their cause. Indeed, elites in Abkhazia were very accessible and quite eager 
to share their views with me. This might also be due to better access to 
gatekeepers and a smaller and more tightly-knit society in comparison with my 
interviews in Russia, the European institutions, and the US. 
Risks faced by the researcher are risks connected with Abkhazia’s status as a 
largely unrecognised state, meaning no EU diplomatic support and assistance 
are available on the ground. I am not sure how one would resolve the case of a 
lost passport (which almost happened to me) without the possibility of consular 
support. There are also risks inherent to a post-conflict society. These include 
risks to physical safety, such as the (very small) risk of renewed hostilities along 
the border and the risk of violent crime. The risk of war is negligible, and the 
region has been peaceful since 2008.107 I did not plan to do research near the 
                                            
106 An example is the use of the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘IDP’ (internally displaced person). The first 
implies that the person fleeing from conflict has crossed an internationally recognised border, 
while the second implies that they have not. As territory, borders and the international recognition 
of Abkhazia are all a matter of dispute, Georgians do not accept the term refugee and the Abkhaz 
do not accept the term IDP. The researcher has two choices. Either he consistently uses one term 
over the other and can defend his choice when inevitably challenged. The other option to resort 
to strategic use of terms depending on the interlocutor. 
107 Abkhazia has experienced a war with Georgia 1992-1993, with hostilities escalating again in 
2008. During August 2008 Russian military intervened and Russian troops now control the border 
 
124 
 
border areas or in the Gal/i region, which has seen violent crime in recent past. I 
mostly stayed in the capital Sukhum/i. By following the local and international 
media as well as keeping in close contact with the local population, I made sure 
I was aware of the security situation any factors that could compromise my 
security during my stay. Abkhazia (and the Caucasus in general) is socially 
relatively conservative and anyone doing research there has to pay attention to 
respect local traditions and customs, including wearing appropriate clothing, 
adhering to the desired ways of interacting with people: old people should be 
treated with utmost respect, food and drink, if offered, should not be refused (it is 
considered an offence) or if done so, thoroughly justified. I made sure to inform 
myself from books and researchers who have done field work in Abkhazia about 
the local culture and rules of proper conduct. I believe the potential risks 
associated with doing fieldwork in Abkhazia were significantly reduced by my 
knowledge of the wider region and by having personal contacts (including 
contacts with government officials) in Abkhazia itself. I have a good knowledge 
of the political situation in Abkhazia and recognise which issues might be 
sensitive. I am familiar with the region and have visited Georgia, Armenia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and the Russian republics in the North Caucasus 
before. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I described my research process and explained how I went about 
answering my research questions. In discussing research design, I justified the 
selection of my methodology and methods, connecting them to my theoretical 
framework on one and the empirical data on the other hand. I clarified that my 
                                            
between Abkhazia and Georgia, with the situation largely stable and without big incidents. 
However, Abkhazia remains an unrecognised state and a post-war zone, risks to personal 
security (albeit low) exist. As mentioned previously, there is a lack of consular assistance, but 
despite this fact, the society is close-knit and having a network of contacts there (as I do) can 
serve to mitigate these problems and provide help and support in case of emergency. The Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office does advise against all travel to Abkhazia (https://www.gov.uk/foreign-
travel-advice/georgia), however this danger is overstated and has a lot to do with the region’s 
unrecognised status and consequentially the parent state (Georgia) insistence on such warnings. 
The risk of war is very small as the region has been peaceful since 2008, presence of Russian 
troops makes any provocations and border skirmishes highly unlikely and wars in the Caucasus 
never start in the winter (when I plan to be carrying out fieldwork) as the rugged terrain is difficult 
to pass then. 
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research falls under qualitative, single-case, constructivist study with within-case 
comparative elements. As such it aims at “deep understanding of the actors, 
interactions, sentiments, and behaviours” (Woodside 2010, 6). As Gerring (2007, 
204) states, “regardless of how informative cross-case evidence (either large-N 
or small-N) might be, one is unlikely to be satisfied that one has satisfactorily 
explained an outcome until one has explored within-case evidence.” I then 
operationalized my core concepts of state identity, ontological security, and 
geopolitical role. In discussing data collection and analysis, most of the focus was 
on interviews, as they form the cornerstone of my methodology. I also discussed 
policy document analysis as a complementary approach, especially important for 
process tracing and data triangulation. In the last part of the chapter I explained 
what measures were taken to ensure my research design is objective, my 
methods reliable, and my conclusions valid. I critically assessed the explanatory 
weight and generalizability of my research. Furthermore, I engaged in an honest 
discussion of limitations and biases, ethical considerations and risks, providing 
examples of the fieldwork challenges I have encountered. Indeed, my motive in 
this chapter was to be as reflexive and as transparent about my methodology, in 
line with Flick’s (2007, 62) remark that “quality in qualitative research (planning) 
is based on a clear, explicit and reflected decision for a specific method or 
design.” 
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Chapter 4: The foreign policy of 
Abkhazia 
“If you are a state, you are a state. Our goal is not to mimic or                            
deceive the international community about our aims, we are not                             
here to impress anyone. We created our state, actually re-created it,                               
because Abkhazia has initially had statehood.”  
– Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba 
 
Introduction 
The analysis of the foreign policy of Abkhazia in this chapter is conducted by 
drawing on the theoretical framework established in the First Chapter (Theoretical 
Framework), which integrates Realist and Constructivist elements into a coherent 
theoretical approach to examine the meaning political decision-makers in 
Abkhazia and actors it interacts with, attach to non-recognition (how they interpret 
it) and how this affects their foreign policy behaviour.  
This chapter is structured by my argument that internal situation in the de facto 
state and the wider geopolitical considerations influence interpretations of non-
recognition by Abkhazian decision-makers, which in turn shape interaction 
between de facto state and other actors. In this chapter the focus is on foreign 
policy perceptions and decisions of Abkhazia, while in the following chapters I 
focus on actors that it has diplomatic relations with (Russia) or that engage with 
it (EU and US). I first take a look at Abkhazia’s foreign policy constraints and 
capabilities, including fleshing out the structure of its foreign policy establishment. 
Afterwards, I look at how Abkhazian identity manifests itself in its foreign policy 
before looking more closely at the objectives it pursues and the means it uses. 
Furthermore, I draw on my previously published work (Jakša 2017) on ontological 
security of post-Soviet de facto states, and finally on the interviews conducted 
with political elites and decisionmakers in Abkhazia in early 2016. Finally, I 
present the main findings of my fieldwork in Abkhazia in the form of a thick 
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description, situate them in existing research, and assess their relevance and 
validity, and their implications for future research. 
Foreign policy constraints and capabilities 
In studying the foreign policy of Abkhazia, three works are especially relevant: 
Frear (2014), Smith (2018), and Comai (2018). These relatively recent texts all 
deal with the foreign policy of Abkhazia in some detail and I briefly discuss the 
merits and gaps in these scholarly pieces to review the state of the art and avoid 
reinventing the wheel before I proceed to discuss the constraints and capabilities 
of Abkhazia’s foreign policy. I briefly summarize their contributions, discuss their 
limits and link them to my own theoretical framework in Chapter 1, which 
discussed foreign policy constrains and capabilities in terms of material and 
ideational factors, employing the concepts of identity, ontological security and 
geopolitical role. 
Frear (2014) makes a useful distinction between formal (inter-state) and informal 
vectors (diaspora-mediated interactions with Turkey and dialogue between 
religious institutions). Furthermore, he does a good job distinguishing between 
the declared objective of attaining recognition and pursuing more short-term 
objectives, such as attracting investment and forging cultural links. However, he 
does not say much about cultural and economic diplomacy: dominoes, football 
(CONIFA), participation at trade fairs, and dancing troupes. Not discussing how 
culture shapes foreign policy and how foreign policy uses culture as an instrument 
is one of the major lacunas in the current literature on de facto states. He also 
discusses the structure of the MFA in some detail and includes contributions on 
Abkhazia’s digital diplomacy as well as issues of content between Abkhazia and 
Russia and demonstrating that it’s not a frictionless relationship. One problem 
with his account is that, despite conceding that perception is important, he does 
not discuss anything related to identity or domestic politics: nation-building, state-
building, identity, norms, values, apswara, ethnocracy are not even mentioned.108 
                                            
108 As discussed in the previous section of this chapter, there are at least three reasons why this 
should have been discussed: 1) in de facto states foreign and domestic are interrelated; 2) the 
insecurity of Abkhaz in their own country (barely 50%); 3) non-recognition has two-fold effects in 
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Partly due to the constraints of a relatively short paper, he omits such important 
domestic elements as the 2004 election (Khajimba and Baghapsh), which is 
significant because the pro-Russian candidate lost the elections, and this speaks 
of a greater margin of internal political independence than expected. Examining 
the lacuna of the foreign-domestic nexus, his article tells us nothing about the 
foreign policy process: how the options are defined, by who, how the decision-
making takes place, what instruments are available. 
Comai’s (2018) research does a good job challenging the area-studies focus, 
especially when it comes to post-Soviet de facto states, and in particular the 
‘Eurasian quartet: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-
Karabakh. However, his attempt to analyse them using the MIRAB (Migration, 
Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy) frame – a model used for explaining how 
economies of (mostly) island micro states – is not entirely convincing and he has 
to abstract many key elements to be able to squeeze them into this frame. All 
this, despite claiming that they are “substantially dissimilar cases, that came into 
being and developed in very different circumstances. Indeed, non-recognition is 
one of the few significant features that allows to put in one category territories as 
strikingly different as Taiwan, Iraqi Kurdistan, and South Ossetia.” (Comai 2018, 
19). Comai’s research, like Frear’s and Florea’s lacks extensive references to 
local particularities - these are recognised as abstractly important, but rarely 
discussed in-depth. The historical, social and cultural context, so important for 
understanding de facto states in South Caucasus – a region where culture, 
tradition, habit, custom play a crucial role, is barely mentioned. Culture and 
identity are never considered, conceptualized or discussed.109 It would be wrong 
to single out Comai for these omissions – they are less of an individual flaw than 
a symptom of what de facto states literature has generally forgotten or supressed. 
His research question, approach and methodology are obviously different than 
                                            
terms of limiting foreign policy options by virtue of external isolation and by the virtue of decision-
makers internalizing this and it then functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
109 In the full length of the thesis, the word ‘identity’ appears six times, four of which is in 
quotations. ‘Tradition’ appears twice, ‘nation-building’ and ‘perception once, and there is no 
mention of apswara, honour, or ethnocracy. 
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mine and given the number of de facto states analysed, he was only able to 
conduct a small number of interviews in each case. 
Smith (2018) makes an important contribution in introducing the concept of social 
moves, further explored in this chapter. In social moves, such as 'formal 
statements of condolences, congratulations, and solidarity', 'naming honourary 
consuls and representatives', 'participation in international sporting events 
abroad', the message really is the medium. Smith also makes other important 
contributions, discussing at some detail Abkhazia’s aspirations to join sporting 
competitions, its education diplomacy and the cultural exchanges it is involved in. 
While Frear (2014) and Comai (2018) employ a more realist perspective, Smith’s 
(2018) is a more structuralist/constructivist account, a veritable micropolitics 
perspective that at times feels a bit too far removed from material conditions and 
the geopolitical reality in which de facto states find themselves in. In Chapter 1, I 
have briefly discussed foreign policy constrains and capabilities in terms of 
material and ideational factors, employing the concepts of identity, ontological 
security and geopolitical role. Identity can be an asset (a source of inspiration, a 
refusal to quit) or a liability (stigma, fatalism), while the maintenance of ontological 
security can be based both on strategies (playing geopolitical roles), on tactics 
(social moves) or defence mechanisms (explored further in chapter 7). There is 
little determinism and non-recognition truly is what states make of it (as claimed 
in Chapter 1 and re-asserted in Chapter 7). 
Constraining factors 
Non-recognition is the most obvious constrain on the foreign policy of Abkhazia. 
According to Caspersen (2012, 42) Unrecognised states are heavily constrained 
by non-recognition. Their legal limbo prevents them from: 1) obtaining loans from 
international creditors; 2) joining international organisations; 3) international laws 
and regulations being applied on their territory; 4) their citizens (including 
diplomats) from traveling, and 5) accessing foreign markets. Cooley (2015, 23) 
adds: 6) participating in sport organisations and taking part in international sport 
events, and 7) international flights from taking off/landing on their territory. 
However, these are only the direct obstacles that Abkhazia and its citizens face. 
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Some are perhaps not necessarily obstacles and can even be blessings in 
disguise (inapplicability of international laws and regulations on their territory), 
there are ways around some of them (traveling on a Russian passport), but most 
are at least a nuisance (inability to take part in international sport events) and at 
most crippling (access to markets before Russian recognition and during the CIS 
embargo). It is important to note, however, that the above-mentioned constraints 
only apply to the implementation of the foreign policy. I argue that indirect 
constraints, which result from non-recognition, also impact the way foreign policy 
is conceptualised before it is implemented by determining what is considered 
possible and realistic, how proactive is its posture and with how much confidence 
it is carried out. The indirect consequence of non-recognition is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that limits foreign policy conceptualisation, which I examine later in 
more detail by analysing how proactive is Abkhazia's foreign policy in relation to 
Russia (Chapter 5) and the EU and the US (Chapter 6). 
Lack of foreign policy (strategy) is another important constraining factor. 
According to Berg & Vits (2018, 1), there is no unity of opinion on  “whether de 
facto states have their own agency, or if these fledgling states are used as pawns 
within the context of wider strategic manoeuvring.” Indeed, some scholars have 
proposed that rather than having foreign policies, de facto states (including 
Abkhazia) are objects of the patron state's foreign policy. This is not my position 
and if I agree that Abkhazia does have a foreign policy, the most important 
question to answer is: to what extent is this an intentional policy that operates at 
a strategic level and to what extent is it a series of ad hoc reactions on the tactical 
level, closer to what Zhemukhov described: “Abkhazia’s status has not developed 
as the result of a consistent foreign policy but rather via a series of accidental 
international events unconnected to each other” (Zhemukhov 2012, 1).”110 
According to Isachenko (2012, 3), this corresponds to operating on a tactical 
rather than the strategic level: “If a strategy can be planned regardless of 
circumstances, a tactic is characterized by dependency on the circumstances” 
(Isachenko 2012, 3). Non-recognition in this context is the overriding 
                                            
110 Unfortunately, it remains unclear what, according to Zhemukov, are these “accidental 
international events unconnected to each other”.  
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circumstance, which condemns a de facto state to tactical level, which is the 
“space of the other”.  
Dependence on a small circle of recognisers is the third constraining factor. It has 
become a truism in de facto state literature to state that Abkhazia’s dependence 
on Russia has increased after the latter’s recognition. If this is true now, it does 
not mean that it was true immediately after the recognition or that it will hold true 
in the years to come. The recognitions of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, Vanuatu, 
Tuvalu, and Syria are also often underplayed and explained away as Russian-
bought. However, despite the fact that they are not politically or economically 
significant, they seemed to have added what Frear (2014, 86) describes as “a 
dynamic to Abkhazian foreign interaction that simply did not exist beforehand, 
that of an equal party in a bilateral interaction.” Recognitions gave a boost to the 
preservation of national identity and the foreign policy ambitions of Abkhazia. 
While Pacher's (2017, 15) assessment that “without Nauru, Abkhazia’s 
ontological security would plummet down well into the depths where really 
unrecognised states such as Transnistria or Somaliland reside,” may over-state 
the role of this relationship for the ontological security of Abkhazia, it does 
contribute to it. They saw a window of opportunity and embarked on the project 
of trying to get other countries to recognise them. Eventually they became 
disillusioned and more dependent on Russia, but the initial impulse was one of 
diversification, of multi-vector foreign policy. Their first choice was balancing, 
when that failed, they went to bandwagoning.  Even as dependence increased, 
the routines and interactions developed in maintaining a network of formal 
diplomatic relations, preserved Abkhazia’s ontological security.  
Similarly, to Zhemukov (2012), Frear (2014, 96), believes that Abkhazia's options 
are severely limited and that : “the triangular relationship between Abkhazia, 
Russia and Georgia determines the foreign policy capability of Abkhazia to a far 
greater extent than dedicated governmental action.” I agree with Frear's 
assessment, although I believe that in addition to legal, political and economic 
restraints, cultural and psychological factors (such as already-mentioned shame 
and fatalism) also restrict Abkhazia's manoeuvring space in foreign policy. 
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Lack of resources and dependance on Russia are two sides of the same coin, 
both stemming not only from the fact that Abkhazia is an unrecognised state, but 
also that it is a small – if not a micro – state. Its resources, including the human 
and financial resources available to conduct foreign policy, are very limited. It is 
in fact questionable whether further recognitions and the necessity to maintain 
those diplomatic relations, would not over-extend its resources. The MFA itself is 
strained for resources (Comai 2017, 9). Foreign minister Chirikba mentioned the 
question of resources when considering applying for an observer seat at 
UNESCO: “We would like to have [an observer seat at UNESCO], but we need 
assistance, it needs a lot of travelling and a lot of lobbying, a lot of communication. 
We need financial resources, but also human resources, which we have a limited 
amount of” (Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba). Track two diplomacy projects 
with the aim of conflict reconciliation between Georgians and Abkhazians 
similarly suffer from lack of resources (Interview with Natella Akaba) and 
insufficient resources to fix and update infrastucture also affect foreign policy as 
a “lack of legally sanctioned, large capacity, transportation links between 
Abkhazia and Turkey serves to restrict the effectiveness of Abkhazian efforts at 
trade diversification.” (Frear 2014, 96). Lack of resources can of course be linked 
to material factors, such as the small size of the entity and hence to the 
geopolitical role by which a de facto state tries to make the most of its situation 
and ‘punch above its weight’. 
Capabilities 
Despite the severe limitations, there are some resources Abkhazia was able to 
draw on in its foreign policy, starting with the MFA and diaspora, and ending with 
Russia, which is both an asset but also a liability. 
Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The MFA is the central and most important actor in shaping, coordinating and 
implementing Abkhazia's foreign policy (Comai 2018, 204). In this section, I 
examine its structure, staffing and role. 
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Structure  
Frear (2014, 86) outlines the basic structure and functions of the MFA of 
Abkhazia: “The structure and operations of the Abkhazian MFA are, by necessity, 
small in scale. Aside from a series of small departments dedicated to 
administration (such as translation and legal matters there are four key 
departments concerned with external engagement.”111 In addition to three 
embassies (in Russia Venezuela and South Ossetia), Abkhazia  “maintains a 
network of Honourary Consuls, Plenipotentiary Representatives, and 
‘ambassadors at large’.” (Frear 2014, 86). Restructuring that took place during 
Vyacheslav Chirikba has changed the structure of the MFA and the regional 
departments were formed: Europe, the US, and Canada; Turkey and the Middle 
East; Latin America; Asia-Pacific countries; as well as the department of the CIS 
countries, Russia, and Georgia. In the past, before the restructuring, there was a 
separate international division. Today, its function is performed by the 
Department of Europe, the US, and Canada. This department now covers 
relations with international organizations and UN agencies that are represented 
in Abkhazia. “We are constantly in contact with them, we hold meetings, we 
inform them about decisions of the foreign ministry, and it is through our 
department that the minister communicates with them, as well as the 
neighbouring ministers” (Interview with Arthur Gagulya112). As mentioned later in 
this Chapter, the MFA has a very tight relationship with the media and has a 
strong influence over what they report on. An important element related to the 
MFA is also the Public Expert Council at the MFA of Abkhazia, which was created 
to conduct expert assessments and provide recommendations to the MFA 
(Report From A Meeting of Newly Established Public Expert Council 2012). 
  
                                            
111 These are: (1) the Department of the Russian Federation, the CIS, Nagorny Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Georgia, and South Ossetia; (2) the Department of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and 
the Asia-Pacific; (3) the Department for Europe, the US, and Canada; and (4) the Department for 
Turkey and the Middle East. The heads of these departments act on the strategic direction 
determined by the Foreign Minister and the two Deputy Ministers. Day-to-day departmental duties 
involve providing written briefs for Abkhazia’s foreign representatives and coordinating their 
activities with governmental policy (Gaguliya 2014) 
112 Arthur Gagulya was the Head of the Department for the European Union, the US, and Canada 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia when this interview was conducted. 
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Staffing 
Predictably, the MFA is not large. Most departments have 2-3 people. For 
instance, the EU, US and Canada department has 2 employees and the plan is 
to hire another person so that there is one head and two subordinates (Interview 
with Arthur Gagulya). The department monitors international events related to its 
area but due to limited resources and the fact that none the actors in the region 
recognise Abkhazia, can do little else:  “De facto, we exist. We are visible. But 
legally, we do not exist for them. Accordingly, it is very difficult to get in contact 
with them and get any agreement, discuss anything openly and officially” (ibid.). 
In terms of its ‘diplomatic corps’, only three internationally recognised states 
(Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua) posted their ambassadors to Abkhazia, but 
only the Russian one is a resident ambassador, while the other two reside in 
Moscow (Toomla 2013, 60-61). The limited human and financial resources at the 
disposal of the MFA “ impacts their outreach capacity equally as much as their 
non-recognition.” (Comai 2017, 9). 
Role 
In addition to being the most important actor in shaping and implementing 
Abkhazia's foreign policy, the MFA is also one of the most important ministries in 
the government, its priorities extending beyond foreign policy, involving contacts 
with the Abkhaz diaspora and conflict negotiations in Geneva (Comai 2018, 192). 
The role of diaspora in foreign policy is important, but it seems to be 
instrumentalized more for changing the ethnic composition inside Abkhazia 
(through repatriation programs) then merely connecting it with the outside world 
(Berg & Vits 2018, 13). This is yet another indicator of how important ontological 
security is to the Abkhazians. The MFA also plays the role of the “middle-man” 
that mediates “interactions between certain state institutions and international 
organisations; for example, if the tax service needs information on a contract that 
involves international organisations, they would request it through the MFA.” 
(Comai 2018, 205). The MFA also cooperates closely with the University in 
Sukhum/i with half of its graduates in International Relations working in the MFA 
and two internships held yearly for graduates” (Interview with Alik Gabelia). In 
addition, the MFA cooperates with educational institutions in Russia and every 
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year five students study at Russian MFA’s MGIMO in Moscow on a scholarship 
(Comai 2018, 162). All this reaffirms my claim that in Abkhazia there is a weak 
distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and a strong link between foreign and 
domestic policies. I look at the cooperation between Abkhazian MFA and Russia 
more closely in the following section. 
Diaspora 
The Circassian umbrella organization KAFFED and the Abkhaz diaspora network 
Abhaz-Fed have played a key role in facilitating the visits of Abkhaz delegations 
to Turkey and in bringing members of Turkish political and economic elites to 
Abkhazia (Smolnik & Weiss 2017, 13). Because of the growing trade and other 
contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey operated through diasporic networks, 
and growing relations with Georgia, Turkey faced a difficult dilemma in developing 
a policy towards Abkhazia (Cornell 2001, 276). It is, however, safe to state that 
Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey is a significant asset to Abkhazia, but that Turkey has 
tried to keep Turkish-Abkhaz low-key and under the radar, giving clear priority to 
the relations with its recognised neighbour – Georgia.  
Russian assistance 
The main question in the relations between Abkhazia and Russia concerning 
foreign policy is whether these relations constitute foreign policy coordination (as 
Russia and Abkhazia say), high degree of dependence (as seen in the EU and 
by the majority of scholars) or even complete control (as stated by Georgia, and 
often followed by the US). I would argue that in addition to dependence and 
coordination, relations of tutelage and assistance with practical matters are also 
important. According to Comai (2018, 162), the Abkhazian MFA benefits from 
Russian support as its members attend trainings at the Russian MFA’s Diplomatic 
Academy and consult with Russian experts and policy-makers.” Nevertheless, 
the first minister of foreign affairs, Sokrat Jinjolia believes Abkhazia has quite a 
bit of autonomy in deciding and conducting its foreign policy: “some in Russia 
have made attempts to integrate Abkhazia into Russia, but it certainly is not 
supported here. They understand that. The 2004 elections were very 
demonstrative in relations between Russia and Abkhazia” (interview with Sokrat 
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Jinjolia). Another former foreign minister of Abkhazia, Viacheslav Chirikba, is of 
a similar opinion:  
“I think we have very good modus operandi with Russia, we are not 
subordinated to anybody, not coordinating with them all the activities but 
some which can touch upon their interests. There are some things which 
are for mutual importance, but for the rest we decide ourselves, apply 
ourselves, for me it's the most important to have the approval of my 
president” (Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba).  
And yet, approval seeking seems to flow from MFA to the president, but not 
necessarily from other political institutions to the MFA. Although there is a law 
obliging Abkhazian representatives to report to the MFA, it is consistently broken 
(Comai 2018, 206). This is yet another proof of the weak division between foreign 
and domestic spheres in Abkhazia, but also of the lack of a more comprehensive 
foreign policy strategy, which I explore next. 
Identity and foreign policy of Abkhazia 
At the end of Cold War, identity - and especially ethnic and national identity - have 
become very important and due to ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the 
Caucasus, proved to be very useful in studying the politics there. As I have 
argued in Chapter 1, examining state and national identity can help us explain 
their foreign policy. At the same time, looking at how they interact with other 
actors, can tell us more about what de facto states are but also how they are 
perceived by others and how it affects their identity and self-perception.113 
                                            
113 Non-recognition casts a stigma on de facto states that tends to undermine their agency in the 
view of international observers. The interactions of de facto states with other actors are therefore 
often termed foreign relations, external relations, even para-diplomacy or sub-diplomacy. 
However, a state can exist politically even if it does not exist legally (has no status in international 
law). As the Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, which stipulates: "The political existence of 
the state is independent of recognition by other states." In this chapter, I depart from the 
standpoint that Abkhazia does have a foreign policy and in Chapters 5 and 6 further discuss the 
evidence for its proactiveness vis-à-vis Russia, the EU and the US. 
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State identity in Abkhazia 
There is a plethora of expressions for the identity of the state.114 To avoid getting 
drawn into a theoretical discussion that could run the length of a book, let's 
postulate, as we did in the First Chapter, that if a state is composed of population 
and territory, then state identity consists of national identity and geopolitical 
identity (which I call geopolitical role). 
First, I examine the two elements of state identity – national identity and 
geopolitical role and then I look at how these shape foreign policy objectives, 
strategies and instruments and what bearing they have on Russian-Abkhaz, 
Abkhazian-EU and Abkhazian-US relations.115  
National identity and foreign policy  
I have already discussed Morin & Paquin's (2018, 261) definition of national 
identity in Chapter 1. In the following section, I examine in more detail each of its 
components: constitutive norms, comparative categories, collective aspirations 
and cognitive references. 
Constitutive norms: apswara 
By constitutive norms I consider norms, values, traditions – to an extent all of 
these are included in the concept of apswara. Apswara is an unwritten moral code 
and respect of it is considered a sacred duty.116 In fact, Abkhaz identity is more 
                                            
114 National self-image (Hirshberg 1993), national role conception (Holsti 1970), state (corporate, 
type, collective, and national) identity (Wendt 1994). Sometimes these are distinguished 
meticulously, but most often they are used interchangeably. 
115 For the purposes of clarity, I make a distinction between Abkhazian and Abkhaz. I consider 
the first to be either 1) pertaining to the de facto state of Abkhazia or 2) pertaining to inhabitants 
of Abkhazia of Abkhaz, Russian, Armenian, Georgian or other ethnicity (I have not chosen the 
criterion of citizenship, because Gal/i Georgians are for the most part not allowed to become 
citizens) and the second is the ethnonym for Abkhaz people – an ethnic group living primarily in 
Abkhazia. Regardless, sometimes it is difficult to make a distinction as for instance Abkhazian 
culture is largely influenced by the Abkhaz culture. 
116 Apswara (literally Abkhazness) can be defined as “the historically formed manifestation of 
national self-awareness and assertion of the Abkhaz; the unwritten code of popular knowledge 
and values, encompassing the system of customs and concepts of a person’s spiritual and moral 
existence, the violation of which is ‘equivalent to death’” (Inal-ipa 1996, 21-22). It can also be 
defined as “the Abkhaz etiquette for personal behaviour, beliefs, values and language” (Kamkiia 
2008). The closest equivalent to Western European frame of reference would be the manners of 
chivalry from the Middle Ages (Hewitt 1999, 247). 
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influenced by apswara than any religion, including Christianity or Islam.117 
Apswara is a pre-modern cultural element in the Abkhaz national identity and 
depicts ideal forms of behaviour. Besides humility, honesty and hospitality, 
martial skills, heroism and bravery are deemed particularly desirable and bring 
honour, which is the main currency of apswara. Honour is both personal and 
collective - traditionally tied to the clan, the family, and the individual, with the 
elders being especially revered (Hewitt 1999, 245). Clans, although not nearly as 
important as they once were, are still the collective referrent of honour.118 
Apswara played the role of socialisation of the youth as well as the role of 
"transmitting knowledge in the absence of a written Abkhaz language" 
(Shesterinina 2014, 86). An ancient moral code, apswara partially managed to 
survive the Soviet era despite the regime’s attempts to eradicate it as traditions 
like blood revenge, kidnapping brides and lavish weddings and funerals were 
considered harmful (Shesterinina 2014, 86-7). Since the fall of Soviet Union, 
Abkhazian culture has been influenced by neighbourly Russian culture through 
globalisation also Western culture. Nevertheless, apswara forms the kernel of 
Abkhazians' deep culture the intangible and invisible ideas, attitudes, feelings and 
beliefs that shape behaviour. Through state-building, apswara for the first time 
became part of state institutions and as "socialization into the basic intra-Abkhaz 
norms at the macro level did not commence until the 1990s, when the Abkhaz 
began building their post-war de facto state institutions" (Shesterinina 2014, 88). 
Preserving honour and practicing vengeance are still not only common but widely 
understood as a matter of individuals concerned. Disputes are settled by people 
                                            
117 “In the Abkhaz case – both in the homeland and in the diaspora – religion has never developed 
into a significant identity marker to unite a large part of the Abkhaz community. The Abkhaz 
cultural and ethical code called “Apswara” is the main denominator of identification.” (Smolnik & 
Weiss 2017, 18). The Abkhaz are mostly pagan and “the Abkhaz historian Stanislav Lak’oba, 
when asked recently about the religion of Abkhazia, answered that the Abkhaz are 80 per cent 
Christian, twenty percent (Sunni) Muslim, and 100 per cent pagan!” (Hewitt 1999, 205). 
Abkhazians' “two conversions to world religions, to Christianity in the sixth century and then to 
Islam under the Turks, have been less enduring than older ways of reverence for natural objects 
and for the dead.” (ibid.). 
118 “Clan solidarity is strongly developed in Abkhazian society. All persons bearing the same 
surname are considered relatives and to the best of their ability render help and support to one 
another, acting, when necessary, for the honour and interests of their representatives. Blood-feud 
might once have been the response to an insult – there was an example of this recorded as 
recently as the 1930s. An offender is no longer killed, but even today an Abkhazian will not tolerate 
an affront to his personal or familial dignity. Such cases are fraught with the danger of serious 
conflicts, into which the clans on both sides are usually drawn” (Hewitt 1999, 245). 
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in the affected lineage with vengence widely tolerated and expected by the 
society. Those who settle disputes are “held in high esteem” (Costello 2015, 131) 
and honour, shame and relational obligation sometimes described as attributes 
of past society /…/ continue to this day” (Costello 2015, 118). The relevance of 
apswara in contemporary Abkhazia has been confirmed in present research and 
some interviewers explicitly acknowledged that apswara has had an effect on 
foreign policy. As stated by Abkhazia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sokrat 
Jinjolia:  
"It is a part of the mentality of the people, the attitude to the word /…/ 
everything that has long been in the Caucasus and in Abkhazia in 
particular, has played a big role, honesty and loyalty to the word. If said – 
it means it is done. It does not need to be verified by any document, if you 
just say the word, it means it is bound to be carried out, it will be done. I 
do not want to say that now it is all the time like that, it is not, of course. 
But in foreign policy I have tried, at least for the period, which I can vouch 
for, to honestly carry out our foreign policy, if it can be called so" (interview 
with Sokrat Jinjolia119). 
Comparative categories 
Comparative categories as an element of national identity are images that 
emerge out of interaction between the (de facto) state and other actors. Here I 
examine how Abkhazia relates to its kin (in North Caucasus) and diaspora 
(predominantly in the middle East), its enemy/Other (Georgia), significant other 
(Russia) as well as the international community in general, and what bearing this 
has on its foreign policy. I need to point out that friendship, enmity, peace, 
alliance, and war are not permanent relationships or states of being.  
Kin 
The Abkhaz are a distinct people and have been recognised as such for at least 
seventy years, including "with a clearly accepted and maintained autonomy by 
                                            
119 Sokrat Jinjolia is the former Speaker of the People’s Assembly, former Prime Minister, and 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia (1992–1994). 
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the Soviet Union and then the Georgian SSR" (Green & Waters 2010, 40). 
According to Costello (2015, 11) the Abkhaz, compared to other post-Soviet 
states, are specific “in the great extent to which they have held onto the power of 
customary practices” that dominate the conduct of daily life. Indeed, Abkhaz 
culture can be described as traditional and conservative, with many pre-modern 
elements, from widespread paganism120 to the importance of apswara – the 
above-discussed traditional customary law. Despite their uniqueness, the Abkhaz 
share many characteristics with the “mountain-peoples of the North Caucasus,” 
in particular “their Circassian relatives (Kabardians, Adyghes, Cherkess).” (Hewitt 
1999, 241). Geographical isolation prevented the emergence of a centralized 
political system but facilitated the establishment of a shared value system 
(Zürcher 2007, 13). Kabardians, Adyghes, Cherkess and even not closely related 
Chechens have played an important role in changing the course of the Georgian-
Abkhaz war and contributed to the existence of Abkhazia. These relations have 
remained important but have suffered three blows. First, Abkhazians didn’t 
reciprocate and didn’t support Chechnya in its war against Russia. Second, most 
Circassians were excluded from the possibility of claiming Abkhazian 
citizenship.121 Third, in 2011 Circassian-Georgian relations were revived after 
Georgia recognised Circassian genocide, effectively weakening Circassian-
Abkhazian relations. Furthermore, Abkhazia supported the 2014 Winter Olympics 
in Sochi, which were opposed by the Circassians.122 I can conclude that although 
Abkhazians share many cultural traits with their kin (Circassians) and more 
distant North Caucasian people and although these ties were important in the 
past, their importance for national identity (which has become more narrowly 
                                            
120 “The Abkhazians are likely the only people of the Caucasus who continue to believe that a 
shaman may find out who caused a certain illness and the necessary remedy. There is a woman 
who is trusted with the knowledge of healing in almost every Abkhazian settlement” (Roudik 2008, 
74). 
121 “Problems between Abkhazia and the Circassians developed as a by-product of Abkhazian 
demographic policy. To resolve the country’s demographic problems, the Abkhazian parliament 
passed a law allowing all people of ethnic Abkhazian origin to become citizens. /.../ Circassians 
had hoped that Abkhazia would allow the mass immigration of diaspora Circassians, descendants 
of those expelled from the Caucasus during the Russian conquest of the 19th century. However, 
Abkhazia made a preference for only some Circassian sub-ethnic groups, claiming that they 
belong to the same Abaza branch as the Abkhazians. The Abkhazian government included in this 
group: Abazins from Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Ubykhs from Turkey, and Shapsugs from the 
Krasnodar region, Turkey and Syria.” (Zhemukov 2012). 
122 Ibidem. 
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focused on Abkhaz ethnicity rather than on Circassian pan-ethnism) and foreign 
policy has waned. This is well illustrated by the fact that the largest mainstream 
Circassian umbrella organization KAFFED, the Federation of Caucasian 
Associations, which used to represent Abkhaz interests in Turkey, no longer does 
so and since 2010 most Abkhaz member associations left KAFFED and 
established the Federation of Abkhaz Associations (Abhaz-Fed) (Smolnik & 
Weiss 2017, 12–13). 
Diaspora 
Kin and diaspora sometimes overlap, such as in the case of Circassians in 
Turkey. This is logical if I consider the origins of this diaspora, which was religious 
expulsion that had little to do with (pan-)ethnicity. The origins of Abkhaz diaspora 
are the mahajirs, who were expelled from the country during and after the 
Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the late 19th century (discussed in Chapter 
2). For a small nation, Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey and former Ottoman lands 
in the Middle East (larger than the population of Abkhazia itself) is significant and 
has played an important role in de-isolating Abkhazia, especially during the 
Russian-imposed CIS embargo of Abkhazia. In 1994-1995, a passenger ferry 
operated between Trabzon and Sukhum/i, which represented a lifeline for 
Abkhazia. It was, however, suspended by Turkey due to pressure from Georgia. 
In 1996 this pressure made Turkey enforce an embargo towards Abkhazia, which 
was defied by some businesspeople. Although the restrictions remain in place, 
trade between Turkey and Abkhazia takes place through cargo ships departing 
from Samsun, Bartın, and Trabzon and calling at Sochi or Novorossiisk (Smolnik 
et al. 2017, 6).  
Georgia 
Georgia is the other, against which Abkhazians identify themselves, but also the 
Other which is uncomfortably similar to the Self. Although Georgian-Abkhaz 
relation is now one of enmity, it was not always like this. Without getting into the 
historical intricacies of Georgian-Abkhazian relations, let us briefly consider five 
representations of Abkhazians by Georgian historians and politicians. These 
images are: Georgians, guests, enemies, victims, and brothers. They roughly 
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follow each other historically, but also exist at the same time, e.g. it is not 
uncommon to find among Georgians people who view Abkhazians as Georgians 
and those who view them as enemies or brothers. 
The Georgian view of Abkhazians as enemies has developed quite late and is 
mostly limited to the period of the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Shortly before, 
Abkhazians were seen more as usurpers, manipulators, untrustworthy etc. Not 
long after the war, the image of Abkhazians as enemies has been softened in an 
attempt to stop the alienation and entice them back into considering staying part 
of Georgia. Georgian deputy Prime Minister Alexander Kavadze once stated with 
understanding and empathy, "that the Abkhaz, unlike Armenians, Greeks, and 
Azeris, ‘have no other native land but Abkhazia’, and that Georgia must hence 
‘do everything to ensure their rights" (Cornell 2002, 174). This recognition of 
Georgians as humans and as having suffered a lot during the war is also present 
in Abkhazia, especially among the older population and in the civil society 
organisations involved in second track diplomacy. However, it is not a common 
opinion among the young generations in Abkhazia and Georgia, which tend to be 
more radical, since they mostly have no direct contact of the other and no 
experience of coexistence.123 
This image of victim is sometimes extended to an image of a brotherly, but not 
necessarily friendly nation (not unlike how many Russians views Ukrainians). 
Souleimanov reports that  "Georgians still tend to regard Abkhazians as a friendly, 
if not kindred, nationality. In an effort to excuse ethnic cleansing and murders, 
some Georgians tend to blame such groups as the North Caucasian volunteers, 
especially Chechens, who fought in large numbers in the war on the side of the 
Abkhazians, as well as Armenians and Russians, as the main culprits for the 
                                            
123 Sabirova (2008, 52–53) notes that young people in Abkhazia often perceive themselves as 
the victims of war Youth in Abkhazia “has a distinctive patriotic attitude characterised by a high 
degree of willingness to get involved in events that decide the fate of the country, including, if 
necessary, sacrificing their own lives.” Another important takeaway from Sabirova’s research is 
that according to her poll of residents of Abkhazia, apswara is very important to the Abkhaz and 
not important to non-Abkhaz. The Abkhaz believe preservation of the memory of the 1992-3 war 
to be the most important unifying factor (43.7%) along with apswara (43.7%), followed by living in 
the same territory (37.1%) and strong government (31.3%). Among all other ethnic groups, the 
picture is quite different. They see equality of all ethnic groups (49.7%), living on the same territory 
(36.9%) and the preservation of the memory of the 1992-3 war (32.5%) to be the most important 
unifying factors. Only 8% of non-Abkhaz considered apswara to be an important unifying factor. 
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violence against Georgians. Family relations are a truly important matter in the 
Caucasus, and this can also be seen as the basis of the Georgian integrative 
view of Abkhazians" (Souleimanov 2013, 118). The family metaphor puts 
emphasis on kinship ties and mistrust of foreigners. This narrative is surprisingly 
common in the Caucasus and conflicts between small nations are often seen by 
them as stirred and fuelled by the intervening big powers for their own interests. 
Translated into Abkhazian foreign policy: Georgia is the obvious enemy, but we 
also have to be careful and wary about the intentions of our friend – Russia. 
Russia 
Without getting into the details of the Russian-Abkhaz relationship – which will be 
the main focus of Chapter 5 – let us briefly consider the role of Russian in 
Abkhazian national identity and how this is relevant for Abkhazia's foreign policy. 
As Morin & Paquin (2018, 263) have noted: “national identity is not exclusively 
created by contrasts. Alliances can also contribute to constructing identity.” On 
the surface, things are clear: Russia is Abkhazia's patron, protector, an ally and 
a friend. The only significant country to have recognised Abkhazia, offered 
Russian passports along with social transfers and possibility of travel, provided 
security, investments and aid. However, just like with Georgian-Abkhazian 
relations, which are often simplified into enmity, Russian-Abkhaz relations have 
and still do extend beyond simple friendship. 
First, let us stress what scholars still keep getting wrong – that Russia was not a 
patron of Abkhazia from the outset.124 Despite that, more linkages exist between 
Abkhazia and Russia than mere political, economic and security cooperation. 
There are social and cultural linkages, but these are not without frictions. One of 
the most important social linkages are the many Russian tourists who come to 
                                            
124 As has already been suggested in Chapter 2, Russian-Abkhaz relations fluctuated widely over 
time. Russians have switched sides – from supporting Georgia to supporting Abkhazia – relatively 
late, in early 2000 (George 2009, 132; Coppieters 2018, 995; Derluguian 1998, 285). This fact is 
also often pointed out by Abkhazian policy makers, when the topic of Russian-Abkhazian relations 
and especially Abkhazian dependence on Russia, is discussed: “for some reason no-one 
remembers that we had a very difficult relationship with Russia, for 10 years we were in the 
blockade. The blockade was reflected in our people /…/ Only male adult population over 55 years 
had the right to cross the border with Russia. Women in Abkhazia carried on their shoulders the 
whole load: country, economy.” (Interview with Gennady Gagulya). 
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vacation in Abkhazia: “Russian tourists benefit from a visa-free travel regime with 
Abkhazia, which has retained some of its attraction as a holiday destination since 
the Soviet years” (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 304). Although Russian tourists are a 
welcome source of revenue for locals and being a tourist destination is a source 
of past pride and present optimism about the future (Sideri 2012, 271), Russians 
are often viewed as arrogant and disrespectful of (more conservative) local 
culture and custom and Sukhum/i’s City Council has banned swimwear outside 
the beach areas, while “signs essentially saying no naked Russians allowed are 
being placed around the city” (Lomsadze 2014). In the summer of 2017, a further 
series of events undermined this social linkage: in August an ammunition dump 
exploded, killing two Russian tourists and wounding 64. The news caused fears 
among Russians and resulted in a wave of cancellations. Three weeks before, a 
local man attacked a Russian tourist group and killed one person (Kucera 2017). 
In the summer of 2018, hundreds of Russians ended up on the street having been 
sold tours by fake internet sites offering trips to Abkhazia, further impacting the 
feeling of insecurity among visiting Russians (Khashig 2011). 
One of the biggest sources of tension between Abkhazia and Russia that have 
remained to this day is the “tension over the law that would allow Russians to buy 
property (houses) in Abkhazia”, while others include: border demarcation 
issues,125 conflicts between the Russian and Abkhazian Orthodox Churches (the 
former tried to take over the Novoafonsky [New Athos] monastery, and the 
conflict over the ownership of 'MVO Sukhum', Abkhazia's biggest sanatorium. 
(Khashig 2011). Despite viewing Russians as friends, Abkhazians are weary of 
Russia. They know allegiances can shift (as they already have several times) and 
Cooley and Mitchell (2010, 80) go as far as stating: “Ironically, Abkhazia believes 
that a warming of relations between Georgia and Russia is a more significant 
threat than invading Georgian troops.” Khashig (2010) also recognises that 
regulating relations with Russia represents a problem for the Abkhaz political 
elite. Dependence was a concern already in 2010, when Cooley and Mitchell 
wrote their overview of what ties Abkhazia to Russia (Cooley and Mitchell 2010, 
77), focusing on Russian presence in media, security, and politics but also such 
                                            
125 Abkhazians accuse Russia of taking the village of Aibga and another 160 sq.km. of Abkhazian 
territory (ibid.). 
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practical matters as the use of Russian passports, currency and replacement of 
local phone exchanges with Russian ones. Since then Abkhazia has become 
even more dependent and fear of overdependence is expressed by 
representatives of civil society and advisors (Interview with Natella Akaba126), 
although foreign policy actors were careful to qualify it in the interviews 
(Interviews with Viacheslav Chirikba127, Maxim Gvinjia128, and Sokrat Jinjolia). 
Minorities in Abkhazia 
Abkhazians have three main fears. I have already discussed two: the fear of being 
attacked and swallowed up by Georgia and the fear of being turned into a 
protectorate by Russia. The third fear is that of being overshadowed in their own 
republic by the minorities. I discuss these from an ontological security perspective 
in Chapter 7. 
This demographic situation is not favourable to the Abkhaz as they at best make 
half of the population (50.7 per cent according to the 2011 census), with 
Georgians amounting to just under 20 per cent, Armenians approximately 17 per 
cent, and Russians just shy of 10 per cent (Dembinska 2018, 8–9). Souleimanov 
(2013, 128) attributes the "unfavourable ethnodemographic composition” to the 
expulsion of the mahajirs in 1864 and subsequent settlement of immigrants from 
different parts of the Russian Empire (covered in Chapter 2), including many 
Georgians (although there is evidence of Mingrelian presence going back 
centuries). This migration was probably a result of circumstances, although 
Abkhazians tend to see it as an organized invasion. What, however, amounted 
to an organized invasion, was Beria’s129  resettlement programme during which 
the Abkhaz becoming a minority in the republic and were discriminated against 
                                            
126 Natella Akaba was the Head of the Public Chamber of Abkhazia when this interview was 
conducted. 
127 Viacheslav Chirikba was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia when this interview was 
conducted. 
128 Maxim Gvinjia is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia (2010–2011). 
129 Lavrentiy Beria was, like Stalin, a Georgian, but a Mingrelian born in Abkhazia. After making 
his career in the secret police as Stalin’s right hand, in 1936 he ordered the poisoning of Nestor 
Lakoba, Abkhazia’s most popular political leader (King 2008, 192–193), who has saved Abkhazia 
from collectivisation (Marshall 2010, 239). In 1940s, Beria enforced a resettlement that changed 
the demographics in the region and made the Abkhaz a minority in their own titular republic 
(Dembinska 2018, 8). 
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by the Georgian elite especially through the restrictions on the use of the Abkhaz 
language (Dembinska 2018, 8). By the 1980s, when Soviet Union was 
approaching its end, Georgians were in a relative although not an absolute 
majority in the republic.130 Although in historical retrospect, it is clear that 
Abkhazians have managed to significantly alter the demographics of the de facto 
state (mostly through expelling Georgians during the Georgian-Abkhaz war), 
Abkhazia has remained heterogenous and this resulted in “ambiguous politics 
that simultaneously exclude and include others. On the one hand, the objective 
is to reverse the position and status of the ethnic Abkhaz on ‘their own’ territory 
in order to justify the independence of Abkhazia. On the other hand, ‘it is critical 
to attract other minorities into the project.” (Dembinska 2018, 8–9). Abkhazians 
have tried to establish an ethnocracy  based on precarious practices of 
simultaneous social inclusion (for the purpose of legitimacy) and political 
exclusion, while also professing reservedness about in-migration from other parts 
of the world – Russia (ban on property sales), China (Lambert 2018), and Central 
Asia in spite of the fact that since 1989 the population has more than halved 
(Cooley and Mitchell 2010, 74), much of Abkhazia lays empty and lacks human 
capital to develop (Cooley and Mitchell 2010, 76). 
Although several minorities inhabited Abkhazia in the past, some of them are no 
longer present or present in very small numbers: Svans, Abazins, Ubykhs, 
Greeks, and Estonians. Significant minorities that remain are Mingrelians (Gal/i 
Georgians), Russians, and Armenians which together account for half or more of 
the population. While Gal/i Georgians are Mingrelians, not Kartvelians (like the 
majority of Georgians), they are viewed with mistrust at best and are politically 
discriminated. President Alexander Ankvab was ousted from power for wishing 
to give Gal/i Georgians Abkhazian citizenship and hence being too soft on the 
population widely seen as hostile (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015, 470–471; Hale 2014, 
352–353). I have discussed Abkhazian wariness of Russia and opposition to 
                                            
130 "Georgians comprised 45.7% of the population of Abkhazia, whereas the Abkhaz constituted 
17.8%, the ratio that was reverted after the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993 /…/ Georgians 
were a dominant group across most of the territory of Abkhazia then. The Gal/i region was almost 
entirely Georgian. The major cities of Abkhazia—Sukhum/i and Ochamchire/a—as well had a 
dominant Georgian population. The exceptions included the region of Gudauta, a traditional 
Abkhaz enclave, and a mountainous mining region of Tqvarchel/i" (Shesterinina 2014, 97). 
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Russians buying property in Abkhazia earlier. However, there is little fear 
attached to the Russian minority in Abkhazia since it is composed mostly of 
pensioners, who –  together with Gal/i Georgians –  surprisingly prefer Abkhazia 
to be independent to it becoming part of Russia or Georgia (this view is 
economically logical considering Russian pensioners receive Russian pensions 
and live in Abkhazia,131 where expenses are much lower, so they have a reason 
to support the status quo). Although Russians in Abkhazia are not seen as a 
threat, “increased russification is a challenge to Abkhaz identity and it remains 
unclear whether Abkhazia will be able to preserve an Abkhaz national identity in 
an independent state” (Kerselidze 2015, 315-6). Similarly, Armenians are seen 
as well integrated in the Abkhazian society and are in good moral standing as 
they largely supported the Abkhaz during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, even 
forming the Armenian Bagramian battalion to fight on the side of the Abkhaz 
(Cornell 2001, 174).  
Finally, it should be emphasized that there are relations between the relationships 
I outlined and that one affects the others. For instance, the “close military and 
economic cooperation between Moscow and Abkhazia casts an aura of patron–
client dependence that delegitimizes the Abkhaz independence struggle in the 
eyes of the international community” (Florea 2017, 341). Greater engagement 
between Abkhazia and the West could worsen these ties as could the 
improvement in Georgian-Russian relations. A dip in Russian-Turkish relations 
following the downing of the Russian jet in 2016, has put Abkhazia in a difficult 
spot as it felt obliged to support Russia and join the Russian economic sanctions 
against Turkey, although hesitantly, with exceptions and questionable 
implementation. 
International community 
The final element of interaction, shaping the construction of Abkhazian national 
identity is less of an actor and more an environment holding the mirror to the 
state-building aspirations of Abkhazia. Often identity construction vis-a-vis the 
                                            
131 Not only Russians, but the majority of adult Abkhazians (except for Mingrelians/Georgians in 
Gal/i), have Russian citizenship. If during the Soviet period, they worked for at least five years, 
they have the right to a Russian state pension (Kolossov & O'Loughlin 2011, 638). 
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international community is shaped not by interaction, but lack of it – through 
isolation. Or as Fabry (2017, 23) put it: “refusals of state recognition have, in 
general, a far stronger affirmative impact on national identity than extensions of 
it.” A formed identity is not just a precondition for self-determination and joining 
international organisations. Morin & Paquin (2018, 263) observe that it “is a way 
of consecrating aspirations of national identity” as has been the case with East 
European countries joining the EU and NATO, for example. Since being 
recognised by the international community is even more fundamental than 
becoming a member of an international organisation, it can be concluded that it 
is of extreme importance for national identity. A distinction must be made between 
non-recognition and non-engagement, and between physical and ontological 
security. Although non-engagement presents no physical threat it threatens 
ontological security of the state. Just like an isolated person without a possibility 
to interact with other people, the state turns inwards and starts questioning its 
identity (this is one of the findings I discuss further in Chapter 7). 
The role – and to an extent the identity – of de facto state is imposed (like the role 
of a rogue state), even if the latter does not accept it (Breuning 2011, 33). It is a 
non-existent or at best a passive role in the international community - Abkhazia 
is a part that plays no part: “some political subjects are unrecognised because 
they are perceived as parts but that have no part in a certain community.” (Biswas 
& Nair 2010, 123). It is an object to be engaged with, not a subject that engages. 
This isolation has significant consequences for the ontological security of 
Abkhazia as ontological security is “formed and sustained through relationships” 
(Mitzen 2006, 342). This suggests that when routinized interaction is present, 
attachment happens, which can help explain Abkhazian dependence on Russia 
beyond political recognition, economic aid and security guarantees. Even more 
significantly, when this routinized interaction is absent, attachment to 
international norms is absent, too. 
The only way out of the situation of non-recognition is for Abkhazia to convince 
the international community that it is worthy of recognition and that recognition is 
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in the interest of the recognizing states.132 International community figures as a 
spectator and a judge that is able to both change the status of Abkhazia and to 
apply or remove the stigma of non-recognition, which enables or disables 
engagement with the de facto state.  
Collective aspirations 
Collective aspirations of Abkhazia are twofold: they concern the status (aspiration 
to recognition) and to interacting with the rest of the world (aspiration to 
engagement). 
Collective anxieties and inspirations of states share with individual anxieties and 
inspirations of their citizens the same cultural context. Therefore, if on the 
individual level isolation is widely understood as a social sanction that follows a 
breach of a social norm and entails loss of honour, it is likely that it is interpreted 
similarly by all individuals who share this culture – including those individuals in 
the positions of power who lead and represent the state. As will be discussed in 
this chapter and in Chapter 7, non-engagement and isolation are seen in 
Abkhazia as a punishment for transgressing an international norm of territorial 
integrity, which is consistent with expulsion and social isolation of individuals in 
pre-modern societies (or societies with acting pre-modern rules, such as 
apswara) who have broken a norm. The norm that was allegedly violated by 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which, in turn, claim to accept that norm and 
to not have transgressed it, has often been discursively invoked as that of 
territorial integrity (Broers 2014).  
If territorial integrity is the norm that was broken, non-recognition is a stigma and 
non-engagement is a shame. Drawing on recently emerged research on culture, 
identity and stigma in Abkhazia (Shesterinina 2014, Costello 2015, Pacher 2017, 
and Ker-Lindsay 2018), I first proceed to define stigma in relation to honour, then 
                                            
132 This briefly seemed like a possibility when Kosovo’s recognition was being discussed by some 
of the major world powers and shortly after it was eventually recognized. However, the path of 
the ‘earned recognition’ or the ‘standards before status’ model soon proved futile as Kosovo’s 
recognizers refused to consider that it could be counted as a precedent for other states seeking 
recognition. Until the bias towards territorial integrity and against nations’ right to self-
determination through seccession changes, Abkhazia will not be able to convince the majority of 
the international community that its recognition is their interest. 
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examine shame and differentiate it from guilt. The contribution I make is then to 
link isolation and the associated guilt on the level of the individual and on the level 
of the state, the link being the culture of honour the two share.133  
Stigma and identity 
As evidenced in Chapter 2, the idea of the Abkhaz as a guilty nation is not new.134 
The current stigma “suggests that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are ‘illegal’ or 
‘abnormal’ or even ‘criminal’ and ‘dangerous’ entities” (Pacher 2017, 6). Stigmas 
are different from stereotypes in that they play a corrective function and prescribe 
behaviour: “the stigma’s aim in international relations is to push the isolated 
countries back toward norm-compliance” (Pacher 2017, 8). Stigma can, however, 
be supported by “stereotypes that view them as puppet states or harbours of 
criminal activities and smuggling” (Pacher 2017, 8). If stigma is justified and guilt 
is accepted, the state – just like an individual – accepts the punishment of 
exclusion and isolation. If, however, stigma is viewed as not justified and guilt 
rejected, the state will not accept isolation but will try to interact with others and 
convince them that the stigma is unjustified and unfair. Ker-Lindsay (2018, 1) 
recognises the relationship between stigma and non-engagement as “the 
stigmatisation of individual de facto states can change over time and 
                                            
133 As Costello (2015, 16) writes “The term itsasym is used to denote shame in the sense of being 
the result of anything that generates a sense of shame, including one’s own inappropriate conduct 
and the behaviour of someone else, and is contrary to apswara.” [The emphasis is mine] As can 
be seen, individual's guilt is not the only source of shame as the loss of honour can be collective. 
134 I have partly discussed this in Chapter 2 and here I only briefly summarize the relevant points. 
After the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Abkhaz were considered as a “guilty” nation 
which collaborated with the Ottoman Empire (Bgazhba and Lakoba, 2007, 236–240). Mass 
deportations of the Abkhaz, known as mahajirism, were carried out in retribution (Dzidzarija, 1982) 
and the ‘guilt’ was only removed in 1907 as the weakened Abkhaz in general did not participate 
in the 1905 anti-tsarist Revolution" (Shesterinina 2014, 92). Guilt only induces shame when it is 
recognised, not when it is imposed from the outside, but it always produces a stigma. Stigma 
continued throughout the Soviet period. Although Abkhazians, unlike some other North 
Caucasian peoples (Balkars, Chechens, Ingush), were spared population transfers of 1930s and 
1940s, they were seen as suspect by the leadership of SSR Georgia as well as the leadership of 
USSR (which was for a quarter of a century heavily Georgian with Stalin, Beria and Ordzonikidze 
calling the shots). Abkhazians didn't collaborate with Germans and were not considered a guilty 
nation, were not deported, but were nevertheless marginalized within the republic through the 
settling of Georgians, Russians and other ethnicities in Abkhazia (Nodia 1997; Souleimanov 
2013; Shesterinina 2014; Dembinska 2018). The promotion of Abkhazians to prominent political 
posts in the republic as a form of positive discrimination of the Soviet regime in 1970s and 1980s 
probably did more harm than good by further stigmatizing them as meritless usurpers who have 
climbed to the top. If in the Tsarist times, the Abkhazians violated the norm of loyalty, they proved 
all too loyal – and rewarded for their loyalty by the central government – as the Soviet Union 
approached its end. 
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circumstance, and with it the degree of engagement without recognition enjoyed 
by that de facto state can vary.” To sum up: engagement is a way of countering 
the stigma of non-recognition, of battling an imposed identity. Through 
engagement the imposed identity of stigma is rejected, and a de facto state's self-
identity is affirmed, preserving its ontological security. 
The discourse that underpins engagement and the arguments that a de facto 
state puts forward to convince the international community of the injustice of 
stigma, are different. The foreign policy strategies can resort to victimisation and 
claim remedial recognition or highlight institution-building and democratisation 
and claim it earned recognition. In any case, the narrative it tells, has an impact 
on the state's identity: “The stories states tell about themselves are not “just 
stories”—they have concrete behavioural consequences. Identities are both told 
and enacted.” (Mälksoo 2018, 8). This is especially true of de facto states, where 
domestic and international affairs are closely intertwined. 
Shame and (self-)isolation 
As Pacher (2017, 8) notes, that stigmatisation is based on an insufficient 
understanding and vagueness of shared norms that are interpreted differently by 
different actors: “Not common values, but the quest for the international society’s 
ontological security leads to stigmatization.” Abkhazians feel no guilt for 
breaching the international norm of territorial integrity – they refer to the 
international norm of peoples' right to self-determination and interpret their 
independence war as one of self-defence and for the preservation of themselves 
as a people. They are however ashamed of their unrecognised status and 
insulted by non-engagement of others. As Costello (2015,152) has noted in his 
ethnographic study of Abkhazian society, shame “appears very differently from 
guilt”135 Shame is “felt when being placed outside of society and that had to be 
                                            
135 Voell & Kaliszewska (2015) give this real example, which illustrates the importance in the 
Abkhazian society of apswara and the preservation of honour: “A villager had killed a fellow 
villager in an automobile accident. The Soviet court convicted the driver of involuntary 
manslaughter and sentenced him to a prison term. Relatives of the deceased, believing that they 
needed to take their own action in accordance with traditions of blood revenge, appeared to be 
preparing some retaliatory action against a member of the convicted man’s family. The elders 
who told me this story said they did not really think a retaliatory murder was imminent, but that 
talk about taking action was the family’s way of showing its high value of Abkhazian traditions, a 
mark of honour in any Abkhazian community, then and now.” 
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ended through taking individual action to restore one’s position or, if not, in exiling 
oneself or even committing suicide” (Costello 2015, 152). Whereas stigma 
imposes isolation, shame can result in self-isolation. This applies not only to 
individuals, but also to de facto states. 
Abkhazians traditionally experienced shame “as individuals, virtually in isolation, 
in the sense of being made to feel isolated from life” (Costello 2015, 151). While 
honour is lost, and stigma imposed collectively, shame is experienced 
individually. If the identity of being largely unrecognised de facto state is 
accepted, it can lead to fatalism (coming close to the term ‘learned helplessness’ 
in cognitive psychology) and act as self-fulfilling prophecy. One form that has 
consistently come up in the interviews with decision-makers in Abkhazia is that 
of the 'sour grapes'. Officials would normally confirm that obtaining (wider) 
international recognition remains a high foreign policy priority, but then often state 
that “recognition does not really matter”, is “not that important”, that they “will not 
beg for it”, and that “it is enough to have recognised ourselves, and that we were 
recognised by Russia” (Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba). To return to collective 
aspirations of Abkhazia, those of recognition and engagement: it seems that a 
gradual shift in priorities has taken place and that Abkhazia has moved from the 
long-term goal of obtaining recognition to adopting a more pragmatic, short- and 
medium-term goals of attracting investment, aid, forging informal cultural links. 
How can this be explained? 
There is little research on how lack or recognition and engagement affects the 
mindsets of foreign policy decision-makers in de facto states. Fabry’s (2017, 23) 
research does point out that “refusals of state recognition have, in general, a far 
stronger affirmative impact on national identity than extensions of it.” This may 
help to explain the resilience and longevity of de facto states, whose motivation 
to persist in the legal limbo of non-recognition is strengthened by non-recognition 
itself. However, existing ethnographic research on Abkhazian cultural patterns 
(Hewitt 1999; Shesterinina 2014; Voell & Kalisyewska 2015; Costello 2015; 
Smolnik et al. 2017) and this author's own interviews with Abkhazian decision-
makers, suggest that lack of recognition can act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and 
represent an additional constraint to de facto state's foreign policy. Inversely, 
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recognitions can boost a state's self-confidence, infuse its foreign policy with 
dynamism and enable it to take up a more pro-active stance. This seems to be at 
odds with previously quoted statement by Fabry (2017, 23) that “refusals of state 
recognition have, in general, a far stronger affirmative impact on national identity 
than extensions of it.” As will be demonstrated (in Chapter 6 with reference to the 
EU and the US and in Chapter 7 more broadly), several factors shape how 
decision-makers interpret non-recognition and non-engagement, what meaning 
and significance they attach to it. We have already discussed how relations with 
other actors (kin, diaspora enemy, friend, spectator/judge) can affect identity and 
shape foreign policy. In this segment, we have analysed how cultural factors 
shape perceptions and behaviour, and since this represents a lacuna of research 
on de facto states, I examine it further in this chapter. I now discuss the third 
factor that shapes national identity and influences foreign policy - cognitive 
references produced and reproduced through media narratives and images, 
maps and other cartographic representations, and state trappings and symbols. 
Cognitive references 
As has been stated, identity is relational – it is constructed through relations with 
others, but also through the relationship with the self. Self-identity and its 
preservation in time-space (ontological security) depends on maintaining a 
socially constructed image, which is done through media discourse and other 
forms of representation. It is well-established in de facto states literature that 
“cartographic representations, national maps and other symbols of nationhood 
play an integral part of building national identity and legitimacy” (Kabachnik 2012, 
403). We focus on three discourses – the triple-M of media, maps, and modeling 
and mimicry. Media discourse promotes the image of Abkhazia in the present. 
Maps provide historical, geographical and demographical legitimization. 
Modeling and mimicry are conveyed through trappings and symbols of state to 
present Abkhazia as a state with all its attributes. All three discourses intend to 
de-stigmatize and normalize Abkhazia and present it as a normal state. 
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The media 
On the one hand, media in Abkhazia is largely state-controlled and pro-Russian. 
On the other hand, there are some independent media outlets that as part of the 
civil society are important in sustaining a sense of independent identity. I explain 
the relationship between the above statements through a brief analysis of the 
media landscape below. 
Firstly, “the mass media in Abkhazia is subsidized by the state, allowing the latter 
to control this sector. The news agency “Apsnypress”, newspapers “Respublika 
Abkhazia” and “Apsni” are controlled by the state with editors being appointed by 
the ruling class” (Mikhelidze and Pirozzi 2008, 28). The state media is dominated 
by pro-Russian views, mostly because it benefits from Russian funding and are 
thus of higher quality. Independent media in Abkhazia is generally of poorer 
quality due to the lack of funding: “Most of the budget money for the media is 
spent on the TV. This year for the first time it was provided in the budget to 
allocate cost to the independent media, that is, a very small amount from the 
budget” (Interview with Manana Gurgulya136).  
Secondly, Ó Beacháin (2012, 173) and Cooley and Mitchell (2010, 61) state that 
relative to the size of Abkhazia, there is quite a bit of media diversity with several 
independent news outlets. Among the independent media outlets, the newspaper 
Chegemskaya Pravda, Radio Soma, and Studio Re TV-Programmes have been 
notable in sharing views that differed from the pro-Russian state media 
(Mikhelidze and Pirozzi 2008, 28). Hoch et al. (2016, 6) add Echo of Abkhazia 
and Abkhazian Forum, but note that these outlets have been “more or less 
connected with a few prominent independent-minded journalists, such as Vitaly 
Sharev or Manana Gurgulia, rather than being newspapers of an independent 
character overall.”  
Despite the lack of funding and poorer quality of independent media, which 
results in in small readership and weak influence of the independent media, these 
outlets have played an important role in Abkhazian civil society development, 
                                            
136 Manana Gurgulya was the former Head of Apsnypress when this interview was conducted. 
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especially in supporting the 2004 protests (Kopeček et al. 2016, 94). As Cooley 
and Mitchell (2010, 66) note, Abkhaz media commentators are critical of the 
“leadership’s transfer of key strategic assets to Russia.” The independent media 
also produces critical stories about domestic corruption and governance 
problems while at the same time facing “severe pressure from the leadership in 
Sukhumi” (Cooley and Mitchell 2010, 69). The media landscape in Abkhazia is 
therefore characterised by a degree of diversity and pluralism but the pro-Russian 
state media is dominant.  
Media is the main vehicle for public diplomacy, conceptualized by McConnell et 
al. (2012, 805) conceptualise it as a relationship between the government, the 
media, and public opinion. However, given its status, size, and resources, 
Abkhazia is in no position to set media discourse and shape the opinions of 
foreign audiences. Its media is therefore aimed not externally but at the domestic 
population. As such, the media does play an important role as a link between the 
foreign policy and the domestic politics of Abkhazia, acting as a filter to public 
perceptions of Abkhaz foreign policy. When it comes to state media, several 
interview respondents have assessed relations between the MFA and the media 
as very good (Interview with Manana Gurgulya; interview with Viacheslav 
Chirikba). Political representatives in cooperation with state and Russian media 
mostly try to react and counter the discourse of the international media.137 Hoch 
et al. (2016, 10) state that due to the influence of domestic media, “Abkhazian 
society remains locked into stereotypical views of Georgia as a belligerent 
opponent—a stereotype”, however they also note that “in the opinion of many 
Abkhazians, the conflict has been resolved /…/ That is why Abkhazia’s civil 
society is currently focusing its efforts on domestic issues such as administrative 
                                            
137 as stated by Gennady Gagulya: “we represent our country and try to tell people who we are, 
why we are, because the information that is spread throughout the media is far different from the 
truth” (Interview with Gennady Gagulya). The negative image of Abkhazia reproduced by the 
western media is so strong that according to Arthur Gagulya, who is in charge of the EU, the US 
and Canada sector at the Abkhazian MFA, there have been occasions when the European and 
US officials, ambassadors came here; even despite their actual presence here, despite what they 
saw with their own eyes, there were times that they processed information in their own way” 
(Interview with Arthur Gagulya). Western media discourse is not favourable to Abkhazia and as 
Kabachnik (2012, 399) has remarked: “Based on the persistent political rhetoric typical of the 
media coverage of the conflict, it would be easy to believe that Abkhazia separated from Georgia 
in 2008. However, Abkhazia has been independent of Tbilisi since 1993.” 
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reform, media legislation, reform of the judicial system, and copyright protection” 
(Hoch et al. 2016, 7). 
However complex and internally conflicted the media landscape in Abkhazia, the 
media remain an important part of cognitive references in Abkhazia by 1) 
countering foreign media discourse and de-stigmatizing Abkhazia; 2) 
perpetuating the sense of a Georgian threat; and 3) promoting positive views of 
Russia. The independent media represent a limited but non-negligible challenge 
by questioning and problematizing 2) and 3) and as such play an important role 
in sustaining the self-identity of Abkhazia as an independent state. 
Maps 
With maps, just like in the media, the odds are stacked against Abkhazia: “Most 
maps of the world continue to represent them [Abkhazia and South Ossetia] as 
parts of Georgia” (Artman 2013, 696). Just like it cannot influence the mainstream 
media discourse, Abkhazia has no influence over the mainstream cartographic 
discourse. Kabachnik (2012), drawing on Krishna (1994) writes of cartographic 
anxieties of Abkhazia as a fear for both physical and ontological security.138 The 
way to deal with cartographic anxieties is first to extend sovereignty to all claimed 
territory and be incorporated into the state. Abkhazia has largely achieved that in 
the Georgian-Abkhaz war in 1990s and finished it in the August war of 2008 when 
they expelled the Georgians and as of then fully control the territory they lay claim 
on (Kabachnik 2012, 403). Second, these ‘gains’ need to be visually represented, 
mapped as “cartographic representations, national maps and other symbols of 
nationhood play an integral part of building national identity and legitimacy” 
(Kabachnik 2012, 403). However, some areas, such as Gal/i and Kodor/i Gorge 
present challenges for cartographers as the Abkhaz have only recently taken 
control over these regions and hence the whole territory they lay claim on 
(Kabachnik 2012, 410). This is because these are predominantly Georgian areas 
with Georgian population and Georgian names – to map them in accordance with 
                                            
138 “The recent proliferation of Abkhazian national maps reveals the attention given to Abkhazia’s 
‘shape’. To legitimize the national map, Abkhazia must claim control over the entire territory within 
Abkhazia’s borders. Attempts at the nationalization of all Abkhazian space have encountered 
difficulties in two problematic regions, the Gal/I district and Kodor/i Gorge” (Kabachnik 2012, 397). 
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national aspirations would require the erasure of this population with all traces of 
its existence. As this is unacceptable, a compromise solution seems to be to 
withhold Abkhazian citizenship to Gal/i Georgians and to change place names 
from Georgian to Abkhazian. Whether these were originally Abkhazian and later 
subject to Georgisation as some have suggested (interview with Sokrat Jinjolia) 
or Georgian, is another question. 
Like countering the media discourse, production of alternative maps which depict 
Abkhazia as an independent, internationally recognised state, is not as much 
aimed at foreign, as at domestic audience. As Abkhazia’s status does not enable 
it to have a voice in international fora, be represented abroad through recognised 
embassies, or reach foreign audiences through mass media, virtual 
representations have become an important alternative channel: embassy 
websites, media articles, blog posts, social networks and discussion forums offer 
platforms for virtual representations of Abkhazia in virtual space and “help to 
construct Abkhazia as a national state” while building “support for alternative 
political geographic representations of the world.” (Kabachnik 2012, 405). 
Normality through modelling and mimicry  
Finally, the last of the discourses underpinning the Abkhazian national identity 
and the idea of Abkhazia as a normal state, a regular member of the international 
community, is based on modeling and mimicry of the trappings of state, which 
are important for nation-building and state-building (in an ethnocracy these are 
hard to disentangle). By modeling I mean the conscious borrowing and adoption 
of foreign models and practices of state institution and by mimicry the signalling 
of trappings of state in the conditions of absent state-building. Drawing on 
Bhabha’s (1984, 126) definition of mimicry as “the desire for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not 
quite” in the post-colonial context, McConnell et al. (2012, 806) argue that “the 
diplomacy of state-like non-state actors can be understood as mimicry of a 
colonial (and colonizing) discourse of legitimacy; the mimicry can approach its 
referent asymptotically but never match it, never gaining full recognition as equal” 
(McConnell et al., 806). There is no colonial discourse of legitimacy today, but 
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there certainly is a discourse in which recognised liberal democracies are 
considered the norm. 
Trappings of state include legal documents, such as the Constitution; political 
institutions, such as an elected parliament and the presidency (Costello 2015, 
17–18).  Furthermore, Abkhazia – like other de facto states – has “a separate 
government with functional ministries, separate health and education institutions” 
(Florea 2017, 341). Unsurprisingly, Russia is most often taken as the model for 
laws, institutions and practices of the Abkhazian state (Mylonas & Ahram 2015, 
2). Trappings of statehood also include symbols: the national flag and anthem, 
coat of arms.139  
Broers (2013, 59) states that “de facto states present an existential paradox in 
their simultaneously transgressive and mimetic qualities: they both challenge the 
international state order by violating de jure borders and replicate it by seeking to 
exhibit the normal appearance of a state.” However, there is no paradox there: 
the de facto states, excluded from the club of recognised states and stigmatized 
as renegades, have no choice but to model and mimic what they believe is normal 
and widely-accepted behavior. They believe that if they are like the other states, 
the international community will be obliged to extend recognition to them, or as 
Pacher (2017, 12) puts it: “A contested polity is ‘externally acceptable’ if it has 
sufficiently internalized the usual foreign policy methods so that its membership 
would simply serve as an extension of currently routinized practices. Norm-
compliance of a stigmatized polity simply means that the actor behaves like ‘one 
of us.’” Russo (2018, 7) acknowledges mimicking in foreign policy (although he 
calls it para-diplomacy): “The governments of these de facto states are involved 
in “para-diplomatic activities”, dispatching representatives abroad and trying to 
develop their status in the international context by means of collective 
legitimation.” Indeed, mimicking in foreign policy and specifically in diplomacy has 
a double role: it promotes its statehood through diplomacy, but even more 
                                            
139 Abkhazian flag itself is an interesting symbol: “the green and white stripes represent harmony 
between Islam and Christianity. The white hand of friendship represents Abkhazia on 13th century 
Genoese maps, while the seven white stars on the red background are the seven historical 
divisions of Abkhazia” (Hewitt 1999, 21). The flag depicts a peaceful country of religious harmony 
and coexistence, a welcoming place of friendship with a long and rich history. Each of these 
symbols is another element that supports the call for recognition. 
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importantly - it provides the proof for it by exhibiting the capacity to engage in 
diplomacy. It truly is, as the Olympic slogan goes, more important to take part 
than to win. 
Modelling and mimicry are ways of sustaining the sense of normality and as such 
aimed at both foreign and domestic audiences. They can also be considered part 
of Abkhazia’s arsenal of foreign policy tactics – a topic I examine in the next 
section. 
Foreign policy objectives, strategies and tactics  
Recognition has always been a declared objective and the first priority of 
Abkhazia. However, it seems that with no recognitions forthcoming (with the 
exception of the recognition by Syria in 2018), working on short-term goals of 
forging economic and cultural links has been just as important (Frear 2014, 86). 
I explore the objectives, strategies and tactics of Abkhaz foreign policy below. 
Objectives and strategies  
Some opinions in policy circles whether recognition is still the first goal seem to 
consider engagement as more important than recognition. Some members of 
elites in Abkhazia believe that recognition is “maybe a dream, but not a goal” 
(Interview with Natella Akaba), while for others engagement “is even more 
important than anything else /…/ to become independent and be economically 
dependent that does not mean to have independence, it is something else. It is 
an imitation of independence.” The relatively unrealistic goals of obtaining 
recognition from a large part of the international community with a necessity to 
increase internal legitimacy through good governance have led to a pragmatic 
search for diverse ways of interaction with different actors, the most prominent 
being the multi-vector foreign policy, most often employed with reference to 
engagement with the EU and the US (further discussed in Chapter 6). 
Multi-vector foreign policy 
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‘Multi-vector foreign policy’ is a term that is most closely associated with post-
Soviet states that have not adopted straightforward pro-EU or pro-Russian 
foreign policy. According to Gnedina (2015, 1008), “‘the post-Soviet leaders claim 
that it is a policy of cooperation and co-habitation with all regional powers. Others 
however, view ‘multivector’ foreign policy as ‘shifting, incoherent, and 
ideologically vacuous’ behaviour.” Minasyan (2012, 268–269) considers the 
Baltic states, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova as examples of pro-
Western univectoral foreign policy, while pro-Russian univectoral foreign policy 
now prevails in the de-facto states Abkhazia, North Ossetia, and Transnistria, but 
not in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Minasyan, multi-vector foreign policy is 
the prevailing approach in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states.  
Multi-vector foreign policy,140 most closely associated with president Baghapsh, 
was about diversification of Abkhazia’s foreign policy (Berg & Vits 2018, 14). 
While Abkhazia now has a univectoral pro-Russian foreign policy, it did explicitly 
attempt to introduce (a more) multi vectoral foreign policy under the presidency 
of Baghapsh. He understood the multi-vector foreign policy to be “free from 
ideological prejudices and opportunistic short-term considerations” (Berg and Vits 
2018, 10). Practically, this meant counterbalancing the heavy domination of the 
patron state (Berg and Vits 2018, 9). This counterbalancing was however very 
careful not to go against Russian strategic interests, resulting in the Russian MFA 
expressing support for Abkhazia’s multi-vector foreign policy (Berg and Vits 2018, 
10). Despite the fact that Abkhazia never had a truly multi-vector foreign policy, 
“in comparison with other cases, Abkhazia is closest to what could be perceived 
as policy diversification” (Berg and Vits 2018, 14). 
Foreign policy diversification has mostly been considered in terms of actors with 
which Abkhazia is willing to have relations with, but not about the kind quality of 
these relations. What is crucial here is that expanding the circle of interaction in 
the context of wide-spread non-recognition is not possible without considering 
relations other than those of mutual diplomatic recognition. This is further 
                                            
140 Multi-vector foreign policy appeared in Abkhazia around 2010 with the aim of creating good 
relations with both Russia (which has recognised Abkhazia in 2008) and the West, which rejected 
the possibility of recognition, but was open to engagement.” (Kopeček et al. 2016, 96). 
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corroborated by the fact that the discourse on multi-vector foreign policy 
appeared shortly after the discourse of 'engagement without recognition', first 
proposed in 2009 by Peter Semneby, at the time the EUSR for the South 
Caucasus. Engagement without recognition and multi-vector foreign policy will be 
discussed in more detail in the Chapter 6 on EU-Abkhazia and US-Abkhazia 
relations. Here, let us note that they are tightly connected, and that multi-vector 
foreign policy was likely an answer to the political overture that was the policy of 
engagement without recognition. This in turn begs the question: to what extent 
does Abkhazia have a foreign policy strategy and to what extent it is only reacting 
to the international environment. In other words: how proactive is Abkhazia's 
foreign policy? 
Different visions of Abkhazia’s foreign policy 
Ó Beacháin (2012, 165) states that “almost nothing has been written about how 
this de facto state [Abkhazia] organises its domestic politics.” He adds that “the 
works that have examined aspects of domestic affairs within Abkhazia” have 
focused mostly on exploring economy, minorities, inter-ethnic relations, nation-
building, civil society, or they survey popular attitudes within Abkhazia” 
Additionally, there have been virtually no attempts at explaining the domestic 
dynamics of foreign policy or at analysing different foreign policy views and the 
foreign policy debate in Abkhazia. The character of domestic politics in Abkhazia 
has a lot to do with that. Domestic politics in Abkhazia are “personal, local, and 
informal,” with political parties “neither consolidated nor institutionalized” (Ó 
Beacháin 2012, 173). Agreements are often informal, such as the “gentlemen’s 
agreements” regarding the divvying up of constituencies among ethnic minorities 
(Ó Beacháin 2015, 244). In the National Assembly, “the style of discourse is 
consensual and non-confrontational; even the seating arrangements reflect the 
lack of adversarial politics with meetings taking place in a spacious hall with seats 
around a large table with no obvious division of parties” (Ó Beacháin 2012, 168). 
Most sensitive issues – which includes foreign policy and the relations with 
Georgia and Russia – are not discussed publicly, making political positions hard 
to gauge. The political debates – including foreign policy debates – thus give a 
sense of false consensus and unity as “the opposition political parties hesitate to 
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undermine the ruling regimes in order not to endanger the ‘unity’ of the nation” 
(Kopeček 2017, 130). 
The National Assembly “is not considered the locus of power” and is subordinate 
to the executive (Ó Beacháin 2012, 168). This means the foreign policy debates 
tend to take place informally within the executive although the executive itself is 
highly centralized and the President “defines the basic directions of internal and 
foreign policy” (Ó Beacháin 2015, 241). As “political parties “do not represent 
societal cleavages” (Ó Beacháin 2012, 168) and are based on strong 
personalities and clientelist relations rather than ideologies and programmes” 
(Kopeček 2017, 130), we can assume that most political debates take place not 
between political parties in the National Assembly but between informal political 
groups. According to Kopeček (2017, 131), “the most important informal 
institution is clientelism on the state level and clannish politics on the local level.” 
Virtually no literature exists on political networks involving clans in Abkhazia, 
much less on their attitudes towards foreign policy issues in Abkhazia. As my 
research focuses on external relations of Abkhazia, I have not undertaken 
extensive empirical research that the mapping of political clans and their positions 
would entail. Keeping this caveat in mind and avoiding speculation, it is possible 
to present only a rough contour of the foreign policy debate in Abkhazia by 
drawing on my interview data. 
It would be wrong to assume that there is no difference in opinion regarding 
Abkhazia’s foreign policy and that it has stayed the same over time and in 
radically different contexts. Some interviewees have stated that they believe 
there is close to a consensus in Abkhazia regarding foreign policy objectives 
(Interview with Natella Akaba) or that “maybe there are some nuances, but in 
general it’s the same” (Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba). Others, however, 
pointed to greater differences in views and approaches:  
“The current foreign policy makers of Abkhazia have a different approach 
from mine. I think our current foreign policy is made as if we were China. 
They behave like they are China, like a great super power, which has 
already achieved all of the goals and we just need to be very generous 
going abroad making exhibitions, presenting our country as ‘here we are’. 
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If I were them, I would keep trying to get recognitions and keep getting not 
only political recognition but would concentrate on economic recognition” 
(Interview with Maxim Gvinjia).  
If Abkhazia's diplomats are not proactively approaching potential engagement 
partners with a vision in mind and a proposal in hand, what do they do? I argue 
that social moves (Smith 2018) are an answer to this question and discuss them 
in the next section. 
Proactiveness of Abkhazia’s foreign policy 
It is difficult to get rid of the impression that Abkhazian foreign policy has 
progressively been slipping into a sort of strategy of ‘strategic patience' (Mitchell 
& Cooley 2010, 26–27). This 'knock-and-wait' approach was clear from my 
interview with Abkhaz policy makers: “we would like to cooperate with anybody 
but if the doors are all closed what can I do?” (Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba). 
While there are indicators pointing to the fatalism of the Abkhaz foreign policy 
makers,141 it is important to mention that my empirical data on Abkhaz 
proactiveness in engagement with Russia (Chapter 5) and the EU and the US 
contradicts this (Chapter 6). The reason is to be found in the fact that it changed 
over time, with 2008–2010 period representing the pinnacle of proactiveness in 
Abkhaz foreign policy, which subsequently declined, succumbing to the sour 
grapes syndrome (discussed in Chapter 7).  
Tactics: social moves 
As has been previously elaborated in the section Foreign policy constraints and 
capabilities of Chapter 4, social moves are the practical, material routines that 
strengthen Abkhazia’s external legitimacy “in response to the stagnation of 
international recognition proceedings” (Smith 2018, 182). Examples include 
                                            
141 It is interesting that during the time when I was conducting interviews in Abkhazia (January 
2016), the official foreign policy concept was being prepared and was supposed to be released 
in a few months (Interview with Viacheslav Chirikba). However, as of November 2018, the foreign 
policy concept has still not been released. The reasons may be entirely domestic (the 
development of the concept was started by the previous government), or Abkhazia might favour 
this kind of strategic ambiguity in order to be more flexible in segregating Russian and Western 
audiences and playing various geopolitical roles (as will be suggested in Chapter 7). 
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'formal statements of condolences, congratulations, and solidarity', 'naming 
honourary consuls and representatives', 'participation in international sporting 
events abroad' – all employed by Abkhazia. To clarify further, social moves differ 
from other formal foreign policy interactions not in kind or actor but in scope. They 
are official interactions and can be carried out by the staff in the Ministry of the 
Foreign Affairs or even the Minister himself. They differ from formal foreign policy 
interactions in being routine and low-key, attempting to elicit reciprocity through 
expressions of support and solidarity. A congratulatory note sent by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia to a head of state is not likely to lead to changes in 
the foreign policy of that country but sustained social moves might contribute to 
opening of channels of communication. Even more importantly, Georgia is much 
less likely to protest against condolences and congratulations than to a more 
overt attempt at initiating relations, such as a request for a visit of the Abkhaz 
delegation. Social moves are a surrogate for comprehensive formal diplomatic 
interaction between recognised states and can also be thought of as a safe space 
for learning and experimenting in political communication and relationship-
building in a similar vein to what Richards and Smith (2015, 1731–2) have 
considered non-recognition to be a political sandbox for testing different political 
solutions.142 In the case of formal statements made by a de facto state, the 
message really is the medium. By giving a statement, it is relaying the message 
that it can give a statement – and does – like ‘every other normal’ state. These 
messages are entirely performative – their contents do not matter, simply by 
being uttered, they are already acts in themselves. However, given that Abkhazia 
seems to lack an overarching foreign policy strategy, the social moves are better 
understood as routines that sustain interaction and identity and as tactics of 
response to the engagement of others. This is in line with Isachenko (2012, 3) 
view that de facto states employ different tactics, but non-recognition prevents 
them from having a foreign policy strategy of their own. Instead they figure as 
                                            
142 Examples of Abkhazia’s social moves include formal statements (condolences, 
congratulations, and expressions of solidarity with other leaders), the appointments of honourary 
representatives (to Austria, Bulgaria, China, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, San Marino, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Vatican City), and participating in international sporting 
competitions (within the Confederation of Independent Football Associations – CONIFA and in 
martial arts competitions in Armenia and Russia) (Smith 2018, 186). 
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objects in strategies of others and are much more reactive than proactive in their 
behaviour.  
Despite the fact that social moves can be seen as routines with not much 
significance for the status of Abkhazia, they do occupy quite a lot of the MFA's 
time.143 There is no better indication of how important social moves are than the 
fact that Minister of foreign affairs - according to his own words – spends six hours 
on correspondence on an average day. It is a sign that they are in fact more than 
foreign policy tactics but play a crucial role in ontological security as has been 
established before (Mitzen 2006; Chernobrov 2016). 
Abkhazia’s geopolitical roles 
How do geopolitical roles that were introduced as part of the theoretical 
framework, apply empirically in the case of Abkhazia? Drawing on the historical 
context (Chapter 2), the analysis of Abkhazian foreign policy (Chapter 4), and its 
relations with Russia (Chapter 5), the EU and the US (Chapter 6), Abkhazia can 
be observed to play the following roles: 
Divider: 
- Abkhazia has prevented Georgia from achieving territorial integrity and 
being able to enter into regional integration frameworks, such as the EU 
and NATO. This role was played most prominently since Saakashvili’s 
coming to power in 2004 and the escalation of Abkhazian-Georgian and 
Georgian-Russian relations. 
- Requiring Georgia to keep its military expenditures high – this role has 
been played ever since the Georgian-Abkhaz War in 1992–1993. 
  
                                            
143 At least if we can judge from Maxim Gvinjia’s (former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia)’s 
account: “A diplomat of country which is not recognised does exactly the same as one of a 
recognised country. Maybe I even have more job to do because I have to make every time the 
first step. […] I spent three hours for correspondence in the morning, then another three or four 
hours for correspondence in the evening” (Baudelaire 2014). 
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Middle man: 
- This role was not played by Abkhazia in a classical sense as it has few 
natural resources and few important economic transit routes. However, 
Abkhazia’s semi-tropical climate, its status of holiday destination since 
Soviet times and the fact that it continues to host a plethora of FSB 
sanatoria and hotels (Nemtsova 2010), has given it good access to 
Russian political elites since the 1930s in the Soviet Union and continuing 
to this day. 
- Abkhazia also actively tried to play this role in the run up to and during the 
Sochi Olympics in 2014, when it believed its location and cheap labour 
would enable the de facto state to attract investments in infrastructure and 
construction sector, respectively.  
Tollman: 
- Abkhazia lies on the strategically important transit corridor between Russia 
and South Caucasus. On the one hand, Russia has a long-standing 
strategic interest in building a railway link to its ally Armenia through 
Abkhazia and Georgia. On the other hand, Georgia has an economic 
interest in exporting goods to Russia through Abkhazia. Despite the fact 
that none of these projects have yet materialized (which is mostly due to 
political disagreements and lack of trust between Georgia and Abkhazia, 
and Georgia and Russia), the Abkhazian side has even come up with 
solutions how Georgian goods can be transported through Abkhazia in 
sealed railway carriages to prevent them from being stolen or tampered 
with. 
Extorter: 
- Abkhazia continues to attract Russian aid and investment in return for 
compliance and support. A good example of this is when following the 
Turkish downing of a Russian jet in 2016, it joined the Russian economic 
sanctions against Turkey. Given that Turkey, due to the largest population 
of Abkhaz outside of Abkhazia, is very important for Abkhazia, its 
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compliance in this matter was a gesture it hoped Russia would reciprocate 
with continued supply of aid and investment. 
Keeper of the status-quo: 
- Similar to the role of divider, Abkhazia has played the role of the keeper of 
the status quo by not only preventing the regional integration of Georgia 
into the Euro-Atlantic framework but has also delayed conflict resolution. 
By obstructing GID and not allowing Georgian refugees to return to 
Abkhazia, it has maintained the status-quo of de facto independence. 
Through disenfranchisement of Gali Georgians, renaming places, and 
building state institutions, it has and continues to create ‘facts on the 
ground’ and the more time that passes, the more impossible its 
reintegration into Georgia has become. 
 
Emulator: 
- Abkhazia started playing this role started already in 2003, when the 
‘standards before status’ policy for Kosovo was launched. It was played 
most clearly by Abkhazia between 2008 and 2010 as it hoped to follow 
Kosovo’s path and ‘earn’ recognition through convincing the international 
community that it is a responsible actor that deserves recognition for its 
state-building and democratisation efforts. 
Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the analysis of Abkhazia’s foreign policy and examined 
the meaning policy makers in Abkhazia and the actors it interacts with, attach to 
non-recognition, and how this affects their foreign policy behaviour.  
In this context, I examined first the national identity of Abkhazia and its relevance 
to studying its foreign policy. I discussed in some detail each of its four 
components: constitutive norms, comparative categories, collective aspirations 
and cognitive references. The conclusion is that apswara continues to shape 
perceptions and behaviour of Abkhazians, including in foreign policy. Abkhazia’s 
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relations with its kin ethnic groups in the North Caucasus, the diaspora in Turkey 
and the Middle East, relations with Georgia, Russia and ethnic minorities in 
Abkhazia are also important. They serve as ‘mirrors’ that shape how it perceives 
itself, while the perception of it as an unrecognised state by recognised actors 
imparts stigma on its identity that through the filter of Abkhaz cultural perceptions 
becomes associated with the shame of being isolated. Through the 
representations of Abkhazia in the domestic media, in cartography, in modelling 
and mimicry of recognized states, Abkhazia maintains a counter-narrative, 
rejecting its stigmatised identity and preserving its ontological security.  
Non-recognition, the lack of foreign policy strategy, dependence on a small circle 
of recognisers, and lack of resources are the most important factors constraining 
the formulation and execution of Abkhazian foreign policy, while its MFA, 
diaspora network, and Russian assistance are some of the most important 
capabilities it is able to draw on. 
Opinions on Abkhazia’s main foreign policy objectives, its strategies, and how 
proactive it is, differ both among scholars and the Abkhazian policy makers 
themselves. While the empirical data (further discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) 
points to Abkhazians being quite proactive in meetings with EU officials, in 
representation and lobbying in the US, and in opposing the initial version of the 
Russian-Abkhazian Agreements on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support 
in 2014. The most proactive period was in the heyday of multi-vector foreign 
policy under the presidents Baghapsh and Ankvab, but with unmet expectations 
regarding EU and US engagement and the election of the more pro-Russian 
Khajimba, Abkhazia became more dependent on Russia and more fatalistic in its 
outlook. 
Finally, I discussed social moves as important tactics for strengthening 
Abkhazia’s external legitimacy in the absence of recognition and as a surrogate 
for formal diplomatic interaction that Abkhazia predominantly lacks. I discuss the 
opposite case of formal diplomatic relations between Abkhazia and Russia in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Russian-Abkhaz 
relations 
“Ce n’est pas l’inégalité qui est un malheur, c’est la dépendance.”  
[“It is not inequality which is the real misfortune, it is dependence.”] 
– Voltaire (Dictionnaire philosophique, Article 'Égalité' (1764) 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine Russian-Abkhaz relations in the context of wider 
geopolitical considerations (including Russia's relations with the West, Georgia 
and the situation in the North Caucasus), paying special attention to how Russia’s 
own ontological (in)security and its conceptions of status and honour have 
shaped its foreign policy and particularly its relations with Abkhazia between 1999 
and 2014. Drawing on Tsygankov's honour-centered analysis of Russian foreign 
policy, Morozov’s (2015) referencing of ontological security and his analytical 
push beyond great-power politics, I have followed Russia’s enduring interests 
and fluctuating political relations through process-tracing in two distinct periods: 
from 1999 and culminating with recognition in 2008 and between 2008-2014 
marked by formal diplomatic ties and growing dependence of Abkhazia on 
Russia. 
On one hand, a mere glance at books and articles that deal with the foreign policy 
of Russia, proves that the temptation to reduce the analysis of foreign policy of 
the Russian Federation to Kremlinology at best and Putinology at worst, is alive 
and well.144  On the other hand, to treat Russia just like any other (liberal 
                                            
144 Judging from these titles we might confuse the world’s largest country by territory and with a 
population of around 145.000 belonging to over 170 ethnic groups with a personal fiefdom of 
Vladimir Putin: Putin's Russia; The Long Hangover: Putin's New Russia and the Ghosts of the 
Past; Putin's Russia: How It Rose; How It Is Maintained, and How It Might End; Putin And The 
Rise Of Russia: The Country That Came in from the Cold; Putin's World: Russia Against the West 
and with the Rest; Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain; From Cold War to Hot Peace: 
An American Ambassador in Putin's Russia; The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for 
Russia; All the Kremlin's Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin; Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns 
Russia?; Behind Putin's Curtain: Friendships and Misadventures Inside Russia; Should the West 
Engage Putin's Russia?; The Invention of Russia: The Journey from Gorbachev's Freedom to 
Putin's War; Protest in Putin's Russia; The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin etc. 
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democratic) country, ignoring the largely authoritarian political system that lacks 
democratic competitive elections, and possessing a strong presidency (a political 
institution) and the powerful president (an individual who occupies it), the political 
networks (siloviki and others), wide-spread corruption, and other elements that 
make Putin and his Kremlin's entourage so crucial to foreign policy decision-
making of Russia, would be a mistake. The fact that Russian foreign policy is 
politicized as well as very broad and multi-layered (as one would expect for the 
country with the largest territory, longest borders, and most neighbours), it is 
necessary to approach the topic with Occam's razor in hand and a heuristic 
device in mind. I borrow the latter from Tsygankov. His combining of realist and 
constructivist approaches to understand Russia's interests and foreign policy 
behaviour is well suited to my project, particularly his focus on the importance of 
honour and status in Russia's relations with the West.145 His focus on the 
domestic underpinnings of Russian foreign policy does a good job of avoiding 
over-focusing on Putin or the authoritarian nature of Russian politics, while his 
network-based analysis uncovers important motives and interests as well as their 
supporters. His way of presentation in the form of three enduring schools of 
Russian foreign policy (Westernizers, Statists and Civilizationists) strikes a good 
balance between accuracy and simplicity. Of course, one could always find 
figures that stand outside these schools or who can legitimately belong to two or 
even all three of them equally, people who have changed their positions through 
time etc., but this does not invalidate the overall accuracy and usefulness of the 
categorization). Although his periodisation146 of Russian foreign policy is 
                                            
Tony Wood’s Russia Without Putin (2018) is a rare example of the contrary in which the author 
consciously tries to frame recent Russian political history more in terms of international contexts, 
domestic political institutions, power networks etc. 
145 Tsygankov’s (2012, 7) way of combining realist and constructivist insights happens within the 
framework of social constructivism, because he believes that a mutually satisfactory synthesis of 
the two theoretical schools is impossible. Like myself, he takes “factors of power and security 
seriously, but [does] not view their influence as decisive in determining foreign policy.” For him, 
possessing extensive material resources can have a dangerous effect of reinforcing policy 
assertiveness, but this does not amount to a cause-effect relationship. Instead, “what determines 
Russia’s foreign policy is the national ideal of honourable behaviour augmented by its available 
material capabilities.” 
146 Thorun (2009) distinguishes four distinct periods in Russian FP, with the first two being relevant 
here: the strong alignment with the West from 1992 to 1993/94; and the increasing ambiguity and 
assertiveness from 1993/94 to 2000. In the 1991–1993 period, Russia was not a unified political 
actor. 
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sensible, I am using a different timeline and focus on different watershed 
moments, since I examine the Russian-Abkhaz relations specifically. 
Identity and foreign policy of Russia in 1990s 
Russia’s foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum but has been “formed in 
different external contexts, while responding to some similar sets of security 
challenges.” (Tsygankov 2016, 2). There is no independently existing Russian 
foreign policy identity that precedes interaction; it exists only through interaction 
and is a product of this interaction, especially Russia’s interaction with the West 
(ibid., 9). Specifically, it is the perceived (in)equality of this interaction and the 
(non-)recognition of status that shape the foreign policy choices of Russia (ibid., 
1). Despite establishing solid foundations for analyzing Russian foreign policy, 
Tsygankov’s approach lacks two elements to be applicable to my project – both 
addressed by Morozov (2015), which I address next.  
First, despite discussing both the geopolitical context and identity (with emphasis 
on interests, honour and status), Tsygankov does not go as far as introducing the 
concept of ontological security or does not connect them in any other way. 
Morozov (2015, 60) recognises Tsygankov’s honour-centered approach as close 
to but not focused on ontological security. He concedes that it makes sense to 
use ontological security theory in explaining seemingly “inconsistent or outright 
irrational” behaviour of Russia. Rooting Russia’s othering of the West in its “desire 
to overcome ontological insecurity” can help explain a pattern of reliance on 
conflictual routines, especially during crises, like the one following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Morozov 2015, 57). According to Morozov (2015, 40), 
ontological security theory may help us understand “what exactly happens when 
the outsiders face the profound ambiguity of their international status”. However, 
he avoids delving deeper into ontological security because he fears that its 
discursive approach would make results non-generalizable in cross-country 
comparisons. While Morozov’s identification of ontological security approach with 
discursivity (Morozov 2015, 60–61) is wrong (which is explained by his reliance 
on Steele’s discursive conceptualization of ontological security) as he ignores 
Mitzen’s (2006) non-discursive approach, his worry about generalizability is 
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justified. However, since mine is a single-case study, the doubts regarding the 
use of ontological security approach do not apply.  
Second, Tsygankov considers the importance of relations with the West and with 
other great powers (what I call horizontal relations) for Russian identity and 
foreign policy but does not go past great power politics. For him Russian 
relationship to Georgia and Abkhazia is little more than a function of Russia’s 
great power aspirations – the horizontal relationships determine the vertical 
relationships. Yet, as I argue, Russia’s imperial history is as much an inspiration 
for great power status as Russia’s sense of honour and status are the basis of its 
aspirations to great power status. Morozov (2015, 65) understands Russia’s as a 
hybrid identity “shaped by multi-vectored colonial encounters”, an internalised 
“subaltern identity”, which continues to be externally defined. It is, equally, an 
imperial identity which prides itself in civilizing its periphery by promoting its 
hegemonic order among the populations of the periphery that are in subaltern 
positions in relation to the Russian imperial centre. To Morozov (ibid.) this 
represents the conflict between the role of the colonial Master and the role of a 
colonised native, both roles deeply ingrained in Russia’s identity, which results in 
“‘stigma’ or ‘ontological insecurity’, so characteristic of the Russian being in the 
world.” Here we have not only the influence of horizontal relationships of big 
power politics on state identity, but also the weight of vertical relationships of 
hegemony.147 Morozov sees the reason for Russia’s subaltern identity not in the 
subjective perceptions of Russian foreign policy elites of the West as hypocritical, 
imperialistic, expansionist, and harmful to Russia, but claims that the peripheral 
position of Russia originates in “the capitalist logic of uneven and combined 
development” (Morozov 2015, 66). It can thus be concluded that Russia’s imperial 
identity is based both on the perceptions of Russia’s vertical relations with its 
former imperial lands, now independent countries in its ‘Near Abroad’ as well as 
on the perceptions of geopolitical notions, such as encroachment and 
encirclement by the West. Similarly, Russia’s subaltern identity is based both on 
the perceptions of Russia’s horizontal relations with great powers as well as on 
the perceptions of geo-economic notions, such as underdevelopment, 
                                            
147 Russia has a hybrid imperial/subaltern identity, but so does Georgia, which Andrei Sakharov 
called the ‘little empire’ due to its historical ethnic diversity (Petersen 2008, 11). 
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technological gap, and the need to modernize. Having established the basic 
coordinates of Russia’s identity relevant to its foreign policy, I now turn to the first 
of its main elements: ontological and geopolitical (in)security. 
Ontological & geopolitical (in)security 
Russia is blessed with the largest territory of any country and a wealth of natural 
resources. However, it also has the longest borders and most neighbours among 
all countries. Few geographical barriers protect its European core (Tsygankov 
2012, 31), which lies in the flat and vulnerable North European Plain. Likewise, 
the Eurasian Steppe to the south and east makes for an easy access to the core 
– a fact well known to those familiar with the earlier periods of Russian history, in 
which a loose federation of Rus struggled against succeeding invasions and raids 
by the nomadic horsemen, such as Khazars, Cumans (Polovtsi), Petchenegs, 
Kipchaks, before finally succumbing to the Mongol invasion in mid-13th century. 
Russia’s geography and history thus present objective challenges and as such 
contribute to the sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, whatever challenges it 
presents, Russia’s geography does not form its political choices, at least not 
directly and deterministically. As scholars working in the Critical Geopolitics 
tradition (most notably Toal 1996) have stated, it is politics that write geography 
and not the other way around. In other words, geographical challenges and 
historical experiences must be interpreted in a specific way for them to become 
sources of insecurity. Tsygankov (2016, 108) illustrates this point well by noting 
that Foreign minister and later Prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, recognised that 
NATO’s expansion “is not a military problem; it is a psychological one” 
(Tsygankov 2016, 108). Primakov, a statist and realist proponent of power 
balancing seemed to understand well that Russia’s security problem is not about 
geopolitics, the (in)balance of powers or military hardware per se, but about 
perceptions of that; in the other words, that the threat was the threat to Russia’s 
ontological security.148 Historically, Russia’s preoccupation with border security 
                                            
148 Hansen (2016, 359) draws on public opinion polls in Russia to show how much the sense of 
insecurity can change (in this case increase) when interpretations change (due to political and 
economic changes in both the international and domestic contexts): “The number of respondents 
who believe that Russia is faced with enemies [rose] – from a mere 13% in 1989 over 41% in 
1994 and 65% in 1999 to a full 78% in 2013.” 
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became predominant in the fifteenth century, and it is in the same period that 
great power reputation and political independence were important parts of 
Russia’s conception of honour (Tsygankov 2012, 31). Guarding the border of the 
Russian state also meant preserving its independence and honour, 
demonstrating that physical and ontological security in Russia have been 
inextricably linked for centuries. Indeed, one should not understand physical and 
ontological security as separate or even opposites.149 
Ontological security through othering 
For Morozov (2015), Russia’s ontological insecurity comes from the fact that its 
European identity has been overshadowed by the imperial legacy. It was the 
dialectic between the subaltern and the imperial that produced a sense of 
ontological insecurity stemming from the inability to preserve a stable “self-
concept as a European nation.” This ontological security then produced 
resentment that eventually transformed into the antagonization and othering of 
the West. (Morozov 2015, 104).150 Hansen (2016, 359–360) notes that that by 
employing the concept of ‘ontological security’ suggests that this othering has 
helped consolidate the fragile notion of ‘Russianness’ and thus helps explain its 
positive reception by the Russian public.151 Akchurina & Della Salla (2018, 1652) 
have pointed to the fact that adversarial relations between Russia and the EU, 
“could mutually reinforce ontological insecurity,” highlighting how a conflict – even 
a seemingly irrational one – can serve concrete state needs. Even if their claim 
that “the EU’s eastwards enlargement has led to states such as Poland and 
                                            
149 See Ejdus (2018) on the importance of predictability of the physical environment for ontological 
security. 
150 Whenever the concept of the relations with the West is invoked in the context of foreign policy, 
it is good to keep in mind Hopf’s (2005, 227) thought that “The conversations between Putin and 
Schroeder /…/ tend to reproduce a European identity for Russia that is both being expressed at 
the very highest official state level and reverberating throughout Russian society on a reciprocal 
basis. No such reverberation is possible when Putin meets with Bush, as there is a vanishingly 
small level of identification with the United States among the Russian public. The United States 
is not a significant Other for Russian identity construction at home; Europe is.” However, one 
could argue that in recent years Russian officials have progressively dumped both the EU and 
the US in the basket of the West. 
151 Browning (2017, 111) believes that “EU conceptions of self-identity” are similarly reaffirmed by 
viewing Russia “as a laggard, mired in historically anachronistic modes of thinking, becoming 
increasingly authoritarian and fully expected to suffer continuing economic, social, political and 
even military decline, and therefore only destined for greater marginalisation.” 
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Hungary undermining the EU’s liberal narratives,” may have some validity, Russia 
– on the contrary – seems to have benefited from increased ontological security 
through rallying around the flag because of strained political relations and 
economic sanctions. The takeaway from considering ontological security of 
Russia through relationships with great powers and the West in particular, is that 
these horizontal relations have an impact on vertical relations, including the 
relationship between Russia and Georgia, and Russia and Abkhazia. However, 
focusing on the mirror processes of othering in Russia and the West, have limited 
applicability to my project. It is an ahistorical truism as shown by Neumann (1996, 
208), who noted that there is no reason why Russia wouldn't be counted as part 
of Europe. 
Ontological security through routines 
Theorists of ontological security understand that identity is formed and sustained 
through relationships (Mitzen 2006, 342) and the discourses, script and 
narratives of othering form the context of these relationships. Having explored the 
sources of Russia’s ontological (in)security, I now proceed to answering the 
question how ontological security is sustained. According to Mitzen (2006, 342), 
actors reach ontological security especially through relations with significant 
others. Because continued agency necessitates cognitive certainty provided by 
these routines, these actors then get attached to their social relationships.152 
Chernobrov (2016, 583–584) understands Russia’s ontological security through 
routines. Actors prefer known, practiced and recognizable forms of interaction, 
even if they may be detrimental to their security, as we have seen in the Ukrainian 
crisis, where familiar Cold War routines have been observed. According to 
Chernobrov (2016, 583–584), the fact that the threat is familiar to all sides, is both 
attractive to them as well as dangerous as it gives them an illusion of predictability 
and prevents them from seeing “other dimensions of the problem and leads to a 
known and well-rehearsed routine of policy escalation and popular suspicion.” At 
this point ontological security departs from physical survival as the states in this 
                                            
152 Hence, dependence of Abkhazia on Russia may not come only from Russia providing physical 
security and economic investment, but also from the dependence on the established routines of 
interaction. 
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situation may favour continuity and routine (social actions aimed at satisfying their 
self-identity needs) to the point of compromising their physical security or even 
existence. 
Status and honour after the ‘geopolitical 
catastrophe’ 
In Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honour in International 
Relations, published in 2012, Tsygankov argues that Russia’s seeking of 
security, power, and welfare are filtered through cultural belief in which 
conceptions of honour supply a framework for organizing and producing “policies 
of cooperation, defensiveness, and assertiveness in relation to the West.” He 
uses ten case studies from the Russian history including the Holy Alliance, the 
Triple Entente, and the Russia–Georgia war to demonstrate that when Russia 
sees that its sense of honour is recognised, it maintains a cooperative stance 
towards the West. In the opposite case it adopts independent policies in either a 
defensive or assertive manner (Tsygankov 2012). According to Tsygankov (2012, 
xi) Russia’s conception of honour, which continues to shape its foreign policy, 
harks back to the premodern era before the emergence of the system of nation-
states. He distinguishes between two dimensions of Russia’s honour – European 
and local (Tsygankov 2012, 5); that is the international and local audience. 
Depending on whether Russia’s sense of honour is challenged by the West or 
not, Russia tends to adopt different foreign policies. This depends on what 
Tsygankov terms “Russia’s internal confidence”, a reflection of material power 
and the perception of that power by the political elites. This confidence is the 
“ability to pursue an independent foreign policy that determines whether Russia 
chooses a defensive or assertive direction.” (Tsygankov 2012, 5).153 
The limits of my project prevent me from delving deep into Russian history to 
uncover the sources of Russia’s modern identity, its conceptions of status and 
                                            
153 The fact that honour shapes interaction does not mean this interaction is honourable, or as 
Tsygankov (2012, 6) puts it: “To argue that honour shapes foreign policy is not to characterize an 
international behaviour as honourable. Rather, it is to draw scholarly attention to the moral and 
ethical implications a state action entails and to raise the question of responsibility for episodes 
of misunderstanding and failed cooperation in Russia–West relations.” 
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honour, and how they came to influence its foreign policy.154 Instead, I limit myself 
to discussing the significance of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-
Soviet ‘Yeltsin years (1991–1999) as the formative period for the contemporary 
Russian state. I have three reasons for this. First, the period is in Russia 
commonly seen as one of downfall and chaos, a tragedy for the population facing 
the collapse of state structures and safety nets, economic crisis, de-
industrialization, unemployment, inflation, poverty, crime, and oligarch 
privatizations. For the state and policy makers it was a ‘geopolitical catastrophe’, 
a dramatic fall in Russia’s power, prestige, status, and honour. The period 
accentuated Russia’s ontological insecurity and inspired its later assertiveness. 
Second, this period of Russia’s withdrawal from the post-Soviet space is crucial 
for understanding the development of Russian-Georgian and Russian-Abkhaz 
relationships, as well as Georgian-Abkhaz relationships. Since my research 
focuses on Abkhazia’s foreign interaction and engagement between 1999 and 
2014, I do not discuss the 1991–1999 period at in-depth in other parts of the 
thesis. Discussing it here therefore fills this lacuna. Third, in this chapter I start 
with more conceptual discussions of Russia’s identity and ontological security. I 
use the discussion of the ‘Yeltsin years’ to provide empirical historical context for 
the conceptual framework, and as a bridge between analytical concepts and the 
analysis of Russian-Abkhaz relations that takes up the rest of the chapter. 
Russian-Abkhaz relations between 1999-2008 
On the last day of 1999 Yeltsin resigned from the Presidency in favour of Vladimir 
Putin, who took over, buoyed by popularity over major military campaign against 
the Chechen rebels. Putin, who was relatively unknow until he was chosen to 
succeed Yeltsin, entered the stage of Russian politics at a difficult moment. 
Russia was again in war with the Chechen separatists and the EU introduced 
sanctions in response to Russia’s military campaign in January 2000. This was 
an additional burden as Russia was still recovering from the 1998 financial crisis. 
                                            
154 Looking at the cultural history of Russia (Billington 2010; Figes 2002), one gets an impression 
that Russia’s is a culture based on honour – its preservation and maximisation. Perhaps no other 
period is as indicative of this as the 19th century Russia of duels fought between noblemen 
(Alexander Pushkin even died in one). 
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However, with Putin in power during the 2000s, the Russian state had recovered 
a large part of its policy autonomy (Tsygankov 2016, 24). The successful yet 
merciless campaign in Chechnya made Putin popular with the Russian voters, 
even more so when his government was able to restore the economy to growth 
by 2000 (Kanet & Piet 2014, 2), largely due to rapidly rising oil prices.155 In March 
26, 2000, Putin consolidated power by winning in the presidential election, while 
his inner circle was taking over the state-controlled media (Toal 2017, 300). In 
the same year Shevardnadze was re-elected president of Georgia amid 
allegations of irregularities and vote-rigging. In Abkhazia, Ardzinba was still in 
power, although in February 2000 the movement Aitaira (Revival) appeared, 
calling for reforms. A much less cooperative parliament was elected prompting 
frequent clashes between the president and parliament. In the US, George W. 
Bush was elected President. All this was good news for Russia: Shevardnadze 
and Ardzinba represented predictability and stability, while – according to Putin – 
a Republican in the White House offered an opportunity for the improvement of 
US-Russian relations (Zygar 2016). This opportunity came with the terrorist 
attacks against the US on 9th September 2011. Putin used the context of growing 
threats of terrorism to establish a partnership with the US and emphasized the 
importance of jointly addressing this common strategic threat (Tsygankov 2012, 
44). He was among the first world leaders to send condolences to President Bush 
after the attacks and helped the US acquire access to military bases in Central 
Asia to aid them in the war in Afghanistan (Kanet & Piet 2014, 2–3). Putin insisted 
on the preservation of Russia’s great power status, but his strategy was markedly 
different from the one employed by Primakov before him. He did not continue with 
balancing against the West, but rather bandwagoned with the EU and the US, 
insisting on Russia's identity being European and Western (Tsygankov 2016, 20).  
The key insight from this period is the demonstrated importance of ontological 
security through routines as Russia’s relationship with the West at that time was 
important for Russia’s self-perception as a great power. Abkhazia at this time 
                                            
155 Putin is often referred to as the president who restored Russia's greatness through his 
assertiveness, power politics, and brinksmanship. However, even before that, Putin was the first 
to introduce “the economic dimension into the discourse of Russia’s greatness and its foreign 
policy programme.” (Samokhvalov 2017, 213). 
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barely figured as an issue of Russia’s foreign policy except perhaps in Russia’s 
genuine efforts to play the role of the mediator as part of its aspirations to regain 
the great power status. 
The Russian-Georgian-Abkhaz conundrum 1999-2001 
In the early 2000s Russian foreign policy was still firmly supportive of Georgia. 
Even though Abkhazia applied to become part of the Russian federation as an 
independent associated state (having previously applied to become a Russian 
republic), Russia rejected the request (Zhemukov 2012) with president Putin 
stating that “Russia’s fundamental position is that Georgia’s territorial integrity 
should be maintained” (Jeffries 2003, 130). During this time, Russia's activity in 
Georgia and Abkhazia was mostly focused on peacekeeping while continuing 
with the closure of its bases in Georgia (Lieven 2001). Russia and Georgia signed 
agreements on the return of refugees and the economic rehabilitation of the zone 
affected by the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Within the framework of the Istanbul 
OSCE commitments, between 2000 and 2001, Russia pulled out its heavy 
weapons and closed the military bases in Gudauta and Vaziani (Samokhvalov 
2017, 181). Early on in Putin's presidency, Russia was therefore a cooperative 
actor, a reliable partner, and sincerely interested in conflict resolution for the 
benefits of security in the region. According to Samokhvalov (2017 181–2), 
Russia was not hesitant to apply pressure on Abkhaz authorities when they 
resisted Russia’s negotiation efforts, however Toal and O’Loughlin (2016, 110) 
report that economic sanctions against Abkhazia in place since 1996, were eased 
by 2000. Even more remarkable is that Russia continued to be on friendly terms 
with Georgia, while the latter was turning noticeably towards the US. This pro-US 
turn in the last years of Shevarnadze's presidency is often overlooked due to 
Saakashvili's even more radical and vocal embrace of the US. However, 
according to Toal (2017, 107), Shevardnadze was very successful in lobbying the 
US to send aid to Georgia, making Georgia the third-largest recipient of US aid 
per-capita by 2001. This was an incredible achievement for a small post-Soviet 
country run by a former Communist that lacked strategic resources, powerful 
diaspora networks, or a democratic pedigree.  
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The conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that small states that can 
punch above their weight are not limited to the highly developed Nordic countries, 
but that even Georgia by the turn of the millennium, which was almost a failed 
state a few years ago, was able to profit immensely from the geopolitical situation 
in a region of increasing importance and competing interests. This in turn, is a 
testament to the importance of wider geopolitical dynamics for the local and 
regional conflicts, but also a testament to the importance of playing the right 
geopolitical role and playing it right. While Georgia was turning things around, 
Abkhazia too was slowly able to turn the situation in its favour, by slowly 
improving relations with Russia that gradually lifted its embargo. 
Russian-Abkhaz rapprochement 2002-2003 
Already in 2002, however, the relationship between Russia and Georgia began 
to decline. In April, US special forces arrived to train and equip Georgian forces 
for counterterrorist operations, a move seen by Russia as deeply threatening to 
its interests in the region. The fears were compounded by Russian fears that 
Georgia was harbouring Chechen militants in Pankisi. In September, Putin went 
as far as warning of military action if Georgia failed to deal with Chechen militants 
(Brecher 2018, 267). In October, Georgia mounted an antiterrorism operation 
against Chechen rebels on its territory. Several suspected guerrillas were killed 
or detained and extradited to Russia. This had restored the relationship 
somewhat, but Russia already started hedging its bets by adopting a more 
favourable approach towards Abkhazia (George 2009, 132). In December 
2002 the train connection from Sochi to Sukhum/i was restored with the help of 
Russian investment. During the same year, Russian CIS peacekeeping units in 
Abkhazia started providing security to the Abkhazians, while Russia started 
granting Abkhazians and South Ossetians partial citizenship (George 2009, 133) 
based on the new federal law on citizenship (Federal Law no. 18 cl. 2500) 
adopted by the Duma (Souleimanov & Abrahamyan 2017, 9) in what can be 
considered the beginning of Russia's 'passportisation policy'. This policy turn can 
be partially explained by Russia tactically responding to Georgia’s pro-US and 
allegedly pro-Chechen policy. However, it is no coincidence that in the same year, 
Putin re-introduced the idea of greatness in Russian foreign policy, stressing that 
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“that Russia would be either great or nothing (velikoi ili nikakoi)” (Samokhvalov 
2017, 213), which points to the fact that this was part of the larger foreign policy 
shift that touched upon Russia’s ontological security. The logic was that Russia 
can only exist as a great power, if it loses its greatness, it ceases to exist. A more 
clear illustration of ontological security as a relationship between existence and 
identity would be hard to find. Another important change was Russia’s more 
differentiated view of the West. Putin’s statements clearly articulated that 
Russia’s interest was in developing strategic relationships with the EU member 
states (Tsygankov 2016, 143) although his view of NATO soon became more 
sceptical. Nevertheless, when speaking about Ukraine’s entry into NATO in May 
2002, he stated that “At the end of the day the decision is to be taken by NATO 
and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners” (Toal 2017, 207).  
This period in Russian relations with Abkhazia has more to do with Russia’s 
relations with Georgia and the West than the dynamics of the Russian-Abkhaz 
relationship itself. There seemed to be an inconsistency as political deceit or as 
genuine desire to maintain good relations with the West that is conditioned by 
respect for Russia’s honour and status. However, this possibility of a double 
interpretation suggests that in this period relationship routines with the West 
(which Russia found disappointing) were not anymore enough to maintain its 
ontological security and that Russia was starting to rely more and more on 
othering to portray itself as a great power not in cooperation but in competition 
with the West. It is in this period that Abkhazia’s physical security started to 
strengthen but at a price of increasing dependence on Russia. It is clear that this 
process, which is often traced to Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia in 2008, has 
much deeper roots. 
Saakashvili and the fall of Georgian-Russian relations 
2004-2005 
In January 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia and in 
February declared the intention of joining NATO. In March the alliance added 
seven new members and for the first time expanded into the post-Soviet space. 
Despite being sceptical about the ‘Rose Revolution’ (Toal 2017, 147), Putin met 
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Saakashvili in Moscow to sign a good neighbour treaty in February. In May, 
Georgia restored control over Adjara, with Kremlin taking the Georgian side and 
engaging in conflict-resolution. Adjara was home to a Russian military base and 
was strategically important for its energy distribution port and as a key border 
crossing with Turkey. Adjara was also a region well-suited for Russia to cross 
Saakashvili’s plans. However, Foreign Minister Ivanov and Putin got personally 
involved to broker Aslan Abashidze’s exile to Moscow in a move that enabled 
Saakashvili to sell as his great victory (Toal 2017, 147). Kanet (2007, 108) also 
claims that Putin’s responses to the Rose Revolution in late 2003 and the Adjara 
crisis in early 2004 were signs of a ‘softer’ approach, a less negative reaction to 
events that were not going in the direction Russia wanted them to.156 Russian 
leadership clearly enjoyed playing the role of mediator, hoping the consolidation 
of vertical relationships and acting as a responsible and constructive partner 
would help in it being taken more seriously by other great powers.  
Russia, however, was willing to concede Adjara, a largely ethnic Georgian region, 
but warned against taking the same approach to reincorporate Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (Toal 2017, 147). These warnings notwithstanding, in June 
Georgia decided to forcibly crack down on smuggling in South Ossetia, prompting 
harsh criticism from the Ossetian leadership as well as from Russia. “In August 
2004 the Kremlin’s expectations of honour were violated, when Tbilisi used force 
against South Ossetia /…/ Putin responded by calling for Georgia to show restrain 
and honour its pledge to resolve sovereignty disputes peacefully” (Tsygankov 
2012, 244). Domestic politics have meanwhile reshuffled the cards so that by the 
end of 2004 both Georgia and Abkhazia had new governments, and Putin won 
the 2004 presidential elections, securing his second term. However, while 
Saakashvili and Putin were elected with more than 95% and 70% of votes cast, 
respectively, Abkhazian presidential elections produced a surprise with the pro-
Kremlin candidate Raul Khajimba losing to Sergei Baghapsh (Hale 2014, 204–
205). Despite having the support of Ardzinba and Putin, Khajimba failed to win 
the first round of the presidential election, which had to be repeated after a wave 
                                            
156 Putin allegedly warned Saakashvili over the phone: “OK, Mikheil Mikheilovich, we helped you 
on this one, but remember very well, there will be no more free gifts offered to you, on South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia" (Toal 2017, 147). 
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of protests. The election was won by an opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, 
but the Russian pressure forced him to create a government of national unity, 
allocating several seats to Khadjimba’s followers. Nevertheless, a gradual 
process of democratisation was set in motion (Kopeček et al. 2016, 93). The final 
blow of 2004 for Russia came from Ukraine, where the ‘Orange Revolution’ took 
place, with Yushchenko coming up on top of Russia-backed Yanukovich. On one 
hand, 2004 saw the expansion of the EU by ten and of NATO by seven members, 
stretching both all the way up to Russia’s borders. On the other hand, it seemed 
like Russia was losing its influence over the countries outside these integrations, 
while the EU was strengthening its cooperation with them through the ENP. 
Finally, Russia seemed to have lost the power to call shots not only in Georgia 
and Ukraine, but even in Abkhazia. It seemed Russia now had problems not only 
in horizontal relations with the West, but also had lost credibility and influence vis-
a-vis the former Soviet republics, damaging its vertical relations and 
compromising its ontological security. While Russia has restored its economy and 
Putin consolidated political power, its foreign policy was far from desired and 
would soon change to a more assertive course to restore its sense of honour and 
status. One of the early signs of that was Russia’s move to block the prolongation 
of the existing OSCE Border Monitoring Operation on the Russian-Georgian 
border, which thus expired on December 31, 2008. Russia, which was so eager 
to play the role of the mediator to impress its Western partners, was moving away 
from this role and towards a more unilateral interest-based foreign policy, 
mimicking what it perceived to be US unilateralism. According to Toal (2017, 
281), by the summer of 2004, Putin’s government made the support for Georgia’s 
breakaway regions one of the core national security interests.  
The key insight from this period is that Abkhazia comes into the focus of Russia’s 
foreign policy and we can observe greater agency on the part of the Abkhaz the 
beginnings of Abkhazian geopolitical role play. Indeed, I have not so far 
discussed proactiveness on the side of the Abkhaz simply because by all 
accounts, in this period there was very little of it.157 Not being seen as part of 
                                            
157 I have explained Abkhazia’s efforts to move from a univectoral to (a more) multi-vector foreign 
policy in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6, concrete examples of Abkhazian proactiveness in foreign policy 
are discussed based on empirical interview data.  
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Russia’s core interests, CIS sanctions, and stigmatized by the international 
community, Abkhazians had modest success in lobbying the local political elites 
in Krasnodar and Moscow (including its former mayor Luzhkov) to help ease the 
embargo but could do little more until geopolitical circumstances became more 
favorable. 
The preludes of Kosovo precedent and NATO expansion  
Early in 2006, tensions between Russia and the West flared up again over 
Kosovo. Putin resented NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia and strongly 
opposed any moves towards the independence of the separatist region. The 
words of Sergey Mironov, the Speaker of the Federation Council in March 2006 
mirrored Putin’s earlier pronouncements: “We are closely watching what is 
happening in Kosovo. The situation there is very similar to South Ossetia, and 
they are heading toward the establishment of an independent state” (Tsereteli 
2018, 9). Similarly, the president of Abkhazia Sergey Bagapsh declared that “if 
Kosovo is recognised, Abkhazia will be recognised in the course of three days. I 
am absolutely sure of that” (Popescu, 2007: 18). Two years later Bagapsh would 
be proven right on making the connection, but six months off regarding his 
assessment of the speed of the succession of events. It was in 2006 that Russian-
Georgian relations started worsening persistently. Already in January explosions 
on the Russian side of the Russian-Georgian border cut gas and electricity 
supplies, with Saakashvili blaming Russia for the disruption. Less than two 
months later Russia banned imports of Georgian wine (Peimani 2009, 57), while 
in July 2006 Georgia insisted on the departure of Russian peacekeepers from 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, asking for them to be substituted by international 
peacekeepers. In the same month, Georgian troops reestablished control over 
Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, with Georgia announcing it will move the pro-Tbilisi 
government-in-exile there. In September and October more incidents followed, 
including the shelling of the helicopter carrying the Georgian Defence Minister 
Okruashvili in South Ossetia, and the detention of Russian army officers in 
Georgia on espionage charges. Russia reacted by imposing further sanctions, 
cutting transport links and expelling hundreds of Georgians (Radio Free Europe 
2007).  
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Saakashvili’s initial approach to the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia was a mix of liberal idealist soft power to entice the populations of the 
entities and the contradictory nationalist hardline stance of non-compromising on 
Georgian territorial integrity (Toal 2017, 144). The absence of coherent strategy 
failed to convince the Abkhazians and Ossetians, making Saakashvili impatient 
and reckless. Already in 2004, Saakashvili moved to increase pressure on South 
Ossetia. He tightened border controls, broke up a large smuggling operation, 
reportedly sending hundreds of police, military, and intelligence officers into 
South Ossetia (Nichol 2008, 3). Tensions with the de facto states and Russia 
running ever-higher, Saakashvili made a series of aggressive moves which are 
hard to understand but can perhaps be explained with him still being drunk on his 
success in Adjara (Toal 2017, 147) and severely misjudging that the situation 
there was like the one in South Ossetia (Artman 2013, 688–9). Saakashvili 
gathered a contingent of 12,000 American-trained Georgian soldiers, who took 
part in “manoeuvres” in July, before attacking Tskhinvali on the night of 7 August. 
It was a full-scale attack involving heavy tanks, artillery, Grad rockets and cluster 
bombs, which killed civilians as well as Russian peacekeepers and caused 
24,000 residents of South Ossetia to flee the region (Marshall 2010, 306). On the 
same day, Russia stated that NATO should reconsider its plans to admit Georgia 
into the alliance in the light of the Georgian military assault on South Ossetia.  
One takeaway from examining this period of Russian-Abkhaz relations is that we 
can observe not just the proactivness of Abkhazian foreign policy but also a 
newfound confidence stemming from the recognition of Kosovo, giving hope to 
several de facto states that a precedent and a way towards recognition has been 
established by achieving the ‘standards before status’ and ‘earning’ recognition.  
After the 2008 War 
I have covered the 2008 War in Chapter 2 and continue the process-tracing with 
its aftermath. The 2008 War was a clear message that Russia will not tolerate the 
expansion of Western influence on its doorstep, that it will not allow any other 
former Soviet state to become NATO member and that it is prepared to use force 
to protect its interests in the neighbourhood (Rumer et al. 2017). In April 2009 
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed an agreement with Russia to allow the latter 
to guard their borders, a move strongly condemned by Georgia (Associated 
Press, 4/30/09). In June of the same year, Moscow vetoed a resolution to extend 
the mandate of UN monitors in Abkhazia (Reuters, 6/16/09). In September 
Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez recognised the pro-Russian rebel regions 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (Reuters 9/10/09) followed 
by the tiny Pacific island of Nauru in December 2009 (Reuters, 12/15/09). There 
would be no recognitions until 2011 and the focus shifted to Abkhazia’s domestic 
politics. In December 2009, presidential elections were held in which Sergei 
Bagapsh unexpectedly defeated the Moscow-backed Raul Khajimba. 
(Associated Press, 12/13/09). Under Bagapsh, Abkhazia led the so-called ‘multi-
vector foreign policy’, attempting to establish relations with other states and 
international organisations. The EU and the US responded with the policy of 
‘engagement without recognition’ but it brought little results. US policy was one 
of “managing the status quo rather than seeking breakthroughs or launching new 
initiatives,” (Rumer et al. 2017) which resulted in a shift from the US to the EU as 
the main actor in the South Caucasus (ibid.).  
The ceasefire agreement brokered by the French president Sarkozy (also at that 
time presiding the EU) after the August war in 2008 stipulated that new 
negotiations will take place between Russia and Georgia: The Geneva 
International Discussions with three co-chairs: UN, OSCE, and EU, with US 
present but not given a leading role (Hille 2010, 201). The first round in October 
2008 was marred by disputes on who should be present at the negotiations. 
Georgia only wanted to negotiate with Russia and didn’t want Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian delegations to be present. Russia on the contrary insisted on the 
presence of Abkhazian and South Ossetian delegations not only as parties of the 
conflict, but also as independent states which it recognised. Due to 
disagreements, the meeting was postponed until November" (Hille 2010, 201-2). 
During the second round, all parties were incorporated into the process but met 
informally in working groups, “giving Georgia the idea that the Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian delegations had lower status.” (Hille 2010, 202). The negotiations 
were asymmetrical as the position of Russia and Georgia were stronger than the 
position of Abkhazia and South Ossetia not only due to their limited recognition, 
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but also because the mediators, the UN, OSCE and EU, all voiced support for 
Georgian territorial integrity. This raised the question of the neutrality of the 
mediators (Hille 2010, 203). 
Russian-Abkhaz relations between 2009-2014 
After the August War, relations between Russia and Abkhazia changed radically. 
Recognition and the agreements signed between Russia and Abkhazia meant 
security guarantees, economic assistance, social de-isolation, and above all the 
hope of future recognitions. It was of huge symbolic importance for a people, who 
has been largely ignored by the international community. Recognition was to the 
Abkhaz not just international diplomatic recognition, but also a recognition of their 
identity as separate from the Georgian, the recognition of their struggle in the 
Georgian-Abkhaz war, and the “recognition of their state-building efforts”158 
(Interview with a Russian MFA official).159 This increased the foreign policy 
confidence of Abkhazian decision-makers and prompted them to embark on the 
multi-vector foreign policy of actively seeking recognition. However, soon after 
the recognition, paradoxically, fears of growing dependence of Abkhazia and 
Ossetia on Russia arose (Popescu 2009; Egorova & Babin 2015, 94–95; Bakke 
et al. 2018,162) as the two de facto states have outsourced several state 
functions to Russia, above all, citizenship, becoming synonymous with Russia’s 
‘passportisation’ policy (Krasniqi 2018, 21). Berg & Vits (2018, 7) have argued 
that this was due to their limited recognition by other actors. They believe that 
“the provision of security and economic incentives” by the patron state turns de 
facto states into completely dependent, making the existing ties under the guise 
of strategic partnership increasingly deeper, turning them into constraints, except 
if the de facto state tries to actively oppose its growing reliance by diversifying its 
                                            
158 It would be difficult to claim that the Russian official knows what the meaning of recognition 
was for the Abkhazians. However, it does point to the fact that struggle in the Georgian-Abkhaz 
war and “state-building efforts” were mentioned as criteria (if we take the interviewee at face 
value) or at least justifications for Russia’s recognition. While Russian officials may never know 
what exactly recognition means to the Abkhazians, some seem to understand better than their 
Western counterparts (at least judging by my own interview data) that recognition has an 
important emotional and symbolic value for the Abkhaz.   
159 To maintain consistency of foreign policy after recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Russia was also forced to change its discourse on and obstruction to Kosovo’s campaign for 
recognition (Newman & Visoka 2016, 13). 
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engagement (Berg & Vits 2018, 7). I argue that the latter was indeed the case of 
Abkhazia, but not South Ossetia. 
Examining the start of the 2009-2014 period, it is possible to observe the first 
signs of Abkhazia’s disappointment with the engagement strategies of the EU 
and the US. Recognitions were not forthcoming while engagement was deemed 
insufficient. As I discuss in Chapter 6, it was in 2009, after a year of cooperation, 
that Abkhazia decided to end the contract with the Saylor company hired to 
represent the Abkhaz, communicate in their name and lobby for them in the US. 
While the recognitions in 2008 raised the expectations of Abkhaz policy makers 
high, they soon came crashing down. 
Further recognitions and Georgian attempts at re-
engagement 
Nicaragua and Venezuela recognised Abkhazia in September 2008 and 
September 2009, respectively. Russia's political relationships with the two 
countries were instrumental in securing both recognitions (Cooley & Mitchell 
2010, 62). After Nauru recognised Abkhazia in December 2009, the recognition 
process stalled, but in May and September 2011, Vanuatu and Tuvalu,160 
respectively recognised Abkhazia prompting fears in Georgia, that the recognition 
process might continue. Georgia wanted to make sure that any engagement of 
the international community with Abkhazia would be done on its own terms, and 
it intended to take a pro-active stance in this. On the one hand, it tried to sanction 
unauthorised interactions. The Parliament of Georgia adopted in June 2011 a 
package of legislative amendments providing for the issuance of neutral 
identification and travel documents to residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The documents, called "status neutral travel documents" to allowed residents of 
Abkhazia to travel abroad and enjoy social benefits in Georgia. However, "such 
a document could only be acquired by travelling to Georgian-controlled territory 
and this is politically or socially difficult for most Abkhaz." Additionally, the 
passports had a distinct code that identified the holder as a resident of Abkhazia, 
                                            
160 Tuvalu’s recognition remains contested as Georgia claims that it later retracted its recognition, 
while Abkhazia states otherwise (Pender 2018). 
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which would allow Georgia to regulate the contact of Abkhazians with the outside 
world (Caspersen 2018, 10–11). In a tactical move to draw a wedge between the 
Abkhazians and their Circassian kin, in May 2011, Georgia recognised the 
Circassian genocide, prompting Abkhazians to start commemorating their Day of 
Genocide jointly with the Circassians on 21 May (abandoning their traditional May 
31 commemoration) (Barton 2015). All these moves intended to isolate Abkhazia 
and pre-empt further recognition, didn't prevent the former president of Georgia, 
Eduard Shevardnadze from declaring in June 2011 that the recognition of 
Abkhazia by Georgia would be a sensible option, particularly in regard to the 
facilitation of the return of the Georgian refugees to this territory (Coppieters 
2018, 1009).  
In the end, EU's policy of 'engagement without recognition', Georgia's policy of 
engagement with the intention of re-incorporation, and Russia's policy of 
engagement on behalf of Abkhazia to secure recognitions for its independence, 
all failed to produce tangible results, leaving Abkhazia largely isolated. A 
combination of sour grapes (inability to sustain high expectations and preserve 
honor despite not achieving them, for instance the self-unacceptability of being 
seen to ‘beg for recognition’) and fatalism (learned helplessness as a result of 
unsuccessful engagement) made Abkhazia progressively lose first its confidence, 
then its interest in diversifying its foreign policy, slowly succumbing to a growing 
dependence on Russia. 
Abkhazia’s growing dependence on Russia 
Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Georgian efforts to 
isolate the two entities as well as the departure of UN observers from Georgia in 
June 2009 (due to the Russian veto leading to the inability to extend the mission 
by the UN Security Council), further facilitated Russia’s monopolisation of 
external relations of Abkhazia while making it more dependent on itself in terms 
of security and economics. On 30 April 2009, Abkhazia and South Ossetia signed 
agreements with Russia on the protection of their borders. These near-identical 
agreements included civilian and military components, Russian-funded and 
wholly under Russian control. This was supposed to be a temporary arrangement 
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until the de facto states formed their own border guards, however, the practical 
result of the agreements was the Russia's border was extended to the de facto 
border between Georgia and the two de facto states (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 
681). After the Agreements were signed in September 2008, Russia moved to 
build several military bases in both de facto states, including a naval base in 
Abkhazia (Gerrits and Bader 2016, 302). The Agreement on the military base 
signed on February 17, 2010 is valid for 49 years, automatically renewable for 
15-year periods and allows Russia to keep 1700 troops in Abkhazia in addition to 
the border guards already present in Abkhazia (Toomla 2016, 61). In August, 
Russia and Abkhazia signed the Agreement to assist Abkhazia in its socio-
economic development. This and the agreements signed in 2010, represented 
concrete steps towards lifting trade barriers and fostering cooperation regarding 
customs (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 301). These agreements had a “friendly 
character and a humanitarian component pointing to the close relationship 
between Russian and Abkhazian peoples” (Interview with an official of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation).161 
In 2011, Russia increased its soft power in the entity as Russia and Abkhazia 
signed the Agreement on the establishment of informatory-cultural centres and 
the conditions governing their activities.162 Abkhazia's economic reliance on 
Russia also increased. In 2009, according to President Bagapsh, 99 percent of 
foreign direct investment originated from Russia (Gerrits and Bader 2016, 300–
301), while the direct budgetary contribution of Russia to the Abkhaz budget 
amounted to 57% (Toomla 2016, 61) to 60% (Gerrits and Bader 2016, 302). 
Around 80% of all goods consumed in Abkhazia were imported from Russia 
                                            
161 An interesting thing that came up in my interviews with Abkhazian and the few Russian officials 
I spoke to (Russian officials were much less interested in speaking to me compared to officials in 
Georgia, Abkhazia, the EU or the US for which I blame my weaker network of contacts in Moscow, 
but also the low state of relations between Russia and the EU), was that Abkhazians consistently 
focused on relations between the state of Russia and the state of Abkhazia, whereas Russians 
talked of relations between Russian people (Россияне [rossiyane], referring all citizens of the 
Russian Federation, not only ethnic Russians) and Abkhazian people. From this one could 
speculate that Abkhazians understand Russian recognition and diplomatic relations with Russia 
as having a more formal character, while Russians have a more informal attitude towards them. 
The latter seems to be confirmed by the fact that citizens of Russia do not have their passports 
stamped when they exit Russia and enter Abkhazia at the border on the Psou river.    
162 At the same time, in 2011, a public opinion survey about the EU in Abkhazia and its role in 
resolution of the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict, showed that Abkhaz society did not see EU as neutral 
(Shakryl and Kerselyan 2012, 3). 
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(International Crisis Group Annual Report 2010). In fact, Abkhazia imported so 
much from Russia, that it had a considerable trade deficit, with the value of 
Abkhaz imports in 2011 roughly eleven times bigger than that of its exports 
(Gerrits & Bader 2016, 300–301). “During the presidential election in 2009, 
Abkhazia's current president Khajimba expressed concerns about Russian 
'colonization' (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 677–8). Interestingly enough, Khajimba 
ran again in 2011 Abkhazian presidential elections after the incumbent President 
Sergey Bagapsh died in office. This time however, he was widely seen as a 
Russian-supported candidate. Khajimba lost the August 2011 elections to 
Alexander Ankvab of Aitaira, who won in the first round with 54.90%. During de 
facto presidential elections in 2011, 9000 Abkhazian passports were issued to 
Georgians (Kereselidze 2015, 315–6) and it would ultimately be this policy of 
granting passports to Gal/i Georgians, which would cause the downfall of Ankvab 
in 2014. 
While the core objective of Russia’s foreign policy has since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union been securing the ‘Near Abroad’ as its sphere of influence, since 
2011 or 2012 this has become even more of a priority closely linked to Russia’s 
increasingly authoritarian politics. The conflicts involving de facto states have 
become an important instrument in Russia’s revisionist policy as it maintained 
military presence in the conflict areas, distributed Russian passports to residents 
of de facto states, and offered support for state-building efforts (Fischer 2016, 6). 
However, not everyone in Russia was happy with Putin’s sponsorship of the 
majority non-Russian de facto states, which provoked a backlash among some 
Russian nationalist circles, including those who “mobilized in October 2011 
around the slogan 'stop feeding the Caucasus'" (Toal 2017, 282–283).  
In Abkhazia, too, Russia's exploitation of the region's resources was not without 
opposition, with some accusing Russia of trying to annex the territory and 
Russians of wanting to buy up Abkhazia's real estate. There were also 
disagreements between Russia and Abkhaz authorities regarding the 
disbursement of financial assistance (Gerrits and Bader 2016, 308) but all main 
political forces and politicians in Abkhazia welcome Russia’s involvement, and 
none of them can imagine a reintegration into the Georgian state (Gerrits and 
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Bader 2016, 308). However, a sense of mistrust has crept into the relationship 
and fears of growing overdependence on Russia are increasingly present. 
Domestic political changes in Russia, Georgia and 
Abkhazia in 2012 
The year 2012 saw important political developments in Russia, Georgia, and 
Abkhazia. On March 4, 2012 Putin again becomes president winning 63.6% in 
the first round, after one mandate of Medvedev in power. From the start of the 
mandate, he adopted an even harder line towards the EU, trying to dissuade the 
ENP countries from signing association agreements with the EU (Orenstein and 
Kelemen 2017, 90–91). Russia’s foreign policy focused towards creating the 
alternatives to the EU and NATO in the Eurasian Economic Union and Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), respectively. These efforts were aimed at 
creating a new system of vertical relationships to challenge the ones the West 
had with the ENP countries. If Russia would not be treated as an equal by the US 
and the EU, perhaps it could achieve equality and parity in horizontal relations 
through creating new institutions that it could dominate. In addition, Russia 
focused on expanding its influence in the region through developing ‘soft power’ 
instruments including ties with Russian and Russian-speaking diaspora, and the 
state agency Rossotrudnichestvo (which also has offices in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), which promotes Russian culture and language, preserves historical 
heritage, and strengthens ties of Russians living abroad to Russia (Fischer 2016, 
13). Trying to beat the West at its own game was more than just borrowing 
strategies and tactics, it was also about seeking status. 
On October 1, 2012, Russia’s hand in Georgia was strengthened when President 
Saakashvili’s United National Movement lost to the newly formed Georgian 
Dream of tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili in what was regarded as free and democratic 
elections (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015, 464). The new Georgian government 
adopted an explicit and reinvigorated policy of engagement of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, while being more permissive regarding other actors’ interactions 
with the two de facto states (De Waal 2017). Russia tried to use this opportunity 
to counter Georgian engagement, tie Abkhazia even closer to itself, while 
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polarizing Georgia. The then Prime minister Ivanishvili repeatedly criticised the 
preceding government’s strategy towards Russia, while being in turn criticized by 
the former president’s allies regarding his seeking of relations normalization with 
Russia (Delcour & Wolczuk 2015, 472). The ruling coalition, the Georgian Dream, 
being a broad and internally diverse movement, included both visible pro-
European elements as well as “more nativist, nationalist, and closer to hard-line 
elements in the Georgian Orthodox Church” (De Waal 2017). Despite being more 
lenient towards the international community’s interaction with Abkhazia, it kept in 
place the Law on Occupied Territories and the commitment to join the EU and 
NATO. The newly appointed minister of reconciliation, Paata Zakareishvili, made 
a number of overtures to Abkhazia and South Ossetia ostensibly to bring them 
out of isolation through cross-border societal and economic activities and by 
trying to establish direct communications with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
However, the change in political course has produced few results (Fischer 2016, 
51–53). A different development was under way in Abkhazia, where 
parliamentary elections in 2012 did not produce a change in power but were 
nevertheless a surprise, since the pro-Kremlin Raul Khajima lost the elections to 
Baghapsh’s successor Alexander Ankvab, who was having a difficult time 
mastering his inherited political domain. In early 2012, less than a year after he 
took office, his motorcade was attacked with heavy weapons but he president 
survived the assassination attempt (Hale 2014, 352–353). 
Russia’s relations with Abkhazia during this period were marked by Abkhaz 
wariness of Russia. Raul Khajimba, the Russian-backed Abkhaz politician lost 
parliamentary elections after losing the presidential elections in 2009 and 2011. 
The choice of the Abkhazians not to elect the Kremlin-approved candidate 
probably had something to do with the fact that in 2012, Russia’s financial aid 
made up only 22% of the Abkhaz budget (Gerrits and Bader 2016, 302), down 
from around 60% the year before. Abkhazian wariness was further demonstrated 
in the trade agreements signed with Russia in 2012, with the Abkhazian version 
of the agreement markedly more restrictive regarding the free-trade regime 
compared to the South Ossetian version. This reflected Abkhazian economic 
insecurities but also a desire of the officials to preserve the customs revenues 
coming from Russian imports (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 681). 
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The calm before the storm 
The first half of 2013 was a strangely uneventful time for Russian foreign policy 
and the Russian-Abkhaz relations, with by far the most important event being the 
unveiling in February 2013 of the New Russian Foreign Policy Concept, which 
attacked 'shifting sovereignty principles' and stated that Russia will oppose any 
revision of universally recognised norms of international law, such as state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that their subjective interpretation is 
particularly dangerous to international peace, law and order (Deyermond 2016, 
964) – a pronouncement strangely at odds with Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. An opinion poll by Kommersant in 2013, showed that the 
sense of insecurity and the siege mentality was not only present among Russian 
decision-makers, but also shared by the wider population. The opinion poll 
showed a strong increase in the number of people who believed that Russia is 
faced with enemies – from only 13% in 1989 to 41% in 1994 and 65% in 1999 to 
an eventual 78% in 2013 (Hansen 2016, 359). 
2013 saw political instability in Ukraine and Abkhazia that would lead to regime 
changes the following year, to the War in Ukraine, the seizure of Crimea and a 
complete breakdown of Russia's relations with the West. Trouble in Abkhazia 
started in early 2013 when Ankvab’s government stated it would double electricity 
rates. This decision sparked protests, which eventually forced the government to 
compromise” (Hale 2014, 352). The opposition raising concerns about the 
process of passportisation of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia, and the threat of 
losing sovereignty and territorial integrity. In late 2013 the Parliament adopted a 
resolution to carry out a sweeping probe into passport offices of the interior 
ministry regarding the distribution of passports to Georgians in Abkhazia and 
called for the annulment of illegally issued passports (Hale 2014, 352). 
September 2013 also saw Armenia’s political u-turn, when it decided not to 
proceed with a recently-finalised association and free trade agreement with the 
EU, opting instead to join a customs union led by Russia. Similar to how 
successfully applying pressure on Adjara made Saakashvili believe he could do 
the same with South Ossetia, the fact that Russian pressure on Armenia changed 
its decision probably influenced Putin’s decision to apply pressure on Ukraine to 
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give up its EU course in the following year, a decision that would ultimately lead 
to war. 
Georgia saw further internal developments: Giorgi Margvelashvili of the Georgian 
Dream won the presidential elections (Saakashvili was constitutionally barred 
from running for a third consecutive term and left Georgia after the end of his 
office), and Bidzina Ivanisvhili stepped down as prime minister and was replaced 
by his hand-picked successor, Irakli Garibashvili. However, these changes kept 
Georgia on its charted political course, with the Parliament approving the bilateral 
agreement on the non-use of force in Abkhazia and Ossetia (Interview with Paata 
Zakareishvili). Russia maintained a heavy military presence in Abkhazia in 2013, 
with about 3500 military and 1500 border guard troops (ICG 2013, 3), while 
construction was going on new military facilities (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 302). 
Despite the large Russian footprint in Abkhazia, Pacher’s (2017, 4) analysis of 
diplomatic notes sent by Abkhazia, shows that only a fourth of the diplomatic 
resources of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are dedicated to the management of 
the relationship with Russia, with the rest aimed towards other de facto states, 
Pacific islands and Latin American countries that have recognised them, even in 
some cases towards recognised countries that have not recognised them (ibid.). 
This points to the fact that the multi-vector foreign policy or at the willingness to 
pursue it, existed in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but fundamental 
differences were also observed in October 2013, when South Ossetia, an 
essentially irredentist entity, and the Russian Republic of North Ossetia-Alania 
signed agreements bringing the former close to the integration with the latter. In 
contrast with South Ossetia, Abkhazia had no desire to become part of Russia 
as the Abkhazian national project is based on the idea of an independent state 
for the Abkhaz people (Egorova & Babin 2015, 90–91). 
In early 2014, several opposition figures, including Raul Khajimba, Sergei 
Shamba, and Beslan Butba demanded the resignation of the Ankvab 
government, criticizing it for the high levels of unemployment (up to 70 percent 
according to some reports) and accusing it of misspending Russian aid on pet 
projects like the new stadium in Sukhum/i (Hale 2014, 353). A wave of protests 
shook Sukhum/i in May (Kopeček et al. 2016, 94), with Vladislav Surkov, 
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President Putin’s personal adviser on relationships with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia flying to Sukhum/i to conduct talks with the conflicting sides (Fischer 
2016, 56). Abkhazian Parliament voted for the resignation of President Ankvab 
and after Russian mediation in early June 2014 Ankvab agreed to step down, 
making way for early presidential elections (Hale 2014, 353). Clamadieu (2018) 
attributes Ankvab's resignation to a controversy over Abkhazian identity: “Identity 
is a subject of major controversy at the political level. For instance, in 2014, the 
Abkhazian President, Alexander Ankvab, had to resign because he was 
considered “not Abkhaz enough” by his political opponents due to his liberal 
policy towards Georgian inhabitants of Abkhazia” (Clamadieu 2018). Raul 
Khadjimba was finally elected president in August 2014, in the first round with 
50.57 % of the votes. However, the election was not fair and free for the first time 
since 2004. Most Georgians living in the Gal/i district were not able to vote, while 
polling stations in Russia and Turkey enabled the vote of the members of 
Abkhazian Diaspora (Kopeček et al. 2016, 94). As Dembinska (2019, 10) argues, 
“Khadjimba wanted to deny a voice to a large section of the community that was 
unlikely to vote for him.” The summer of 2014 didn't just bring political change in 
Abkhazia with the election of a more pro-Russian politician, but also – and often 
overseen and underreported – an unprecedented civil society mobilisation and 
cross-party opposition to the contract that would allow Rosneft to prospect for 
and drill oil (to the alleged detriment of environment) in Abkhazia (Khalilova et al. 
2016, 3022). This points to the fact that with a change in power, the Abkhaz civil 
society had the ability to organize and defend what it considered to be a matter 
of vital national interest, which it saw could be threatened by a pro-Russian 
President. It could also be read as a signal to Russia that despite the regime 
change, it would not allow Abkhazia to capitulate to Russian interests. 
The second half of 2014 in Russian-Abkhaz relations was marked by greater 
willingness of the newly elected Abkhazian President to seek closer ties with 
Russia. The latter did not consider political change in Abkhazia necessary, but 
did find it useful as Khadjimba was an ally and weaker than Ankvab. Soon after 
his election, he expressed his willingness to conclude a new treaty (Fischer 2016, 
56). He moved quickly to sign two wide-ranging agreements – the 'Agreement on 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support', and the 'Agreement on Strategic 
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Partnership and Alliance' in September and November, respectively. Although 
Russia and Abkhazia signed over 70 agreements, the two signed after Khajimba 
became president, established a new baseline for Russian-Abkhaz relations 
(Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 680). The content of the agreements tells the story of 
Abkhazia’s growing dependence on Russia, but the process of their negotiation 
shows a story of Abkhazia’s successful resistance to what it deemed 
unacceptable provisions. Therefore, I first analyse the process and then turn to 
the assessment of the content and how it impacts the margin of Abkhazia’s 
independence. 
The initiative to conclude a treaty came from Russian and Abkhaz actors, who 
suggested that Abkhazia could become ‘associated’ with Russia, a move that 
could be interpreted as a “symmetrical response” to the EU-Georgian Association 
Agreement (Fischer 2016, 54), showing the desire of both parties to find 
ontological security in vertical relationships that mimic the ones between the EU 
and the ENP countries. In mid-October 2014, Russia handed the draft of the 
Treaty on Alliance and Integration between Russia and Abkhazia to Abkhazian 
authorities. Several proposed provisions concerning the creation of a joint social, 
economic, security, defence and foreign policy areas, went against the Abkhaz 
claim for sovereignty (Fischer 2016, 56). As Ambrosio & Lange (2016, 684) have 
noted, even the title phrase “Alliance and Integration”, implied future incorporation 
of Abkhazia into Russia, which was deemed unacceptable. This draft was then 
leaked to the Abkhaz press, causing a scandal among Abkhazian policy-makers 
and the civil society. Zedgenidze (2014) has speculated that most probably the 
Abkhazian authorities themselves released the early draft agreement to provoke 
a public outcry, which would give them leverage for seeking a revision. The 
reaction of the Abkhaz government was to present its own draft of the Treaty on 
Alliance and Strategic Partnership that differed markedly from the earlier Russian 
draft (Fischer 2016, 56). Most importantly, the word 'integration' was dropped in 
the next drafts (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 684) and the treaty signed on 24 
November 2014 stipulated “close coordination” between Russian and Abkhaz 
military, border and police structures (Remler et al. 2016, 16). 
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It is not possible to cover here in detail all the subject areas of the treaties, so I 
focus instead on the question how these treaties impact Abkhazia's margin of 
(in)dependence.163 Gerrits & Bader’s (2016, 302) point out that these treaties 
anticipate more integration, providing the basis for a “coordinated foreign policy” 
and a “single space of defence and security” between Russia and the de facto 
states. They also include clauses regarding the simplification of procedures 
leading to Russian citizenship for citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
promise an increase of average salaries towards the level of the Southern 
Federal District of Russia (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 302). Kereselidze (2015, 315) 
called the treaties part of Russia’s ‘embracement policy,’ while Egorova & Babin 
(2015, 94–95) have shown that it is not a mutual embrace since there are 
significant fears on the Abkhaz side that Russia intends to monopolize every 
sector and an anxiety of getting ‘swallowed’ by Russia. Fischer (2016, 18) argues 
that “With the economic and military agreements concluded since 2014 the 
threshold to de facto annexation has now been reached”, but also notes that 
Russia “has failed to enforce its interests in Abkhazia time and again, finding itself 
“forced to operate more cautiously in Abkhazia, for instance during the political 
crisis in May/June 2014 and the debate over the agreement on alliance and 
strategic partnership.” Berg & Vits (2018, 8) go the furthest by claiming that “with 
the signing of the treaty with ABH on alliance and strategic partnership (in late 
2014) and the treaty on alliance and integration with SO (at the beginning of 
2015), Russia effectively turned these entities into its geopolitical pawns.” It is not 
surprising to see a re-emergence of discourses that diminish the agency of 
Abkhazia (but also other post-Soviet de facto states) in the aftermath of the 
annexation of Crimea.164 Ambrosio & Lange (2016, 674) in their careful analysis 
of the two Russian-Abkhaz agreements, have stated that such a “perspective 
understates their separate state- and nation-building processes, their capacity for 
independent agency, and their ability to garner concessions from Russia during 
                                            
163 For a closer analysis of the treaties themselves, on which I draw, see Ambrosio & Lange 
(2016), Comai (2018) and Gerrits & Bader (2016). 
164 These discursive practices have dominated the scholarly discourse on Eurasian de facto states 
since they first appeared in 1990s and have diminished throughout the years, although some 
scholars, such as Florea (2014) still referred to governments of all unrecognised states as to 
‘rebels’ or ‘separatist rebels’, making practically no distinction between the Polisario Front in 
Western Sahara and the Government of Taiwan. However, many scholars disagreed with 
reducing Abkhazia to a geopolitical pawn or a puppet state. 
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bilateral negotiations.” Perhaps Abkhazia’s willingness and capacity to keep 
Russia at an arm’s length is again best understood in comparison with South 
Ossetia; Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia and goes to greater lengths to 
protect its separate identity and institutions than South Ossetia. Abkhazia asked 
for and received greater autonomy than South Ossetia, which is particularly 
evident in the 2014 and 2015 agreements (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 682–3). De 
Waal (2014) agrees with this assessment, noting that commentators have mostly 
ignored to what extent the Abkhaz side was able to change or even completely 
remove parts of the draft treaty. They changed 'integration' to 'strategic 
partnership', foreign policy was no longer 'coordinated' but rather 'agreed'. 
Russians were not given the possibility to acquire Abkhaz citizenship as the first 
draft stipulated and the Abkhaz kept their own military structures. 
My assessment of the treaties' impact on the margin of Abkhazia's dependence 
on Russia is that they have further increased it, but it still does not amount to 'de 
facto annexation' or Abkhazia becoming a 'puppet state'.165 A series of 
disagreements between Abkhazia and Russia continue to exist, with Abkhazian 
leadership and civil society showing both willingness and capacity to push back 
when challenged on issues like property ownership by Russians in Abkhazia, oil 
reserves exploitation off the coast of Abkhazia, the status of the Abkhaz Orthodox 
Church (regarded by the Russian Orthodox Church as part of Georgian Orthodox 
Church), and the exact demarcation of the Russian-Abkhaz border (Fischer 2016, 
54). Abkhazian foreign policy in the period 2012-2014 has definitely been less 
multi-vector, but 2014 did see a push towards establishing international 
connections especially in the cultural sphere, notably when Abkhazia participated 
in the Confederation of Independent Football Associations (CONIFA) World Cup 
held June 2014 in Sweden and hosted the next tournament in 2016 in Sukhum/i 
(Smith 2018, 186). Furthermore, between 2014 and 2016, “Abkhazia accelerated 
its foreign affairs strategy and began a socio-cultural outreach program aimed at 
seeking external legitimacy in the international system” (Smith 2018, 185), which 
                                            
165 See Pegg (2002); Caspersen (2008); and Berg and Kamilova (2012) for discussions on the 
dependence of de facto states and criteria for distinguishing them from puppet states. What is 
common to all three accounts is that they do not reject patron state involvement or downplay de 
facto state’s dependence on it but neither do they overplay it. 
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suggests that Abkhazia has not retreated from addressing the international 
audience to focusing solely on the bilateral relationship with Russia. Rather than 
changing interlocutors it has effectively reduced its ambitions and is no longer 
actively trying to obtain new recognitions but focuses on developing economic 
and cultural ties that can pass under the radar, while still providing the necessary 
routinized ways of interaction to fulfil Abkhazia's ontological security needs. 
However, and this has been largely overlooked, the agreements might present 
problems for the maintenance of distinct Abkhaz identity. Most citizens of 
Abkhazia are also Russian citizens and the agreements contain the provision that 
the schools in South Ossetia and Abkhazia should “encourage the study of the 
Russian language” (Ambrosio & Lange 2016, 680). Honour and ontological 
security depend on well-defined communities with clear-cut identities and 
blending identities might defuse these cultural self-defence mechanisms for 
maintaining independence, weakening the resolve of the Abkhaz leadership and 
civil society to resist Russian pressure and influence. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analyzed Russian-Abkhaz relations in the context of wider 
geopolitical considerations (including Russia's relations with the West, Georgia 
and the situation in the North Caucasus). I have paid special attention to 
ontological (in)security, including how Russia’s conceptions of status and honour 
have shaped Russia’s foreign policy in general and Russia’s relations with 
Abkhazia between 1991 and 2014 in particular. Drawing on Tsygankov's honour-
centered analysis of Russian foreign policy, Morozov’s referencing of ontological 
security and his analytical push beyond great-power politics, I have followed 
Russia’s enduring interests and fluctuating political relations through process-
tracing. 
I began by tracing the deep roots of Russia's sense of ontological security to its 
historically bivalent relationship with the West characterized by push-pull 
dynamics of seeking ontological security through both othering and maintaining 
relationship routines. I partially identified historical grounds for understanding of 
Russian foreign policy in Chapter 2, paying particular attention to the ‘geopolitical 
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catastrophe of 1990s’. This is a historically 'thick' period, with complex domestic 
and international dimensions that form the habitus of foreign policy thinking of 
Russian foreign policy practitioners today. Of particular interest for my project in 
this time period are Russia's relations with the West, but also with Georgia and 
its domestic situation in the North Caucasus. Importantly, Russia was largely 
supportive of Georgia through 1990s and Abkhazia remained effectively without 
a patron state, and under a Russian embargo until the 2000s. I then charted the 
course of Russian-Abkhaz relations through Russia's fluctuating relations with 
Georgia and the West during Putin's first two presidential mandates, focusing on 
the role of honour in Russia's shift from a country hoping to regain its great power 
status through cooperation with the West to a revisionist one bent on asserting 
its power when it considered its interests violated. Russian-Abkhaz relationship 
– often seen as either static (full dependence) or linear (ever-growing 
dependence) – has also fluctuated with time, not only as a result of Russia's 
relations with other actors, but also due to local dynamics, including the 
willingness and capacity of Abkhazian political elites and civil society to push back 
when they saw Abkhazia's core interests being threatened. Russia has definitely 
consolidated its hegemony over Abkhazia, but it does not amount to domination 
of its domestic politics or preclude its foreign policy. However, the ever-closer ties 
and continuing international isolation of Abkhazia has a potential of defusing 
Abkhazia's ontological security through the blending of identities. Rather than 
territorial and political incorporation into the Russian Federation as in the case of 
Crimea, the threat is cultural absorption into the 'Russkiy mir', the quasi-imperial 
cultural space of the Russian world. Arguably, Abkhazia's best bet to maintain its 
ontological security and preserve its identity is through balancing Russian 
influence by interacting with other international actors. As part of that, I look 
specifically at Abkhazia's relations with the EU and the US in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: EU and US 
engagement  
with Abkhazia 
Estragon: “Nothing to be done.” 
Vladimir: “I'm beginning to come round to that opinion.” 
– Samuel Beckett: Waiting for Godot (1952) 
 
Introduction 
After having analysed Abkhazia’s foreign policy in Chapter 4 and its relations with 
Russia in Chapter 5, I now turn to the analysis of Abkhazia’s relations with the 
EU and the US.166 As in the previous chapters, this chapter is focused on and 
structured by my research question regarding the relationship between 
interpretations of non-recognition and foreign policy behaviour (Chapter 1). In 
operationalization of my concepts (Chapter 3), I have tied ontological security to 
status (recognition, partial recognition or non-recognition) on the one hand, and 
interaction (from isolation to extensive and intensive engagement) on the other. 
States try to maintain a consistent foreign policy in which actions correspond to 
words. Defining an entity as a de facto state or as an occupied territory therefore 
has important implications for the foreign policy behaviour of both the de facto 
state and the actors that interact with it.   
To follow the aim above, I look at how the interpretation of status affected EU and 
US policymakers’ engagement with Abkhazia. I do this through three 
comparisons. First, as the EU is not a unitary actor to the extent that the US is, I 
compare how different EU institutions and members states have interpreted 
                                            
166 As the title of the chapter suggests, I primarily examine the EU and the US side of the 
interaction – their engagement with Abkhazia. This is not to deny or diminish Abkhazia’s agency 
and the ability and willingness to play a pro-active role in these engagements (as it does and 
which I show in the section on Abkhaz lobbying in the US). The reader looking for a more-in-depth 
analysis of the Abkhaz side of its external relations, should refer to Chapter 4, where Abkhazia’s 
foreign policy is discussed in more detail.  
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Abkhazia’s status and how this has impacted EU’s engagement strategy. 
Second, I look at the engagement throughout time, comparing the 1999–2008 
and 2009–2014 periods and by doing that compare EU and US strategies of 
engagement with Abkhazia. Building on these comparisons, a comparison 
between engagement of Abkhazia by the EU and the US, by Georgia, and by 
Russia will be made in the next and last chapter, Chapter 7. As in the previous 
chapters, my point of departure is that engagement with Abkhazia is shaped by 
external (geopolitical considerations) and internal factors (ontological security 
and domestic politics). I argue that the US engagement with Abkhazia was 
shaped more by the first, specifically by interests tied to energy and security in 
the Caucasus. In contrast, the EU engagement with Abkhazia was shaped more 
by the latter, specifically by interests tied to conflict resolution and norms 
promotion as part of its agenda of stabilizing and democratizing its Eastern 
Neighbourhood.  
I have so far applied the perspective of ontological security to both the analysis 
of Abkhazian and Russian foreign policies. In both cases the use of the 
perspective was justified on cultural grounds as the national identity of both relies 
on (premodern) conceptions of honour (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), that 
pushes them to seek recognition as a nation and a state by Abkhazia and as a 
great power by Russia. I do not explicitly employ this perspective in analysing the 
foreign policy of the EU and the US for two reasons. The first one is that I chose 
to focus on interests, inter-institutional dynamics between actors, and 
engagement strategies as a more important explanatory factor instead. The 
second reason is that the EU’s self-perception as a great power, a successful 
mediator and a normative actor, while at stake in its engagement of Abkhazia, in 
no way reaches existential dimensions. This is even more true in the case of the 
US. Geography plays an important role here. For Russia, Abkhazia is a former 
imperial subject with a shared history, a neighbour and an ally, with a Russian 
ethnic minority and a majority of Russian citizens. For the EU, Abkhazia has only 
recently become part of its neighbourhood, Abkhazia nor Georgia border any EU 
member state, there are few historical commonalities and links between their 
populations. Finally, the US is the farthest from Abkhazia than EU and Russia in 
geographical as well as historical, cultural, political, and symbolic sense. 
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Consequently, its stake in the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is 
smaller than that of either Russia or the EU. 
In the first part of the chapter, I start by looking at EU and US foreign policy in the 
Caucasus by identifying their overarching interests. I then consider the different 
actors involved and the formats and levels at which engagement happens. In the 
second part of the chapter, I analyse EU and US engagement with Abkhazia 
through process-tracing, comparing the 1999–2008 period with the 2009–2014 
period. I do so to answer the question to what extent were the recognition of 
Kosovo, the August War between Russia and Georgia, and the Russian 
recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia that represent the separation between these 
two periods, also watershed events in EU and US engagement of Abkhazia. 
EU's foreign policy towards Abkhazia 
The EU has no declared foreign policy towards Abkhazia.167 It recognises and 
supports the territorial integrity of Georgia with Abkhazia as its constituent part, 
yet it engages with Abkhazia based on 'engagement without recognition', which 
is more than a concept and less than a policy. For Georgia and much of the 
international community, including the EU and the US, Abkhazia seems like a 
phantom limb, which does not exist but continues to produce pain or at least 
occasional soreness. Instead of further dwelling on definitions of foreign policy 
and interpreting whether EU has one towards Abkhazia and vice versa, I propose 
to start my constructivist analysis – perhaps paradoxically and hence appropriate 
to the subject – by looking at interests. I then go beyond the Realist paradigm by 
peeking into the Realist black box to identify the multiplicity behind the actor we 
call 'the EU', and the plurality of perceptions and policies before bringing it all 
back and identifying 'unity in diversity' in a dialectical synthesis and a discussion 
on strategies. 
                                            
167 This may seem in direct opposition to the sub-title of this chapter, but it is not. In EU's case the 
inexistence of a policy is a policy of inexistence, the non-recognition of a policy towards Abkhazia 
turns out to be the policy of non-recognition. EU's policy towards Abkhazia is conspicuous in its 
absence. 
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Interests: conflict resolution and normative influence 
I argue that EU's interests in Abkhazia are shaped by EU's wider interests in 
peace, stability, democracy and human rights promotion in the Caucasus as part 
of its Eastern neighbourhood. Oskanian (2013, 142) notes that the South 
Caucasus is important to the EU because of “strategic material interests” and “as 
a source of and transit corridor for Caspian hydrocarbons”, especially to reduce 
its energy dependence on Russia (Baran, 2007). As the South Caucasus is a 
potential area of enlargement, the EU also has an interest in furthering the 
stability of the region by diffusing ‘European’ values” (Oskanian 2013, 143). 
Interests shape the roles states play and the EU primarily wears the hats of 
mediator assisting conflict resolution and of the role model exerting normative 
influence. However, despite relatively strong interests in the region, Georgia (as 
the rest of the South Caucasus and Central Asia) had the weakest relations with 
the EU among all EU’s neighbours (Tocci 2007, 141). Although the EU attention 
and aid to the Balkans (for instance) still dwarfs that accorded to Georgia, this 
has changed in recent years and especially after the 2008 War, which drew more 
attention and assistance to Georgia and – as part of that – to Abkhazia). The EU’s 
role in the South Caucasus and Georgia has also grown as the role of the US has 
declined. 
The Geneva International Discussions 
EU's role as a mediator in the South Caucasus is most prominent in the Geneva 
International Discussions (GID),168 of which it is a co-chair alongside the OSCE 
and the UN.169 At the same time, the GID serves as the main platform for 
interaction between the EU officials and the Abkhaz.  
In 1994, the ‘Group of Friends for Georgia’ was created under the auspices of the 
UN Secretary General, including the US, Germany, the UK, Russia, and France. 
                                            
168 A distinction must be made between the 'Geneva process' and the GID (also referred to as 
'Geneva talks' or 'Geneva negotiations'). The former started in 1993 after the Georgian-Abkhaz 
war, while the latter began after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 (Tekushev et al. 2013, 42). 
169 In comparison, it plays a relatively small role in conflict resolution between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is conducted by the OSCE Mins Group that includes 
France, Russia and the United States as the co-chairs. 
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In 1997, the UN appointed a Special Representative to the Secretary General 
with a mandate to coordinate conflict resolution efforts under the Geneva process 
while the UNOMIG started its operation. The Geneva process was managed by 
the Coordination Council with three working groups on: non-violence, the return 
of the IDPs, and on economic issues (Tekushev et al. 2013, 42). With the 
establishment of GID, the EU took over greater responsibility as a “conflict 
manager” and “security actor” in the South Caucasus (Freire & Simão 2013, 470). 
According to Fean (2009, 6), the EU previously avoided playing a role in the 
negotiations. It supported the peace process by providing funds but – “in order 
not to duplicate the activities” of the OSCE and the UN – “refused to engage in 
the process itself.” The first round of GID took place on 14 October 2008 (Freire 
& Simão 2013, 470) and immediately the dispute of who was to be present at the 
negotiations appeared. Georgia considered the dispute to be between Russia 
and itself, while Russia demanded the inclusion of delegations from Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia – states that it now recognised as independent – and that also 
wanted to participate. The Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhazian delegations 
threatened to walk out of the negotiations and the meeting was rescheduled to 
November (Hille 2010, 201–2). In the second round, the mediators and the 
conflict parties managed to reach a compromise. At Russian insistence, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia were also included in the format (Mikhelidze 2010, 10) but on 
Georgia’s insistence only in their personal capacity and not as official state 
representatives or representatives of the local population in Abkhazia (Coppieters 
2018, 8–9). Because of the difference in status and because groups met 
informally in working groups (Hille 2010, 202), the positions of Russia and 
Georgia appeared stronger than the positions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
the negotiations became asymmetrical (Companjen 2010, 203).  
During the subsequent round in December no progress occurred (Hille 2010, 202) 
but in the February 2009 session, both sides came to an agreement to establish 
an “incident prevention and response mechanism” aimed at defusing tensions 
(Nichol 2009, 11). The latter rounds of GID, however, again achieved very limited 
progress. One positive example was cooperation on the historic archives that 
included a productive discussion on cultural heritage protection in the 32nd and 
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33rd round (Interview with Carlo Natale170). Despite the highly politicized 
discussions, which often stalled, the informal occasions for interaction seemed to 
have contributed to trust-building, especially the separate informal meetings over 
lunch between Georgians, Abkhazians and South Ossetians in which the 
participants speak in Russian and that “have created a good – even cordial – 
atmosphere among the participants that have met many times now” (Interview 
with Carlo Natale). 
Despite EU’s increased role in the conflict resolution process, the GID have not 
achieved the desired outcome. According to Mikhelidze (2009, 40–41), the new 
format came too late to meaningfully change the outcome of the conflict and the 
integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Russia – although unlikely to 
happen in the short term – is more plausible in the long run. Grono (2010, 28) 
adds that participants and co-chairs in the GID – including the EU – “seem to 
operate in the power-based, not the interest-based paradigm”, leaving the EU 
with little leverage to conduct effective mediation. Bouris and Schumacher (2017, 
162) note that GID have made little progress but all sides accept them as an 
important formal channel for the exchange of views (Bouris & Schumacher 2017, 
162). GID has become an end in-itself; a welcome communication platform but 
not much more than that (Smolnik 2012, 3). 
Some have put the blame for lack of progress in GID on Abkhazia. Malyarenko & 
Wolff (2012, 188) note that one year after the start of GID, Sergei Bagapsh stated 
that “the independence of Abkhazia not only is assured, but that we will thrive 
politically and economically ... [and that] it is only a matter of time before we are 
recognised by most countries of the world” (ibid.). This points to the fact that at 
that time the self-confidence (if not arrogance) of Abkhazian foreign policy makers 
was high as they were not really interested in GID and the compromises the 
negotiations would require. Others have chastised the EU for the lack of robust 
policy positions that would enable it to play a greater role and for allowing “its 
                                            
170 Carlo Natale was the Deputy Head of EU Delegation to Georgia when this interview was 
carried out. 
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internal divisions to undermine the leverage it could bring as mediator” (Grono 
2010, 7).  
EU as a normative actor 
The other interest the EU has in the region, including its engagement with 
Abkhazia, is that of normative influence; promoting positive political, social and 
economic transformations. While the EU has, despite the lack of progress in 
negotiations, succeeded in playing a more prominent conflict resolution role in 
the region generally and in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict specifically, it has not 
been as successful in playing the role of a credible normative actor. 
There seems to be a disconnect between the self-perception of the EU as a 
normative actor, acting normatively (employing the language of peace, 
democracy, and human rights), and having a normative impact to the extent that 
there is doubt whether the democratic peace doctrine extends beyond the 
borders of the EU (Pace 2007, 1059). As Smolnik (2012, 5) argues, the EU policy 
towards the conflicts “has been more declarative than substantial, more reactive 
than proactive,” with ‘engagement without recognition’ policy being a case in 
point. The strategy has been strong on the latter but less on the former and 
according to some (Kvarchelia, 2011, 33) it is tied exclusively to conflict 
resolution, increasing distrust of the EU among Abkhazians. However, for all the 
shortcomings of the EU’s approach, the bias against secession is understandable 
and not unique to the EU. In fact, the OSCE – also a co-chair in the GID – has 
also been accused of the same (Tocci 2006, 72). 
While it was an achievement for the EU to take up responsibility and act as the 
mediator, it has largely failed to be perceived as a neutral mediator, especially by 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has affected its normative impact, given the 
lack of information about the EU available to the populations of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (Stewart in Whitman 2011, 77). Assessments of EU’s image in the 
region vary. Smolnik (2012, 5) claims that despite the local actors mostly viewing 
the EU as less biased than the US or Russia, the EU failed to capitalise on this 
positive image. Dobrescu and Schumacher (2018, 9) on the contrary, state that 
negative perceptions of the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are also due to 
 
209 
 
implicit comparisons with Russia, whose leadership enjoys greater trust among 
the citizens of Abkhazia than that of their own leaders. According to Vasilyan 
(2014, 397), the EU is not very inclusive and consequently lacks legitimacy in the 
de facto states. Garb (2009, 240) reports that not all EU and US officials are 
viewed negatively in Abkhazia, and Schiffers (2015, 31) adds that there may be 
more appreciation of the EU among the civil society activists, who have more 
contact with and have benefitted from the EU. 
Low level of involvement compared to some other regions – the EU spends much 
more on assistance to the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle 
East than on Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tocci 2007, 175) – and a focus on 
narrow agendas by the de facto states caused the EU to play a relatively small 
role. This was further exacerbated by unclear perceptions regarding its own 
interests regarding “security, power and material gain” in the region (Whitman & 
Wolff 2010, 100). An additional problem is that the Abkhaz and the Ossetians 
reject EU’s role as a mediator due to their balance-of-power view in which the EU 
and the US are perceived as being on Georgia's side (Tocci 2007, 145). Another 
reason for EU’s weak engagement related to the balance-of-power view of 
Abkhazia, is competition from Russia, causing ‘Europeanisation’ to lose traction 
as a way of positively influencing conflict dynamics (Melvin & Prelz Oltramonti 
2015, 2). 
As described above, the EU's conflict resolution and normative engagement with 
Abkhazia encounters many challenges and its interests in the conflict may be 
lower than in some other regions. Despite that, EU’s interests remain significant 
and broad. Although I am focusing on EU's roles of the mediator and the 
normative actor, it must be acknowledged that the EU is also an economic 
(interested in economic cooperation with its neighbours), and geopolitical 
(countering the influences of Russia, China, and others in the region, and 
ensuring access to resources) player.  
The EU’s interests in conflict resolution and normative influence in the Caucasus 
influence its perception of Abkhazia, while at the same way influencing 
Abkhazia’s perception of the EU. The EU’s involvement as a co-chair in GID 
enabled more interaction, but at the same time it remained limited to the format 
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of the GID and the goal of conflict resolution, which in its final instance for Georgia 
and EU, cannot mean anything else but Georgia’s restoration of territorial integrity 
and Abkhazia’s reincorporation into Georgia. Abkhazia’s behaviour in the early 
rounds of GID seems to be disingenuous as they expected that further 
recognitions will keep coming, resulting in Abkhazia being widely recognised 
internationally and making the conflict-resolution moot. It is likely that the EU’s 
bias against secession and support for Georgia’s territorial integrity made their 
participation even more apathetic. While this account gives an insight into how 
the interpretation of status affected EU’s engagement with Abkhazia, it needs to 
be explored further in terms of segregating our analysis by different EU 
institutions, strategies, and finally chronologically. 
Actors: Institutions and member states’ perceptions of 
status  
Complicating the already paradoxical foreign policy situation of the EU described 
above, is the fact that the EU is a sui generis actor – something between an 
international organisation and a confederation of states. As a result, its 
interactions with the de facto states are complex and multi-faceted.  
Member states: unity in non-recognition, diversity in 
engagement? 
The motto of the EU is "In varietate concordia" or "Unity in diversity" and each of 
its 28 (at the time of writing in November 2019) member states has its own views 
on recognition of states and engagement of non-recognised states. For instance, 
Germany is very reluctant to issue visas to Abkhazians whose Russian passport 
was issued in Sukhum/i, while Italy and the UK are less strict in this respect. What 
explains this variance among the EU member states?  
Several factors influence EU member states' attitudes towards de facto states. 
Size and influence are important factors in whether engagement with Abkhazia 
even appears on a member state's radar and agenda. Only some members 
possess an in-depth understanding of all the levels of conflict dynamics, with most 
focusing on the relations between Georgia and Russia and few have a firm grasp 
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of ‘local’ dimensions, including the Georgian-Abkhaz one (Grono 2010, 16–17). 
Larger states with more resources and a better staffed MFA are more likely to be 
familiar with the situation and to have a standpoint. Bigger and more influential 
states like France and Germany find it more difficult to shirk responsibility than 
Slovakia and Greece. These are also more often countries that the Abkhaz want 
to travel to or establish contacts with, forcing them to take a position. However, 
size is not everything and smaller countries with NGOs active in de facto states 
can take an interest in Abkhazia. Among countries that have funded civil society 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation projects in Abkhazia, mentioned by 
Grono (2010, 16–17), are the relatively small Denmark and the relatively 
influential UK and Germany alike. 
Geographical location is another important factor. While the situation in the South 
Caucasus isn't much of a priority for Portugal and Ireland, Bulgaria and Romania 
– both with coasts on the Black Sea – are much more interested in the stability 
and security of the wider Black Sea region. As Fischer (2009, 338) notes, since 
their accession into the EU in 2007, the Union’s interests in the region “have 
become more explicit.”  
Relations with Russia also importantly affect member states' positions on the 
issue. Sharp critics of Russia, like the Baltic states, Poland, Sweden (Bouris & 
Schumacher 2017, 162) to a degree and in some cases the Czech Republic and 
Finland (Grono 2010, 16) tend to view Abkhazia more as a Russian puppet and 
find it less acceptable to engage with it. According to Mikhelidze (2009, 38), one 
group of member states – which includes the Baltic states, the UK, and the 
eastern members – advocates for “soft containment”, with another group – that 
includes France and Germany – calls for engagement.  
Finally, the presence of separatism within the territory of a member state is 
another factor that may influence engagement. Spain and Romania, for example, 
both have large ethnic minorities and have refused to recognise Kosovo, clearly 
favouring the status quo and the principle of territorial integrity.171 The separatist 
                                            
171 In relation to this, Coppieters (2018, 1–2) makes an important distinction between the policies 
of ‘engagement without recognition’ and 'non-recognition and engagement’. The first refers to a 
policy where the EU is united on engagement but divided on recognition, while the second refers 
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problems in some EU members and the crisis in Catalonia in 2017 made it difficult 
for the EU to advocate for stronger regional autonomy or even for members to 
accept any regional autonomy at all (Lambert 2008, 117).  
EU institutions: one voice, many tones? 
In addition to the divisions among member states, each EU institution has a 
slightly different view of and approach to engagement with Abkhazia. While they 
all subscribe to one policy and proclaim support for Georgia's territorial integrity 
with one voice, it is possible to distinguish between different tones in their 
pronouncements and different nuances in their narratives. Looking at the intra-
EU divisions in relation to contested statehood and how they affect EU 
consistency (Papadimitriou & Petrov 2012) is important for understanding EU 
foreign policy behaviour, including its engagement with Abkhazia. 
Coppitiers (2018, 2) addresses the use of concepts, including ‘statehood’, ‘de 
facto authorities’, and ‘occupation’ by different EU institutions, finding that the EC, 
the EP, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU, formerly European Court of Justice) and 
the European Court of Auditors each take a different approach and use their own 
terminology. In the next passage, I look at some of the main EU institutions and 
discuss their views on and engagement with Abkhazia. 
European Parliament, Council of the EU, and the European Commission 
There are differences that cut across the big trio of EU institutions. The European 
Parliament (EP) itself is internally divided in MEPs who sit in political groups 
representing different political ideologies and not their countries of origin 
(although in practice they often also do that). The Council of the European Union 
(not to be confused with the European Council and the Council of Europe) 
functions as the second house of EU’s bicameral system. Involved in drafting and 
passing legislation in a complicated process with the EP, it is itself composed of 
national governments of EU member states and divided according to their 
                                            
to a policy where the EU is united on the fact that “the legal status should be withheld” but where 
engagement is possible. 
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interests. The European Commission (EC) is the most unitary actor of the three, 
but its foreign policy has been institutionally fragmented with the establishment 
of the separate European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010.  
The EP’s impact is relatively small, although groups of MEPs have focused more 
on certain aspects of conflict resolution and the EU’s role in mediating them 
(Akçakoca et al. 2009, 34). A 'goodwill visit' to Sukhum/i in 2003 was even 
conducted by invitation from the Georgian government, although logistics in 
Abkhazia were arranged by the UN, which acted as a broker. According to one 
EP official, the conversations with de facto authorities in Sukhum/i were “were 
very open and very constructive. They wanted to discuss cooperation with the EU 
and asked for more EU presence” (Interview with Paolo Bergamaschi172). 
Abkhazians even came to the EP on the invitation of some MEPs who have a 
right to invite anyone they wish. These meetings were, however, informal 
(Interview with Paolo Bergamaschi). According to Bouris and Fernandez-Molina 
(2018, 11), the EP’s role has always been ‘interesting’ within the EU institutional 
framework in relation to de facto states due to its “open nature” and more flexible 
rules that enable formal and informal events to be organized with de facto states 
authorities invited alongside EU officials. This “parliamentary diplomacy” enables 
and normalizes engagement with de facto states while at the same time avoiding 
crossing red lines regarding recognition. Because of that, the EP has been the 
institution of choice for Palestinians and Sahrawis looking to approach the EU. 
When it comes to expressing commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity, the 
Council and the Commission use weaker language, avoiding condemning 
“Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” (Coppieters 2018, 12). In 
conflict resolution, the Council’s role has traditionally been more political (actively 
mediating or facilitating negotiations between conflict parties, for instance) but it 
has also been less clear in defining what its mandate is in this respect and what 
concrete aims it wants to pursue (Akçakoca et al. 2009, 34). The previously 
mentioned divisions among member states are reflected in the Council, meaning 
that the institution often has difficulties in finding a common language. This is 
mostly done by looking for the lowest common denominator and avoiding 
                                            
172 Paolo Bergamaschi was the Political Adviser on South Caucasus for the Greens in the 
European Parliament when this interview was carried out. 
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wordings that member states oppose, including the concept of 'occupation'. The 
Council avoids the concept of ‘occupation’ to maintain “the question of Georgia’s 
territorial integrity at the negotiating table” (Coppieters 2018, 15–16). Given that 
fact, it is not surprising that the Council does least engagement with Abkhazia 
among the big trio of EU institutions.  
The EC is most involved in engagement with Abkhazia and its efforts come 
closest to an actual, systematic policy. The foreign policy of the EC is mostly 
carried out by the Directorate-General for External Relations and previously by 
the EU Delegations on the ground (Akçakoca et al. 2009, 34) now part of the 
EEAS. For more than a decade, the EC has been one of the largest international 
donors in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, second only to Russia (Bouris & 
Schumacher 2017, 167) and has adopted a thoroughly practical approach in the 
conflict-affected areas through supporting predominantly humanitarian and 
developmental activities (Grono 2010, 18). Before it fell under the mandate of the 
EEAS, the Commission’s engagement was conducted by the EU Delegation to 
Georgia using the Instrument for Stability, which funds activities of NGOs 
implemented locally (Grono 2010, 18). In this context, it is worth mentioning 
Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM) a joint EU/UNDP 
program that in 2010-2015 provided support for 130 civil society initiatives in the 
fields of farming, healthcare, culture, youth work, journalism, research, and 
women’s rights amongst others (Schiffers 2015, 28). COBERM runs outside the 
ENP framework, giving it more flexibility and explicit focus on fostering “people-
to-people contacts”, “conflict transformation” and – less explicitly – on breaking 
“the isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” to prevent their integration into 
Russia (Freizer 2017, 167). In this way, the assistance of the EC has helped to 
shape “the domestic environment in a manner that could foster reform and conflict 
resolution” (Tocci 2007, 160). However, the EC prefers indirect engagement with 
several layers and actors between itself and Abkhazian de facto authorities. 
Another such indirect involvement is carried out by the Paris-based EU Institute 
for Security Studies (EUSS), which is associated with and provides 
recommendations to the EC. It has played an important role in not only providing 
analytical input to the EU institutions, but also organised roundtables focused on 
EU policy debate in Abkhazia from 2009 on (Grono 2010, 14). 
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EEAS, EUSR, EUMM 
Two main bodies within EEAS that deal with Abkhazia are the Georgia Desk 
Office and the EU Delegation to Georgia. The Georgia Desk Office at the EEAS, 
which nominally deals with Abkhazia as part of Georgia, does little outreach to 
Abkhazia and primarily sees itself supporting Georgia's territorial integrity through 
mediation that will eventually bring the breakaway regions back into Georgia 
(Interview with Chris Kendall173). However, Bouris & Fernandez-Molina (2018, 
15) report that in the case of Sahrawis and Palestinians, meetings mostly happen 
upon request by the representatives of contested states at the EEAS 
headquarters, usually and at head of division or desk officer levels. It seems that 
no concerns about recognition prevent the EEAS officials from regularly receiving 
de facto authorities. Another obstacle to engagement on the part of the EEAS, 
mentioned by Shapovalova (2016, 12) is that according to an EEAS policy-maker, 
people working in NGOs have been involved in conflict resolution for decades in 
contrast with people working for the international organisations, who are “in and 
out.” The EU Delegation in Tbilisi adheres to the same policy guidelines as the 
EEAS, but also does some engagement and occasionally visits the breakaway 
regions. They, however, consciously avoid engaging formally with de-facto 
authorities preferring to create the opportunities to work with 
international organizations, NGOs and to continue supporting the welfare of the 
population, an objective shared by the government of Georgia (Interview with 
Carlo Natale). 
The European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for South Caucasus and 
Georgia, who reports directly to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (who is at the same time also the Vice-President of 
the EC and heads the EEAS), is more involved in engagement, with frequent trips 
to Abkhazia. The EUSR’s mandate developed from merely “assisting” conflict 
resolution in 2003 to more proactively “contributing” to the resolution of the 
conflicts with the appointment of Peter Semneby in 2006. This change reflects a 
more general change in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy towards 
                                            
173 Chris Kendall was the Political Counsellor for Strategy and Communication at the Eastern 
Partnership section of the EEAS when this interview was conducted. 
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the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Malyarenko & Wolff 2012, 193–194). 
According to Jeppsson (2015, 20), EUSR's work and regular visits to Abkhazia 
have been instrumental in preserving links with Abkhazia. The EUSR travelled to 
Sukhum/i on regular basis for consultations, with the UN taking care of practical 
arrangements. After Russia vetoed an extension of the UNOMIG mission, the 
EUSR established “more direct links with the Abkhaz” (Interview with Fredrik 
Wesslau174). The EUSR’s unique position allows it to have the best channels of 
communication with Abkhazia. It is not accredited to Georgia in particular, but has 
an international mandate, meaning that it can interact with Abkhazian de facto 
authorities without crossing any red lines on recognition (Interview with Chris 
Kendall). It is also different from other EU external services in that people do not 
change every 3-4 years (Interview with Carlo Natale), meaning that institutional 
knowledge and communications are less affected by the turnover. 
After the departure of OSCE and UN observers, the EUMM is the only 
international body with a permanent presence on the ground (Fean 2009, 20). 
This is symbolically important for the EU, which has in this way “gained 
recognition as a security actor in the South Caucasus” (Freire & Simão 2013, 
474). However, the mission is limited to the Georgian side of the Inguri river and 
is not allowed entry into Abkhazia. It also has no funding for projects and its 
primary role is in observing incidents along the Administrative boundary line 
(Schiffers 2015, 27). Shapovalova (2016, 12) notes that EUMM cooperates with 
a local NGO running a radio station that reaches out to the local population in 
Abkhazia to counter the myths about the mandate and the activities of the EUMM. 
Additionally, the EUMM officials disseminate its monitoring observations to NGOs 
to reach out to the population and authorities that the mission otherwise does not 
have access to. This indicates that EUMM’s role transcends mere monitoring to 
include public diplomacy. Indeed, the mandate of the mission encompasses four 
main goals: stabilization, normalization, confidence-building, and information 
provision (Freire & Simão 2013, 471). Through intermediaries it is also able to 
reach beyond the border and into Abkhazia. France and Germany are the biggest 
                                            
174 Fredrik Wesslau was the Director of the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council 
on Foreign Relations and a former Political Adviser to EUSR when this interview was conducted. 
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contributors of monitors (Nichol 2010, 14–15) with Italian involvement also being 
prominent early on (Fean 2009, 6–7). 
As is clear from the overview of the main EU institutions, differences among them 
in relation to their attitude and engagement with Abkhazia are not only conceptual 
but also behavioural and there are often discrepancies between the two. The 
expectation that institutions, which use stricter language (often borrowed from 
Georgia) are more reluctant to engage, is not necessarily true. For instance, the 
EP, which is the only EU institution that refers to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
to 'occupied territories', sent official delegations of MEPs to visit the territories, 
while the role of the Council has been quite political, but also very vague in terms 
of language. 
US foreign policy towards Abkhazia 
Just like the EU, the US has no declared foreign policy towards Abkhazia. Its 
close relations with Georgia, especially during Saakashvili's presidency, made 
the US an even stauncher supporter of the Georgian territorial integrity. The 
question that arises here is not why there is so little US engagement with 
Abkhazia but why there is any at all? As I did in the section on the EU's foreign 
policy towards Abkhazia, I look at the interests and actors in US foreign policy to 
answer this question. 
Interests: energy and security cooperation 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the US engagement with 
Abkhazia was shaped by its interests in energy and security potential of the 
region. Specifically, since the 1990s the US was interested in access to energy 
resources in the region amid rising oil prices, and since 2001 in closer security 
cooperation amid the War on Terror. While the main object of interest in energy 
was Azerbaijan, the main object of interest in security cooperation was Georgia, 
especially after the coming to power of Saakashvili. Focusing on these two 
interests does not, just like in the case of the EU, mean that other interests were 
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not present. Just like the EU, the US too took an interest in conflict resolution and 
acted as a normative player, promoting democracy and the free market. 
The ‘Contract of the Century’ and the BTC pipeline 
In the early 1990s the US showed little active interest in the Caucasus, mostly 
regarding it as part of the Russian sphere of influence, implicitly consenting to the 
Russian notion of 'near-abroad' (Lund 1999, 6). However, by the mid-1990s, the 
second Clinton Administration started taking a keen interest in economic interests 
in Azerbaijan – going as far as appointing a Special Adviser to the President and 
the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy and signing the 
‘Contract of the Century’ with Azerbaijan in 1994 (MacFarlane, 1999). US 
interests in the energy sector are centred on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline, which provides an alternative supply of crude oil, allowing for 
diversification and hence limiting Russia’s (and possibly Iran’s) dominance of the 
Caspian oil resources (Akçakoca et al. 2009, 29).  
The security of the pipeline also involved an interest in the security and Georgia, 
which is why the US became progressively more concerned about emerging 
security threats, including the involvement of Russian military in Abkhazia and 
Chechnya (Börzel et al. 2019, 166). The defeat of the Georgians against a 
numerically smaller opponent in the Georgian-Abkhaz War testified to the 
weakness of the Georgian armed forces (Fawn 2002, 138). Indeed, during 1990s, 
the US considered Georgia to be at risk of becoming a failed state and supported 
programs of democratic, economic, and security reform that centred on institution 
building (Peters & Bittner 2006, 20). The pursuit of a narrow “national security 
agenda” in Georgia prevented the US from playing a larger and more constructive 
role in conflict resolution, which meant leaving the UN and OSCE as the key 
players in conflict resolution (Malyarenko & Wolff 2012, 205). In looking at the 
early involvement of the US in the region, we can conclude that the economic 
interest in energy was of prime importance, but that due to security threats and 
the weakness of the Georgian state, US interests broadened to include security 
interests. At first these security interests were narrowly focused on energy 
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security, but they soon cascaded into shoring up Georgian state institutions and 
training the Georgian army.  
The War on Terror and the Rose Revolution 
With the onset of the War on Terror, security became an independent concern, 
no longer tied only to energy security. By far the most important issue pushing it 
up the US security agenda, was the proximity of South Caucasus to Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and the Middle East. Since the US needed access to the airspace of all three 
countries in the South Caucasus, this led to a prompt establishment of two 
airbases in Georgia under joint US-Turkish control (Akçakoca et al. 2009, 30). 
However, the presence of Chechen terrorists in Russia and Georgia – the Pankisi 
Gorge (Peters & Bittner 2006, 20) – drew increased US interest to the region. The 
Caucasus that has been one of the priorities of the US foreign policy for its 
resources, now also became a source of instability (İşeri 2009, 34–35). The US 
declared the Caucasus as a region of “vital interests” and NATO as a “strategic 
region” (Bryn & Coletti 2015, 190–191). In 2002, American military personnel 
were sent to Georgia to help train Georgian special forces in combating terrorism 
under the Georgia 'Train and Equip' program (GTEP), which ran for 20 months 
and involved 150-200 US military instructors. This of course alarmed both 
Abkhazia and Russia (Fawn 2002, 138–139; Tocci 2007, 140–141), the first 
seeing American presence and the discourse of ‘stability’ as a veiled disguise for 
US intervention in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, while the Russians 
saw it as a threat to its influence in Georgia that was already diminished by 
Russian military withdrawals (Fawn 2002, 139). The unintended consequence of 
GTEP on Abkhazia has been the fear of US-supported or independent Georgian 
attack (Fawn 2002, 140). This was further compounded by pronouncements of 
officials, such as the Georgian Special Forces Captain Shalvab Badzhelidze, a 
participant in GTEP, who declared: “Pankisi is a minuscule problem. Regular 
troops and police can handle that.” Instead, he claimed, “We are doing something 
much more serious. We are training for an operation in Abkhazia.” (Fawn 2002, 
140). It is sometimes forgotten that all this took place during the presidency of 
Shevarnadze, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and before 
Saakashvili – a staunchly pro-American firebrand – came to power. 
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As Cooley and Mitchell (2009, 31–32) note, after the Rose Revolution, the US 
was no longer interested in presenting itself as “an honest broker” that considers 
the concerns of the Georgians and the Abkhaz alike. It abandoned its problem-
solving approach and aspirations to reach a compromise, consistently framing 
the discussion as a question of the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia. 
The initial US interest in energy that became progressively concerned with 
security and especially terrorism, now became more closely bound to supporting 
Georgia both discursively and militarily. In its policy towards Georgia and 
Abkhazia, the US has been cooperating with the EU and despite staying engaged 
in conflict resolution as part of the GID, it has progressively reduced its role and 
influence in favour of the EU.175 Although the US remains cautious of unwittingly 
initiating the use of “hard power” in the South Caucasus through the strategic 
partnership with Georgia, it has been ready to support a policy of “soft power” 
regarding Georgia’s conflict with Abkhazia. This includes a US commitment to 
fostering contacts between populations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with those 
of the rest of Georgia (Welt 2010, 11–12). 
Actors: Track one and Track two 
While the EU’s engagement of Abkhazia is shaped by a plurality of member 
states and institutions, the US is a much more unitary actor, which is not 
necessarily obvious from their respective policies of engagement. The EU’s 
plurality is mediated through an approach of ‘engagement without recognition’ 
that aims at providing a guideline and focusing the efforts of various actors within 
the EU. Although the US supports the EU efforts for engagement, it is itself much 
closer to a more restrictive, Georgian notion of engagement, which has the 
explicit purpose of bringing Abkhazia back into Georgia. What is interesting, 
however, is that given the more unitary and restrictive nature of US approach to 
engagement, it has in practice often been more flexible in its dealings with the 
Abkhazian de facto authorities and the civil society. For instance, the US 
                                            
175 This is visible in the institutional framework of conflict resolution processes: the US is not a co-
chair in GID (unlike the EU) as it is in the OSCE Minsk Group on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh (Baun 2006, 7). The interest in being a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk 
Group established in 1992, was without a doubt related to the primary interests of the US in South 
Caucasus – that of access to Azerbaijani energy resources in the early 1990s. 
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diplomats involved in the GID hold informal discussions with the Abkhaz, while 
the EU delegates refuse to do so. The EU is also shier in admitting the fact that 
it is funding projects in Abkhazia. To understand why this is so, I look at the issue 
from the point of view of the common distinctions between track one and track 
two diplomacy. Again, focusing on this distinction here does not serve to deny 
that I could apply it equally to the EU (where I preferred to focus on member 
states and institutions), but to highlight the plurality of approaches undertaken by 
different actors and explain US flexibility vis-à-vis the EU. This section also tries 
to focus on the actors on the other side of engagement – the Abkhaz actors 
engaged by the US: the de facto authorities, the civil society, and various actors 
engaged in lobbying activities in the US on behalf of the Abkhaz.  
Track one: low profile, more flexibility in the GID? 
The US is involved in the GID, but since there are “3 co-chairs, none of which is 
American, and they are all kind of European”, it plays a smaller role than the EU. 
However, the fact that they have a lower profile, perhaps allows them to “talk with 
the Abkhazian delegation during coffee breaks”, which the EU delegates do not 
do (Interview with Susan Allen176). In the GID, the US follows Georgian guidelines 
on engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, outlined in the Law on 
Occupied Territories and the Strategy on Occupied Territories, much more 
closely than the EU, including referring to Abkhazia and Ossetia as to ‘occupied 
territories’ – the term was first used by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who 
in July 2010 publicly referred to the Russian presence in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as to an “occupation” while on tour of the region (Berg and Pegg 2016, 
10). This poses a question to what extent is the US engagement with Abkhazia 
an independent policy as opposed to a one borrowed from Georgia, like the 
concept of occupation. In other words, to what extent is the US engaging with 
Abkhazia as opposed to supporting Georgian engagement with the breakaway 
region? Opinions among scholars are divided. According to Welt (2010, 2), the 
latter is closer to the truth as the US is not so much directly engaging with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as supporting Georgia’s engagement with Abkhazia 
                                            
176 Susan Allen was the Director of the Center for Peacemaking Practice at George Mason 
University when this interview was carried out. 
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and South Ossetia before addressing the issue of final status. However, Berg and 
Pegg (2016) paint a different picture, stating “that the conventional wisdom that 
de facto states are typically shunned as illegal pariahs is wrong. The United 
States, at least, regularly engages these entities on a wide variety of different 
subjects” (Berg and Pegg 2016, 17). The US considers parent-state preferences, 
but they do not determine “its willingness to engage de facto states. Strategic 
considerations arguably play a greater role in influencing US interactions with de 
facto states.” (Berg and Pegg 2016, 17). Given that Berg and Pegg’s analysis is 
both relatively recent and empirically well grounded, their conclusions seem valid. 
Nevertheless, the triangle US-Georgia-Abkhazia is much more complicated than 
is often presented in a reductionist accounts of Georgia’s fear of other actors 
crossing red lines on engagement that might amount to “creeping recognition”. 
As (Caspersen 2018, 15) puts it, “there is no clear threshold beyond which the 
relationship between the parent state and the de facto state, or their relative 
position, is altered. Red lines are negotiable in practice and are shaped by 
perceptions and internal politics, rather than international law.” Georgia prefers 
to “look to the US rather than the EU for political backing” (Whitman and Wolff 
2010, 94) and has even “encouraged the US to become more actively involved 
in Abkhazia (Berg and Pegg 2016, 6). 
Track one-and-a-half: the story of the cables 
Track one-and-a-half diplomacy generally refers to unofficial contacts between 
official state representatives (Allen Nan 1999). In their innovative analysis of 
WikiLeaks cables, Berg and Pegg’s (2016) show a more complete picture of 
interactions between the US and Abkhazia that would have remained hidden if it 
wasn’t for the leaks of the US diplomatic cables hosted on the website of 
WikiLeaks. In their study, Berg and Pegg’s (2016, 17) show that the US does 
differentiate between different de facto states, not treating them all in the same 
way. This means that there is no overarching policy on engagement with de facto 
states. Data suggests that US engagement didn’t change after the change in 
presidency from Bush to Obama, but the cables show that “US engagement 
decisions are often reactive or opportunistic, driven by specific events or crises.” 
(ibid.). For instance, the US increased its engagement with Abkhazia in 2009 as 
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a way of countering Russia’s increasing influence in the South Caucasus (ibid., 
8). In terms of volume of cables, Abkhazia and NKR were less engaged than 
Transnistria (ibid., 7). In terms of content, roughly three-quarters of US 
engagement with Abkhazia was neutral, with around fifteen percent hostile and 
only 2 cables supportive (ibid., 4). Although the data shows that there is more 
communication between the US and Abkhazia than one would assume and that 
the majority is not hostile, one should not overestimate its importance or impact. 
US officials continue to have very little contact with Abkhaz authorities outside 
the GID and their policy remains one of supporting the territorial integrity of 
Georgia, but through “strategic patience” (Phillips 2011, 16). 
Track two: US engagement with the Abkhaz civil society 
The GID has not been producing the result desired by the EU and the US – 
coming closer to resolving the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. The US 
has in some cases in the past got involved in domestic politics to promote a 
regime change and break political deadlocks. However, the US does not engage 
in domestic politics in Abkhazia and seems to lack trust in in the Abkhazian 
opposition (Berg and Pegg 2016, 13). Another option to break a deadlock in 
negotiations is to open a parallel channel (track two) and involving the civil society 
in hope of conflict transformation. The US has shown that it is willing to engage 
with Abkhazian civil society organizations. The aim is to prevent a complete 
Russian takeover of the region and to keep the option of “eventual reintegration 
with the rest of Georgia” but the logistics of these engagements in trying to avoid 
implying any kind of recognition, can be complicated (Berg and Pegg 2016, 14). 
While European NGOs like Conciliation Resources (UK), Saferworld (UK), 
Berghof (Germany), Danish Refugee Council (Denmark), and Kvinna Till Kvinna 
(Sweden) (Schiffers 2015, 30) have been more present in Abkhazia than US 
ones, some US projects have been running for a very long time, for instance 
Paula Garb’s University of California at Irvine-sponsored project.  
One of the problems the US faces in engaging with the civil society in Abkhazia 
is misperception. Abkhazian NGOs are not seen as representative of the general 
population but as an “avant-garde” that can introduce “new ways of thinking and 
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acting” regarding the conflict (Stewart 2004, 15). This means that the outreach to 
the society in general is very limited. Another problem is that the US policy makers 
fail to understand the pressures the civil society in Abkhazia faces, such as the 
social pressure not to take Georgian-issued Status Neutral passports. They also 
sometimes do not understand that there is significant “anti-Russian sentiment in 
Abkhazia” (Interview with Susan Allen). Policy-makers often lack the 
understanding of the “historical and cultural context, which are so crucially 
important for an adequate understanding of the roots and perspectives of 
Abkhazian-Georgian conflict” (Shevchenko 2013, 14–15) and fail to understand 
the Abkhaz rejection of “the possibility of remaining part of the Georgian state” 
(Akaba & Khintba, 2011, 15). Failure to understand the cultural context, including 
the notion of honour (covered in Chapter 4), prevents the policy-makers from 
realizing that “the Abkhaz have pride and don’t go around begging for 
engagement” (Interview with Susan Allen). It seems that while the relatively low 
profile of the US in GID allows for more flexibility, but in engagement with the civil 
society, “the EU has found more flexible mechanisms” (Interview with Susan 
Allen). This has contributed to the fact that after a halt in the progress of track 
one diplomacy, track two diplomacy has come to a standstill (Hoch 2009, 88). 
Abkhazia’s proactiveness: lobbying in the US 
Despite the absence of diplomatic breakthroughs and public engagement, as 
Berg and Pegg (2016) have demonstrated, a lot of interaction happens under the 
radar. Little of it is documented, so most of my information comes from my 
interviews with individuals involved in advocating for Abkhazia’s recognition and 
engagement. Contrary to my expectations, interviews with people involved with 
Abkhazia in the EU and the US have pointed to the fact that Abkhazians were 
quite proactive in seeking contact and sometimes presented concrete ideas for 
furthering engagement. According to Fredrik Wesslau, Political Advisor to the 
EUSR for the South Caucasus, the Abkhaz “were quite proactive. They wanted 
us to fund development projects which went in direction of state-building, that fell 
outside of the framework of non-recognition and that we could not do.” (Interview 
with Fredrik Wesslau). 
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Lacking representation in the US (but also in international fora, such as the US-
based UN), Abkhazia has tried to advocate for itself by using different 
intermediaries – from Russian diplomats to Abkhaz diaspora, and private 
companies. According to Elene Agladze from the Permanent Representation of 
Georgia to the UN, “the Abkhaz voice is communicated to the missions by the 
Russian mission [to the UN], which distributes documents to other missions” 
(Interview with Elene Agladze177). Diaspora representatives seem to have played 
a more important role before, but no longer do. Yanal Kazan, a chiropractor based 
in Patterson, New Jersey, served as Ardzinba’s representative in the US until 
1999. According to him, he was able to get more than 50 audiences with country 
ambassadors and representatives at the UN, explaining the motives behind 
Abkhazia’s actions. However, the majority was pro-Georgian, and it was an uphill 
battle from the beginning (Interview with Yanal Kazan). He also tried to bring 
Ardzinba to the UN but was unsuccessful. He arranged several press 
conferences and even arranged for officials from Siemens and Ericsson to visit 
Abkhazia. Frustrated by the lack of the Geneva process, Yanal Kazan resigned 
in 1999 and to his knowledge nobody has been representing Abkhazia in the US 
since (Interview with Yanal Kazan). Nikolai Zlobin, a D.C.-based Russian political 
scientist and journalist, also tried to act as an intermediary to bring the Abkhaz 
delegation to the US. According to him, President Baghapsh could visit the US 
under a UN invitation and present his case. However, they have sent some 
documents before and “did not get a good response” so they decided that “it is a 
lost case” (Interview with Nikolai Zlobin178). President Baghapsh was more 
successful in reaching out to the Washington Times, where his opinion was 
published in the editorial pages on 16 October 2009. As Whitman & Wolff (2010, 
87) have noted, it was a “remarkable turn of events” that a leader of a largely 
unrecognised breakaway region was given such a platform given what had 
happened in August 2008 and given the very close relationship between the US 
and Georgia. This “turn of events”, however, did not happen spontaneously. In 
August 2009, Abkhazian and South Ossetian governments contracted the 
                                            
177 Elene Agladze was the Deputy Ambassador of Georgia to the UN when when this interview 
was conducted. 
178 Nikolai Zlobin was the President of the Center on Global Interests (CGI) when this interview 
was conducted. 
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services of Steven Ellis’s Saylor Company (each de facto state had its own 
contract and communications were kept separate). According to Mr. Ellis, the 
company provided media relations services to the de facto states for about a year:  
“We pretty much became their embassy in Washington. We shared their 
statements with the Congress and the State Department. We never met 
anyone, but we shared our statements with them and I know that they read 
them. I’m not sure if they did anything about it, but they read them” 
(Interview with Steven Ellis). 
They reached out to the Western media outlets in Europe and the US with a 
document called “issues points”, which included an interview or a summary of 
their achievements or talking points. They sent one every week to a list of 400 to 
500 recipients and engaged with their government representatives “almost on 
daily basis”. Of course, 
“nobody in the US Government could acknowledge that we talked to them. 
They would be polite and would listen to us. A couple of members of staff 
in the Congress did agree to see the Abkhaz. We shifted a narrative to the 
point when people at least said let’s see what they have to say” (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, it seems that the Abkhaz ran out of patience quite soon:  
“I think they ultimately expected recognition. They expected they would get 
feature stories about them by the mainstream media. When they didn’t get 
it, they were disappointed. The Abkhaz ran out of patience because they 
didn’t understand that this takes a lot of time” (ibid.).  
It was easier to raise awareness about Abkhazia in Europe than in the US, 
probably because Abkhazia is more relevant to the EU than to the US. According 
to Mr. Ellis, the Abkhaz “didn’t understand how Western media works” and “were 
impressed not by how much we knew, but by how much they didn’t know.” For 
that reason, it seems that the Saylor Company didn’t only provide the de facto 
states media relations services, but also a learning opportunity: “We gave them 
a sense of how the Western governments, especially the US government works. 
We gave them an opportunity to advance their communication strategies” (ibid.). 
 
227 
 
Through a closer analysis of interests and actors on both sides of engagement, 
a more complex picture emerges as do parallels and differences between EU and 
US engagement strategies. In the next two sections, I look at the latter even 
closer within a chronological context to better understand how the two 
approaches developed. 
The US adopted a harsher language vis-à-vis Abkhazia, going as far as adopting 
the Georgian term 'occupied territories' after the Russian-Georgian War and the 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia in 2008. This has 
constrained both its engagement with Abkhazia as well as prevented it from 
playing a role of an independent and credible moderator. However, the good US-
Georgian relations do not fully explain the reluctance to engage with Abkhazia. 
Abkhazia's distance from the US, its small size, economic insignificance, 
dependence on Russia as well as historical and cultural factors come into play 
here. Perhaps even more interesting, the mentioned constrains to engagement 
have not entirely prevented the US engagement with Abkhazia. As has been 
explored in this section, this can be attributed to the lower profile and hence 
greater flexibility of US policy makers in the conflict resolution process, their more 
informal way of engagement with the Abkhaz (over lunch), and as Berg and Pegg 
(2016, 17) have observed, to “strategic considerations”, namely the wish to 
counterbalance Russia’s influence in the region. Abkhazia’s level of proactivness 
in certain periods, especially between 2008 and 2010 went beyond my 
expectations and, as I elaborate in Chapter 7, can be considered one of the 
important empirical contributions of this thesis. 
EU and US engagement with Abkhazia 1999-2008 
A snapshot of interests and actors involved in EU and US engagement of 
Abkhazia presented in this chapter so far shows the complexity of factors 
affecting engagement, from geopolitical to inter-institutional and linguistic. A 
snapshot, however, is a still image and gives us no sense in how engagement 
developed throughout time. I cover this next. 
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The 1990s: Prelude to engagement 
During the Georgian-Abkhaz War 1992-1993 and during the early period of 
Abkhaz de facto statehood (when it was under the CIS-enforced embargo), the 
EU and the US involvement in conflict resolution was minimal. According to 
Sabanadze (2002, 13), the main mediator – and to some extent participant – in 
the active phase of the conflict was Russia. The UN faced increased pressure 
from the Georgian government to deploy a peacekeeping force but the fact that 
only an observer mission (UNOMIG) was established, testifies to the wish of the 
Russia to keep its leading role in conflict management throughout the post-Soviet 
space (MacFarlane 1999, 36). Indeed, the UN’s role was only to supervise a 
Russian-brokered ceasefire.179 By the end of 1990s, the US and several EU 
member states also gained a chair at the table, but not the EU itself. In fact, the 
EU was only legally established after the Georgian-Abkhaz ceasefire (July 1993) 
and the establishment of the UNOMIG (August 1993), in November 1993 when 
the Maastricht Treaty came into force and replaced the European Economic 
Community (EEC). According to Freire and Simão (2013, 467), for much of the 
1990s, relations between the EU and Georgia remained marginal in respect to 
the agendas of both actors. The EU saw Georgia as a “distant country” facing 
secessionist problems in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while still under the deep 
influence of Russia. Vasilyan (2014, 402) traced EU’s first attempts to conflict 
resolution to a 1995 EC document entitled ‘Towards a European Union Strategy 
for Relations with the Transcaucasian Republics’, which “called for a ‘coordinated 
strategy’ towards the ‘region’ following the end of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, through the extension of Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)” and identified conflict-resolution as one of the 
objectives. This was full two years after the war in Abkhazia ended. In the 1990s, 
the US and EU engagement with Abkhazia was mostly one-way and limited to 
condemnations of Abkhazia’s declarations of sovereignty, independence, and the 
                                            
179 As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, as the international attention grew the group 
‘Friends of Georgia’ was established under the auspices of the UN to help manage and resolve 
the conflict. The group included the US, the UK, Germany, France, and Russia (Sabanadze 2002, 
14). 
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holding of elections.180 Both the EU and the US sent humanitarian aid but most 
of it was earmarked for Georgia181 and little if any reached Abkhazia, partially 
also due to corruption, crime and smuggling along the de facto border 
(Ghazaryan 2010, 233). Further constraining engagement was the reluctance of 
multilateral agencies to continue their assessment and programming activities in 
Abkhazia (MacFarlane 2000, 58). Russia, too, was unwilling to let other actors 
meddle in what it considered its ‘near abroad’. In August 1997, Yeltsin stated that 
Russia would continue to mediate talks between Georgia and Abkhazia and 
would not let the US take over. The Geneva process started in December 1998, 
but negotiations were soon deadlocked and as a clear sign of lack of patience, 
on October 12, 1999 the Act of State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia 
was signed and entered into force. 
Early 2000s: US and EU presence grows 
The early 2000s saw growing interest of US and the EU. The terrorist attacks in 
the US in September 2001 saw an increase of American interest in the region 
both because of its logistical importance in their operations in Afghanistan and 
later Iraq, and because of the presence of terrorist groups in Chechnya and the 
Pankisi Gorge in Georgia (Tocci 2007, 140–141). In 2002 the US special forces 
military instructors arrived to train and equip Georgian forces. The EU funding 
increased significantly after 1999, when the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) between Georgia and the EU entered into force (Whitman and 
Wolff 2010, 89). The EU was also increasing its political footprint in the region. In 
2001, an EU troika visited the region and the EU was accepted as a member of 
the OSCE Control Commission for South Ossetia (Peters & Bittner 2006, 18). In 
early 2003, a delegation of the EP visited Sukhum/i but failed to convince the 
Abkhaz side to resume political dialogue with Georgia, with the Abkhaz 
delegation not even attending the subsequent Geneva process meeting (Vasilyan 
                                            
180 Đorđević (2010, 35) claims that dismissing elections as “contrary to the established 
international law” extends the non-recognition of statehood to also include non-recognition of 
state-building and regime.  
181 According to Tocci (2007, 140–141), since the beginning of the 1990s, Georgia has been one 
of the largest recipients of US aid per capita. In the period 1992–2005 total US aid to Georgia 
amounted to $3bn. 
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2014, 410).182 Uncoordinated attempts of EU institutions and such ad-hoc 
delegations convinced the EU of a need for new bodies and mechanisms to deal 
with the problem. In 2003, the ENP was developed (which Georgia joined in 2004) 
and the first EUSR for the South Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie, was appointed. 
Dobrescu & Schumacher (2018, 2) see this as a milestone, claiming that before 
2003 the EU’s involvement in Georgia was mostly economic and technical but 
that the Rose Revolution created a favorable context for the EU to broaden “its 
range of policy instruments.” This signaled the EU’s greater preparedness to take 
up a greater role as a conflict mediator, which its increasing political and 
economic presence in the Caucasus but also its aspirations to act as a normative 
actor, demanded. In doing so, the EU also used the opportunities created by the 
2003 Rose Revolution, the US shift in “security alignments”, and the problems 
that Russia encountered trying to maintain its influence in the ‘near abroad’ 
(Freire & Simão 2013, 467). 
Mid-to-Late 2000s: US and EU encounter Russian 
resistance 
Even in the second half of 2000s, the EU’s involvement in conflict resolution was 
seen as insufficient. German (2007, 359) claimed that its role was mostly in 
“supporting organisations such as the UN and OSCE, which have taken the lead 
role” but acknowledged that the EU has the opportunity of becoming more 
involved. While the US got involved in ‘hard matters’ of security (training and 
equipping the Georgian Army) and politics (unreserved support for Saakashvili’s 
pro-American policies), the EU’s main concern “was not to antagonize Moscow 
by supporting a radical change in the status quo”, which was being promoted by 
Saakashvili in Georgia. Instead, it sought to support the existing mechanisms of 
conflict resolution, under the aegis of the UN and the OSCE (Freire and Simão 
2013, 469). Thus, the EU opted for de-politicized projects that the Commission 
presented as apolitical to assuage both Russia and its own reluctant member 
states (ibid.), keeping a low, mostly economic profile (Vinatier 2009, 91). 
                                            
182 The Abkhaz side eventually returned to the Geneva negotiations in April 2005, but only due to 
Russian mediation (Vasilyan 2014, 411)., which proved once more that Russia was the lead 
mediator and the US, and the EU could only play a secondary role. 
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However, by mid-2000s, the US also tried to pursue a more cautious policy, avoid 
openly discussing the question of the breakaway regions and criticizing Russia 
too often, leading Peters and Bittner (2006, 22) to conclude that this cautious 
approach led to a “dangerous impression” that the South Caucasus is still part of 
Russia’s sphere of influence and that “the Europe of Yalta continuous to exist” 
(Peters and Bittner 2006, 22). As I have discussed in Chapter 5, from 2004 on 
and with the change of regimes through the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia increasingly pushed back and criticized the 
EU and the US for what it saw as interference in its sphere of privileged interests. 
Russia increasingly acted as a gatekeeper to the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides as 
“power-related interests dominated the mediation” (Vasilyan 2014, 411). Despite 
significant increases in funding,183 political visits to the region and the creation of 
a new body to deal with conflict resolution (EUSR), Whitman and Wolff (2010, 96) 
have assessed the role played by the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
“relatively marginal until summer 2008.” German (2007, 356) gave a similar 
assessment, praising the EU’s financial efforts but expressing the need to engage 
politically to more effectively support conflict resolution. With the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetians having no voice in the key negotiating formats, the political 
influence of the EU “remains extremely limited.” Nevertheless, according to De 
Wall (2017, 1), the EU has only achieved modest success in Abkhazia, mainly by 
maintaining some leverage over the de facto authorities and by providing a few 
connections between the Abkhaz and the rest of the world, without compromising 
the EU’s relationship with Georgia (De Waal 2017, 1).  
In the early 1990s, Abkhazia was not high on the agenda of either the EU or the 
US. In the case of the EU, it was overshadowed by the war in the Balkans and in 
the case of the US, by the Gulf War. In late 1990s and early 2000s they became 
progressively more interested in resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict each for 
its own reasons: the US for energy security, counter-terrorism and export of 
democracy, while the EU also shared these interests but also viewed the 
Caucasus as a potential region of EU expansion. By mid-2000s, however, both 
                                            
183 The EU became the largest donor to the South Caucasus, financing rehabilitation programs in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 1997 and providing assistance worth €33m to the two conflict 
zones between 1997 and 2005 (German 2007, 365). 
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the EU and the US found themselves at an impasse regarding their engagement 
of Abkhazia especially due to Russia’s pushback but also due to negative views 
of Abkhazian population, which did not see the EU and the US as neutral 
mediators.184 It would take the August War in 2008 for this deadlock to be broken.  
EU and US engagement with Abkhazia 2009-2014 
Ironically, Russian recognition of Abkhazia after the August War in 2008 made 
conflict resolution with a view of Abkhazia’s re-integration virtually impossible yet 
engagement increased, with the EU playing a more prominent role than before. 
The reasons for this were on the part of the EU and the US 1) the desire to prevent 
similar escalations that lead to the war in 2008; 2) the fear of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia becoming completely dependent on Russia; and on the part of Abkhazia 
3) a wish to develop relations with as many international actors as possible in line 
with its multi-vector foreign policy (explored further in Chapter 4). I look at the 
increased interest in engagement and its gradual waning in the next section. 
2008-2010: GID and renewed conflict-resolution efforts 
After the conflict resolution was re-launched in the new format of GID (discussed 
in more detail earlier in this chapter) in October 2008, the EU not only got a seat 
at the table, but was made a co-chair, giving it the higher profile it desired. At the 
same time, the EUMM was established, so that in October 2008 EU observers 
were already on the Georgian side of the Abkhaz-Georgian border. The US, too, 
has remained active in mediation, but started acting in a more supportive role 
(Simão 2018, 108), reflected in the fact that it was not among the co-chairs in the 
new GID format. Interest in greater US engagement was also constrained by 
seeing that Russia could easily outmatch whatever the US offered and by the 
close relationship with Georgia, especially during Saakashvili’s presidency, when 
the US governments have been reluctant to even criticise Georgia (Interview with 
                                            
184 Khintba (2010) claims that “Europe is not fully perceived as a neutral mediator” mostly because 
through its “reiteration of the principle of territorial integrity of Georgia”, it has failed to obtain “a 
crucial amount of credibility needed to affect attitudes of the Abkhazian side.” The support for 
Georgia’s territorial integrity has reduced EU’s acceptability as a mediator (Grono 2010, 7) in the 
eyes of the Abkhaz and has weakened EU’s position as a mediator (Jeppsson 2015, 26). 
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Henry Hale185). On the one hand, after it had recognised Abkhazia, Russia was 
more than ever the gatekeeper able to exert more control so that engagement 
became “contingent on Russia’s acceptance of the terms of engagement” 
(Interview with Cory Welt186). On the other hand, the US and to the lesser extent 
the EU faced demands from Georgia to closely coordinate their engagement with 
guidelines set out in the Law on Occupied Territories. The US eventually adopted 
the Georgian discourse that led to effective criminalisation of any international 
engagement with Abkhazia that Georgia did not approve (Cooley 2015, 30). 
Perhaps the most important process related to engagement with Abkhazia in this 
period, was the gradual development of the concept of ‘engagement without 
recognition as a possible policy solution to so-called frozen conflicts involving 
post-Soviet de facto states. The concept started appearing almost simultaneously 
in policy circles (it was used by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Germany and the EUSR Peter Semneby) and in the academia (Cooley 
& Mitchell 2010; Caspersen & Herrberg 2010; Fischer 2010). 
With the EU being more active and the US maintaining its level of engagement, 
questions of coordination appeared. Simão (2018, 108) has attributed 
subsequent US reluctance to the limited coordination between the policies of the 
EU, the US, and NATO and to “limited commitment of Western powers to regional 
peace and stability.” (Simão 2018, 108). With the ‘engagement without 
recognition’ the differences between the EU and the US approach became more 
pronounced. While ‘engagement without recognition’ explicitly became the EU 
policy approach and the US didn’t object to it, it was less explicit (Interview with 
Cory Welt). This could be traced back to the different relationship with the 
Georgian government between the EU and the US, the choice of a different 
vocabulary (with the US opting for ‘occupation’), which resulted in EU’s 
engagement without recognition focusing more on conflict transformation and 
prevention of further escalation and the US engagement more closely resembling 
Georgia’s own engagement, aimed explicitly at ‘de-occupation’. The opinions 
                                            
185 Henry Hale was the Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, and Co-Director of 
the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS Eurasia) when 
this interview was conducted. 
186 Cory Welt was an Analyst in European Affairs at the Congressional Research Service when 
this interview was conducted. 
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regarding which approach is better are divided among scholars and policy-
makers. Some believe that at the GID “there are no differences in substance 
between our [EU] position and their [US] position” (Interview with Carlo Natale), 
others argue that the EU approach is more “flexible and creative” and that the US 
should adopt it (Cooley & Mitchell 2009, 41), yet others believe that the US policy 
makers “are much smarter and less bureaucratic” (Interview with Antje 
Herrberg187). in their engagement with Abkhazia than the EU, whose complex 
institutional framework and disunity between member states impair its ability to 
speak with a single voice.  
2010-2014: Decreasing interest in engagement on all 
sides 
In late 2010, the Arab Spring captured the attention of the EU and US policy 
makers. While Abkhazia was falling down the list of items on the EU and the US 
agendas, it was also becoming (in part because of the disillusionment with what 
it perceived as insufficient engagement by the EU and the US) more dependent 
on Russia. Russia was itself further challenging the EU and US presence in the 
region and in October 2011 it embarked on its own project of regional integration, 
proposing to establish the Eurasian Customs Union (later rechristened as the 
Eurasian Economic Union) as a rival regional integration project. The EU, which 
has by now overshadowed the US as a funder and a mediator in the region, tried 
to regain initiative by institutional changes and launching new programs. It revised 
the ENP in 2011, explicitly integrating engagement without recognition in the 
document and put pressure on Georgia to adopt a similar strategy. However, the 
2011 ENP revision largely just continued the EC funding of civil society projects 
to foster dialogue with Abkhazia (Freizer in Bouris & Schumacher 2017, 171). In 
May 2011, the EC launched COBERM with the aim of fostering conflict 
transformation and increasing people-to-people contacts (Freizer in Bouris & 
Schumacher 2017, 167). In May 2011, the two EUSR mandates in the South 
Caucasus – the EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia (led by Pierre Morel) and the 
                                            
187 Antje Herrberg was the CEO of MediatEur, the European Forum for International Mediation 
and Dialogue; and a Professor for International Mediation at the College of Europe when this 
interview was conducted. 
 
235 
 
EUSR for the South Caucasus (led by Peter Semneby) – were merged into a 
single body - the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, giving 
equal weight and attention to solving the Abkhaz, South Ossetian and Nagorno-
Karabakh conflicts (Smolnik 2012, 5). Despite these efforts, an EU report from 
2011, admitted that “the positions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were 
growing even further apart” (Jeppsson 2015, 21). 
Hopes of breaking the deadlock were raised in October 2012, when Saakashvili 
lost parliamentary elections to Bidzina Ivanishvili. After EU’s prodding, Georgia 
adopted an ‘engagement through cooperation’ policy, which included providing 
services, such as access to free medical care and universities in Georgia, 
facilitating the transport of goods over the ABL (Administrative Boundary Line), 
and providing “status-neutral travel documents” to Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians (Freizer in Bouris & Schumacher 2017, 163). The appointment of the 
Paata Zakareishvili – a civil society activist – to run the ministry responsible for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (he changed its name from the Ministry of 
Reintegration to the Ministry of Reconciliation), was another such step towards 
dialogue (De Waal 2017, 3–4). However, the Georgian government was still 
sending mixed signals, on the one hand opting for a more permissive approach 
that allowed for more economic activity across the de facto border and access to 
services, while on the other hand considering Abkhazians as citizens of Georgia 
and re-stating Georgia’s claims to territory integrity (Caspersen 2018, 8). 
Unfortunately, hopes of renewed impetus in conflict resolution did not materialize. 
In fact, the contrary occurred. Abkhazia, which has thus far welcomed 
international engagement although sometimes regarding it with suspicion, first 
started pushing against it, most likely inspired by Russia’s foreign agent law, 
which entered into force in November 2012, requiring NGOs with foreign funding 
to register as ‘foreign agents’. According to Schiffers (2015, 32–33), in 2013, 
Sukhum/i-based international organizations were banned from working in Gal/i 
with the local authorities exhibiting heightened suspicion and asking instead for 
more engagement along the ABL. The-then President Ankvab stated that “the 
humanitarian phase is over and that ‘substantial assistance’ in terms of 
infrastructure is needed. The ‘ban’ was later lifted, but legal unclarity persists. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that it was Russia, which wanted to restrain 
international engagement with Abkhazia, for instance the existence of “a 
regulation specifying that all national staff of international organizations need to 
get clearance from the Russian Federal Security Service to cross the ABL for 
work-related purposes” (Schiffers 2015, 32–33). In May 2014, another disruption 
occurred when a political revolt in Abkhazia ousted President Ankvab. In August 
2014, presidential elections were held and the Russia-backed Khajimba emerged 
as a winner and the new President. By November 2014, Abkhazia and Russia 
signed a revised 'Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Alliance', which 
provides for close coordination between Abkhazia and Russia in the military, 
border protection and police spheres. During the political turmoil in Abkhazia that 
has eventually tied it even closer to Russia, the EU and Georgia signed the 
Association Agreement (in July 2014) – an extensive trade partnership – bringing 
Georgia closer to the EU. One cannot but paraphrase the finding of the EU report 
from 2011 by stating that the positions of the EU and the US on one hand and 
Abkhazia on the other are growing even further apart. While Abkhazia has slipped 
further down the US agenda, the EU has maintained its funding188 and 
engagement levels, but the feeling that the window of opportunity has closed and 
a sense of Abkhazia’s growing dependence on Russia and lack of interest in the 
EU, have set in. 
Retrospectively, the 2008-2010 period can be seen as a missed opportunity for 
engagement,189 which was constrained by: 1) Russia playing the gatekeeper 
hampering international engagement with Abkhazia, 2) inability of the EU and the 
US to coordinate and come up with a clear engagement policy, and 3) gradual 
loss of interest of the EU and the US in Abkhazia amid more pressing concerns, 
such as the developments in the Arab world.   
As is commonly believed, the recognition of Kosovo, the August War between 
Russia and Georgia, and the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia were 
                                            
188 Georgia receives the largest amount of official developmental assistance among all post-
Soviet states and ranked the highest among all countries in per capita terms (Schiffers 2015, 18). 
189 As stated earlier, after Russia recognized Abkhazia, the EU stepped up its engagement to 
prevent Abkhazia from falling completely under the Russian dominance. However, despite strong 
interest on the behalf of Abkhazia and talks that the EU might open an information office in 
Sukhumi, the positive trend of engagement failed to continue, mostly due to Georgia’s opposition.  
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watershed moments in EU and US engagement with Abkhazia. However, what 
is surprising is that as the chances of conflict resolution (with the result of 
restoring Georgian territorial integrity and the re-incorporation of Abkhazia, 
subscribed to by the EU and the US) decreased, EU and US engagement 
increased. This allowed Abkhazia to pursue a much more independent and 
confident foreign relations strategy, contrary to what most observers expected, 
which was greater dependence on Russia after it recognised it. This trend, 
however, only continued for a short period (roughly between 2008 and 2010) and 
when the window of opportunity was closed, dependence on Russia increased 
almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I present a multi-faceted account of the EU and the US 
engagement with Abkhazia. As there is a lot of ground to cover, I conducted my 
analysis along two axes. First, through differentiating between different interests 
and actors involved. Second, through a chronological account of engagement in 
which I tried to point to the similarities and differences between interests, actors, 
levels of engagement and the engagement strategies of the EU and the US. Due 
to the chapter length restrictions, I was largely forced to leave out discussions on 
topics, such as the counter-recognition campaigns by the EU and the US, an 
analysis of the European foreign policy agreements and mechanisms such as the 
PCA, the ENP, and the AA (that mainly concern Georgia and only marginally 
Abkhazia, if they apply to it at all), and a more detailed discussion of engagement 
by sector (for instance, which concrete projects in rehabilitation and 
infrastructural development the EU and the US fund and what is their impact). 
I have taken as a fil rouge of this chapter my research question and shown the 
relations between interpretations of non-recognition and foreign policy behaviour. 
One of the conclusions of this chapter is that because states try to maintain a 
consistent foreign policy in which actions correspond to words, the latter directly 
affect policy. Defining Abkhazia as a de facto state, a breakaway region, or as an 
occupied territory therefore has important implications for the foreign policy 
behaviour of both the de facto state and the actors that interact with it. Another 
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conclusion is that there is a large variance in how Abkhazia was perceived across 
time and by different actors. The EU’s institutional framework exhibits significant 
plurality, but also the EU’s own status as a mediator and a normative actor, which 
has fluctuated over time, affected its level of engagement. The US, seen as a 
more unitary actor, too has shown different levels of engagement mostly because 
of changing interests – at first the interest in South Caucasus and Georgia 
remained high but gradually changed from exclusively energy to security, and 
later waned altogether due to greater challenges in other regions (Middle East 
and North Africa, Asia-Pacific). The main conclusions emerging from the 
chronological overview of engagement policies (which should be read in 
conjunction with the chronological account of Russian-Abkhaz engagement in 
Chapter 5) are the complexity of factors affecting the quantity and quality of 
engagement, including domestic politics in Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia, the EU 
and the US (such as the political change in Abkhazia in 2014), international 
developments (such as the Arab Spring), enduring interests (such as US interest 
in securing access to oil), changing interests (growing interest in security after 
9/11), and last but not least – perception and conceptualization of status, which I 
have tried to highlight. Compared to the other two empirical chapters, ontological 
security was not at the forefront of my analysis. However, the idea that 
interpretations affect policies and that definitions and self-definitions play a crucial 
role in ontological security of both the engager and the engaged (explicitly 
expressed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) and the claim that ostracizing de facto 
states hinders conflict resolution and reduces their willingness for engagement 
(Ker-Lindsay & Berg 2018, 1) have been shown to have empirical grounds 
throughout this chapter. 
The weak ontological security of the EU, which did not see itself as a successful 
mediator (having largely failed in this role in 1990s when Yugoslavia descended 
into civil war at its doorstep) nor a normative actor prevented it from playing an 
important role in Georgian-Abkhazian conflict resolution. Assertive US foreign 
policy, which aimed to train and equip the Georgian army and welcomed (in 
Russian eyes instigated) the Rose and Orange Revolutions, may have correctly 
estimated that a few hundred special forces and military instructors represented 
no military threat to Russia, but they may have underestimated the threat they 
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represented to Russia’s ontological security based on defending its ‘near abroad’ 
– territories once part of Russia, with large Russian populations that Russia saw 
as the sphere of its privileged interests – from foreign interference. Above all, few 
policy makers think of the consequences the use of the term “occupied territory” 
has for Abkhaz ontological security. Most discussions about this term revolve 
around whether the word “occupied” is justified, in other words: does Abkhazia 
have any independent agency or is it fully dependent on Russia to the point of 
being a puppet state in which Russia calls the shots? However pertinent this 
question, we should be more worried about the word “territory,” which paints a 
land (without people) that has been illegally taken away (occupied). One does not 
negotiate with territories as one does with de facto states or even breakaway 
regions. It is possible to negotiate with the occupier (and Georgia has insisted 
that the conflict is between Russia and Georgia), but the territory itself is seen as 
a tabula rasa, its population at best given no agency and at worst completely 
ignored. I conclude the empirical part of my research here and continue this 
discussion in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Findings and 
Discussion 
“From an ideal vantage point on the ground, a formation of planes  
may be observed in the air. One plane may be out of formation.  
But the whole formation may be off course […] In particular, it is  
of fundamental importance not to confuse the person who is  
‘out of formation’ by telling him he is ‘off course’ if he is not.” 
– Ronald David Laing (1990, 98). 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter of a thesis is the concluding element of the usual progression 
from description through analysis to synthesis. It is this synthesis that brings 
together theoretical and methodological discussions from Chapters 1, 2, and 3 
with empirical data and analysis from Chapters 4, 5, and 6. This is done by linking 
the analysis of Abkhazia’s foreign policy with the analyses of all three 
relationships (Russian-Abkhaz, EU-Abkhazian, and US-Abkhazian) back to the 
core elements of my theoretical framework (identity, ontological security and 
geopolitical role). In doing so, this chapter unites different pieces of the puzzle to 
construct a more complete and coherent picture of Abkhazia’s foreign 
interactions and to answer the research questions, including my main research 
question regarding how interactions of Russia, EU and the US with Abkhazia are 
related to interpretations of non-recognition. First, I shortly summarize the key 
findings from the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) and discuss how they 
relate to existing literature reviewed in Chapter 1. Second, – and this is the heart 
of this chapter – I answer my research questions drawing on the insights from 
empirical data. Third, the chapter discusses the various contributions my thesis 
has made, starting with the fleshing out of my theoretical contributions and 
continuing with a discussion of the potential and limits to the generalizability of 
my research. Fourth, the chapter discusses both the case-specific and the wider 
policy relevance of this thesis. Fifth, the most important shortcomings and 
limitations are discussed. Sixth, I explore some unanswered and some newly 
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arisen questions and discuss possible avenues for future research. I conclude 
with a short summary of the main findings and contributions. 
As the reader will remember, in my thesis I set out to study Abkhazia’s 
international engagement from the vantage point of Constructivism, looking at 
how interpretations of its status shape how other actors engage with it. I drew on 
de facto state studies for more specific and systematic insight (Caspersen 2013, 
Isachenko 2012), conceptual nuances (Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018) and concrete 
policy analysis (Frear 2014). I have aspired to develop an integrated framework 
of analysis based on Realism and Constructivism. While the physical security 
cannot be overestimated as a concern for de facto states and geopolitical 
interests cannot be overestimated as drivers of great power competition in the 
Eurasian borderlands, I believe that the literature on de facto states has so far 
largely neglected the fact that de facto states (breakaway regions that are self-
proclaimed independent states) are unrecognised by virtue of a restrictive 
interpretation (of the right to self-determination) – even stigmatisation. The way 
they are perceived, conceptualised, and interpreted shapes the way they are 
interacted with. To preserve both aspects and achieve a Realist-Constructivist 
synthesis, I have opted for 'hard-soft concepts', such as ontological security, and 
geopolitical role. For the reason of compatibility, I rejected the linguistic turn in 
Constructivism focused on narratives and discourse, instead focusing on 
behaviour and routines. As I argued in Chapter 1, examining state identity can 
help us explain their foreign policy, while looking at how they interact with other 
actors, can tell us more about what de facto states are. As I demonstrate in the 
next section, there is a linkage between identity and interaction of states in 
Constructivist theory and between status (non-recognition) and engagement with 
Abkhazia. Although a single-case study, each of the empirical chapters explored 
a certain aspect of Abkhazia’s foreign interactions, with Russian-Abkhaz, EU-
Abkhazian, and US-Abkhazian relations offering the most obvious possibility of 
comparison. By structuring these chapters chronologically, this offers another 
axis of comparing and synthesising results. Observing variance between actors 
and time periods in Abkhazia’s relationships confirms my claims from Chapter 1 
that de facto states are neither strong nor weak, neither viable or non-viable 
outside their relationships with others. It has important implications for 
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understanding their agency and conflict dynamics (going against the concept of 
‘frozen conflict’). 
Short summary of key findings 
Here I present a short summary of the findings from the three empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4, 5, and 6), discuss key insights, explain how they relate to the existing 
literature (Chapter 1) and identify ways in which the results confirmed my 
expectations and some in which they were counter-intuitive. 
In Chapter 4, I argued that the internal situation in the de facto state and the wider 
geopolitical considerations influence interpretations of non-recognition by 
Abkhazian decision-makers, which in turn shape the foreign policy of Abkhazia. 
The core question of the chapter was how its identity manifests itself in foreign 
policy. In it, I also outlined the main foreign policy constraints and capabilities, the 
foreign policy objectives that Abkhazia pursues and the means it uses.  
I started out by looking at the state identity of Abkhazia and traced Morin & 
Paquin's four elements of national identity (constitutive norms, comparative 
categories, collective aspirations and cognitive references), I examined apswara 
as a set of constitutive norms, pointing out the importance of honour for the 
Abkhaz identity. Although previous research (Costello 2015; Shesterinina 2014; 
Hewitt 1999) has put emphasis on apswara and the Abkhaz culture, these were 
never considered key to understanding Abkhazia’s foreign relations. However, as 
my interviews have confirmed, apswara importantly shapes the perspectives of 
Abkhaz policy-makers. Next, I examined how kin, diaspora, minorities in 
Abkhazia and other important actors (Georgia, Russia) as well as the 
international community function as comparative categories. The main takeaway 
from this part is that as comparative categories (which act like mirrors in which its 
own identity is reflected), relations with Abkhazia’s North Caucasian kin and with 
Georgia, are of large significance, even if there is very little interaction. Further, 
with concepts of stigma, shame, and (self-)isolation, I analysed the aspiration to 
recognition and the aspiration to engagement as the core collective aspirations 
of Abkhazia. By doing so I have tried to fill the gap in the literature on how lack or 
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presence of recognition and engagement affects the mindsets of foreign policy 
decision-makers in de facto states. Some of the key empirical insights here were 
vacillation between a sense of fatalism and sour grapes by some Abkhazian 
policy-makers that suggest that non-recognition can act as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (this is further discussed in this chapter). In the next section, I examined 
the media, and cartographical representations. My interviews have confirmed a 
heavy dependence on Russian media, which acts as a filter through which reality 
is perceived. The empirical data also confirmed Kabachnik’s (2012) account of 
cartographic representations as a source of anxiety and the extent of politization 
of place names. The key findings in the section where I discussed normality 
through modelling and mimicry, are based on field observations rather than 
interview data. I examined the performative function of trappings of statehood 
that serve to project the image of a normal, responsible and ‘recognizable’ state. 
I concluded my exposition of the identity of Abkhazia by discussing the 
geopolitical roles it plays as a way of attempting to maintain both physical and 
ontological security. The main takeaway from this chapter, based on interviews 
in Abkhazia as well as on my research in Chechnya (Jakša 2017) is that in trying 
to maintain ontological security, de facto states sometimes go as far as 
compromising their physical security and even their existence. In fact, it is only 
through the perspective of ontological security that such seemingly ‘irrational’ 
behaviour can be explained. 
In analysing foreign policy constraints and capabilities, I squared accounts from 
the existing literature (Frear 2014, Smith 2018, Comai 2018) with insights from 
my fieldwork. I discovered non-recognition to be one of (important, but not the 
only one) constraining factor alongside the lack of strategy, dependence on 
Russia, and lack of resources. Unsurprisingly, the MFA proved to be the central 
institution for the conduct of Abkhazia’s foreign policy, but its resources and 
staffing leave much to be desired. Interviews with MFA officials revealed the 
conflation of legal and social recognition (which is further discussed in this 
chapter) and a close relationship between the MFA and the Abkhaz media, which 
indicates that much of foreign policy is also directed domestically, confirming the 
earlier stated notion that in de facto states, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are less strictly 
separated than in other states; that foreign relations are often a matter of 
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domestic politics and vice versa. Regarding the question of Abkhazia’s foreign 
policy coordination with Russia, my Abkhaz interlocutors were keen to stress that 
only some issues are coordinated, and that Abkhazia has “its own course.” 
Concerning the objectives of Abkhazian foreign policy, the interviews confirmed 
a shift from the main goal of obtaining recognition to short-term objectives (seen 
as “more realistic”) of forging other links, especially expanding trade. Opinions of 
elites on this matter varied, ranging from insistence on recognition as the most 
important goal to considering “engagement more important than recognition” and 
finally to considering recognition “a dream but not a goal”. Another key empirical 
insight in relation to this was the existence of quite different visions of Abkhazia’s 
foreign policy. For instance, when asked about the proactiveness of their foreign 
policy, the Abkhaz policy-makers mostly talked about the constraints to being pro-
active. While the then-acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Chirikba saw 
the constraint in the disinterest of the international community to engage, the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Gvinjia also saw constraints in the lack 
of purpose, ideas and a clear vision on the Abkhazian side. 
In Chapter 5, I looked more closely at the Russian-Abkhaz relations in relation to 
Russia’s wider geopolitical considerations, such as its relations with Georgia, the 
EU, the US, and the situation in the North Caucasus. As in the previous chapter, 
I looked at both internal factors (national identity and domestic politics) and the 
international context to examine how Russia perceives and interprets its 
relationship with Abkhazia and how this shapes the relationship itself. By drawing 
on Tsygankov (2016) and Morozov (2015), my analysis focused on the role of 
honour and ontological security in Russian foreign policy. Due to lack of empirical 
data, I have relied more on process-tracing through literature review and 
document analysis, giving the chapter a more chronological structure. 
First, I traced Russia’s ontological security to cultural and historic factors, 
including the fluctuating and often ambiguous relationship with the West in which 
Russia has historically sought ontological security through both othering and 
maintaining relationship routines. One key finding from this historical excavation 
was that even such processes as NATO expansion were not in the mid-1990s 
seen by Russian policy-makers (including realists) as military but as 
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psychological problems, pointing to the relevance of the perspective of 
ontological security for the analysis of Russia’s foreign policy. Next, as Russian 
decision-makers have repeatedly themselves pointed out (most notably Putin), I 
identified the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing period of transition, as 
a key period in which the roots of modern Russian foreign policy must be sought. 
In this historically 'thick' period, Russia lost its former imperial lands – and with it 
its status and honour – while acquiring the problem of millions of Russians 
stranded in now foreign lands in which Russia consequently developed strong 
interests, eventually conceptualizing them as its ‘near abroad’. One of the key 
insights here is the complexity of domestic political situation and the diverse views 
regarding strategic matters. The ideological divisions between the 
Liberals/Westernizers, the Centrists/Conservatives, and the 
Statists/Civilizationists, which I have supported with the statements of 
Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Kozyrev, serve to remind us how different the domestic 
politics and foreign policy-making in Russia was then.  
A key insight, most clearly visible in the 1991-1999 period is that Russian-Abkhaz 
relations were a mere function of Russia’s relations with other actors, most 
importantly Chechnya, Georgia, the US and the EU. It is often forgotten today, 
even by the de facto state scholars, that Russia was largely supportive of Georgia 
through the 1990s and Abkhazia remained effectively without a patron state, and 
under a Russian embargo up to the 2000s. Tracing Russian foreign policy 
through time, I observed that in the 1990s the North Caucasian vector was of 
major importance especially due to the war with Chechnya and continued to 
matter in the early 2000s as a point of US-Russian cooperation in fighting 
terrorism, declining in importance in the later 2000s. Just the opposite proved to 
be the case in Russia’s relations with the EU and the US – Russia didn’t object 
to their presence in the region (in which it was too weak to defend its own 
interests) in 1990s but pushed back with increasing strength in 2000s. Between 
1999 and 2008 Russian-Abkhaz relations changed radically due to domestic 
political changes in Russia and Georgia and the consequent change in Russian-
Georgian relations. Another takeaway from my analysis is that the Russian-
Abkhaz relationship – often seen as either static (full dependence) or linear (ever-
growing dependence) – have fluctuated significantly with time, not because of 
 
246 
 
Russia's relations with other actors, but also due to local dynamics, including the 
willingness and capacity of Abkhazian political elites and civil society to push back 
when they saw Abkhazia's core interests being threatened. Although Russia has 
consolidated its hegemony over Abkhazia, instances of successful resistance 
(such as to the initial version of the Agreements on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Support in 2014) show that it does not amount to domination that some 
suggest and that the term ‘occupied territories’ referring to Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, would imply. An important insight here is that the ever-closer ties and 
continuing international isolation of Abkhazia represent a threat to Abkhazia's 
ontological security through the blending of identities (most residents of Abkhazia 
own Russian passports, depend on Russian financial assistance, and speak 
more Russian than Abkhazian). This suggests that if it wants to maintain its 
ontological security and preserve its identity, Abkhazia will have to carefully 
balance Russian influence by interacting with other international actors. In doing 
so, it may be forced to make compromises.190 It is not clear if Russian policy-
makers are aware of this Abkhazian dilemma, but interviews with Russian officials 
have suggested that they understand that according recognition to Abkhazia was 
not just a legal recognition of statehood but carried an important symbolic weight 
as a recognition of their struggle in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, and the 
“recognition of their state-building efforts”.    
In Chapter 6, my aim was to present a multi-faceted account of the EU and the 
US engagement with Abkhazia. I directed my analysis along two axes, looking 
first at the different interests and actors involved. In the second part of the chapter 
I then gave a chronological account of engagement in which I tried to point to the 
similarities and differences between interests, actors, levels of engagement and 
the engagement strategies of the EU and the US. 
Once again, I structured my chapter by my argument to explore the relations 
between the interpretations of non-recognition and foreign policy behaviour, in 
this case EU and US engagement of Abkhazia. The results of my research show 
                                            
190 It is not likely that Abkhazia could be pushed to a compromise going against its de facto 
statehood or physical security. However, it is not inconceivable that it may try to appeal to the EU 
and the US by taking on a more constructive role in the GID, for instance. 
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significant differences in EU and US interests in Abkhazia, which are largely a 
function of their interests in South Caucasus as a whole. The US was more 
involved in the region than the EU in the early 1990s and gradually expanded its 
interests from resources (oil) access to security (counter-terrorism), but its 
interest declined in the second half of 2000s. The EU got off to a late start due to 
internal (the EU itself was only founded in 1993) and external factors (more 
pressing conflicts in the Balkans, closer to its borders) but became progressively 
more involved throughout 2000s, overtaking the US as a chief mediator. One of 
the insights is that the internal diversity of the EU in terms of differences between 
member states and the EU institutions, is reflected outward. I have outlined 
several factors that influence the member states' attitudes towards Abkhazia, 
among them: size, influence, geographical location, relations with Russia, and 
presence of separatism within their own borders. Among the EU institutions, the 
European Commission along with the EEAS is most involved in engagement but 
prefers indirect engagement with several layers and actors between itself and 
Abkhazian de facto authorities. The European Parliament’s role in engagement 
is quite small but has more flexibility as delegations of MEPs can conduct 
‘goodwill visits’ without fears that this parliamentary diplomacy would cross any 
red lines. The Council of EU’s role is mostly political in mediating between conflict 
parties, which is probably why its mandate in relation to this remains unclear and 
it can use ‘constructive ambiguity’ to enlarge its manoeuvring space. An important 
insight that went against my expectations was that the EU institutions, which use 
stricter language are not necessarily more reluctant to engage. For instance, the 
EP is the only EU institution that refers to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as to 
'occupied territories', sent official delegations of MEPs to visit the de facto states. 
The main conclusion from the process tracing of engagement policies of the EU 
and the US is that there are several factors affecting the quantity and quality of 
engagement, including domestic politics in Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia the EU 
and the US (such as the political change in Abkhazia in 2014); international 
developments (such as the Arab Spring); enduring interests (such as US interest 
in securing access to oil); changing interests (growing interest in security after 
9/11); and last but not least, perception and conceptualization of status. 
Comparing the EU and the US involvement in Geneva International Discussions, 
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I have concluded that the lower profile of the US delegation allows for more 
flexibility in engagement compared to the EU delegation. Despite using harsher 
language of ‘occupied territories’ when referring to Abkhazia, US diplomats 
willingly engage with their de facto counterparts, while the EU diplomats do not. 
Berg and Pegg’s (2016) analysis of Wikileaks data has shown that there is more 
communication between the US and Abkhazia than one would assume and that 
the majority is not hostile. My interviews with EU and US officials as well as 
people involved in representing Abkhazia in the US, add to that and point to the 
fact that the Abkhazia was much more proactive in pursuing its foreign policy 
goals than is often assumed. This was true especially in the 2008-2010 period, 
which can be seen as a missed opportunity for engagement. Engagement was 
constrained by: 1) Russia playing the gatekeeper hampering international 
engagement with Abkhazia, 2) the inability of the EU and the US to coordinate 
and come up with a clear engagement policy, and 3) the gradual loss of interest 
of the EU and the US in Abkhazia amid more pressing concerns, such as the 
developments in the Arab world. However, a more surprising insight is that as the 
chances of conflict resolution decreased, EU and US engagement increased. A 
greater interest in engagement was also reflected in Abkhazia’s more confident 
foreign policy, which went against many predictions immediately after the 
Russian recognition that Abkhazia would become completely dependent on 
Russia. That this dependence gradually increased can be attributed to the above-
mentioned constraints to engagement, but also to the self-fulfilling prophecy in 
which constant references to Abkhazia as an occupied territory and puppet state 
only served to isolate and stigmatise Abkhazia, downplay its agency, and 
eventually contributed to making it more dependent on Russia. 
One consistent thread in my thesis has been the focus on state identity as 
composed of geopolitical and national identity, with the latter rooted in culture. 
This has been especially obvious in Chapters 4 and 5 on Abkhazia’s foreign 
policy and Russian-Abkhaz relations, respectively. For several reasons,191 
                                            
191 Firstly, it is was not possible to discuss the national identity of the supra-national EU. Instead, 
this chapter examined the multi-faceted identity of the EU as it manifests through its institutions. 
Secondly, while it is certainly possible to discuss the US national identity and ontological security 
in depth, Abkhazia is of a marginal concern in US foreign policy and does not engage its identity 
in a way the US-Russian relations do. Indeed, it is often claimed that the outcome of the August 
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Chapter 6 focused less on identity and ontological security and more on interest 
and geopolitical role. In the next section, I connect empirical data to these 
concepts defined in my theoretical framework and connect the concepts between 
each other to provide a comprehensive and consistent answer to my research 
questions. 
Answering the research questions 
The initial research question I started my thesis with was: How do interpretations 
of non-recognition influence the foreign policy interactions between Abkhazia and 
recognised actors in the international community: Russia, the EU and the US? I 
then made two research hypotheses. The first one states that interpretation of 
non-recognition (by both de facto states as well as recognised actors) depends 
on both the internal situation in the de facto state and the wider geopolitical 
context in which it exists. The second states that interpretation of non-recognition 
(by both de facto states as well as recognised actors) shapes their interaction: 
the foreign policy of de facto state, counter-recognition strategies of the parent 
state, support of the patron and engagement by the international community. The 
third hypothesis, which has remained implicit throughout much of my research, 
has become more obvious during my fieldwork and can be stated in this way: 
Abkhazia (and I believe this can be generalised to most other de facto states as 
well), faces a security dilemma regarding both its parent and patron state: What 
has it gained if it wrested the territory from the parent state (Georgia) but lost its 
de facto independence to its patron (Russia), if it gained physical security, but 
lost its ontological security in the process? 
                                            
2008 War can be explained with Russia having a much stronger interest in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as part of its ‘near abroad’ than either the US or the EU. Additionally, the US interest in 
the Caucasus has been of much more practical nature and largely limited to energy (acquiring 
access to Azerbaijani oil) and security (supply logistics related to the War in Afghanistan, anti-
terrorism, equipping and training of the Georgian military). Thirdly, while the Russian and the EU 
interests in Abkhazia are more diversified and could both be analysed along the plane of 
culture/identity and geopolitics/interest, after a literature review, one gets an impression that 
Russia is predominantly a Realpolitik actor and the EU a normative actor. Due to that perceived 
imbalance, I strove to focus on the under-analysed ‘other side’ of both actors, focusing on how 
Russian culture, history, and identity informed its foreign policy towards Abkhazia and looking at 
EU’s engagement with Abkhazia from the vantage point of EU’s geopolitical interests in the 
region. 
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As I stated in Chapter 1, the scholarship on de facto states has hitherto not 
explored the issues of state identity and the meaning of (non-)recognition at great 
depth. They were mostly taken for granted although their unpacking is crucial for 
understanding the interplay between identity and interaction. While the physical 
security cannot be overestimated as a concern for de facto states and geopolitical 
interests cannot be overestimated as drivers of great power competition in the 
Eurasian borderlands, I believe that the literature on de facto states has so far 
largely neglected the fact that de facto states are unrecognised by virtue of 
interpretation – even stigmatisation. The way they are perceived, conceptualised, 
and interpreted shapes the way they are interacted with. As existing approaches 
were unsatisfactory, I introduced my own conceptual framework composed of 
state identity, ontological security and geopolitical role which I operationalised 
into analytical categories and used during process tracing and elite interviews. I 
have already hinted at some answers in the empirical chapters and in the 
preceding section while presenting the key insights from my research. In this 
section, I draw on philosophical and psychological theory to not only help make 
sense of and interpret the empirical results but also construct bridges between 
different theoretical concepts (‘thick’ and ‘thin’ recognition, for instance)192 and 
perspectives (constructivism and realism). Drawing on Hegel, who introduced the 
notion of ‘recognition’ into Western thought, and on Laing who coined the term 
‘ontological security’, this represents a hermeneutical movement between the 
empirical context and back to the roots of the concepts I use. Both thinkers have 
developed their respective concepts in complex contexts that have later been 
marginalized or their concepts have been analytically reduced. Returning to the 
original expositions serves the purpose of performing a synthesis – in the case of 
Hegel between social and legal recognition, and in the case of Laing between the 
ontological security of the person and the state. 
  
                                            
192 Fabry (2017, 24) makes a distinction between thin and thick recognition in this way: “'Thin' or 
'legal' recognition refers to the external acknowledgment of a subject having a specific formal 
status or personality within a community of law, whereas 'thick' or 'social' recognition refers to the 
outside acknowledgment of particular non-formal character, standing, rank, or position within a 
larger social setting. Recognition of the corporate identity as a state is a former type of recognition, 
recognition of the national identity of a people a latter type.” 
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The self-fulfilling prophecy of mis-recognition and 
objectification 
International legal recognition and (mis-)recognition in international relations are, 
as has been suggested in the Introduction, different phenomena but the 
difference is, I argue in this section, in degree not in kind. De facto states studies 
have so far largely ignored the literature on ‘thick’, social recognition at its peril. 
Daase (2015, 3) makes a direct link between (mis)recognition and interaction: 
“‘Recognition’, or its negative counterpart, ‘misrecognition’, is relevant wherever 
people or their collective organizations interact – or fail to interact. Individuals and 
collective political actors seek recognition of certain qualities, positive 
characteristics, competencies, achievements, or of their status within a specific 
group of people, a society, a political system, or the international political realm.” 
Although social rather than legal recognition is meant here, we can connect (non-
)recognition and engagement in the same way as both depend on perception of 
the status and qualities of the individual or state in question. In fact, social 
recognition precedes legal recognition in sense that recognizing a state as 
unviable, dependent, criminal, and irresponsible can prevent it from legally 
recognizing it as independent. This is even more likely when a state is not only 
stigmatised but objectified, depersonalised and stripped of agency – which is 
what I examine in this section. 
While legal recognition is preoccupied with status, ignoring identity and 
interaction, social recognition is only interested in identity and interaction, and 
takes no interest in legal status. The first operates on the international level, while 
the other operates on almost exclusively national or sub-national level.193 It 
would, however be wrong to see the two recognitions as complete opposites. 
Daase (2015, 16) suggests “that recognition should be conceived of as a gradual 
process. Recognition and non-recognition are not clear-cut alternatives but occur 
in complex and entangled forms and constitute two poles on a long continuum of 
policies and outcomes. This continuum runs from highly formalized to extremely 
                                            
193 “While much of the politics of recognition has focused on minority cultures and immigrant 
groups, there has been little investigation of recognition beyond the borders of the liberal state 
whence those groups originated. What international recognition could and should mean is very 
much an open question” (McBride & Seglow 2009, 11). 
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informal modes of recognition, and from the recognition of non-state actors and 
other political collectives as legitimate negotiating partners to the recognition of 
entities as sovereign states and as states with specific entitlements” (Daase et 
al. 2015,16). Legal and social recognition are not completely distinct poles, but 
part of the same continuum. Similarly, legal recognition itself is not a binary 
category, but a spectrum. Abkhazia is not completely unrecognised in either 
sense – it has acquired some legal recognitions and established some routinized 
forms of interaction outside the official confines of diplomatic relations. Given that 
legal and social recognition are part of the same spectrum, it is not surprising that 
policy makers themselves conflate the two. In several interviews, Abkhaz policy-
makers complained that their Western interlocutors “think” or “pretend” that “we 
do not exist”. This begs the question whether the EU policy-makers, for instance, 
really believe that or that the Abkhaz merely think the Europeans perceive them 
as such. What matters is that the way Abkhazia is (not) engaged, importantly 
shapes its perception, identity, its experience of (non-)recognition, and the (non-
)recogniser. 
Recognition is much more ambiguous than it seems. Although it has a positive 
meaning, it can have negative consequences for the one on which it is bestowed. 
If a witness recognises someone as a murderer in the courtroom, the latter can 
get convicted. Recognition can result in “a misconstruing of the self or a reification 
of a fixed and putative identity, instead of liberation or progress. Hence, 
recognition is also a technology of social differentiation that establishes layers of 
legitimacy and social hierarchies” (Daase et al. 2015, 8). Both recognition and 
misrecognition can have positive and negative consequences, the difference is 
in intent – recognition is always done in good and misrecognition in bad faith. 
Broers (2015, 2), who is one of the few scholars of de facto states that has 
considered the wider implications of (mis)recognition, claims that “beyond non-
recognition, both the detractors and advocates of de facto states in the post-
Soviet space engage vigorously in a politics of mis-recognition, inviting audiences 
to mis-recognise these spaces as something they are not, or are only to partial, 
arguable and variable extents.” Russia, which has recognised Abkhazia, closely 
engages with it to the extent that the latter fears becoming overdependent. 
Georgia, from which Abkhazia seceded, engages (and often mis-engages) with 
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a mixture of threats and incentives aiming at future re-incorporation. The EU and 
the US exhibit non-engagement, engagement, and mis-engagement in their 
attempt to resolve the conflict, implicitly or explicitly in favour of maintaining 
Georgia’s territorial integrity. 
Examples of mis-recognition of Abkhazia goes back to 1990s, when it was, along 
with other post-Soviet de facto states, seen a criminal zone or a warlord-run black 
hole. Although the perceptions have changed, attempts to mis-recognise and 
thus stigmatise it, have been made repeatedly, most obviously by employing the 
term ‘occupied territories’. Such objectification or reification is at the core of 
international community’s (non-)engagement of de facto states. They are seen 
as ‘objects’ and parts of another state and not as ‘subjects’ representing a whole 
unit and possessing individual agency. In this sense, we can understand 
ontological insecurity as an existential anxiety of being viewed as an object – of 
being denied not just legal recognition, but all recognition and with it the right to 
exist. Objectification impedes engagement and the (largely unconscious) 
dilemma of engagement without recognition is: how to engage with an actor 
without losing sight of the fact that it is really an object, an occupied territory or at 
best a breakaway entity? Is engaging with an ‘occupied territory’194 not akin to 
speaking to someone’s doll? For Laing, the schizoid vocabulary of psychiatry 
produces not only diagnoses but creates split personalities. In a similar way, the 
objectifying,195 depersonalising, othering and stigmatizing vocabulary not only 
produces unrecognised states, but creates isolated, ontologically insecure, and 
dependent actors. The stigmatizing diagnoses (unrecognised state) becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: treating an actor as if completely dependent and isolating 
them eventually drives the actor towards dependence (in the case of Abkhazia 
on Russia), even against resistance (in case of Abkhazia exhibited roughly in the 
period 2008-2010 when multi-vector foreign policy and expressly stated 
willingness to engage served to showcase its actorness and demanded to be 
                                            
194 While most scholars have taken issue with the ‘occupied’ part of ‘occupied territory”, which 
downplays Abkhazia’s agency and paints it as fully dependent if not for all intents and purposes 
absorbed into Russia – I believe the term “territory” is much more noxious as it implies not a 
downplaying of agency but a complete lack of subjectivity. 
195 Later in the book, Laing (2010, 46) calls “petrification” the specific kind of objectification “where 
one negates the other person’s autonomy, ignores its feelings, regards him as a thing.” This 
seems even more appropriate for states, as petrification literally turns a state into a rock/territory. 
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treated as a subject). Laing (2010, 23) notes that “people who experience 
themselves as automata, as robots, as bits of machinery, or even as animals” are 
“rightly regarded as crazy” but asks “why do we not regard a theory that seeks to 
transmute persons into automata or animals equally crazy?” Why is it not 
legitimate to exist without recognition, but legitimate for recognised actors to 
reproduce the notion that non-recognition equals non-existence discursively 
(stigmatization) and behaviourally (isolation)? 
Depersonalisation and indifference are quite distinct however. In the words of 
Laing (2010, 76), “the depersonalized person can be used, manipulated, acted 
upon /…/ A person minus subjectivity can still be important. A thing can still matter 
a great deal. Indifference denies to persons and to things their significance.” The 
difference between depersonalization and indifference reminds us of the 
difference between mis-recognition and non-recognition in Hegel’s Master-Slave 
dialectics. Depersonalisation is a form of mis-recognition that serves to 
subjugate, while indifference is a form of non-recognition that serves to exclude 
or isolate. I argue that Georgia treats Abkhazia with depersonalization and the 
US discursively adopts the same approach, however both the EU and the US 
treat Abkhazia with a mixture of both. The actors who treat Abkhazia with 
complete ignorance/indifference, are the states and international organisations 
which have never had any interactions with it. We can assume that to be the 
majority of the international community. Despite Abkhaz grievances against the 
West, EU and US engagement serves a vital function in holding a mirror to 
Abkhazia for it to observe its existence. Mystification of de facto states further 
serves to cover up their agency: “In order for transpersonal invalidation to work 
[…] it is advisable to overlay it with a thick patina of mystification” (Laing 1990, 
31). They are not subjects with their own experiences, but objects to be 
experienced. For instance, Soviet Tours, a travel agency specialized for post-
Soviet packaged tours that mostly caters to a more adventurous type of traveler, 
uses these words in describing its Abkhazian tours: little-known, remote, 
secretive, unusual, magical (Soviet Tours website). 
Reading Laing, it seems that we only need to substitute “person” for “state”, 
“body” and “biological” with “territory” and “territorial” and he is talking of de facto 
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states – their struggles for recognition, their struggles with ontological insecurity. 
When he discusses a child at birth, he might as well have been talking about a 
new state being born and its struggles for recognition – of being born not only 
biologically (having its own territory) but also existentially:  
“There it is, a new baby, a new biological entity, already with its own ways, 
real and alive, from our point of view. But what of the baby’s point of view? 
Under usual circumstances, the physical birth of a new living organism into 
the world inaugurates rapidly ongoing processes whereby within an 
amazingly short time the infant feels real and alive and has a sense of 
being an entity, with continuity of location and space. In short, physical 
birth and biological aliveness are followed by the baby becoming 
existentially born as real and alive. Usually this development is taken for 
granted and affords the certainty upon which all other certainties depend. 
This is to say, not only do adults see children to be real biologically viable 
entities but they experience themselves as whole persons who are real 
and alive” (Laing 2010, 41).  
The situation of the de facto state is inverse: it is convinced that it exists but is 
faced with the denial and ignorance of others. This reminds one of an old 
Lacanian joke often retold by Žižek in his lectures, about a man admitted to a 
mental institution for believing that he is a seed of grain. After a lengthy but 
ultimately successful therapy, he is released but returns the next day, shaking 
and obviously terrified. He tells the doctor that a chicken is after him to which the 
doctor responds: “But now you know that you are not a seed of grain”. The man, 
unphased by the doctor’s reply, responds: “Yes, of course. But does the chicken 
know that?” De facto states face the same dilemma: they laboriously and 
ostentatiously engage in state-building to assure themselves and others that they 
are indeed states but after an ultimately long and successful process, when faced 
with the outside world, are faced with the hungry chicken which is not convinced 
of their statehood. It does not matter here if the hungry chicken who believes that 
the individual in question is a seed (or an aggressive state that seeks to re-
incorporate a breakaway territory and believes it does not really exist apart from 
itself) really exists or is a product of the individual’s/de facto state’s imagination. 
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As the Thomas theorem states, things individuals believe in, are real in their 
consequences. In an ontologically insecure actor, a chicken with an open beak 
or a talk about liberating the ‘occupied territories’ – even if not intended as a threat 
– might produce a sense of fear and anxiety. This eventually manifests in siege 
mentality and reluctance to interact with actors that tend to down play its agency 
– which is then conveniently interpreted as lack of agency. 
Ontological security and its defence mechanisms 
R.D. Laing’s basic purpose was, in his own words: “to make madness, and the 
process of going mad, comprehensible” (Laing 2010, 9). In a similar vein, my 
purpose is to make seemingly irrational decisions of Abkhazia,196 and the process 
of arriving at them, comprehensible. That is, not to rationalize and explain them 
away, but to understand their inner logic, why and how they come about. To do 
so, I first discuss Abkhazia’s ontological security dilemma and then analyse how 
it tries to preserve its ontological security through 1) the defence mechanisms of 
maintaining routines, and the 'sour grapes' - ambition management for the 
preservation of honour; 2) preserving the identity of the Abkhaz nation by building 
an ethnocracy domestically; and 3) playing geopolitical roles to avoid the 
extremes of isolation and overdependence. I look at 1) and 2) in this section and 
3) in the context of interaction between isolation and overdependence in the next. 
According to Laing (2010, 39), ontological security is: “a sense of /…/ presence 
in the world as real, alive, whole and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person.” 
An ontologically secure person will “encounter all the hazards of life, social, 
ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and other 
people’s reality and identity” (Laing 2010, 39).197 According to Laing (2010, 37), 
                                            
196 One such decision that is often seen as irrational, is Abkhazia’s insistence to engage on its 
own terms and on an equal footing. From a perspective that looks at Abkhazia through a prism of 
mis-recognition, objectification, and stigma, the decision is absurd as ‘beggars can’t be choosers’. 
Abkhaz delegation’s protest departure from the GID or Abkhazia’s turning down a Chinese 
investment are only seen as irrational in an irrational gaze. 
197 This understanding is very close to the stoic attitude (often conceptualized by ethical but as 
much ontological) to life and the ability to cope with whatever it throws at us. What is equally 
important here, is that ontological security is conceptualized as personal and interpersonal: 
“sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity.” Later in this chapter, I make an 
argument that it would make more sense to conceptualize this interpersonal sense of reality as 
part of epistemogical security. 
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a “truth” about an “existential position” is “lived out”. In this sense, de facto states 
are existentialist subjects through their ‘lived experience’ of ‘being in-the-world’. 
In Laing’s (2010, 40) analysis of Kafka’s The Process,198 “long before the 
sentence is executed, even long before the malign legal process is even 
instituted, something terrible has been done to the accused /…/ he has been 
stripped of all that is becoming to a man except his abstract humanity, which like 
a skeleton, never is quite becoming to a man. He is without parents, home, wife, 
child, commitment, or appetite; he has no connection with power, beauty, love, 
wit, courage, loyalty, or fame, and the pride that may be taken in these.” Have de 
facto states not been subjected to the same treatment even before the legal 
process (of conflict resolution negotiations) has been instituted? Stripped of all 
that is becoming to a state, depersonalized and objectified, denied not only 
statehood, but actorness. Worse, they were denied a separate identity and with 
it any ability to express and behave in their own unique way. They were guilty for 
existing even before the process started. 
In such state of “primary ontological insecurity” when there is “partial or almost 
complete absence of assurances derived from an existential position” and in 
which “anxieties and dangers” arise (Laing 2010, 39), “the ordinary 
circumstances of everyday life constitute a continual and deadly threat” (Laing 
2010, 42). An individual who does not feel secure in himself “can no more live in 
a ‘secure’ world”. In other worlds, to the state, which is not ontologically secure, 
the world itself also appears hostile and threatening. Left to their own devices, de 
facto states tend to create their own world by recognizing and establishing 
relations with other de facto states. Faced with inability to become part of 
international organizations, they establish and join surrogate organisations, such 
as the UNPO or CONIFA. According to Laing (2010, 43): 
                                            
198 In fact, Laing first mentions instances of ontological insecurity in relation to art (and in 
particular, literature) rather than in clinical practice: Kafka (The Process), Beckett (Waiting for 
Godot). It is also interesting that his first use of the term ontological security is in the negative – 
ontological insecurity, which is also the title of one of the chapters in The Divided Self (2010). It 
is often easier to define the pathological through symptoms as it is to point out the characteristics 
of the normal, it seems easier to show how lack of ontological security looks like then how an 
ontologically secure state does. In fact, we rarely think of security from the position of security; for 
most actors it becomes an issue only retrospectively after it is gone. 
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“What are to most people everyday happenings, which are hardly noticed 
because they have no special significance, may become deeply significant 
in so far as they either contribute to the sustenance of the individual’s being 
or threaten him with non-being. Such an individual for whom, the elements 
of the world are coming to have or have come to have, a different hierarchy 
of significance from that of the ordinary person, is beginning, as we say, to 
‘live in a world of his own’.”  
Surrounding themselves with actors that accept them as states and do not 
impinge on their subjectivity, serves the purpose preserving increasing 
ontological security through interaction with others: “In the face of being treated 
as an ‘it’, his own subjectivity drains away from him like blood from the face. 
Basically he requires constant confirmation from others of his own existence as 
a person” (Laing 2010, 46–47). This confirmation of existence is sought through 
routines – or what Smith (2018) has called ‘social moves.’ These may be deprived 
of any meaningful content or conducted with actors of minor significance to 
Abkhazia, but they serve as a mirror in which de facto states can see itself as 
existing in the world. 
Another defence mechanism adopted by an isolated, ontologically insecure 
individual, is to pretend or to convince itself not to want something it does (such 
as recognition or engagement). It does so because not getting something one 
has staked their honour to, would compromise its honour and hence ontological 
security: “The isolation of the self is a corollary, therefore, of the need to be in 
control. He prefers to steal, rather than to be given. He prefers to give rather than 
have anything, as he feels, stolen from him; i.e. he has to be in control of who or 
what comes into him, and of who or what leaves him. This defensive system is 
elaborated, we suggest, to make up for the primary lack of ontological security” 
(Laing 2010, 83). Abkhazian policy makers often prefer to pretend not to want 
recognition than to be seen begging for it. They prefer to reject engagement than 
risk others stop engaging with them first. Recognition, although mostly stated as 
the main goal of Abkhaz foreign policy, is often immediately downplayed: “we do 
not care for recognition of anybody, because we recognise ourselves. To create 
a state, you do not need international relations” (Interview with Viacheslav 
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Chirikba). Sour grapes are a way of dealing with contradictory impulses, a 
vacillation between an object of desire and sense of fatalism. This has roots both 
in its culture in which preserving honour is extremely important as well as in its 
precarious international status and its specific existential experience of it. 
Non-recognition (both social and legal) is not the only source of ontological 
insecurity of Abkhazia, but it compounds the perception of Georgia and Russia 
as threats (discussed below). Furthermore, the Abkhaz feel threatened not only 
from outside, but also from within – they barely account for half of the population, 
and even these figures are by the Abkhazian government, so they may be 
exaggerated. Even worse, the great majority of people in Abkhazia (and many 
Abkhaz themselves) do not know the Abkhaz language. Ethnocracy has been an 
ongoing attempt to preserve the bedrock of Abkhaz nationhood.  
Interaction between isolation and engulfment 
A dilemma de facto states face when they wrest the territory from the parent state 
but lose their de facto independence to their patron – when they gain security but 
lose their identity in the process – has been briefly mentioned in the theoretical 
framework. As can be observed in the empirical chapters and will be elaborated 
here, this dilemma has been empirically validated and represents the crux of 
Abkhazia’s foreign policy, which has vacillated between the strategies of multi-
vector foreign policy and patron reliance, and the defence mechanism of self-
isolation. The choice of the strategy depends on domestic and international 
factors, often difficult to disentangle in de facto states where the borders between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are more effaced. According to Laing (2010, 44), “a firm 
sense of one’s own autonomous identity is required in order that one may be 
related as one human being to another. Otherwise, any and every relationship 
threatens the individual with loss of identity. One form this takes can be called 
engulfment. In this the individual dreads relatedness as such, with anyone or 
anything or, indeed, even with himself, because his uncertainty about the stability 
of his autonomy lays him open to the dread lest in any relationship he will lose 
his autonomy and identity.” Abkhazia’s fear of Russia and their close – at times 
too close and smothering – relationship of dependence demonstrates this fear of 
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engulfment. To quote Laing (2010, 404) further: “The main maneuver used to 
preserve identity under pressure from the dread of engulfment is isolation. Thus, 
instead of the polarities of separateness and relatedness based on individual 
autonomy, there is the antithesis between complete loss of being by absorption 
into the other person (engulfment), and complete aloneness (isolation)” (Laing 
2010, 44).  
This is the dilemma faced by Abkhazia in relation to Russia: either rely on Russia 
for physical security and become engulfed ontologically or self-isolate and make 
itself vulnerable to future Georgian attempts (with tacit support of the international 
community) to re-integrate it. This dilemma tends to become more acute as it is 
cast in Manichean terms: “the polarity is between complete isolation or complete 
merging of identity rather than between separateness and relatedness” (Laing 
2010, 53). Either Abkhazia be an ignored outcast or face the disappearance of 
its identity (either by being overly dependent on Russia and gradually Russified 
or by being re-incorporated into Georgia and Georganised). These are not 
fictional scenarios as the Abkhaz have been subject to both Russification and 
Georgianisation before (see historical context in Chapter 2). When diversification 
of relations is possible, such as in the 2008-2010 window, Abkhazia has been 
keen to pursue it as a strategy of avoiding engulfment. When, however, this 
option is not available, compromising with the parent state or isolation are the 
only other options. As the first one is often untenable for domestic political 
reasons, isolation is all what was left to Abkhazia through much of the 1990s, 
when Russia was largely supportive of Georgia and Abkhazia remained 
effectively without a patron state, under a Russian embargo into the 2000s. 
Richards & Smith (2015, 175) argue that non-recognition and isolation can have 
benefits and act as a “sandbox”, providing “the space and flexibility for states to 
develop institutions and nations, identities, and capabilities, before being 
surrounded by the complications and responsibilities of recognised statehood.” 
Isolation, although not the first choice, is often an instinctive one – a safe space 
a de facto withdraws into to regain its resilience: “isolation does force a degree of 
self-reliance before external engagement is undertaken, creating a possibility of 
a more resilient state emerging if recognition is granted” (ibid.). However, Laing 
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(2010, 114), who could just as well be talking about de facto states, reminds us 
that isolation is not sustainable in the long run: “He can be himself in safety only 
in isolation, albeit with a sense of emptiness and unreality. With others, he plays 
an elaborate game of pretence and equivocation. His social self is felt to be false 
and futile. What he longs for most is the possibility of ‘a moment of recognition’.” 
Attaining Recognition and avoiding overdependence are two goals de facto 
states strive towards using the strategies of multi-vector foreign policy and, patron 
reliance, and when none of these is available, resorting to the defence 
mechanism of self-isolation. I further analyse the functioning of these strategies 
in the next section by drawing on geopolitical role. 
Abkhazia’s geopolitical role: between being and playing 
a state 
De facto states are states. But since they lack international recognition, they are 
only states for themselves (and perhaps a few recognisers), not for others. 
Therefore, they are not only states, but they also play at being states. Being 
something and playing at something differ in the degree of authenticity/falseness. 
To be is to be in an own way but to play is to play a role – it is to present a 
stereotypical image of a state. De-facto states can be said to behave in what 
Sartre described as ‘bad faith’. In other words, when they play at being states, 
they over-play their role and consequently expose cracks in their statehood.199 A 
false self “arises in compliance with the intentions and expectations of the other, 
or with what are imagined to be the other’s intentions or expectations” (Laing 
2010, 98). For instance, immediately after the recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia 
was trying to play up its independence, state-building, and democratization efforts 
as it felt an expectation from the international community (and especially the EU 
and the US) to present itself as a responsible actor who ‘deserves’ recognition. 
                                            
199 Sartre (1993, 167–169) illustrates the concept of bad faith by giving an example of a waiter 
who tries his best to emulate the behaviour of (other) waiters. His behaviour, rather than 
appearing natural, seems exaggerated, which is precisely the evidence that he is acting. Another 
example would be a dictator who tries to present himself as a legitimate leader by rigging elections 
to win with a majority of over 90%. It is precisely the unbelievably high popularity that undermines 
our belief in not just his popularity, but also the democratic nature of the regime. 
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For a state to play a role, however, it needs to have a degree of self-
understanding: “The most basic element of a state’s identity is its self-
understanding: the domestic conception of the self that arises from domestic 
discourses and historical experience and determines which role the state wants 
to play in the international order” (Murray 2015, 70). The reverse is also true, as 
the Goffman (1990, 30) argued, “everyone is always and everywhere, more or 
less consciously, playing a role…It is in these roles that we know each other; it is 
in these roles that we know ourselves.” This completes the circle: self-
understanding serves as a basis for identity, the identity the basis for playing 
roles, through the roles individuals and states come to know and understand and 
recognise each other. To preserve their ontological security, avoid compromising 
their honour, becoming isolated or engulfed, they adopt strategies that depend 
on playing roles etc.200 
While discussions of identity, interaction, recognition and narratives may seem 
far removed from resource-based geopolitical view of international politics of 
classical realism, Lindemann (2012, 221) points out that “the quest for recognition 
is often quite strategic and reputation is a resource in the struggle for power.” This 
is the potential point of constructivist and realist convergence and the point where 
it is possible to connect recognition-seeking with the concept of the geopolitical 
role and with strategies of balancing and bandwagoning (Walt 1985). Insistence 
that de facto states play geopolitical roles instead of just roles, is not an attempt 
to bring in Realism and materiality into the mix at the last instance but is based 
on the typology or roles presented in Chapter 1 and the acknowledgment that 
interpretation of non-recognition depend both on internal factors as well as the 
geopolitical context. The typology outlined six roles played by de facto states: 
divider, middle man, tollman, extorter, keeper of the status quo, and emulator. 
The reason a typology is possible is that roles tend to become established over 
                                            
200 It is important to note that this is an epistemological and as such a hermeneutical circle. I argue 
that self-understanding is part of epistemological security and that a state can understand itself 
well, without others validating this self-understanding through recognition, the state can still be 
uncertain in its identity and therefore ontologically insecure. The previously quoted example of 
ostensibly not caring if others recognise Abkhazia, because they recognise themselves could be 
interpreted both as an extreme example of sour grapes (we cannot be recognised by others so 
we do not want it and it does not matter for us), but its' also an affirmation of epistemological 
security (we are sure of our existence, even if others are not – it's not an ontological problem, but 
an epistemological problem of others who are not able to see us for what we are). 
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time: “When an actor takes on an established social role, usually he finds that a 
particular front has already been established for it. Whether his acquisition of the 
role was primarily motivated by a desire to perform the given task or by a desire 
to maintain the corresponding front, the actor will find that he must do both” 
(Goffman 1990, 37). As I have mentioned, each de facto unrecognised state can 
play different roles at different times or even combine elements of several roles. 
This is achieved by ‘audience segregation’, which “that those before whom he 
plays one of his parts will not be the same individuals before whom he plays a 
different part in another setting” (Goffman 1990, 57). 
Empirical evidence suggests that Abkhazia played the role of the middle man in 
1990s, when isolated and under embargo. This is the role that enabled it to 
survive through smuggling over the porous Georgian-Abkhaz border, with the 
help of local elites in Krasnodar region and the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey. This 
was not a sustainable role as it did not allow for effective audience segregation, 
leaving Abkhazia with a negative reputation in the West. It also became untenable 
after the election of Saakashvili in 2004 when initiatives to eradicate, smuggling, 
black markets and corruption, made the Georgian-Abkhaz border much less 
permeable. There is some evidence that Abkhazia played the role of extorter vis-
à-vis Russia. This role was played more often as a self-defence tactic to what 
was seen as Russian encroachment on Abkhazia’s independence (when in 2014 
the draft Agreements on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support was 
leaked, forcing a renegotiation, for instance). There is even more evidence of 
Abkhazia playing the role of the keeper of the status quo in delaying Georgia’s 
integration in Euro-Atlantic frameworks. As such it is a thorn in Georgia’s foot and 
a trump card in Russia’s hand. Abkhazia combines the role of keeper of the status 
quo with the role of the divider most noticeably by hosting Russian military bases, 
representing a threat to Georgia and forcing it into significant military 
expenditures. By playing these two roles, it benefits from Russian protection, aid, 
and investment) in turn for their compliance. Georgia, in trying to convince 
Abkhazia to abandon this role, is itself providing incentives, such as free 
healthcare and education across the border. Finally, Abkhazia has all but 
abandoned its role of emulator, most prominently played in the 2008-2010 period 
to mimic recognised states and adopt international democracy and human rights 
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standards in order to gain recognition. This role has been played in front of EU 
and US interlocutors and audiences but was unsuccessful in achieving desired 
level of engagement (to say nothing of recognition), while becoming increasingly 
difficult to hide playing this role from the Russia gaze. 
Theoretical contribution 
This thesis presents several original theoretical contributions with applicability 
beyond de facto state studies. The most tangible analytical contribution is my 
typology of the roles de facto states play, while epistemological security 
(discussed later in this Chapter) might be the most original avenue of inquiry. The 
claim to originality of this thesis is based on a reflexive selection of a constructivist 
theoretical framework, which differs from most earlier studies od de facto states, 
grounded largely in implicit Realist assumptions.  
First, as mentioned in the Introduction, the approach is inspired by Wendt (1999) 
and novel in adopting a constructivist view of states as persons, examining (non-
)recognition not as a given, but as perceived, experienced, and socially 
constructed - as what states make of it. It is one of the very few studies (in addition 
to, in minor part Broers 2015 and Chernobrov 2017) that in discussing de facto 
states draw on both the scholarship on ‘thick’ recognition in the international 
relations and the ‘thin’ legal recognition of states. 
Second, while there has been some research on the identity of de facto states, 
looking at the nexus of identity and foreign policy of de facto states through an 
honour-centred perspective, is novel. While the field of de facto state studies 
seems to be going into the direction of large n-studies comparative studies and 
quantification, this contribution goes against the grain by drawing on 
ethnographic research (Hewitt 1999, Shesterinina 2014, Costello 2015, Smolnik 
& Weiss 2017) and producing a thick description of a single case study, which 
however offers many within-case comparisons. 
Third, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this research together with previous 
publications by the author (Jakša 2017), represent the first instance of the 
application of ontological security perspective to de facto states. An even more 
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original theoretical contribution is the recognition of the limits of ontological 
security as an analytical concept and perspective and the proposal for research 
into epistemological security as a complementary perspective of the constructivist 
view of international relations (discussed in this chapter in the section Avenues 
of further inquiry).  
Fourth, the thesis defines the concept of geopolitical role and introduces an 
original typology of geopolitical roles played by de facto states. In adopting and 
defining the concept of geopolitical role, it builds bridges between realist and 
constructivist theories of international relations to capture the impact of both 
internal and external, ideational and material factors that shape the interaction of 
de facto state with other actors.  
Overall the thesis has therefore developed a framework for explaining how non-
recognition is interpreted, which helps in understanding how interpretations of 
non-recognition influence foreign policy interactions between de facto state and 
recognised actors. The focus on honour in international politics, as well as the 
ontological and epistemological security of states, and the concept of geopolitical 
role, arguably extend well beyond de facto state studies with potential applicability 
for the wider discipline of International Relations. 
Generalizability 
Drawing on the critical assessment of the explanatory weight of my research from 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, what are the possibilities and limits of generalising my 
research results? As mentioned in Chapter 2, mine is an embedded nomothetic 
single case study that seeks to provide a holistic account of Abkhazia's foreign 
relations but at the same time makes an argument that this explanatory 
framework can be extended to foreign relations of other de facto states and the 
de facto state foreign policy as such. I have argued that Abkhazia, although in no 
way a typical case, shares some traits with other de facto states, enabling a 
certain level of generalizability of conclusions.  
My research has a high degree of internal generalizability due to triangulated data 
from various sources (elite interviews in Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia, EU 
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institutions, and the US) that capture the empirical reality from various sides and 
angles. An example is my finding that Abkhaz foreign policy has shown to be 
surprisingly pro-active, especially in the period 2008-2010. This goes against 
most scholarly accounts of Abkhazia (often depicted as passively dependant on 
Russia) and against my own expectations. Yet, the fact that it was observed in 
interviews with both EU and US policy-makers, as well as more directly evidenced 
by the people involved in representing Abkhazia in the US, effectively establishes 
a basis for such generalisation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a degree of 
standardisation of the research situations provided additional validity for such 
triangulations. 
Experiences of non-recognition and the vacillation between fatalism and sour 
grapes, can be generalised as they are more than individual experiences and 
closer to being existential truths of the way de facto states (particularly the ones 
with no or few recognitions) are in the world. I would expect de facto states as 
different as Western Sahara and Somaliland to share this experience, but most 
likely not Taiwan, which is prosperous and has extensive foreign relations. The 
precondition for this vacillation, however, is a genuine desire for independence 
and although I would still expect to find it in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, it is probably not as strongly pronounced as in 
Abkhazia. Furthermore, concerns with ontological security are not something 
particular to Abkhazia (although they might be more acutely pronounced in its 
case) but to an extent inherent in the triangular relationship between de facto 
state, its parent and patron states. Especially when the relationship between the 
parent state and the de facto state are very bad, when the patron state is much 
stronger than the parent state and borders the de facto state, concerns of 
overdependence may arise. I would expect Transnistrian policy makers to feel 
more ontologically secure both because they have a more workable relationship 
with Moldova (and through it access to the European markets) and because they 
do not border Russia.  
Among the least generalisable results are the ones concerning the culture and 
identity of Abkhazia. Apswara importantly shapes the perspectives of Abkhaz and 
no other policy-makers, but a general argument can be made for honour to play 
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a greater role in more isolated, traditional societies in mountainous regions. 
Although culturally distinct, we can expect that Abkhazian policy-makers share 
several common traits with policy-makers in Chechnya but not that many with the 
ones in South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. It is also not 
possible to generalise any findings related to domestic politics of Abkhazia, such 
as the diversity in views of foreign policy among policy-makers. As this is probably 
closely related to the level of plurality and democratic expression of a society, I 
would expect to find much more uniform views among South Ossetian political 
elites. 
As I have discussed in Chapter 3, I have made a conscious choice not to make 
external generalisability of results the ultimate goal of my research and to focus 
instead on a thorough and multi-sided account od Abkhazia’s foreign interactions. 
Given that fact, I believe that the generalisations I was able to make are valid and 
contribute to the wider field of de facto state studies. In this sense, perhaps the 
greatest contribution is my typology of geopolitical roles (introduced in Chapter 1 
and applied to Abkhazia in this chapter) of de facto states that I believe covers 
the most important behavioural patterns of de facto states. 
Policy relevance 
The practical contribution of the thesis is its relevance for policy makers. Despite 
this not being the primary goal of this research project, the results nevertheless 
have some policy relevance. 
First, understanding de facto states as a sui generis international actor and a 
semi-permanent fixture of the international system rather than as a temporal and 
spatial exception to it, helps not only in understanding the ongoing political 
fragmentation of the international system, but also reaffirms the need for conflict 
resolution. It is likely that most de facto states will continue to exist in the short- 
and medium-term, making it necessary to devise ways of dealing with them. 
Understanding their identity, culture, the security anxieties and policy dilemmas 
arising from their existential situation, can lead to better engagement and conflict 
resolution policies.  
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Second, they show the importance of the use of language and the negative 
impact of mis-recognition and objectification that can act as self-fulfilling 
prophecies. De facto states are still seen in predominantly negative terms and 
the language that criminalises them (‘illegal’, ‘occupied’) only serves to further 
entrench this stigma. If actors want to avoid de facto states becoming increasingly 
dependent on their patrons, they could start with revising the vocabulary that 
strips them of their agency.  
Finally, engagement, even if not very extensive or meaningful, positively affects 
the agency of de facto states and their ontological security. Engagement is 
especially important in cases when honour plays an important role in the identity 
of a de facto state and when legal recognition and social recognition are 
conflated. There is little evidence to justify the fear of engagement turning into a 
‘creeping recognition’. Engagement needs to make use of the opportunities when 
political elites in a de facto state are keen on de-isolating the entity or diversifying 
its foreign relations. If the opportunity is missed, pressures from the patron, 
domestic political change, fatalism and sour grapes can push the de facto state 
into self-isolation or overdependence on the patron. 
Limitations 
As every doctoral thesis, this was an iterative process with limitations arising both 
due to the necessity to maintain focus (limited scope) and the unpredictable 
nature of fieldwork (data shortcomings). I shortly outline the two and assess their 
bearing on the thesis. 
Limitations of scope 
In Chapter 2, I have defined the empirical scope of my research as a single case-
study of Abkhazia’s relations with Russia, the EU, and the US between 12th 
October 1999 (when the Act of State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia 
was signed and entered into force) and November 24th, 2014 (when the Russian-
Abkhaz ‘Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ was signed). The 
topical/spatial focus of a single-case study meant leaving out comparisons with 
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other de facto state (those with South Ossetia being the most obvious) beyond 
those immediately relevant to the case of Abkhazia. As mentioned, this reduced 
the external generalisability but enabled the within-case comparison of 
Abkhazia’s foreign relations with higher internal generalisability and validity 
(possibility of triangulation of interview data from different interlocutors). The 
temporal focus on the 1999-2014 period proved a sensible one, although doing 
research on and making references to earlier periods, especially between 
September 1993 (end of Georgian-Abkhaz War) and October 1999, proved to be 
unavoidable. Extending the time-frame to an earlier date would likely reveal 
important details about the transformation of Abkhazian identity in and 
immediately after the Georgian-Abkhaz War and during the period when it existed 
in effective isolation and without a patron state. Extending the time-frame closer 
to now could consider important events and processes, such as the consolidation 
of the pro-Kremlin Khajimba government, increasing dependence on Russia and 
the recognition of Abkhazia by Syria in 2018. While both extensions would add to 
the thesis, they would not fundamentally change the argument, or the trends 
observed in the key findings. 
Limitations of data 
In terms of the limitations of fieldwork and the data collected, the most important 
was the relatively few interviews I was able to obtain from Russian policy-makers, 
most of who also refused to speak on record. I consider it very telling that Russian 
policy-makers seemed reluctant to talk to me. As explained in Chapter 3, I 
attribute this fact to political reasons (bad relations between Russia and the EU). 
The Abkhaz Embassy in Moscow was especially difficult to reach, postponing 
and eventually cancelling my appointment. Nevertheless, I did manage to get two 
interviews with MFA officials and another two off-record. The relative lack of data 
from Russia was compensated by drawing on other, mostly documentary, 
sources. Luckily, due to the existence of formal diplomatic relations between 
Abkhazia and Russia, these were accessible. There were other smaller 
limitations, such as failure to obtain interviews from two important interviewees: 
Sergei Shamba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia 1997-2004 and 2004-
2010, and Peter Semneby, the EU Special Representative for the South 
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Caucasus 2006-2011. Access to policy-makers during fieldwork is unpredictable 
and it is rarely possible to speak to everyone on the list. Luckily other sources in 
the Abkhazian MFA, the EU Delegation to Georgia, and the EEAS compensated 
for this gap. The insights of these interviewees would add important detail to the 
thesis, but it is not likely that they would fundamentally change its argument or 
key findings. 
Avenues of further inquiry 
The research undertaken for this thesis can be extended into several directions. 
However, as it was impossible to pursue several of these threads in the thesis, it 
is also impossible to name and discuss all the possible avenues of further inquiry. 
Therefore, I briefly mention a few of these potential trajectories and then discuss 
in more detail one such avenue – epistemological security. 
The methodology and its key concepts (state identity, ontological security, and 
geopolitical role) can be applied to other case studies of de facto states or used 
to compare the cases. In relation to this, examining the role honour plays in the 
foreign policy of some de facto states and recognised actors, would further the 
motive of this thesis to explain seemingly irrational foreign policy decisions. 
Further ethnographic work on the role of apswara in Abkhazia today is also a 
promising avenue to gaining a deeper understanding of the policy-makers’ 
habitus. Another way of furthering this project would be to look at Abkhazia’s 
other significant relations (which had to be kept at a minimum or wholly omitted 
here) based on diasporic (Turkey) or kinship (North Caucasus) ties.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, ontological security is fairly recent but valuable 
perspective and it its application has proven to bear fruit in its application in this 
research. However, it does have some limitations, which have become 
increasingly clear throughout the research process. In my opinion, the most 
important of these limitations that has hitherto not been addressed, is the fact that 
ontological security often tends to cover – and fails to distinguish between – both 
ontological security and what I call epistemological security. If ontological security 
is the security of identity (the internal self), then epistemological security can be 
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conceptualised as the security of the knowledge about the environment and 
different actors (the external other). The current definitions of ontological security 
do not make this distinction, defining it as a “sense of continuity and order in 
events” (Giddens 1991, 243), while ontological insecurity “refers to the deep, 
incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore, 
i.e. how to get by in the world” (Mitzen 2006, 345). I therefore propose a separate 
but complementary concept of epistemological security that can be defined as 
the state of having confidence in an accurate perception of reality, the validity of 
your knowledge, and the methods to acquire and process information.201 
Epistemological security can be defined as security of knowledge. If the 
environment changes quickly, epistemological security may be threatened.202  
The perspective of epistemological security has wide applicability, including the 
potential to further the explanatory power of ontological (in)security of de facto 
states. Their international isolation also means that they are often in the dark; 
they have limited means and opportunities to access information, analyse and 
interpret it. Due to the lack of exposure to current trends in technology, medicine, 
education, but also social sciences (IR, government, public policy), they are 
falling behind. This has nothing to do with their identity but with the insecurity of 
being cut off from sources of information and interactions as ways of obtaining 
knowledge about the international environment they inhabit. Abkhazia's over-
reliance on Russia represents a threat to its epistemological security on the level 
of the population (complete dependence on Russian, and especially, state TV 
media) and the decision-makers (educated in Moscow and most frequently 
                                            
201 Epistemological security should be distinguished from epistemic security. Epistemological 
security is about preserving a unique world view, perception, and grasp of the world. Epistemic 
security, when applied to the issue of the state and politics, is about the security of sensitive, 
classified, and secret information. Similarly, a difference between ontological and ontic security 
could be introduced. While ontological security is about preserving the self-identity (values, 
norms, identity as a nation, people and state) and is directed inwards, ontic security is about 
preserving an identity of a state and is directed outwards. 
202 A good concrete example of a difference between ontological security and epistemological 
insecurity are critical situations after a major terrorist attack, like the November 2015 Paris attacks 
or the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings. It is in the aftermath of these events that fear (as an 
emotion with an object - terrorist attacks) can increase, but anxiety (as an emotion without object) 
generally does not. In fact, the identity is often strengthened, and values revitalised as the 
community rallies around the flag. Ontological security increases. However, the failure to predict 
and stop the attack casts doubt on the ability of intelligence services, police, judiciary, and even 
education and social systems (who failed to prevent – integrate and socialize – the would-be 
perpetrators) on detecting radicalisation and foiling terrorist plots. 
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interact with Russians). Abkhazians, although possessing a unique culture, 
identity and Weltanschauung of international politics, perceive events through the 
filter of Russian habitus maintained through Russian education and Russian 
media dominance. Their ontological security in the sense of a separate and 
unique identity is not threatened, but their separate and unique view of the world 
is. Furthermore, having no embassies and consulates around the world means 
having no eyes and ears to perceive reality on the ground and access information 
first-hand. Among other functions, the diplomatic network also serves to gather 
information and intelligence, including through legal means (by military attaches, 
for example) and illegal means (industrial espionage, for example). Being largely 
unrecognised, de facto states lack this network. Having no representation in the 
parent state means not being able to gather reliable information about possible 
military threats (invasion with the intention to re-incorporate the breakaway entity 
and re-establish territorial integrity) on their own. Consequently, lacking facts that 
would justify specific fear (of a concrete threat) they tend to exist in a state of 
general anxiety, which results in siege mentality.  
Conclusion 
This last chapter represents a synthesis that brought together theoretical, 
methodological and empirical components of the thesis, drawing on all previous 
chapters. As such, this chapter constructed from the partial views of previous 
chapters a more complete and coherent view of Abkhazia’s foreign interactions 
to re-assess the main argument, in the light of key findings, and to answer the 
research questions. The chapter also discussed theoretical contributions, the 
potential and limits to generalisability of the findings, its policy relevance, 
limitations and some avenues of further inquiry. 
The research questions were answered with the help of the three hypotheses, all 
of which were confirmed in the process: 1) interpretation of non-recognition 
depends on both the internal situation in the de facto state and the wider 
geopolitical context in which it exists; 2) interpretation of non-recognition shapes 
interaction: foreign policy of de facto state; 3) Abkhazia faces a security dilemma 
regarding both its parent and patron state. To interpret the results, I drew on 
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philosophical and psychological theory, reexamining the empirical findings in the 
light of going back to the roots of recognition and ontological security. I explored 
the role mis-recognition and objectification play in reducing the agency of 
Abkhazia and other de facto states, and how they may lead to non-recognition 
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Further exploring this from the perspective of 
the de facto state, I focused on its ontologically security and the ways it tries to 
preserve it – both through strategies and through defence mechanisms. The crux 
of the ontological security dilemma faced by Abkhazia was identified in the 
interaction between isolation and engulfment and the geopolitical role presented 
as a model of how de facto states try to manage this double threat by both being 
and playing a state. 
The thesis presented several theoretical contributions. It examined (non-
)recognition not as a given, but as perceived, experienced, and socially 
constructed - as what states make of it. The nexus of identity and foreign policy 
of de facto states was analysed through a novel, honour-centred perspective, for 
the first time applying the perspective of ontological security to de facto states. 
Furthermore, the research discussed the limits of ontological security and 
introduced the complementary concept of epistemological security. It presented 
an original typology of geopolitical roles played by de facto states, capturing the 
internal and external, ideational and material factors, and building bridges 
between realist and constructivist theories of international relations. 
Despite not making external generalisability the main goal of the thesis, several 
valid generalisations pertaining to existential situation of the way de facto states 
(fatalism, sour grapes, ontological security dilemma) and their being-in-the-world. 
The typology of geopolitical roles covers the most important foreign policy 
behaviours of de facto states and has wide applicability. 
The thesis helps inform policy debates by analysing de facto states as semi-
permanent fixtures of a fragmenting international system. Understanding their 
specific existential experience of non-recognition, their ontological anxieties, 
avoiding stigmatising and agency-downplaying language, can lead to better 
engagement and more successful conflict resolution.  
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Limitations to this research are primarily those of scope and data. While 
extending the scope in terms of cases and time-frame, would add to the thesis, it 
would not fundamentally change its argument. Similarly, the gaps in data were 
addressed with the help of other sources and while the missing interviews would 
add detail to the thesis, they would not significantly affect the argument. 
Several avenues of further inquiry were proposed, such as the application of the 
theoretical framework to other cases, analysing Abkhazia’s other significant 
relations, and further examining the role of honour and apswara. The most 
important avenue, with wide applicability, is the proposed concept of 
epistemological security, which would address the limitations of ontological 
security and in conjunction with it provide a stronger explanatory framework. 
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Conclusion 
“Sometimes we don't do things we want to do  
so that others won't know we want to do them.”  
– The Village (2004) 
 
This thesis has examined how interpretations of non-recognition influence the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy objectives and strategies. The 
research focused on the period between October 1999 and November 2014, 
employing process-tracing and interviews with policy-makers in Abkhazia and the 
actors it engages with – Russia, the EU, and the US. By virtue of its design, the 
research’s claim to contribute to the existing literature rests on presenting the first 
multi-sided account of foreign policy interaction of a de facto state. Employing a 
constructivist theoretical framework, non-recognition was explored not as a given 
but as experienced, suggesting that it is what states (including de facto states) 
make of it.  
In the Introduction, de facto states in the international system were likened to 
shards that have fallen from a broken 17th century mirror. This thesis has shown 
that Abkhazia is a shard that reflects other shards and the broken mirror itself in 
several ways. The reflection changed with the change of perspective. As this 
thesis demonstrates, apswara importantly shapes the perspectives of Abkhaz 
policy-makers while comparative categories act as mirrors and play a large role 
in sustaining ontological security, regardless of the intensity and meaningfulness 
of interaction. Abkhazian policy-makers, who vacillate between a sense of 
fatalism and sour grapes are heavily dependent on Russian media, which acts 
as their perception filter. Non-recognition is like a black mirror that offers no 
reflection. In addition to being one of the important constraining factors (alongside 
the lack of strategy, dependence on Russia, and the lack of resources), it acts as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. As such, it limits the goals, expectations and confidence 
of policy-makers, contributing to a shift from the main goal of obtaining recognition 
to short-term objectives (such as fostering trade). In a room with a mirror covering 
the whole wall, it is sometimes hard to distinguish the reflection from what it 
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reflects. It is similarly difficult to tell apart the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of de facto 
states as foreign relations often become the matter of domestic politics and the 
other way around. Abkhazian interviewees were keen to stress that Abkhazia has 
“its own course”, separate from Russia’s, but disagreed on what this course 
should be, suggesting that beneath the glass and out of our gaze, this shard is 
further cracked and split internally. The perspective of ontological security and 
the concept of honour were found to be especially relevant in analysing the 
foreign policies of Abkhazia and Russia but not as much in the cases of the EU 
and the US, suggesting that insistence on reciprocity and mirroring of respect is 
more important for aspiring than for established actors. 
The key dilemma for Abkhazian policy-makers now and for the foreseeable future 
is how to balance Russian influence by interacting with other international actors. 
The increasing dependence is a threat to Abkhazia's ontological security through 
self-perception and the blending of identities. In both cases, the ontological 
anxiety is one of no longer recognizing itself in the mirror. Despite feeling anxious 
about Russia (largely supportive of Georgia through 1990s when Abkhazia 
remained without a patron), Russian policy-makers better understand the 
symbolic weight that recognition (and conflation of legal and social recognition) 
carries for the Abkhazians than do the EU and US policy-makers. The latter differ 
significantly in their interests in Abkhazia, which largely mirror their interests in 
South Caucasus as a whole. My research shows that Abkhazia was much more 
proactive in pursuing its foreign policy goals than is often assumed, especially 
between 2008 and 2010, a period of missed opportunities for engagement. 
Surprisingly, as the chances of conflict resolution decreased, EU and US 
engagement increased, boosting Abkhazia’s foreign policy confidence in the 
short run. International engagement was constrained by both Russia and 
Georgia, the shortcomings of EU and US approaches, the emergence of more 
pressing international issues, and finally the language that isolated and 
stigmatised Abkhazia, downplayed its agency, contributing to its increasing 
dependence on Russia.  
Looking at Abkhazia, a reflection of other actors could be seen. When looked at 
Russia, the EU or the US, they in turn reflected back on Abkhazia. In both cases, 
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glimpses of the international community, its hierarchies and norms could be 
caught. It is customary in research to proceed inductively, from specific facts 
towards more universal conclusions. This has also been the case for facto states 
studies, which has, in slightly more than two decades, run the full course of the 
development of a field. From first tentative attempts to make sense of these 
enfants terribles of the international community, put them on the lowest common 
denominator, and define them, the field has come to produce wide-ranging 
scholarship on many dimensions of the particular existential situation de facto 
states find themselves in…except perhaps the existential situation itself and their 
experience of it.203 This is not to suggest the abandonment of the parts for the 
whole in the shape of some higher truth. Just the opposite: to find the general in 
the specific, the system reflected in one of its shards. Hegel always sought the 
universal in the particular, famously deriving his dialectical method from the 
observation of the stages of a blooming flower in the Preface to his 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 1977, 2). However, with Hegel things are always 
in flux and the universal soon loses itself in a thousand different fragments. It is 
therefore fitting to complement the introductory and general metaphor with the 
following concluding and specific parallel.  
In Manoj Nelliyattu Shyamalan’s 2004 film The Village, the population of the 
eponymous village lives isolated and in a constant fear of creatures in the 
surrounding forest. Similarly, during the 1992-3 War, a Georgian guerrilla group 
called Forest Brothers stayed in Abkhazia and continued a low-intensity war until 
2004, spreading fear among locals (Kukhianidze et al. 2004). The village, called 
Covington, is a pre-modern society avoiding the Other, referred to as "Those We 
Don't Speak Of". This reminds us of Abkhazia’s isolated existence (in both cases 
traditions and honour play an important role) and the simultaneous lack of 
knowledge about and the fear of the Other, perceived as threatening and barely 
human. Similar to Abkhazians and Georgians after the 1992-3 War, a long time 
ago (that only the Elders can remember), the Elders and the creatures agreed 
                                            
203 Already at the beginning of 20th century, G. K. Chesterton (1905, 13) observed that: “A man's 
opinion on tramcars matters; his opinion on Botticelli matters; his opinion on all things does not 
matter. He may turn over and explore a million objects, but he must not find that strange object, 
the universe […] Everything matters — except everything.” 
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that they will not enter their respective territories. The creatures are human-like 
but not entirely human and the villagers have erected a fence and watch towers 
to keep constant watch. After a child in the village dies of disease, the main 
character Lucius Hunt (played by Joaquin Phoenix) wants to visit the 
neighbouring town in order to bring back medical supplies but is shunned by other 
villagers and denied by the village political elite - the Elders. This reminds us of 
the Abkhaz who cross the border to receive medical treatment in Georgia but are 
either met with disapproval or discouraged to speak about their experience by the 
society which shuns all contact with the other as suspicious and threatening. One 
day, a young mentally ill villager Noah appears with red berries (which do not 
grow in the village), suggesting he has been outside and was not harmed by the 
creatures. We could read this as the metaphor for the Gal/i Georgians – the 
heavily stigmatised, extimate, liminal people not of this world and not of the other, 
who retain contact with the outside, bringing in foreign goods. It could, 
alternatively, be equated with the civil society actors engaged in Second Track 
diplomacy, viewed suspiciously by both sides. The Elders are analogous to 
Abkhazian political elites, who are unhappy about such medical trips across the 
border as they expose the shortcomings of Abkhazia’s healthcare specifically and 
its insufficient state-building generally. In both cases – Covington and Abkhazia 
– the ontological security of the community depends on strict regulation of contact 
with the outside world while the epistemological security is built on bad faith – 
stories about the threatening Other to its citizens. In the case of Abkhazia, we 
could say that it is the case of double bad faith – discouraging its citizens from 
getting to know the Other, and mimicry directed towards the other to present itself 
as a normal state, worthy of recognition. In both cases, outside engagement is 
threatening to the ontological security of the community. Ontological security 
rests on a mixture of false information and lack of information – on precarious 
epistemological security without reflexivity. We find out that the creatures do not 
exist and are merely suits worn by the Elders to keep the other villagers from 
going into the woods. This is precisely the case of the Georgians as depicted by 
Abkhazian political elites and the media. They are represented as hideous 
creatures, but in fact they are humans – the same humans as the Abkhazians (in 
the Village they are actually the very same humans – the disguised villagers), 
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who only look like creatures because the Elders/political elites depict them in this 
way. In the film, each Elder has a locked box containing remnants of their past 
that precedes the establishment of the village. In Abkhazia members of political 
elites for the most part remember the 1992-3 War, with many taking active part. 
Their memories ante bellum – of largely peaceful coexistence between 
Georgians, Abkhaz and other ethnicities – are supressed, they are the locked 
boxes of the Elders. The end of the film reveals that Covington was established 
by one of the Elders, as a support community to help people who have lost their 
close ones to violence. The Village was created as a protective shell to isolate 
the suffering individuals whose ontological security has been compromised. Was 
Abkhazia not, similarly, established as a homeland for an injured and threatened 
Abkhazians to protect their identity from the hostile environment – of not only 
being threatened by Georgians, but becoming marginalized as a minority in their 
own Republic? The Village is intentionally preserved as a rural and rustic place 
of the 19th century to the extent that a no-fly zone is created over the territory. 
Abkhazia is no historical theme park, but a combination of war that damaged 
infrastructure (effectively de-urbanised Gal/i), de-industrialisation during failed 
transition, and international isolation, make the de facto state feel antiquated. 
While Covington looks back to the idealised 19th century, Abkhazia dwells in 
Soviet nostalgia. However spontaneous war damage is, there is also 
intentionality behind preserving empty buildings destroyed by the war, including 
the building of the Parliament in Sukhum/i. They are, at the same time, like the 
boxes of memories from past times before the village, and the ubiquitous 
warnings on the fence not to go into the forest. The gutted buildings are at the 
same time mementos of a golden past and a warning of the crimes capable by 
the Other.  
Much remains unwritten and unexpressed in this thesis, mostly due to the 
limitations of scope. Silences are often as telling as what is explicitly stated and 
they should be allowed to tell a story too. In a way, Abkhazia’s story is one of 
silence. Rarely listened to, even more rarely heard. Perhaps never completely 
understood. The Abkhaz seem mistrustful of the international community that has 
failed to listen to their voice and – in another instance of self-fulfilling prophecy – 
have been losing interest in voicing what they want. Their sense of honour 
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prevents them from begging for recognition and the wants themselves have 
become supressed. They turned into sour grapes not unlike the ones expressed 
by Ivy Walker, the blind daughter of the chief Elder, to Lucius in The Village: 
“When I was younger, you used to hold my arm when I walked. Then suddenly 
you stopped. One day, I even tripped in your presence and nearly fell. I was 
faking, of course, but still you did not hold me. Sometimes we don't do things we 
want to do so that others will not know we want to do them.”  
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Annex I: Information Sheet  
Basic information about the research project 
This Information Sheet is designed to provide basic information about the topic, 
objectives and methods of the research, information about the researcher, 
supervision and affiliated institution. It aims to invite potential participants to take 
part in the research and informs them about the 
Research project title: The role of elite interpretations of non-recognition in 
interactions between de facto states and recognised actors in the international 
community: the case of Abkhazia 
This interview is part of Urban Jakša’s research for a PhD degree in Politics at 
the University of York, United Kingdom. 
The research is supervised by Dr. Nina Caspersen, nina.caspersen@york.ac.uk. 
The research plan has been the subject of ethical review and has been approved 
by the Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee 
(ELMPS). Chair of ELMPS: Debbie Haverstock, ReCSS, University of York, 6 
Innovation Close, Heslington YO10 5ZF, elmps-ethics-group@york.ac.uk  
Topic and aims of research 
The research looks at how Abkhazia’s political elites and foreign policy decision-
makers in Russia, the EU and the US, which engage with Abkhazia, interpret 
non-recognition and how this interpretation influences the formulation and 
implementation of their respective foreign policy objectives and strategies. 
The aim of this research is to understand how different interpretations on non-
recognition affect the interaction between Abkhazia and the international 
community.  
The research involves elite interviews with decision-makers, government officials 
and other individuals, who are well placed to provide an insight into the foreign 
policy process of Abkhazia. The answers of interviewees will help the researcher 
to understand how non-recognition is perceived and interpreted in the context of 
foreign policy and how it affects the formation of foreign policy objectives and 
strategies. 
Additional interviews (time and funding permitting) will be made with decision-
makers in the European institutions, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
US State Department to understand both sides of the interaction. 
The data collected during the interview may be used in future research but will 
not be used for any commercial or any other non-academic purposes. 
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Interview format 
The researcher and the participant agree on the date, place and length of the 
interview, considering participant’s preferences.  
Participation at the interview is voluntary and confidential. The right to 
confidentiality is maintained by the fact that the data will be used for research 
purposes only, will be safely stored and will not be given to anyone except the 
researcher and his supervisor. 
The interviewee may withdraw from the interview for any reason and at any time. 
Should this happen, the data already collected, will be destroyed and will not be 
used in future research. 
If the participant has any questions or doubts before the start of the interview, 
he/she can ask the researcher and is entitled to receive an explanation and/or 
clarification before proceeding with the interview. 
The researcher is not able to offer any payment or reimbursement of any kind to 
people who choose to participate in the research. 
Other conditions of participation 
Participants have the right to be informed about the results of the research. If they 
wish to receive published work resulting from this research, they can provide their 
contacts on the consent form and will be contacted by the researcher after the 
research is published. 
The researcher kindly asks for the interviews to be voice recorded, which will 
allow transcription and more accurate preservation of the information conveyed 
during the interview. The choice whether the participant chooses to have their 
voice recorded or not, however, is up to the participant and is not a condition to 
take part in the research. 
The data gathered during the interview (notes and any audio material) will be 
safely and securely stored. Electronic data will be stored on password-protected 
computer, with paper data and electronic data on external drives stored in locked 
container. If the participants request to remain anonymous, data anonymisation 
will be provided and the choice of pseudonym will be agreed with the interviewee. 
The pseudonym will be protected by encrypted keys. 
Should participants have any questions after the interview has taken place, or 
would like to contact the researcher, they can find his contact details at the bottom 
of this page. If they have doubts regarding the ethical conduct of the research, 
they can contact the researcher’s supervisor or the Chair of ELMPS, whose 
contacts are provided above. 
If participants have understood and agree to the conditions of the research, they 
are invited to sign the Consent Form. 
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Annex II: Consent Form  
The role of elite interpretations of non-recognition in interactions 
between de facto states and recognised actors in the 
international community: the case of Abkhazia 
Researcher: Urban Jaksa, PhD student (Politics), University of York 
Consent form for interviewees 
This form is for you to state whether you agree to take part in the research. Please 
read and answer every question. If there is anything you do not understand, or if 
you want more information, please ask the researcher. 
Have you read and understood the information leaflet 
about the study? 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions about the 
study? 
Do you understand that the information you provide will 
be held in confidence by the researcher? 
Do you understand that the participation is voluntary, and 
you may withdraw from the interview for any reason and 
at any time? 
Do you understand that the information you provide may 
be used in future research? 
Do you agree to take part in the study? 
If yes, do you agree to your interviews being recorded? 
(You may take part in the study without agreeing to this). 
 
Yes  No  
 
Yes  No  
 
Yes  No  
 
Yes  No  
 
Yes  No  
 
Yes  No  
Yes  No  
Your name (in BLOCK letters): 
_______________________________________________________ 
Your contact e-mail and phone number (not obligatory): 
_______________________________________________________ 
Your signature: _______________________________________________________ 
Interviewee's name: 
_______________________________________________________ 
Date: _______________________________________________________________ 
